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APPELLATE DIVISION—FIRST

DEPARTMENT.

ULTRAMARES CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
against
GEORGE T O U C H E , J O H N B . N I V E N ,
ANDREW
R.

W.

TAIT,

WHITWORTH,

MENDES,

FRANCIS

CHARLES

HENRY
J.

2

E.

CLOWES,

VICTOR H . S T E M P F , E . H . W A G NER

and

C.

A.

H.

NARLIAN,

copartners under the firm
name and style of Touche,
Niven & Co.,
Defendants-Respondents.

Statement Under Rule 2 3 4 .
The action was commenced by the personal
service of the summons on the defendant Clowes on
November 19, 1926, and on the defendant Narlian
on May 31, 1927. The defendants Mendes and
Niven appeared voluntarily on December 9, 1926.
The amended complaint was served February 24,
1927. The answer of defendants Niven, Mendes
and Clowes was served March 16, 1927, and the
answer of defendant Narlian on June 20, 1927.
By stipulation dated November 17, 1927, the answers of defendants filed were also deemed to be the
answers of defendants Touche, Tait, Whitworth,
Stempf and Wagner.

3

2
Statement

5

G

Under Rule 234.

On June 22, 1927, an order was entered striking
out the first affirmative defense upon the ground
that it was insufficient in law, which thereafter was
unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division
of the First Department (see 222 App. Div. 737),
and on April 13, 1928, was affirmed by the Court,
of Appeals (248 N. Y. 517).
During the trial the amended complaint was further amended by adding a second cause of action.
Plaintiff appeared by Hirsch, Sherman & Limburg and defendants by Guggenheimer, Untermyer & Marshall. Thereafter Limburg, Riegelman,
Hirsch & Hess were substituted as attorneys for
plaintiff.
The full names of the parties appear above.
There has been no change of parties or of attorneys
herein.

3
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Notice of Appeal to Appellate Division.
SUPREME

COURT,

N E W Y O R K COUNTY.

ULTRAMARES CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,
against
GEORGE

A.

NIVEN,

TOUCHE,
ANDREW

CHARLES

R.

JOHN
W.

B.

TAIT,

8

WHITWORTH,

H E N R Y E . MENDES, F R A N C I S J .
CLOWES,
E. H.

VICTOR

H.

STEMPF,

WAGNER a n d C . A .

H.

copartners under the
firm name and style of Touche,
Niven & Co.,
Defendants.
NARLIAN,

Sirs:
that the plaintiff in the
above entitled action hereby appeals to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department, from the judgment of the Supreme Court,
New York County, entered in the office of the Clerk
of the County of New York on the 1st day of July,
1929, in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff, dismissing the amended complaint herein
on the merits and awarding defendants the sum of
$126.26 costs, and from each and every part of said
P L E A S E TAKE NOTICE

9

4
10

Notice of Appeal to Appellate

Division.

judgment, and also from so much of an order entered in said Clerk's office on the 25th day of June,
1929, as sets aside the verdict of the jury herein
and directs the said judgment.
Dated, New York; July 8th, 1929.
LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, H I R S C H & H E S S ,

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
160 Broadway,
Borough of Manhattan,
New York City.
11

TO
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL,

Attorneys for Defendants,
120 Broadway,
Borough of Manhattan,
New York City.
TO:
T H O M A S M . FARLEY, E s q . ,

Clerk of New York County.

12

Esqs.,

5
13

Summons.
SUPREME

COURT,

N E W YORK COUNTY.

ULTRAMARES CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,
against
GEORGE T O U C H E , J O H N B . N I V E N ,
ANDREW
R.

W.

TAIT,

WHITWORTH,

MENDES,

CHARLES

HENRY

FRANCIS J .

E.

CLOWES,

VICTOR H . S T E M P F , E . H . W A G NER

and

C.

A.

H.

NARLIAN,

14

copartners under the firm
name and style of Touche,
Niven & Co.,
Defendants.
To the above-named

Defendants:

You ARE HEREBY SUMMONED to answer the complaint in this action and to serve a copy of your
answer, or, if the complaint is not served with this
summons, to serve a notice of appearance on the
plaintiff's attorneys within twenty days after the
service of this summons, exclusive of the day of
service. In case of your failure to appear or answer, judgment will be taken against you by default
for the relief demanded in the complaint.
Dated, November 18, 1926.
HIRSCH, S H E R M A N & LIMBURG,

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Office and Post Office Address,
160 Broadway,
Borough of Manhattan,
City of New York.

15
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Amended Complaint.
SUPREME

COURT,

N E W YORK COUNTY.
[SAME

TITLE.]

Plaintiff complains, upon information and belief:
I. At all times hereinafter stated, plaintiff was
and now is a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of New York.

17

18

II. At all times hereinafter mentioned the defendants were and now are copartners transacting
business as accountants and auditors under the
firm name and style of Touche, Niven & Company,
having and maintaining offices for the regular
transaction of business in the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York.
III. Fred Stern & Co., Inc., a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the
laws of the State of New York, was, between January 2, 1922, and January 2, 1925, engaged in the
City of New York, among other things, in the
purchase and/or importation and sale of rubber,
and in the conduct of its said business required
extensive credit and borrowed large sums of money,
as these defendants well knew.
IV. On or prior to the 3rd day of January, 1924,
the said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., employed defendants, who, for hire, accepted said employment, to
examine its books, accounts and records for the
calendar year 1923, to audit the same, and to prepare therefrom a balance sheet showing the financial condition of said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of
December 31, 1923, and to certify to the correctness

7
Amended Complaint.

19

of the same over the defendants' signature, and
they were employed and undertook to furnish to
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., in the first instance, twentyfour duplicate originals of said balance sheet so
prepared by them and certified over their signature, and later about eight additional duplicate
originals of said balance sheet so prepared by them
and certified over their signature were furnished
by them to said Fred Stern & Co., Inc.
V. At the time of the acceptance by them of
such employment, and prior to the certification of
the balance sheet by defendants, as hereinafter
stated, the defendants were informed, and they
well knew, that Fred Stern & Co., Inc., intended to
and would submit such balance sheet so prepared
by defendants and certified by them to its creditors
or prospective creditors as part of and in aid of
applications for credit to be made by Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., to said creditors or prospective creditors, and the defendants well knew and intended
and contemplated that the creditors or prospective
creditors of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., should rely
upon the said balance sheet as prepared by the
defendants and so certified by them and extend
credit to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., upon the faith
thereof.

20

21
2
VI. In the months of January, February and
March, 1924, the defendants undertook, purported
and pretended to examine the accounts, books and
records of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the calendar
year 1923, and to audit the same, and they prepared and certified over their signature about
thirty-two duplicate originals of a balance sheet
which purported to show the financial condition of
said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31,

22

Amended

Complaint.

1923, a copy of which is hereto annexed, marked
Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof; and the defendants delivered to Fred Stern &
Inc., said
thirty-two duplicate originals of said balance sheet
to each of which they annexed their certificate and
signed the same, copy of which certificate is hereto annexed marked Exhibit "B" and made part
hereof.
VII. By said balance sheet and certificate and
by the facts aforesaid, the defendants represented
and intended to represent to the creditors or pro23spective creditors of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to
whom Fred Stern & Co., Inc., might apply for
credit, that the defendants had made a careful examination and audit of the accounts, books and
records of Fred Stem & Co., Inc., and that the
balance sheet so prepared and certified by them
represented the actual financial condition of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., and had been prepared by the
defendants as a result of a careful and skillful
audit and examination of the books, records and
accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and that Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., at December 31, 1923, was possessed of and owned the assets which were set
forth as assets upon the said Exhibit "A," and had
no liabilities other than the liabilities so set forth
24 on said Exhibit "A"; and the defendants intended
and expected that said representations would be
relied upon by the creditors or prospective creditors
of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to whom Fred Stern &
Co., Inc., might apply for credit, and that such
creditors or prospective creditors would, upon the
faith of such representations, extend credit to Fred
Stern & Co., Inc.

9
Amended

Complaint.

VIII. Said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., delivered to
the plaintiff one of the said duplicate original balance sheets, Exhibit "A" hereto attached, together
with the certificate of the defendants, Exhibit "B"
hereto attached, for the purpose of inducing plaintiff to extend credit to said Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
and plaintiff, believing in the correctness and accuracy of said balance sheet and in the truth of
the certificate of the defendants, and relying upon
the same and the representations of the defendants
aforesaid, at divers times subsequent to the receipt
by plaintiff of said balance sheet and certificate
and the making of such representations, extended
credit and loaned to said Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
at the City of New York, large sums of money,
payment of which is past due and upwards of
$500,000 of which has not been repaid, in the following amounts and on the following dates:
Date
April

5, 1924

7,

"

11,

"

14,

"

22,

"

Amount
$ 5,040.00
12,880.00
25,760.00
21,056.00
15,792.00
7,728.00
9,856.00
13,720.00
18,848.00
15,120.00
28,000.00
12,880.00
12,320.00
10,752.00
14,560.00
29,120.00

25

26

""
""
""
""
""
""
""
""
""
""
""

10
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28:
Date
May

1,

6,

29

June
July

22,
26,
27,
10,

August
"
"«

6,
13,
25,
29,
{September 2,
6,
'

"

30

October

12,
15,
19,
26,
27,
29,
3,
7,
20,
24,
27,
28,

Amount
27,100.00
12,320.00
9,856.00
2,912.00
14,000,00
9,000.00
9,800.00
10,750.00
18,816.00
60,000.00
55,000.00
50,000.00
356,440.00
38,000.00
67,000.00
62,000.00
60,100.00
58,000.00
50,000.00
55,600.00
74,492.00
30,000.00
14,600.00
32,000.00
52,000.00
50,000.00
30,800.00
78,000.00
60,000.00
6,000.00
61,000.00
21,000.00
58,000.00
139,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00
30,000.00

"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

"

7
1

"

"
"
"

"
"
"
"
"
"
"

8

11
Amended
Date
November

3,
6,
12,
18,
"
19,
"
24,
25,
26,
December 1,
9,
13,
23,

Complaint.

"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

Amount
52,000.00
50,000.00
30,000.00
82,800.00
37,000.00
50,000.00
25,000.00
25,000.00
30,000.00
100,000.00
25,000.00
40,000.00

IX. The pretended examination and audit made
by defendants was incomplete and was negligently,
carelessly and unskillfully made and the said balance sheet (Exhibit A) hereto annexed, was negligently, carelessly and unskillfully prepared by
defendants. The said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., did
not, as purported to be shown by said balance sheet,
have a net worth of more than $1,000,000 and a
surplus of $500,000, but, on the contrary, said Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., was grossly insolvent, did not
own or possess the assets set forth as such assets
on such balance sheet, and had liabilities vastly in
excess of those shown on said balance sheet, all of
which the defendants would or should have ascertained by an examination conducted with reasonable care and skill.
X. On or about the 21st day of January, 1925,
said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was adjudicated a
bankrupt by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, in bankruptcy.
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32

33
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34

Amendments

to Amended

Complaint.

XI. Plaintiff was wholly free from any negligence on its part, and solely by reason of the negligence of the defendants as aforesaid, plaintiff has
been damaged in the sum of $500,000, with interest, for which, together with the costs of this action,
plaintiff demands judgment.
plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges all and singular the
allegations contained in the amended complaint, and further alleges upon information
and belief:
F O R A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION,

35

36

XII. That these defendants represented that
they had with reasonable care examined the
accounts and records of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
for the year 1923, and that in their opinion
the balance sheet (Exhibit A) gave a true and
correct view of the financial condition of said
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31,
1923, and that such opinion was based upon
and the result of an examination conducted by
them with reasonable care.
XIII. That these defendants at the time of
such representations knew or should have
known that the books and records of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., were falsified and inaccurate
and that the balance sheet did not represent
the true financial condition of Fred Stern &
Co., Inc., in that as a matter of fact Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., on December 31, 1923, was grossly
insolvent, and that the examination by defendants of the accounts and records of Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., had not been made with reasonable care but had been recklessly made, and
that said alleged opinion of the defendants was

13
Amendments

to Amended

Complaint.

37

not based upon nor the result of an examination conducted by them with reasonable care.
XIV. That said representations were recklessly and wantonly made by the defendants;
that in truth and in fact defendants either
knew of their falsity or made and gave such
certificate (Exhibit B) with balance sheet attached (Exhibit A) without knowledge or
without opinion in good faith as to their truth
or falsity; that said defendants either knew
that the said statement (Exhibit A) did not
give a true and correct view of the financial
condition of said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at
December 31, 1923, or knew that no sufficient
examination or inquiry had been made by them
to ascertain whether such balance sheet did
present the true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at
December 31, 1923.
XV. That all of said representations had
been made by defendants and said certificates
and balance sheet signed and delivered by
them, with knowledge that they would be used
by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the purpose of
procuring loans and securing credit on the
faith thereof, and would be relied upon by
those making such loans and extending such
credit; that the loans made and credit extended
by plaintiff to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., set forth
in paragraph VIII of the amended complaint,
were so made and extended upon the faith of
such representations and in the belief by plaintiff that such representations were true.

38
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14
Amendments

to Amended

Complaint.

XVI. That by reason of the premises, plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $275,000
with interest, for which, together with the
costs of this action, plaintiff demands judgment.
LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS,

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Office and P. O. Address,
No. 160 Broadway,
Borough of Manhattan,
City of New York.
41

(Verified for Plaintiff April 3, 1929.)

The second cause of action was added upon trial,
upon motion of plaintiff without objection by defendant (see p. 246).

42
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Exhibit A.
FRED

STERN

& CO.,

43
INC.

BALANCE S H E E T DECEMBER 3 1 , 1 9 2 3
ASSETS
CURRENT A S S E T S :

Cash:
Current funds
Held by banks in anticipation of
maturity of acceptance under letters of credit
Notes and trade acceptances receivable :
Held by the Company
Pledged as collateral to acceptances

$20,927.83
185,123.86

$206,051.69

$52,818.38
155,944.53

$208,762.91
Trade accounts receivable and sundry debtors:
Held by the Company
1,349,280.43
Pledged as collateral to acceptances
903,285.83

44

$2,461,329.17
Less reserve
counts

for doubtful ac427,541,78

2,033,787.39

Inventory of crude rubber pledged under trust
receipts, etc

131,423,81

$2,371,262.89

INVESTMENTS :

Participating interest in syndicate
owning plant and machinery at
Batavia, N. Y.
Participating interest in syndicate
owning plant and machinery at
Marion, Ohio
Cost
Less reserve
Participation certificate in class A
preferred stock Bennett Day Co...
Voting trust certificates, Racine
Horseshoe Tire Corporation
Pledged as collateral to acceptances:
Ames Holden Tire & Rubber Co.,
Ltd., 7% cumulative preferred
stock, 194 shares
Howe Rubber Corp. preferred
stock, 157 shares
F U R N I T U R E AND FIXTURES

Less reserve for depreciation
PREPAID CREDIT I N S U R A N C E

$181,350.43
30,673.39
$212,023.82
55,337.60

$156,686.22
45
1,502.33
4,000.00

$7,800.00
6,200.00

14,000.00

176,188.55

$8,683.92
8,683.92
3,220.44

$2,550,671.88

16
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Exhibit

A to Amended

Complaint.

LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES :

Secured by assets pledged per contra
and by borrowed securities, aggregating
$1,402,278.03 :
Dollar acceptances
Sterling acceptances

$868,409.45
493,948.45

$1,362,357.90

UNSECURED :

Accounts payable

117,598.72

$1,479,956.62

CAPITAL AND S U R P L U S :

Capital stock:
Preferred, 8% cumulative redeemable:
Authorized 10,000 shares of
$100.00 each
$1,000,000.00

47

Whereof issued 5,000 s h a r e s . . . .
Common, authorized and issued,
100 shares of $100.00 each
Paid-in surplus, after deducting $85,000.00 for which preferred stock
was issued upon collection of specific accounts and notes receivable,
in accordance with the stockholders' agreement
Earned surplus, subject to provision
for federal taxes on income for
current year

$500,000.00
10,000.00

$305,439.14
255,276.12

Total surplus

560,715.26

1,070,715.26

CONTINGENT LIABILITIES:

Trade acceptances discounted
Securities borrowed and pledged of a nominal
value of about
Sterling contracts (£165,000) covering purchase
commitments
Total

48

$159,682.28
12,500.00
737,300.00
$909,482.28
$2,550,671.88

17
Exhibit B.
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TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO.
P U B L I C ACCOUNTANTS

Eighty Maiden Lane
New York
February 26, 1924.
CERTIFICATE OF AUDITORS

We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern &
Co., Inc. for the year ended December 31, 1923,
and hereby certify that the annexed balance sheet
is in accordance therewith and with the information and explanations given us. We further certify
that, subject to provision for federal taxes on income, the said statement, in our opinion, presents
a true and correct view of the financial condition of
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923.

50

TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO.,
Public Accountants.
(Verified by Louis A. Deetjen, president of
plaintiff corporation, on February 23, 1927.)
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Answer of

Defendants Niven, Mendes
Clowes.

and

SUPREME COURT,
N E W YORK COUNTY.
[SAME

TITLE.]

Defendants Niven, Mendes and Clowes, being
three of the copartners of the firm of Touche, Niven
& Co., answering the amended complaint herein by
their attorneys, Guggenheimer, Untermyer & Marshall :
: Admit the allegations contained in paragraph designated "II" of the amended complaint,
except that they deny that C. A. H. Narlian is
now or has been a member of said copartnership
since the early part of 1926.
FIRST

SECOND: Deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph designated "IV" of the
amended complaint, except that they admit that on
or prior to the 3rd day of January, 1924, Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., employed defendants, who, for hire,
accepted said employment to examine its accounts
as of December 31, 1923, in so far as they deemed
necessary for the purpose of making a balance sheet
audit thereof and to certify to Fred Stern & Co.,
54 Inc., their opinion as to the correctness of the
same, over defendants' signature, and to furnish
to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., a number of duplicate
originals of a balance sheet so to be prepared by
them and certified over their signature.
THIRD:
Deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph designated "V" of the amended
complaint, except that they admit knowing that

19

Answer of Defendants

Niven et al.
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the balance sheet so to be prepared by them might
be submitted by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to some
of its bankers.
F O U R T H : Deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph designated "VI" of the
amended complaint, except that they admit undertaking to examine the accounts of Fred Stern &
Co., Inc., and auditing the same in so far as they
deemed necessary for the purpose of preparing a
balance sheet audit of the accounts of Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., as of December 31, 1923, and that they
prepared thirty-two duplicate originals of the balance sheet, Exhibit A, annexed to the amended
complaint, and thirty-two duplicate originals1 of
the certificate, Exhibit B, annexed to the amended
complaint, and delivered them to Fred Stern & Co.,
Inc.

56

Deny each and every allegation contained in paragraphs designated "VII" and "XI"
of the amended complaint.
FIFTH:

: Deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of each and
every allegation contained in paragraph designated
" V I I I " of the amended complaint.
SIXTH

57
: Deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph designated "IX" of the
amended complaint, except that they deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of the allegations that said Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., did not have a net w o r t h of more than
11,000,000 and a surplus of $500,000, and that said
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was grossly insolvent, did
not own or possess the assets set forth as such
SEVENTH

20
58

Answer of Defendants Niven et al.
assets on such balance sheet, and had liabilities
vastly in excess of those shown on said balance
sheet.
F O R A FIRST AFFIRMATIVE AND COMPLETE DEFENSE,
T H E S E DEFENDANTS ALLEGE:
E I G H T H : These defendants are and each of them
is a certified public accountant holding a certifidefense was
cate of the Board of Regents of the State of New This
stricken out as
York authorizing them to practice as public ac- insufficient in law
(see Statement,
countants in the State of New York.
| fol.
).

59

N I N T H : The alleged cause of action stated in
the amended complaint did not accrue within two
years before the commencement of this action.
FOR

A SECOND AFFIRMATIVE

AND

COMPLETE

DE-

FENSE, T H E S E DEFENDANTS ALLEGE:
T E N T H : On information and belief, plaintiff is
a domestic business corporation incorporated and
doing business under and by virtue of the Stock
Corporation Law of the State of New York and
is not a moneyed corporation or incorporated under the Banking Law of the State of New York.
E L E V E N T H : On information and belief, plaintiff,
in lending and advancing money to Fred Stern &
GO Co., Inc., and in other respects, did a banking business within the State of New York, in contravention of the Stock Corporation Law, the General
Corporation Law and the Banking Law of the State
of New York, and that in making such loans and
advances of money to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and
in doing a banking business in other respects plaintiff acted ultra vires.

21
Answer of Defendants Niven et al.
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W H E R E F O R E , these defendants demand that the
amended complaint herein be dismissed, with costs.
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL,

Attorneys for Defendants Niven, Mendes
and Clowes, being three of the copartners in the firm of Touche, Niven & Co.,
Office and Post Office Address,
No. 120 Broadway,
Borough of Manhattan,
New York City.
(Verified by John B. Niven on March 14, 1927.)

62

Note: By stipulation (page 246) the allegations
of the second cause of action are deemed to be
denied.

63
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Answer of Defendant Narlian to Amended
Complaint.
SUPREME

COURT,

N E W YORK COUNTY.
[SAME

TITLE.]

Defendant Narlian, answering the amended complaint herein, by his atorneys, Guggenheimer,
Untermyer & Marshall:
: Admits the allegations contained in
paragraph designated "II" of the amended complaint, except that he denies that he is now or has
been a member of said copartnership since the
early part of 1926.
FIRST

65

SECOND : Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph designated "IV" of the
amended complaint, except that he admits that on
or prior to the 3rd day of January, 1924, Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., employed defendants, who, for
hire, accepted said employment to examine its accounts as of December 31, 1923, in so far as they
deemed necessary for the purpose of making a balance sheet audit thereof and to certify to Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., their opinion as to the correctness of
the same, over defendants' signature, and to fur66 nish to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., a number of duplicate originals of a balance sheet so to be prepared
by them and certified over their signature.
THIRD:
Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph designated "V" of the amended
complaint, except that he admits knowing that the
balance sheet so to be prepared by them might
be submitted by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to some of
its bankers.

23
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F O U R T H : Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph designated "VI" of the
amended complaint, except that he admits that defendants undertook to examine the accounts of
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and audit the same in so far
as they deemed necessary for the purpose of preparing a balance sheet audit of the accounts of
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of December 31, 1923, and
that they prepared thirty-two duplicate originals
of the balance sheet, Exhibit A, annexed to the
amended complaint and thirty-two duplicate originals of the certificate, Exhibit B, annexed to the
amended complaint, and delivered them to Fred 68
Stern & Co., Inc.

: Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph designated "VII" and "XI"
of the amended complaint.
FIFTH

S I X T H : Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of each and
every allegation contained in paragraph designated
"VIII" of the amended complaint.

: Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph designated "IX" of the
amended complaint, except that he denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of the allegations that said Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., did not have a net worth of more than
$1,000,000 and a surplus of $500,000, and that said
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was grossly insolvent, did
not own or possess the assets set forth as such
assets on such balance sheet, and had liabilities
vastly in excess of those shown on said balance
sheet.
SEVENTH
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Answer of Defendant

Narlian.

F O R A FIRST AFFIRMATIVE AND COMPLETE DEFENSE,
T H I S DEFENDANT ALLEGES :
E I G H T H : Defendants Niven, Mendes and Clowes
are and at all times referred to in the complaint
were certified public accountants holding certificates of the Board of Regents of the State of New
York authorizing them to practice as public accountants in the State of New York, and this defendant is and at air times referred to in the complaint was a certified public accountant holding a
certificate of the State of California.
71

: The alleged cause of action stated in
the amended complaint did not accrue within two
years before the commencement of this action.
NINTH

FOR

A SECOND AFFIRMATIVE

AND COMPLETE DE-

FENSE, T H I S DEFENDANT ALLEGES :
T E N T H : On information and belief, plaintiff is
a domestic business corporation incorporated and
doing business under and by virtue of the Stock
Corporation Law of the State of New York and is
not a moneyed corporation or incorporated under
the Banking Law of the State of New York.
72
E L E V E N T H : On information and belief, plaintiff,
in lending and advancing money to Fred Stern &
Co., Inc., and in other respects, did a banking business within the State of New York, in contravention of the Stock Corporation Law, the General
Corporation Law and the Banking Law of the State
of New York, and that in making such loans and
advances of money to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and
in doing a banking business in other respects plaintiff acted ultra vires.

25
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W H E R E F O R E , this defendant demands that the
amended complaint herein be dismissed, with costs.
GUGGENHEIMER, U N T E R M Y E R & MARSHALL,

Attorneys for Defendant Narlian,
Office and Post Office Address,
No. 120 Broadway,
Borough of Manhattan,
New York City.
(Verified June 14, 1927.)
74
Stipulation as to Answers of Defendants
Touche, Tait, Whitworth, Stempf
and Wagner.
SUPREME COURT,
N E W YORK COUNTY.
[SAME TITLE.]

The plaintiff having announced its purpose to
procure an attachment in this action against the
property of the defendants or some of them, and
the defendants deeming it desirable to avoid such 75
attachment ; and for the purpose of avoiding such
attachment the defendants Touche, Tait, Whitworth, Stempf and Wagner, some of the copartners
above named, doing business under the firm name
and style of Touche, Niven & Co., having agreed to
appear herein by Guggenheimer, Untermyer & Marshall as of the 17th day of November, 1927,

26
76

Stipulation

as to Answers of Touche et al.

I T IS STIPULATED AND AGREED, in consideration
of said appearance, that the plaintiff will not during the pendency of this action apply for such an
attachment herein against the defendants or any
of them.

that the
answers heretofore filed herein on behalf of the defendant who have heretofore appeared herein shall
be deemed the answer of the other members of the
firm of Touche, Niven & Company except as to the
first affirmative defense, which, as to such other
members of the firm of Touche, Niven & Company,
shall be deemed to read as follows:
I T IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED

77

"1. The defendants Niven, Mendes and
Clowes are and each of them is a certified public accountant holding a certificate of the
Board of Regents of the State, of New York,
authorizing them to practice as public accountants in the State of New York, and these
defendants are and each of them is a chartered or certified public accountant, and the
acts and omissions complained of are the acts
and omissions of said Niven, Mendes and
Clowes.
78

"2. The alleged cause of action stated in
the amended complaint did not accrue within
two years before the commencement of this action."
I T IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the
notice of trial heretofore served herein shall stand
and no new notice of trial need be served because
of the appearance of said defendants Touche, Tait,
Whitworth, Stempf and Wagner, copartners, as

27
Stipulation

as to Answers of Touche et al.
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above described; and that the time of the plaintiff
to move to strike out said first affirmative defense
upon the ground that it is not sufficient in law be
and the same hereby is extended to and including
the tenth day after the entry in the office of the
Clerk of the Appellate Division of the order of the
Appellate Division determining the appeal now
pending in that Court from the order made herein
by Mr. Justice Peters dated the 22nd day of June,
1927.
Dated, New York, November 17, 1927.
HIRSCH, SHERMAN & LIMBURG,

80

Attorneys for Plaintiff.
G U G G E N H E I M E R , UNTERMYER & M A R S H A L L ,

Attorneys for Defendants.
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Extract from Clerk's Minutes.
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SUPREME

COURT,

TRIAL T E R M — P A R T 1 8 .

June 27th, 1929.

ULTRAMAREIS CORPORATION

against
GEORGE TOUCHE, J O H N D . N I V E N ,
ANDREW
83

R.

W.

TAIT,

WHITWORTH,

MENDES,

CHARLES

HENRY

FRANCIS

J.

E.

CLOWES,

VICTOR H . S T E M P F , F . H . W A G NER a n d

C.

A.

NARLIAN,

co-

partners under the firm name
& style of Touche, Niven & Co.

I hereby certify that this cause was tried before
Hon. John L. Walsh and a jury on the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
8, 9, 10, 11 & 12 days of April, 1929. April 3,
1929—Plaintiff moved to amend complaint. Decision Reserved. April 4, 1929—Motion to amend
to include another cause of action granted. April
8, 1929—Plaintiff Rests. Defendant moved to dis84
miss complaint. Reserved. April 9, 1929—Plaintiff moved for a withdrawal of a juror. Motion denied. April 11, 1929—Defendant moved that plaintiff elect between the two causes of action. Denied.
Defendant moved to dismiss 1st cause of action.
Decision Reserved. Defendant moved to dismiss
2nd cause of action. Granted. Defendant moved
for a direction of verdict. Denied. April 12,
1929—The jury after deliberation render a verdict

29
Extract

From Clerk's Minutes.
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far the plaintiff for the sum of $187,576.32. Defendant moved to set aside the verdict and for a
new trial. Decision Reserved. June 14, 1929—
Opinion. The Complaint must be dismissed. June
25, 1929—Motion granted setting aside verdict and
dismissing complaint. Order filed. Motion for an
extra allowance is denied. Order filed.
THOMAS M. FARLEY,
Clerk.

Order Setting Aside Verdict and Dismissing
Complaint.
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At a Trial Term, Part 18, of the New
York Supreme Court, held in and
for the County of New York, at the
County Court House therein, on the
25th day of June, 1929.
Present:
HON. JOHN L.

WALSH,

Justice.
[SAME TITLE.]

The above-entitled action having regularly been
brought on for trial at Trial Term, Part 18, of the
Supreme Court, held in and for the County of New
York, at the County Court House therein, on the
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th
days of April, 1929, before Mr. Justice Walsh, and
a jury, and the plaintiff herein having appeared by
Messrs. Limburg, Riegelman, Hirsch & Hess, their
attorneys, David L. Podell and Herbert R. Limburg, Esqs., of counsel, and the defendants appear-
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30

88

Order Betting Aside Verdict, etc.

ing by Messrs. Guggenheimer, Untermyer & Marshall, their attorneys, James Marshall, Esq., of
counsel, and the allegations and proofs of the parties having been heard and considered, and the
defendants having moved at the close of the plaintiff's case for a dismissal of the complaint, and decision on said motion having been reserved, and
the defendants having moved again at the close of
the entire case for a dismissal of the complaint,
and decision on said motion having been reserved,
and the case having been submitted to the jury,
and the jury having rendered a verdict for the
89 plaintiff in the sum of $187,576.32, and the defendants having moved to set aside the verdict, and
decision on said motion having been reserved, and
due deliberation on said motions having been had,
Now, upon the pleadings and bills of particulars
herein, and upon the minutes of the trial and all
the proceedings heretofore had herein, and upon
filing the opinion of the Court, on motion of Guggenheimer, Untermyer & Marshall, attorneys for
the defendants, it is
that the motions of the defendants to
set aside the verdict of the jury and to dismiss the
complaint be, and the same are hereby, granted,
90 upon the law only and not upon the facts; and
it is further
ORDERED,

ORDERED, that the verdict of the jury in the aboveentitled action be and the same is hereby set aside,
upon the law only and not upon the facts, and the
complaint herein is hereby dismissed on the merits;
and it is further
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that the Clerk of this Court be and he
is hereby directed to enter judgment for the defendants dismissing the complaint on the merits,
with costs to the defendants against the plaintiff,
to be taxed.
ORDERED,

Enter,
J. L. W.
J. S. C.
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Judgment Appealed From.
SUPREME

COURT,

N E W YORK COUNTY.
[SAME TITLE.]

The above-entitled action having regularly been
brought on for trial at Trial Term, Part 18, of the
Supreme Court, held in and for the County of New
York, at the County Court House therein, on the
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th
days of April, 1929, before Mr. Justice Walsh, and
a jury, and the plaintiff herein having appeared by
Messrs. Limburg, Riegelman, Hirsch & Hess, their
attorneys, David L. Podell and Herbert R. Limburg, Esqs., of counsel, and the defendants having
appeared by Messrs. Guggenheimer, Untermyer &
Marshall, their attorneys, James Marshall, Esq., of
counsel, and the allegations and proofs of the parties having been heard and considered, and the defendants having moved at the close of the plaintiff's case for a dismissal of the complaint and of
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Judgment

Appealed

From.

each cause of action therein, and decision on said
motion having been reserved, and the defendants
having moved again at the close of the entire case
for a dismissal of the complaint, and of each cause
of action therein, and said motion having been
granted as to the second cause of action, and decision on said motion having been reserved as to the
first cause of action, and the second cause of action
having been dismissed on the merits, and the first
cause of action having been submitted to the jury,
and the jury having rendered a verdict thereon for
the plaintiff in the sum of $187,576.32, and the
defendants having moved to set aside said verdict,
and decision on said motion having been reserved,
and due deliberation on said motions having been
had, and said motions having been granted upon
the law only and not upon the facts, and an order
having been entered herein on June 25, 1929, setting aside the verdict of the jury upon the law only
and not upon the facts, and dismissing the complaint herein on the merits, with costs to the defendants against the plaintiff, and the defendants
having moved for an extra allowance of $2,000, and
said motion having been denied, and the costs of
the defendants having been taxed by the Clerk at
the sum of One hundred and twenty-six 26/100
Dollars ($126.26),
Now, on motion of Guggenheimer, Untermyer &
Marshall, attorneys for the defendants, it is
that the amended complaint herein
be and the same hereby is dismissed on the merits
and that the defendants George A. Touche, John
B. Niven, Andrew W. Tait, Charles R. Whitworth,
Henry E. Mendes, Francis J. Clowes, Victor H.
ADJUDGED,
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Stempf, E. H. Wagner and C. A. H. Narlian, copartners under the firm name and style of Touch e,
Niven & Co., recover of the plaintiff, Ultramares
Corporation, the sum of One hundred and twentysix 26/100 Dollars ($126.26 ), their costs, as taxed,
and that they have execution therefor.
Dated, New York, July 1, 1929.
THOMAS M. FARLEY,
Clerk.
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Case and Exceptions.
SUPREME

COURT,

N E W YORK COUNTY,
TRIAL

TERM—PART

XVIII.

[SAME TITLE.]

New York, April 1st, 1929.
Before:
HON. J O H N L. WALSH,

J.,

and a Jury,
1 0 1

APPEARANCES :

Esqs., Attorneys for Plaintiff; by DAVID L . PODELL,
Esq., and HERBERT R . LIMBURG, Esq., of Counsel.

LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, H I R S C H & HESS,

GUGGENHEIMER,

UNTERMYER & MARSHALL,

Attorneys for Defendants; by J A M E S
Esq., of Counsel.

PLAINTIFF'S

102

Esqs.,

MARSHALL,

OPENING.

(A jury was duly impaneled and sworn.)
(Mr. Podell opened the case to the jury on behalf of the plaintiff.)
(Mr. Marshall opened the case to the jury on
behalf of the defendants.)
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TO T H E

JURY.

Mr. Podell: If the Court please, Mr. Foreman
and gentlemen of the jury: I think perhaps the
most important thing that I can say to you at the
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very outset is that we are exceedingly anxious
that you should understand this case; and so I
am going to make a statement in outline of what
we intend to show, and I will ask you, gentlemen,
to please bear with me if I go a little in detail.
I will do it solely to enable you to follow the testimony as it is presented here a little better. Of
course, what I say is nothing; I am merely going
to tell you what I intend to prove by witnesses
and by documents. I would like you to understand
me, so that you can follow those witnesses and
documents a little better.
There are three concerns that are going to be
mentioned here constantly: The plaintiff, which
is the Ultramares Corporation, that is an institution that has been doing business as a factor—if
you know what that means. A factor is a concern
that handles certain kinds of financial transactions,
takes care of the finances of the transaction The
details of their business will be fully explained to
you. The defendant, the firm of Touche, Niven
& Co., according to their letterhead, is a firm of
Public Accountants with offices at 80 Maiden Lane,
New York, apparently offices in New York, Chicago, Cleveland, St. Louis, Minneapolis and Los
Angeles; also offices in England, in London and
Birmingham; and in Canada, Montreal, Toronto,
Winnepeg; and in South America, several cities
named there. It is a firm that did an extensive
business, I assume, as Public Accountants.
The other concern that you will hear mentioned,
is a concern by the name of Frederick Stern &
Company. Frederick Stern & Company were for
some years engaged in business in this city as an
importer and exporter particularly of rubber.
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So you have got the three people whose names
you are going to hear mentioned and the nature of
their respective businesses.
We have had—and I speak for the plaintiff,
Ultramares Corporation—we have had very little
business with Fred Stern & Company prior to
April, 1924. I will ask you to keep that date in
mind, April of 1924; also keep in mind as we go
along, we are going to talk a good deal about what
happened during the year 1923.
In April of 1924, we were solicited to do business
with this concern of Fred Stern & Company, and
that meant that we were asked to finance them in
certain transactions, purchases and sales of rubber
that he was making, that he was bringing in rubber,
buying it in the raw, bringing it in and selling it
to others in this country, and he wanted to do
business with us so that we would help finance
these transactions; and as we will show you that
involved right from the start extending credit to
him in this financing.
We could take and we did take at times certain
securities for our advances, but there was always
a period of time when we practically had no security whatsoever, and we had to trust the concern
itself, and that you will understand a little better
when the details of the transaction are explained
to you.
As an inducement to make us go into business
transactions with Fred Stern & Company there was
presented to us by Fred Stern & Company, its
certified accountant's statement. We never had
occasion to look at its books, and never did look at
its books. All we got at that time, in substance,
was the financial statement, signed by this respon-
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109

sible and reputable, as we thought, substantial firm
of accountants. There was delivered to us a certificate. It said:
"We have examined the accounts of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc. for the year ended December
31, 1923"—
So you see the period of that year, 1923, will
be important
"and hereby certify that the annexed balance
sheet is in accordance therewith and with the
information and explanations given us. We
further certify that, subject to provision for
federal taxes on income, the said statement,
in our opinion, presents a true and correct
view of the financial condition of Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923."
Signed "Touche, Niven & Co., Public Accountants."
Now, if you will look at this statement, you will
find that the statement was made in detail—
"Capital & Surplus," they have their worth $1,070,715.26.
Now, we commenced doing business with them.
We financed several transactions. Toward the end
of that year, and it all happened almost over night,
Fred Stern, in fact on January 2nd, 1925, Fred
Stern was reported to have committed suicide and
his concern became insolvent, and we were in the
hole, to use common parlance, to the sum of about
two hundred to two hundred and fifty thousand
dollars. The exact figures will be presented to you.
The whole thing was a sort of a shock. It came
suddenly, and we naturally began to inquire how
it was that a concern showing a certified public
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accountant's statement of a million dollars of assets
over liabilities, capital and surplus, how it was
possible it could have lost that money. It was possible it could have lost that money, yes, but we
looked into the situation and we found, gentlemen,
and this is what we intend to show in connection
with this case, that this statement is false.
Now, if there is anything in this case that I
intend to prove beyond a question of doubt, it is
that this statement as certified to by these accountants is false, that it is not false merely to a matter
of fifty, sixty, seventy or a hundred thousand, but
it is false to the extent of over a million, over a
million two hundred thousand, over a million five
hundred thousand.
Now, that is not enough for us to make a claim
against the accountants merely because the statement is false. Naturally a man may so fake his
books—there is a good deal of faking of books—so
as to conceal those things even from an accountant, even though an accountant may work on it
for months, it is possible he may be an honest man
and doesn't notice it, that a million and a half of
assets was concealed.
I make the second proposition that I intend to
show to you gentlemen before we close this case
that it did not require a certified public accountant, it did not require an assistant certified public
account, but that any clerk, any bookkeeper that
used just ordinary care, could have seen from those
books not only that they were crooked, but that they
were false. And would have known that the largest
items that they claim of assets that they had were
pure fabrication. I say I will show you that any
clerk, any bookkeeper, any accountant, if he had
used just the ordinary care, would have seen it. In
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other words, our claim is that for a man not to
know that this was a perfect statement to the extent of a million dollars, he would have to shut his
eyes deliberately to things that would just poke
right into his eyes. Now, that is the part that I
would like you to understand, gentlemen, and I
am going to show you why I make that statement.
I will ask you to remember in connection with this
certified statement that there are no qualifications,
no "ifs" and no "ands," no conditions. As every
accountant will tell you who knows his business,
this is an absolute certification without conditions,
without "ifs" or "ands." It does not say that they
did not know, that they did not do this or that,
that they did not check up. Sometimes accountants do that. There are no "ifs" or thoughs in
this statement, It is a certified balance audit statement as and for a certain period.
When Touche, Niven & Co. came there to prepare those books we will show you that they found
many things right at the start which would have
convinced any man who had any brains at all, that
not only were the books crooked but that the concern was crooked. The books had not been written
up since March. For many months they had not
been written up, and Touche-Niven's man had to
sit down and write up these books for them right
at the start.
When they were handed an inventory, the first
checking that they did on the inventory showed
that the inventory was padded. Mind you, they
must have known, because they made that correction—that the inventory was padded not ten, fifteen, fifty or a hundred thousand, but over a quarter of a million dollars. That is right at the start.
At the beginning they are handed an inventory,
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and an examination of that inventory with their
checking will show you that they knew right then
and there that this concern had attempted to defraud its creditors by adding more than a quarter
of a million dollars to its assets by way of inventory, which it had no business to do; and did it
crookedly, did it crookedly. It was not a question
of putting a higher value on it at all. They just
did it deliberately and with an intent to pad the
inventory and to have a false statement; and that
they knew right at the start.
Now, gentlemen, I do not know how many of
you are familiar with bookkeeping or with bookkeeping systems, but I am sure that we all understand a certain little of it, and some of it from our
own business experience, and some of it possibly
from a little better knowledge. We all know, for
instance, what we mean by a ledger. We may not
be able to give an exact definition of what a ledger
is, but we know what it is, and we have heard of
journals and we have heard of sales books and we
have heard of shipping records.
Now, one of the ways that Fred Stern & Company defrauded and faked its books and falsified
its books was by adding $706,000 worth of false
accounts receivable. In other words, they wrote
into their books that certain people owed them,
Fred Stern & Company, $706,000.
One item I am talking about in particular and
I am going to talk about that because I am going
to show you in connection with that how these
men, studying these books for months, knew or
should have known that that was false, that claim
that $706,000 was due them from various customers,
when, as a matter of fact, it was a pure fabrication,
it was wholly manufactured. Customers did not
owe them that money at all.
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For years you will find that in the ledger, that is,
from the year 1922 and for the year 1923, as you
examined the ledger for every month, there is a
summary of the sales that Stern & Company made,
just entered as a monthly figure, the total sales;
and there is just one entry for that month, beginning with the year 1922. Beginning with the year
1922, take January, there is an entry; February,
there is an entry; March, there is an entry; one
entry for each of these months until you come to
December of 1923. In December of 1923—and this
statement, you will bear in mind, was a balance
sheet as of December 31st, 1923, that is the last
month of this balance sheet—in December there appeared to be two entries, one of them totalling six
hundred and forty-four odd thousand dollars; the
second of them, the fake one, totalling $706,000.
Now, what does that mean? There is an entry
in the ledger that there were $706,000 worth of
sales made in the month of December, for which
customers ' owed Frederick Stern & Company
$706,000. It meant that merchandise had been
shipped in that amount to customers, that invoices
had been sent for those amounts to customers; it
named customers, certain designated customers.
Now, sometimes a house does not want an accountant to write letters to all the customers and
ascertain, "Do you owe this money?" although frequently that is done; and when an accountant does
not do that, usually in the statement he says, "This
is to certify that is the worth, but we desire to
state that we did not check the individual accounts" ; which is a little warning to a man who
relies on it. But that is not what we are quarrelling with, mind you.
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What we are quarrelling with, is this: A ledger,
as you all know, is a posting book. You post into
the ledger. You post it from what?
From supporting books. You post it from the
journal or you post it from a memorandum book,
from a shipping record.
Now, I say to you, gentlemen, at the outset that
not only was this $706,000 entered as accounts receivable pure fake, but that there is absolutely no
support for that item or any of those items comprising the $706,000 in the shipping records or in
the journal entries.
If those accountants had looked at that shipping
record to check back that there were $706,000 worth
of accounts receivable that Fred Stern & Company
had these people owing to them, even if you did
not want to write to these people, the Ford Motor
Company or somebody else, whether they owed
Fred Stern & Company that much money as is
shown in the book, if you did not want to do that,
although that is the proper thing, if you did not
want to do that, the very least you should do is to
check back in the other books and see if the other
books support this item of $706,000, because you
are certifying to a statement that other people are
going to use and rely upon, and that is the very
least, that you, as an accountant, should do.
I am going to show you that when you begin to
check back, to try to find supporting records for
that item of $706,000, accounts receivable, you cannot find any trace of it anywhere in the shipping
records, that those goods were shipped to anybody ; and when you look at the invoices, by looking at them you can see that they are not the same
invoices that that concern sent out. They had
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fake invoices. By looking at them, there are seven
different reasons why you could see just by looking
at the invoice, that it was a fake.
For instance, their invoices were numbered
serially, and these invoices were not in the serial
numbers. Secondly, the invoices did not have any
customer's order number. Every other invoice that
the concern ever sent out had a customer's order
on it. These did not.
Thirdly, it had no reference to shipping records
on its face. It was not entered in any book called
the debit memo book, never entered.
Please remember, gentlemen, what I said to you
at the beginning, that what I tell you is merely a
statement of what I intend to show to you by witnesses and by testimony. I do not want you to
accept my statement for it any more than I ask
you to accept Mr. Marshall's statement of the facts,
but I am outlining this so as these figures are given
to you and these books are referred to, you will be
able to follow them and understand them.
There were also fake accounts receivable for the
month of November, aggregating about a million
dollars, and they were similarly faked because they
had no supporting entries, no basis.
The second item: Every concern that does business has two kinds of people as a rule that it deals
with, as you know; people you buy from and you
owe money to and people, on the other hand, whom
you sell to and who owe you money. They are
usually and naturally different groups. It is very
seldom that the same man is both a seller to you
and a buyer from you. That sometimes happens,
but in this rubber situation it could not very well
be, because the rubber came from abroad. It was
bought from people all over the world, on the other
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side, and it was sold to people on this side, usually
to tire manufacturers who bought the raw rubber.
So you had one class of people that the Stern &
Company owed money to for purchases that they
made from them, and this other group that made
purchases from them.
Now, would it not immediately surprise you if
you found that a man that you were buying from,
that normally you owe money to for merchandise
you buy from him, is entered in the books as owing
money to you—not a small sum of a thousand or
two thousand, but over a hundred thousand?
This man who owed these amounts was selling
merchandise to Stern and to whom Stern owed
money for that merchandise, is entered on the books
as owing Stern $113,000. And we will show you
that the only time that he ever is entered on the
books as owing Stern & Company is in the months
of November and December, this period when these
books were faked up.
Now, it would have been a very simple matter,
when an accountant sees that to ask, "Did you sell
merchandise to these people?" "No." "What is
it?" Here is a concern that is borrowing. The
books show they are borrowing large sums of money
from banks, from factors, from various people, and
they have got a note on their statement that it is
an advance deposit; and the quickest way of verifying that would be to communicate with that concern, "Do you owe us, Stern & Company, $113,000?"
United Baltic Company. They had representatives in this country, and they would have found
out a different situation altogether. What would
they have found out? That instead of this United
Baltic Company owing Fred Stern $113,000, Fred
Stern & Company was indebted to the United Baltic
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Company for $250,000, a total difference of over
three hundred odd thousand.
These mistakes, you know, if they are claimed
to be mistakes on the part of a man, seem always
to run into large figures. Notice the figures. An
inquiry of the United Baltic Company would have
disclosed that instead of the United Baltic Company owing Fred Stern & Company $113,000, not
only did it not owe that, but Fred Stern & Company owed the United Baltic Company for merchandise which it had received, over $250,000.
And finally, gentlemen, I am just giving you
certain instances of how this man made up his million dollars. How these accountants did their business, and what happened. We were not there.
Something happened. They cannot say they did not
know, because I am going to show it in writing that
they knew, the accountants knew. I am going to
show it. I will tell you now, by letters written
by these accountants, Fred Stern & Company was
so crooked in its transactions that in borrowing
money from banks and from other people, it would
pledge certain shipments of rubber, and sometimes
it would take those shipments and pledge them not
once but three or four times, first to one person and
then to another. It had a shipment coming on.
They wanted an advance of so much, and got it, and
then they would go to another person and take the
same shipment they had placed with the first bank
or with the first person and pledge it over with
the second and third and a fourth. I think you
will find that some of these items were pledged five
or six times.
You will say to yourselves that an accountant
working on these books could not discover that. I
will show you something stranger than that as this
case goes along. I will show you that they dis-
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covered some of it, that they wrote to banks, that
they got answers, that those answers showed these
accounts were being pledged two, three and four
times. All they had to do was to read the answers
they got themselves from banks, showing that these
accounts had been pledged three or four or five
times, and we will have those answers here, and you
will see them for yourselves, to inquiries written by
these accountants to check up, because they suspected them. And not a word of it in this statement, not a word of qualification to this statement.
Not a suggestion to anybody who is going to rely
on this statement as being signed by a reputable
137
concern with offices in England, Canada, New York
and Chicago, and all over the country—certified
worth a million dollars—crooked. They should
have known it.
Now, gentlemen, the one thing I want to avoid
in this case is to confuse you on anything. I am
going to call my witnesses to show these various
things, and then I am going to say to you men, if
we are right, if these men knew or should have
known—now, mind you, we do not have to show
that there was any crookedness between Touche,
Niven & Co. and Fred Stern; all we have to show
is that they did not use ordinary care as accountants. That is our claim, that we are entitled to
138 have them use reasonable and ordinary care. And,
gentlemen, we will show you that we are out of
pocket as a result of getting this statement. Had
we gotten a true statement, showing them practically bankrupt, we certainly would not have advanced a dollar to them. Nobody does business
with a bankrupt. And we would have been in, instead of out of pocket, those two hundred and fifty
odd thousand dollars by reason of this statement,
because if the statement were a true and correct
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one, it was bound to show that these $706,000 of
accounts receivable were not due, that their goods
were pledged three, four and five times, that people
entered on the books as owing Stern & Company,
did not owe them any money at all that Stern &
Company owed them money. And if there had been
a statement that this was a crooked concern, we
did not want to do business with a crooked concern,and we would not have had to advance them
anything and we would not have done business
with them.
So there you are. We were advised by this certified public accountant's statement, on which we had
a right to rely, believing they were careful and
responsible people. We will show you, as I said,
that the statement was false and that they should
have known it was false, and did not use the common and ordinary care to find it so, and we shall
ask at your hands a verdict,
Mr. Marshall: In view of Mr. Podell's opening
remarks, I would like to know now whether he
makes any claim now of any fraud on the part of
these defendants?
Mr. Podell: I have set forth my complaint.
That speaks for itself.
Mr. Marshall: You have made some inuendoes
here and I would like to have it definitely understood.
The Court: The Court will rule on that, that
there is not any inuendo. There is no allegation,
there is nothing of any kind or character in this
case which indicates fraud, and when you reach
that point for a ruling, the Court will rule accordingly.
Mr. Marshall: Thank you, your Honor. That
is all I want to know.
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Mr. Marshall: Now, gentlemen, you understand,
I hope, that the Ultramares Corporation did not
ask us to make an audit of the books of Stern &
Company. It was Stern who asked us to make the
audit of their own books. Now, that is going to present a question of law in the first place, whether
there is any liability on our part at all, even if we
were grossly negligent, to a third party, such as the
Ultramares. That is a question, however, which
happily you will not be bothered with, but the Court
will have to decide.
Now, the next thing I want to call to your attention is that we do not guarantee the truth of
any statement contained in a balance sheet. A public accountant cannot possibly for the fee that he
gets for his work become a guarantor of any certificate. The most he says is that he has examined
the books and that in his opinion the balance sheet
represents a true picture of those books. He is only
certifying, in other words, to his opinion, his honest
opinion, based upon his investigation.
Now, there are several kinds of audits. There is
what is known as the balance sheet audit, and what
is known as the detailed audit.
The balance sheet audit is what we were employed to make in this case. It consists of the
preparation of the balance sheet of the company, an
audit, a sufficient testing and investigation of the
records to give us a right and fair basis for our
opinion, that that balance sheet represents the condition of the books.
Now a detailed audit, as the name indicates, is
something in greater detail. There the accountant
tries to go into many more items in the books during the course of the whole year. He does not rely
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so much upon tests as upon investigation of particular transactions. That kind of audit is used
more frequently when you are trying to check up
on employees, to see whether they have been guilty
of stealing from the company, and then you want
to trace out each item; but in ordinary commercial
life the form of audit that is most frequently used
is the balance sheet audit, because the time and the
expense of a detailed audit is out of all proportion
to the value of such an audit, in the preparation of
the ordinary balance sheet.
It is found moreover in thousands and thousands
of cases for all practical purposes the tests which
must be made by the accountant preparing his balance sheet audit, are sufficient to determine the accuracy of the report.
Where there is the grossest kind of fraud on the
part of the company whose books are audited, as is
indicated in this case, where if as Mr. Podell says,
they had such accounts receivable of over $700,000,
failed to enter on their books liabilities, that can be
so well faked that the best auditors in the world
making the most careful audit, cannot possibly find
it; but we were not in any way negligent. We shall
show you that we spent on this audit some three
hundred hours of work, hard work. It is not just
taking off lists. It is very hard work, making comparisons between books, between documents, and
then arranging them in proper balance sheet form
so that they meant something.
We put in over 300 hours of work on this audit,
for which we got approximately $1100.
In the course of that work we had occasion to
check up the customers' ledgers against the sales
invoices, the sales invoices against the lot record
of shipments, and the lot record of shipments, re-

145

146

147

50
148

149

150

Defendants'

Opening

Statement.

versing it the other way, it runs from the lot record
of shipments to the sales invoices and from there
back to the customers' ledger.
Now, it is true that we did not examine every
single lot record, every single voucher in the course
of the year. As I told you before, we were not hired
to do that. That would have cost an immense
amount of money, more than Stern was ready to
pay. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred it would
have been a useless procedure.
New, it is suggested by Mr. Podell that these
books were way behind, that all books of the company were way behind. As a matter of fact, the
only book, as far as I know, that had not been written up to date was the accounts receivable account
in the control ledger. Now, the control ledger, let
me say, is a sort of a summary book. You have
your summary in the general ledger, you have your
accounts receivable ledger, which was written up to
date. That, in their system, should again have
been posted to the control ledger for accounts receivable in the general ledger. That was a mere
summary. As far as their bookkeeping was concerned, it might have been left out altogether. It
was a convenient way to group all of their accounts
receivable together by entering it in this control
ledger. It was this posting that was behind, not
the original entries at all.
Now, in considering this question, I am going to
ask you to judge these defendants in the light of
the facts that were then known to them, that then
appeared; not in the light of Stern's subsequent
bankruptcy or of Stern's subsequent suicide, or of
anything else that might be presented here; but I
am going to ask you to look at their work, and to
test it and see whether they did good work. Look
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at it from the viewpoint that they may have had
at that time.
They had implicit trust in Stern; they had implicit trust in his employees. They consulted on a
number of these items, not one man alone, not the
books alone, but they tested them by conversations
with employees, with several employees in many instances, so that if there was fraud in this case on
the part of Stern, it was fraud through the whole
organization, because any man of any importance
in that business who was talked to by us was then
a thief and a liar.
Mr. Podell has been silent on one very important
or several very important phases of this case.
He will have to show, in order to recover here,
not only that they were negligent, but that his
clients relied on our balance sheet and that his
client was guilty of no contributory negligence,
that it was in no way negligent in relying on this
balance sheet, if it did so rely.
Now, we are going to show you that they did
not rely on this balance sheet at all; they relied on
Stern's honor just as we relied on Stern's honor.
They relied on trust receipts covering definite specified merchandise which was given to them in every
instance before they advanced one cent of money
to Stern. When the merchandise covered by these
trust receipts was sold by Stern, Stern immediately gave them the accounts receivable, the accounts of the people to whom he had sold the certain specified named merchandise covered by the
trust receipts, so in place of the merchandise they
had the accounts receivable, the accounts of the
people to whom the merchandise had been sold
and they were so careful about that that they themselves sent these invoices to the customers with a
notation signed by Stern, "This invoice has been
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assigned to Ultramares Corporation. Please pay
them." Or words to that effect, signed by Stern.
And I want to suggest to you further that the
Ultramares Corporation, secured as they were by
trust receipts and by accounts receivable, would
have gone into this business with Stern, no matter
what balance sheet they had. Even if they had no
balance sheet, because we are going to show you,
gentlemen, that they got for their advances to
Stern interest and commissions at the rate of 26
per cent, per annum, which on a secured business
such as this is a very nice return, and you can take
some chances on short loans when you get that return ; and I tell you further that we are going to
show that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence, that it was negligent, because it claims
that its losses occurred on loans made in November and December, 1924, almost one year after the
date of our balance sheet, and they claim they were
still relying on that balance sheet one year after
the date of it. Why, in a business like the rubber
business all kinds of things could happen in that
time to make such a balance sheet just a perfectly
worthless thing.
We are going to show you further that they
never took the trouble to inquire whether the security which they were given on these final payments, on these final advances, were actually in
existence. They took Stern's word for the fact and
let it go at that. They took the trust receipts and
then woke up one morning and found out that
Stern had defrauded them, had given them no merchandise or trust receipts at all but just a blank
piece of paper.
And finally we are going to urge upon you that
even if we were negligent, it was not our negligence
that caused this loss, but Stern's fraud, the fraud
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of Stern upon us, the fraud of Stern in presenting
this balance sheet to the plaintiff, the fraud of
Stern in failing to give them security as he had
agreed to give them, failing to give them security
as he had represented.
This case is going to last some time, I am afraid.
It may be that at any one time we might not be
able to get a perspective of the whole case, but we
ask you to be patient, and I promise you as we go
along you will begin to see the matter as I have
outlined.
Mr. Podell: I wonder, your Honor, if we might
make an effort, in view of the statements, to have
the courage to ask whether we could not stipulate
a number of things that neither side disputes, and
in that way save considerable time?
Mr. Marshall: Will you state what they are?
Mr. Podell: I would like to identify the certificate or statement that was furnished us as being
the statement that was prepared by Touche, Niven
& Co., and that that is their signature.
Mr. Marshall: I think we will have to have evidence, your Honor, as to how they got it, and under
what circumstances.
Mr. Podell: I shall furnish that. All I am asking you now is to stipulate
Mr. Marshall: I will stipulate this is the balance
sheet prepared by us and the certificate, but I will
not stipulate it ever got into their hands or how it
got into their hands.
Mr. Podell: I am not asking you for that. All
I want is to identify the statement and that is
signed by one of your partners, is it not?
Mr. Marshall: Yes, that is signed by one of the
partners.
Mr. Podell: Will you mark this for identification, please?
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(Marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 for Identification. )
Mr. Podell: And I wonder if we may agree on
identification of the books and records of Stern &
Company?
Mr. Marshall: I do not think so, no.
Mr. Podell: Mr. Djorup, will you take the
stand?

1G1

P L A I N T I F F ' S PROOFS.
CHRISTIAN D J O R U P , a witness called on behalf of
the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, and stating
that he resides at 18 West 70th Street, New York
City, testified as follows:

Direct examination by Mr. Podell.
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Q. Mr. Djorup, what is your profession or occupation? A. Public accountant; certified public accountant.
Q. And whom have you been associated with;
what concern? A. Christian Djorup & Company.
For how many years back, Mr. Podell. At the present time?
Q. During 1923 and 1924, whom were you associated with? A. McArdle, Djorup & McArdle.
Q. And in 1925? A. McArdle, Djorup & McArdle.
Q. That was your firm at that time? A. Right.
Q. And were you engaged as accountant in behalf of the receiver in bankruptcy of Fred Stern
& Company? A. I was first engaged by the Creditors' Committee and after we formed the receiver-
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ship, then by the receiver, and afterwards by the
trustee of Stern & Company.
Q. And did you, pursuant to that engagement,
visit the premises of Fred Stern & Company? A.
I did.
Q. And did you then and there at the time of
such visit take possession of the books and records
of Fred Stern & Company? A. I did.
Q. And can you identify the books and records
that you took possession of at that time? A. I can.
Q. Now I show you one book and ask you
whether that is one of the books of Fred Stern &
Company that you took possession of? A. It is; it
is the general ledger for the years 1921 to 1923.
Q. 1921 to 1923? A. Right. From 1920 to 1923.
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Mr. Podell: I offer it in evidence, your
Honor.
Mr. Marshall: May I examine preliminarily?
The Court: Yes.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Mr. Djorup, will you open that book, please?
You did not see this book, did you, in 1923 or
1924? A. I saw it in 1925; January of 1925, when
I came into the offices of Fred Stern & Company.
Q. That was the first time you saw it? A. That
was the first time I got into Fred Stern's office.
Q. That was the first time you saw this book?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you say that those pages in that book
are in the same condition as they were in January
or February, 1924?
Mr. Podell: They are certainly not. We
do not claim they are.
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Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. Make the
objection then.
Mr. Podell: There is no claim those
pages in 1925 were the same as they were in
January, 1924.
The Court: You mean as to the subsequent entries that were made therein?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Court: I think Mr. Marshall's question intended to cover evidently that thing,
whether they were the same figures.
Mr. Podell: It is difficult for the witness
to answer.
Mr. Marshall: I will withdraw the question then and I will ask some other question
instead.
By Mr. Marshall.
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Q. Can you say that every figure on that book
was there in January or February, 1924? A. No,
for I came in in 1925.
Q. Can you say whether any sheets had been
removed from that book since 1924, January or
February of that year? A. I cannot.
Q. Can you say whether any sheets had been substituted in that book for the sheets that were in
there in January and February, 1924? A. I cannot say. I can prove whether they have been substituted or not or whether the sheets were in there
or not by the statements that have been submitted
in prior years.
Mr. Marshall: I ask that be stricken out.
The Court: The latter part may be
stricken out.
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Q. You do not of your own knowledge know
that any item in that book was or was not there in
January or February, 1924? A. I do.
Q. Of your own knowledge? A. Of my own
knowledge.
Q. Did you see that book, Mr. Djorup? A. I
didn't see the book.
Q. And you say of your own knowledge? A. Indirectly, for we took off the balances of 1921, 2, 3
and 4, for each year for the past three years, and
they corresponded with the statements that had
been submitted for those prior years by the same
firm of accountants.
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Mr. Marshall: That is reasoning, your
Honor.
The Court: Strike it out.
Mr. Podell: An accountant, your Honor,
has nothing to do with books except to reason about them.
The Court: Strike it out.
Q. This book, by the way, is a loose leaf book, is
it not? A. It is.
Q. That means that any one leaf can be taken
out at any time and a new leaf be put in? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall: I object to the admission
of those books on the ground that there is
nothing to show that they are in the condition in which they were at that time.
The Court: I will take them not as the
authentic books. I will take them as the
books that were presented to this accountant
at that time. As to their authenticity, we
may come along and take that later and find
out as to their authenticity. It is taken subject to that connection.
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Mr. Marshall: Your Honor is taking
them as the books this accountant found in
the office of Stern in 1925?
The Court: That is all he said. We have
no basis to assume anything else.
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception to the
admission of the book.
(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2.)
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Q. Is there anything in that book to show the
number of pages in the book? A. No, there is not.
They are not numbered.
The Court: May I suggest, Mr. Podell,
that all of these books and these papers that
are involved here, and which were involved
in the matter of the bankruptcy and trustee
in bankruptcy, be submitted to this witness,
who I suppose was the man who made the
examination, at least I make that assumption ; collect them all here, so we will not
have to go through them all individually,
and let the objection be made by counsel
for the defendant as to their introduction in
one broad objection and we will get that
over with quickly, instead of taking each
book separately.
Mr. Podell: I would do that provided
your Honor will permit me to mark each
book as a separate exhibit, because the record would not be clear otherwise.
The Court: Certainly, I see the necessity
of that. Identify each one.
Mr. Podell: We will take all the books
and identify them as the books found by this
witness in Fred Stern's office at that time.
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The Court: In 1925?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Are these books that I show you here, all
books that you found in the offices of Fred Stern
& Company and that you took possession of on the
1st of January, 1925? A. They are part of the
books which I took possession of.
Q. They are part of the books; there were other
books? A. There are other books.
Q. But these were all there at that time? A.
These were all in the offices of Fred Stern & Company at that time.
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Mr. Podell: I offer them in evidence.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. As to these books, Mr. Djorup, your answer is
the same, that you never saw them before you went
into the office of Stern & Company in January of
1925? A. That is correct.
Q. So you could not say whether the books are
the same as they were in January or February of
1924, as of your own knowledge? A. That is right.
Mr. Marshall: Same objection.
The Court: Same ruling.
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception.
Mr. Podell: You will identify them as
they are marked.
(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3.)
The Witness: Carbon copies of invoices
for the year 1923 called "Debit Memos."
(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4.)
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The Witness: That is the accounts receivable ledger from January 1, 1922, to December 31, 1924.
(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5.)
The Witness: That is debit memo book or
sales record from July, 1923, to December
31, 1924.
(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6.)
179

The Witness: That is the shipping record
of the United Baltic Corporation.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Whose book was that; is that a Fred Stern
book? A. Fred Stern book, showing shipments of
the United Baltic.
Mr. Marshall: Do not say what it shows,
please.
The Witness: And of L. Ruffer & Sons.
(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7.).
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The Witness: That is the shipment or delivery record of outgoing shipments from
No. 10,001 to 10,500. The dates are from
October 5, 1923, to December 19, 1923.
(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 8.)
The Witness: That is shipment record or
delivery record from 10,501 to 11,000, from
December 20, 1923, to March 5, 1924.
(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9.)
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181

The Witness : That is a ledger for notes
and trade acceptances receivable from January, 1922, to 1925.
(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10.)
The Witness: That is the trial balance
of accounts payable or shippers and dealers
for the years 1923 and 1924.
(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 11.)
The Witness: That is trial balance of accounts receivable or customers for 1923 and
1924.
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(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 12.)
The Witness: That is debit memorandum
book or sales journal from September, 1922,
to July, 1923.
(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 13.)
The Witness: That is the credit memorandum, book or purchase journal from
January, 1922, to January, 1925.
(Book received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14.)
The Witness: That is bank and letters
of credit ledger from January, 1923, to December 31, 1923.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Now, did you have occasion, Mr. Djorup, to
make any comparisons of figures between state-
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ment, Exhibit 1 for Identification, and the contents
of any of these books? Just answer yes or no. A.
Yes.
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Mr. Podell: I ask for the production of
all work sheets of the defendants supporting
this statement.
The Court: May I ask here if there was
an examination before trial?
Mr. Marshall: There was not.
Mr. Podell: There was an examination
under 21-A, your Honor, a very exhaustive
one, where books were identified under 21-A
by certain of the witnesses.
Mr. Limburg: That made it quite unnecessary to have any further examination before
trial.
Mr. Marshall: I present these work
sheets. I do not present them though as being in support of any balance sheet. They
are the work sheets that we prepared in the
course of our audit. Try to keep them in
order, if possible, please.
The Court: Mr. Podell, the witness has
called the Court's attention to the fact that
there are some books on the floor which are
material, which you have forgotten to introduce.
Mr. Podell: I have not forgotten, your
Honor. There are not only the books on
the floor but there are other books for another year which we have not marked at this
point.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Have you ever seen these work sheets that
are produced by the defendants? A. I have seen
some of the work sheets.
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Q. Copies or originals? A. Originals.
Q. And did you have occasion to compare the
contents of some of these work sheets with some
of the volumes? A. I did not compare the work
sheets, but photostat copies.
Q. You mean photostat copies of the work
sheets? A. Right. The originals I saw in the office of the defendants.
Q. Of these very work sheets? A. The originals
of some of these very work sheets. Just the accounts receivable trial balance were shown to me
in their office when I called their attention to discrepancies and had rechecked the books of Fred
Stern & Company at my request.
Q. In making both the comparison of this statement, Exhibit 1 for Identification, as you have testified, as well as the copies of work sheets produced
by the defendants, did you find that the books
therein referred to were the books that are marked
in evidence?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling
for a conclusion and not being the best evidence; whether those are the correct books
or not.
Mr. Podell: We do not claim they are the
correct books.
Mr. Marshall: That calls for a conclusion, comparing one thing to another and
then saying it is the authentic book.
The Court: Yes, but I will take it under
the same ruling as originally made, that
they be connected with these particular
books, but as an introductory matter, for the
purpose of proceeding with the trial, I will
allow it at this time.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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Mr. Podell: Your Honor, is there any
question raised as to the identity of these
books?
The Court: None, but there is some question apparently raised by questions of counsel for the defendants as to the correctness
of their present condition or as of January,
1925.
Mr. Podell: We are not seeking to prove,
your Honor, the correctness of their present
condition.
The Court: But as of January, 1925.
Mr. Marshall: It is a question of identity,
your Honor.
The Court: I appreciate that.
Mr. Podell: And we are not seeking to
prove anything more by the offer of these
books in evidence. They have been marked
in evidence and I am taking this time in the
hope that a little discussion of this thing in
clarification may save us a great deal of
time. Perhaps your Honor will permit me
to do it at this stage.
The Court: I will.
Mr. Podell: Will they stipulate that these
are the books without warrantees of the entries at all, that each of the entries are exactly as they were? Will they stipulate that
they are the set of books that Fred Stern
used, the physical books that Fred Stern
used during the years that they purport to
be his books, and that these defendants
worked on them? That is all. After all,
there is only one ledger which they used, or
two, and we want the identity of it.
The Court: That is easily obtainable outside of this witness.
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Mr. Podell: I can call a half a dozen people who will testify to that. I have a man
here that was in Fred Stern's employ. I am
saying this merely to save time.
The Court: I appreciate what you are doing and how much time would be saved, but
still I have the objection in front of me.
Mr. Podell: That is up to counsel. Will
you stipulate that these physically are the
books that Fred Stern used without guaranteeing that those entries are the same entries, or any other guaranties; but that these
books are the same thing?
Mr. Marshall: The covers, you mean?
Mr. Podell: The physical books. I mean
the covers and the pages.
Mr. Marshall: They are loose leaf.
Mr. Podell: They are not all loose leaf.
Most of them are bound, and even if they
are loose leaf, there is certain identity both
in the cover and in the contents.
The Court: There certainly is, but not
from this witness,
Mr. Podell: I want to know first whether
they will put me to the necessity of calling
half a dozen people that I have here to identify these books. If counsel think they can
gain anything by it, of course that is their
privilege, but I will do that if I must.
Mr. Marshall: Are you finished?
Mr. Podell: I want to know whether you
will stipulate that. If not, I will call my
witnesses.
Mr. Marshall: We are in this position,
your Honor—that after all these years we
cannot possibly say what was in the books
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at that time, whether any given entry or
given sheet is as it was at that time. It is
unfair to ask us.
Mr. Podell: That is just what I am not
asking you for.
Mr. Marshall: May I proceed without interruption?
Mr. Podell: I will withdraw my request
for a stipulation. Romberg, take the stand.
Mr. Marshall: May I finish what I was
going to say?
Mr. Podell: I have withdrawn any request for any stipulation. I find now we
waste more time by discussing it.
The Court: The question is withdrawn.
That ends the matter.
(Witness excused.)

LESLIE M. SIESS, a witness called on behalf of the
plaintiff, being first duly sworn, and stating that he
resides at 571 Madison Avenue, Elizabeth, New
Jersey, testified as follows:

Direct examination by Mr. Podell.
198

Q. What is your business, Mr. Siess? A. I am
with the New Empire Corporation as a clerk.
Q. Were you ever connected with Touche, Niven
& Co.? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you do accountancy for them? A. I
worked as a junior.
Q. You worked as a junior accountant for them?
A. As a junior accountant.
Q. Did you work on the books of Fred Stern &
Company? A. Yes.
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Q. At the premises of Fred Stern & Company?
A. Yes.
Q. State the time when you worked on the books
of Fred Stern & Company? A. I imagine for
about three weeks or more.
Q. What three weeks?
The Court: Identify the year, sir, if you
can.
The Witness: I went there in the latter
part of the year 1923. I imagine it was three
weeks out of the latter part of December and
the first part of January, 1924.
200
Q. What did you do, what was your first job
there? A. I was to work for Mr. Romberg.
Q. What were you to do working for Mr. Romberg? A. Post the ledger.
Q. Post the ledger from what date to what date?
A. I think from April, 1923, to the end of the
year.
Q. You posted it up from April, 1923, to the end
of 1923, is that right? A. Yes.
Q. Who told you to do that? A. Mr. Romberg.
Q. Were you taking your instructions from Mr.
Romberg? A. Yes.
Q;. Who told you to take your instructions from
Mr. Romberg? A. I believe, practically, Mr. Rea.
Q. Who was Mr. Rea? A. A manager of Touche,
Niven & Co.
Q. You found that their general ledger had not
been written up for how long? A. As I say, from
April, 1923. I imagine it was about that date.
Q. Did you report that to Mr. Rea? A. I don't
know as though I did or not.
Q. Was it not an unusual condition for a general
ledger not to have been posted up from April to
December?
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Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. Will you
show he is an expert to give an opinion of
that sort?
The Court: I will allow it as a matter of
course of business.
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Q. Did it strike you as unusual that the ledger
had not been written up from April to December?
A. Well, yes.
Q. You did not report it to Mr. Rea, the manager? A. As I said, I don't know as though I did
or not.
Q. You do not know whether you did or you did
not? A. I think that was my answer before.
Q. Can you identify your own handwriting in
any of these books? A. I think I can.
Q. Can you point to the book that you wrote
in, please? Would you recognize it better by looking at them? A. I guess I had better.
Q. (Handing book to witness) What book is that
that you are looking at ? A. This appears to be the
general ledger.
Q. Is it the same general ledger that you wrote
in, or is there some doubt about that in your mind?
A. I recognize some of my figures in here.
Q. Is it the same book that you wrote in, yes or
no? Can't you say that?
Mr. Marshall: Part of it may be the same,
part of it may not, your Honor.
Mr. Podell: That is a very happy suggestion to your witness. It had not occurred to
him. I object to counsel
Mr. Marshall: He is your witness now.
Mr. Podell: Your employee, not mine.
Mr. Marshall: He is not my employee.
Mr. Podell: I disown him.
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Mr. Marshall: You called him; you cannot disown him.
The Court: He is yours for all purposes
here.
Mr. Podell: Excepting I have the right to
cross-examine as an employee of the defendants.
Mr. Marshall: He is not an employee, and
he so testified, Mr. Podell.
Q. Were you an employee of Touche, Niven &
Co. at the time you were up there?
The Court: He said he was.

•
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Q. Can you answer the question that has been
put? A. I can't identify this book in its entirety.
Q. You cannot? A. Not in its entirety.
Q. Do you find everything that you wrote in
there? A. I don't know as I can find everything I
wrote in this book.
Q. Do you find any of your writing in there? A.
I said so before, that I recognized some.
Q. Will you turn to the pages that you wrote in.
The Court: This will be a job forever and
a day.
Mr. Podell: I cannot help it, your Honor.
I do not know what we are wasting a lot of
time about. Counsel won't stipulate the
books, so I have to prove them, that is all.
The Witness: Do you want me to identify
each sheet that I have figures on?
Q. Can you identify the rubber sales account
that you wrote up? Have you got the account? A.
Yes, I have found it.
Q. Is it in your handwriting? A. Not all of it.
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Q. Where did your handwriting begin? A. 6/10.
I am in doubt as to the 5/7.
Q. You are in doubt about the entry made on
5/7, which is May 7th, is that it? A. Yes.
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Mr. Marshall: 5/7, does that mean May
7th?
The Witness: I assume it would.
Mr. Marshall: It may refer to something
else.
Mr. Podell: Will you please not tell him
what it means or what you think it means.
I submit he should not interrupt my questions by saying he thinks it means something
else.
Mr. Marshall: I am sorry. I meant to
object to Mr. Podell's leading the witness by
saying that meant May 7th or whatever it
was.
Mr. Podell: You should have taken your
objection.
Q. What is it? Are you in doubt now about 5/7
being May 7th? A. I say I am in doubt as to
whether those are my figures.
Q. What I am asking you now is, is there any
doubt in your mind whether 5/7 means May 7th of
1923? A. Yes, there would be doubt.
Q. There would be doubt as to that in your mind?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, let me see, Mr. Clerk or Assistant—is
that what you called yourself, a clerk or assistant to
Touche, Niven? A. Junior.
Q. Your page begins with 1/38, does it not?
Mr. Marshall: January 38th, yes.
The Court: Mr. Marshall, please, do not
interrupt again.
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Mr. Marshall: I am sorry my sense of
humor got the better of me, your Honor.
Q. What do these numbers to the left indicate?
A. I was ahead of Mr. Marshall. I happened to
see that 1/38. That is what made me doubt.
Q. What do the numbers to the left indicate?
How many such separate numbers are there? A.
One to twelve.
Q. Do you understand that the year 1922 had
twelve months? A. I imagine so.
Q. So that the numbers 1 to 12 as they appear
on the left-hand column, do they indicate the first,
second, third, fourth month? A. I assume they
would.
Q. You assume that much. You know that much,
do you not, or is it just an assumption? A. I know
that much, if it wasn't for this figure here, this
1/38.
Q. We will come to that in a moment. As an
accountant, did you ever try to find out what the
figures are that you wrote, what they meant? A.
I did at the time.
Q. You knew, did you not? A. Yes.
Q. Now, you are certain that you wrote these
figures I am pointing to now, 6/10? A. I am almost certain.
Q. Almost certain? A. Yes.
Q. Are you Certain that you wrote 7/5? A. Yes.
Q. You are certain about that. Can you tell us
what the 10 or the 5 meant when you wrote it? A.
To me now that looks like 6/10.
Q. What does that mean? A. I would say June,
but I don't know whether it would mean the 10th
of June or not.
Q. What is this account? A. Rubber sales.
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Q. Mr. Witness, can you tell this jury what it is
that you wrote on there after you began to write?
A. Posted the debits and credits to the rubber sales
account.
Q:. You pasted the debits and the credits to the
rubber sales account, is that right? A. Yes,
Q. From what period to what period? A. From
June, 1923
Q. Up to what period now? Answer the question? A. It is identified on this sheet as 12-8.
Q. What year? A. 1923.
Q. That is December 8th, 1923. Now, can you
say to this jury that all these items that preceded—
that appeared to have been made before you actually there at the time when you began your writing? A. Yes,
Q. Then that account contains entries that were
there when you started and contains also entries
made by you up to December 8, 1923, and contains
one entry that you are in doubt about, that is
12/29, is that the thing? A. Yes.
Q. You are in doubt about that one? A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Now, you are certain that that is the book
that this account was in, are you not, or was it in
some other book? A. That I couldn't tell you.
Q. Are you certain that that is the book that
that account was in? What would you call this
book? A. I say that is the general ledger.
Q. And was this account in the general ledger
at the time you wrote on it? A. The account was
in the general ledger.
Q. At the time you wrote on it? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And is this the general ledger that you wrote
in? A. That I don't remember.
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Q. Will you look through and see if you find
other handwriting there than yours? A. Yes, there
is other accounts.
Q. That you wrote in? A. Yes.
Q. You recognize your handwriting in there? A.
Yes.
Q. With these other items of handwriting and
these other accounts that were in there, can you
not tell this jury whether this is the book that you
wrote in at that time? A. I can say that I wrote
in this book.
Q. That is all that I am asking you. A. But I
doubt as to its entirety.
Q. Did I ask you anything about its entirety?
A. No.
Q. Who was it that suggested entirety to your
mind? A. Nobody.
Q. Have you talked over this question of your
identifying these books with any of the lawyers or
any of the Touche-Niven people? Have you talked
about that before you came to court? A. Yes.
Q. Who was it told you about entirety of the
contents of the books when you talked to them?
Who was it talked to you about entirety? A. I
talked on these books before a referee some
Q. I am talking now about any lawyers or any
people that you spoke to before you came here to
identify these books.
Mr. Marshall: I think it is improper for
him to cross-examine his own witness.
The Court: I will allow this question.
While not a hostile witness, he was in the
employ of the defendant.
The Witness: Nobody told me as to its
entirety.
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Q. Did anybody talk to you as to identifying
these books as a witness here in court?
The Court:
tion?

On the subject of identifica-

A. No.
Q. Nobody at all? A. No.
Q. You have not any reluctance to identifying
the book, have you? A. No, sir.
Q. Do you say that this is the general ledger that
you worked on at that time?
221

Mr. Marshall: I think that question has
been asked in several different forms already.
Mr. Podell: It has been answered in several forms, and I would like to get a definite
answer on that.
Q. Is this the
for Fred Stern
From the sheets
say yes, but not

222

general ledger that you worked on
& Company, and its books? A.
I find my handwriting in, I would
in its entirety.

Mr. Podell: I offer the book in evidence,
your Honor.
Mr. Marshall: I object to the admission
of anything excepting what the witness had
his handwriting on.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
(Received in evidence heretofore, having
been marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2.)
Mr. Podell: I ask that these work sheets
be marked for identification at the present
time.
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Mr. Marshall: Why not put them in evidence?
Mr. Podell: I will only mark them for
identification.
(Marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 15 for
Identification.)
Q. Can you identify any other books here that
you worked on? If you cannot identify them, can
you name them? A. No, I cannot.
Q. Do you mean to tell this jury now, that you
were working in the employ of Touche, Niven & Co.
and that you did not at that time know the names
of the books you were working on? A. No.
Q. You do not mean that, do you? A. No.
Q. You do know? A. Yes.
Q. What books were you working on besides the
general ledger? Never mind looking at those. Just
tell me what books.
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The Court: That is a pretty hard question. Remember this is an accountant who
has worked in a number of places. It may
be difficult to test his recollection, to snap
so quickly an answer.
Q. Do the best you can and see what you can
remember of the type of books you examined. If
it is going to help you to see these, I will be very
pleased to have you look at them, if it is going to
help you to identify the books you worked on.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. You just look at this book, Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 4, and tell us whether you made any entries
in that book (handing to witness), either made
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entries or worked on at the time you were working
there. A. Did you want me to identify this book,
as to what it is?
Q. Yes. A. And if I made any entries in it?
Q. Yes. A. And if I worked on it?
Q. That is it. A. In answer to the first question,
this is the accounts receivable ledger. I don't see
any figures here that are mine, as making any
entries, but I believe I must have worked on it.
Q. Do you recognize it at all, after seeing it now,
as one of the books that you had in the place at
that time? A. It looks like one of the books they
had up there. It has been five years and I don't
quite remember all the books.
Q. Did you not make any record of the books you
were working on? A. I may have.
Q. Where would that record be? A. Time sheet.
Mr. Podell: I ask for the production of
the time sheet.
Mr. Marshall: They do not show any list,
Mr. Podell.
Q. What is there about the book that makes you
say
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Mr. Marshall: Just a minute, please.
He asked for the production of a paper and
I want to produce it (handing paper to
counsel).
Q. Will you look at the time sheets that are produced here and see whether that will refresh your
recollection so that you can identify the books that
you worked on? A. May I answer now?
Q. Yes. A. General ledger, accounts receivable
book.
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Q. Is there anything on those time sheets that
enables you to identify the book before you as the
accounts receivable book that you worked on at
that time? A. No.
Q. Do you say that that book before you is the
book that you worked on at that time? A. It appears to be the book, because a good many rubber
accounts are listed here, Canadian Consolidated
Rubber, etc.
Q. You mean you recall that from those names
or those pages? A. No.
Q. What do you remember about the book that
identifies it in your mind? A. It is not identified in
my mind.
Q. Look through it and see if you cannot find
some trace of your writing or your auditing or
anything that will identify it; just look through a
few of the pages, anyway.
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Mr. Podell: Is Mr. Towell in court?
Mr. Towell, take the stand, please.
Mr. Marshall: May I have the privilege of
cross-examining this witness?
The Court: You may cross-examine him
now, if you wish to.
Cross-examination

by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. You said you were employed by the Empire—
what company was it? A. New Empire Corporation.
Q. How long have you been employed there?
Speak up so the jury can hear you. A. Three years.
Q. And were you discharged by Touche-Niven,
or why did you leave them? A. I was not discharged. I had a better offer.
Q. From the New Empire people or their connections? A. Yes.
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Q. Now you say you posted a ledger. Do you
know which ledger it was that you posted at Stern
& Company? A. Yes, the general ledger.
Q. That is not the accounts receivable ledger, is
it? A. No.
Q. Not the customers' ledger, rather? A. No.
Q. That is the part of the general ledger which
is a summary of the customers' ledger? A. Well,
the general ledger is not a summary of the customers' ledger, but there is an account in the general ledger that would naturally have a summary,
the accounts receivable control.
Q. Is Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 the book that you referred to and in which you did the writing (handing to witness) ? A. Yes.
Q. Now, I think you said that you took instructions from Romberg. On what did you take instructions from Romberg? A. Mr. Romberg gave
me instructions what to do. You want to know
what they were?
Q. No. Was that in posting the books, was that
in respect to posting the books? A. Yes. He instructed me to post the books.
Q. Did he give you any instructions at all with
respect to the audit of the books? A. No.
Q. Whose instructions did you take in respect to
auditing the books when you came to that? A. Mr.
Towell.
Q. And who was Mr. Towell? A. An employee
of Touche, Niven & Co.
Q. He was your senior was he not, the senior
accountant? A. Yes.
Q. And Mr. Romberg was who? A. An employee
of Fred Stern & Company.
Q. What were the duties of a junior accountant
on an audit, as you understood them? A. To fol-

79
Leslie M. Siess—For Plaintiff—Cross.
low the instructions of the senior to the best of his
ability.
Q. And what did you do in connection with this
audit as far as you can recollect—I will withdraw
that and say, did you follow the instructions of the
senior? A. Yes, I did.
Q. On this audit? A. Yes.
Q. And anybody else's instructions; did you follow anybody else's instructions on the audit besides
the instructions of the senior? A. No.
Q. You said you came to Stern & Company, I believe, in December, 1923. Is that your best recollection?
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The Court: Refresh it, if you can.
Q. Will you look at your time sheets and see if
that refreshes your recollection any on that point
(handing to witness) ? A. Yes, it does.
Q. When did you first come there? A. January
28.

Q. January 28? A. 1924.
Q. Not in December? A. No. I am in error.
Mr. Podell: I ask that these time sheets
be marked in evidence, your Honor, so far
as they relate to Fred Stern & Company.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, may
we make a transcript of it, to be put in evidence, because they do refer to other accounts of ours.
Mr. Podell: There is only one page, I
think, that refers to other accounts, and I
have no objection to that page—a transcript
being made thereof. There is one toward the
end. You can make a transcript of that.
(Time sheets received in evidence and
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16.)
(Witness excused.)
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SYDNEY TOWELL, witness called on behalf of the
plaintiff, and being first duly sworn, and stating
that he resides at 1950 Andrews Avenue, New York
City, testified as follows:

Direct examination
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by Mr. Podell.

Q. Mr. Towell, what is your business or occupation? A. Public accountant.
Q. And were you connected with Touche, Niven
& Co. in 1923 and 1924? A. Yes.
Q. And in what capacity? A. As a senior accountant.
Q. As a senior accountant, you say? A. Yes.
Q. Did you have occasion to do any work on the
books of Fred Stern? A. Yes.
Q. All I am going to ask of you now is to tell
the Judge , and jury, if you can, can you identify
the books that you worked on? A. I have no recollection about the books to-day.
Q. Can you identify the books that you worked
on for Fred Stern & Company? A. No.
Q. Your answer is no? A. No.
Q. Did you write in any of them? A. No.
Q. Did you make any checks in any of them? A.
I do not think so.
Q. You do not think so? A. No.
Q. How much time did you put in at the premises
of Fred Stern & Company? A. About two weeks.
Q. Is that all the time that you put in? A. Yes.
Q. In connection with what did you put in those
two weeks? A. Examination of the records in the
preparation of a balance sheet,
Q. You did that in two weeks? A. Yes.
Q. What records did you examine? A. Pretty
nearly all of the records in the office of Fred Stern.
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Q. What did they include, what records did they
include? A. It included their ledgers
Q. What did your examination consist of? A. A
balance sheet audit,
Q. And in making that balance sheet audit, did
you not make some marks of some kind in those
books? A. No.
Q. Did you. not check any of the figures? A.
Yes,
Q. Did you prepare work sheets from those
figures as you saw them in the books? A. Yes.
Q. Can you by comparison of your work sheets
with the books presented to you, check off to see
whether or not the entries on your work sheets were
copied from those books; can you do that? A. If
you have the books here I could probably check
through most of these work sheets, as you suggest,
Q. All right. Take the first of these work sheets.
Take your general ledger trial balance, if you
please. Have you got that general ledger trial balance? Have you got your work sheets covering the
accounts receivable? A. I have the general ledger
trial balance that you asked for.
Q. We will pass that for the moment. Look at
your work sheets covering accounts receivable. A.
Yes, I have that,
Q. Now, that contains certain conclusions and
certain figures copied from certain books, does it
not? A. Yes,
Q. Look at the book before you now and make
as many comparisons as you require in order to be
able to answer the question whether that paper
before you, those figures, those work sheets were
copied from the book that is before you. Just check
up something of the figures on the one with the
other and see if they are taken from that book?
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Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I
think he ought to put the work sheets in evidence if he is going to use them as a basis
of comparison. They are only marked for
identification.
Mr. Podell: I have not any objection to
putting in evidence whatever work sheets I
use.
Mr. Marshall: If they go in, they ought
to all go in, because they are part of the
same thing.
Mr. Podell: Does counsel want to take
the position I am bound by the contents of
those papers because I put them in evidence?
And if your Honor will hold
The Court: I have not thus held, and I
do not propose to.
Mr. Marshall: I have not made any such
claim, your Honor.
Mr. Podell: I will offer them in evidence,
if that is what you wish. I offer them all
in evidence, upon the understanding, or,
rather, upon the reservation that I certainly
do not propose to be bound by their contents, being the papers and books and records of the defendants themselves, made at
that time.
Mr. Marshall: He has got to be bound to
some extent by their contents.
The Court: That is just the point, so the
Court stands on its original ruling. The
application for counsel to put all these papers in evidence is denied and an exception
given to the counsel for the defendant.
Mr. Podell: I will put in the paper I call
for.
The Court: Proceed.
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Q. Have you made those check-ups? A. No, sir.
Q. Check as many that will satisfy you so you
can say those items on your work sheets were really
copied from the book before you.
Mr. Marshall: There is the work sheet
there now, and I think this is the time to
mark that particular sheet.
Mr. Podell: Yes.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 15-A.)
Mr. Marshall: May we have the name of
this particular sheet?
The Witness: It is the working papers on
the accounts receivable of Fred Stern &
Company in connection with the audit of
December 31, 1923.
Q. Are those working sheets in your handwriting? A. Part.
Q. But you know the handwriting on the others
are? They were all Touche-Niven men that were
working on those? A. I am not at this time certain of Mr. Siess's handwriting, but I believe them
to all be in his handwriting, if not in my own.
Q. And Siess was an employee of Touche-Niven
at that time? A. Yes,
Q. Will you go along and check them up and see
if you can say the book before you is the book you
made those work sheets from? A. I didn't copy
these down out of the ledger, you know.
Q. That is the accounts receivable book, I think,
that you have before you. You said you copied
them from the accounts receivable? A. That was
done at my direction.
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Q. Check the one against the other and see if
you can say it was done from the book before you.
Just check them up so you will be satisfied, so that
you can honestly say that that is the book. A.
I have an account here that is the same name on
the account, on the trial balance. I haven't yet
followed the balance of the account into this ledger
account,
Q. Now, can you not check up one against the
other, so that you can say to twelve men that this
is the book from which these figures were taken;
can't you do that? A. No.
Q. You cannot do that? A. No.
Q. Was this taken from the accounts receivable
ledger? A. Yes.
Q. And if a book were presented to you that
purports to be the accounts receivable ledger, you
could not check one against the other so you can
say whether these figures were compiled from that
book? Do you understand my question? A. I do.
Q. You are sure you understand it? A. Yes.
Q. Now, here you have—these are work sheets,
are they not? A. Yes.
Q. They are work sheets of what, on the subject
of accounts receivable, are they not? A. Yes.
Q. You know as an accountant that they must
have been taken from some accounts receivable
ledger; you know that, do you not? A. Yes.
Q. Now, you have the names of the various accounts, have you not? Where do you begin? Where
is your first one? A. Akron Seamless Rubber Company.
Q. Can you tell us whether there is an account
by the name of Akron Seamless Rubber Company
in that book? A. The name is in the index.
Q. Now, will you turn to the book? A. Yes, there
is.
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Q. Is there any account that precedes it? A. Yes.
Q. Which one is it ? A. The Asbestos Textile.
Q. That is a closed account as of the date of this
audit, is it not? A. Yes, it appears to be.
Q. So that really the first open account in this
accounts receivable book is the Akron Seamless
Rubber Company; that is the first open account,
is it not? A. That is the first open account.
Q. Does it also appear to be the first open account on this work sheet? A. Yes.
Q. It does, does it not? A. Yes.
Q. Can you get any other comparisons on that
account so you can get—what is your next item?
Is the amount due from them stated here on your
account? A. $69,981.75.
Q. Do you find that precise figure on the page
of the Akron account ?
Mr. Marshall: I think we might save time.
I will be ready to concede that these sheets
show items that were on the books, if that
will help, Mr. Podell.
The Court: He wants to know whether
that is the book.
Mr. Marshall: If we can shorten it by the
other concession.
Mr. Podell: It has taken a long time to
extract that little bit of a concession, but I
think we better go through now.
Mr. Marshall: You never asked for it.
Mr. Podell: We had better go through
now and prove our case.
Mr. Marshall: If you will find a place in
the record where you asked me to make a
concession that the work sheets show
Mr. Podell: I stopped asking concessions.
I will prove them if it takes me a week.
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Mr. Marshall: I defy him to show where
he made such a request.
By Mr. Podell.
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Q. The question is whether this first figure that
you have here, $69,981.75, is the precise figure that
appears on this page, $69,981.75? A. Yes.
Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that this
first item was taken from that page? A. The figure
is the same.
Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that this first
item was taken by you from this first page? A.
It was not taken by me.
Q. But taken by whomever they were taken, were
taken from this first page?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling
for a conclusion.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, accountants can
only give conclusions.
Mr. Marshall: That is a concession I am
awfully glad to have.
Mr. Podell: Exception. I would like to
be heard on that question.
The Court: He took all of his from the
work sheets.
Mr. Podell: This is the work sheet I am
talking about.
Q. Did you examine the work sheets? A. Yes.
Q. You did examine the work sheets at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. After the juniors had prepared them? A.
Yes.
Q. And did you examine this book yourself? A.
The book came to my attention. I did some work
on it.
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Q. Did you not check off and make the comparison to see whether there was a correct transcript
made? A. No.
Q. What did you do in connection with that
book? Did you not make the audit? A. I directed
Mr. Siess to take off a trial balance, which he did.
Q. You said that you examined
Mr. Marshall: Please do not interrupt the
witness.
The Court: Let him answer.
The Witness: I saw that he had taken off
a trial balance and that his addition of that
trial balance and his total balance agreed
with the total as shown in the general ledger.
Q. Is that all that you did? A. I then had him
make a further examination of each and every account, and aged the account in order that I could
properly take them up as to their age and their
collectibility. I think that was all the work done
by Mr. Siess that I myself
Q. Mr. Siess is the young man that preceded you
on the witness stand? A. Yes.
Q. Now, did you personally check up on his work
sheets to find out whether he did his work correctly?
A. Sufficient for my purposes. Not a complete
check right through.
Q. Did you do it? Yes or no. Did you do it?
A. No.
Q. You did not do it? A. Not the whole thing.
Q. I did not ask you about every item. Did you
do it in the way you thought it ought to be done?
A. Yes.
Q. And did not that involve checking up to see
whether or not these items are correctly transcribed
from the accounts receivable? A. No.
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Q. Or whether the total is correct? A. Whether
the total is correct, yes.
Q. Which total did you check up on? A. The
total of these sheets.
Q. The total of each separate sheet? A. No, the
total of the whole thing. This total (indicating).
Q. I see. Now, then, if you as an accountant
were asked to identify this book as the accounts
receivable ledger, could you do it as an accountant
by examining these work sheets and seeing whether
these work sheets represent work sheets of figures
taken from this book; could you do that? A. No.
Q. You could not do it? A. No.
Q. Not even if every item that appears on these
work sheets is identical with every item that appears on those very accounts in this book. To you
as an accountant, that would not be enough? A.
I could prove it out as an accountant if I found
a duplicate in this ledger of everything that I have
on the sheets, I would come to the conclusion myself that it was the same ledger.
Q. That it is the same book. Well, now, would
you have to examine every one of these items on
these sheets to say that, or could you make a checkup? A. I don't know whether I could do it then.
Q. You just told us that you would come to that
conclusion if every one of these items— A. I said
I would probably come to that conclusion.
Q. You want to put in the word "probably"? A.
I can't tell how it would come out.
Q. I am not asking you how it would come out.
I am assuming now that every item that you have
on these yellow sheets is found in this book exactly
the same; whether you as an accountant would say
to the jury that those entries were taken from that
book? Now, would you do that, could you do that?
A. No.
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Q. You are sure you understand my question?
A. Yes, I understand your question.
Q. Will you be good enough during recess
Mr. Podell: I take it that your Honor
wants to recess at the usual hour?
The Court: Yes, we will take it now.
Mr. Podell: I was going to ask the witness if he could do it in recess time, so as to
save us time, to check off these figures and
at least tell the jury whether the figures on
his work sheets are contained in this book,
referring to the accounts receivable ledger.
(Recess until 2 o'clock P. M.)
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A F T E R RECESS.
SYDNEY T O W E L L

Direct examination

resumed.
(continued)

by Mr.

Podell.

Q. Now, have you traced a number of these items
that appear on the work sheets with regard to the
accounts receivable, so you can say that they came
out of the book that is before you? A. Yes. May
I qualify that?
Q. Yes. A. I have it. I can't say they came out
of the book. I find the same items with the same
names of account on this sheet before me, as there
are in this ledger.
Q. What do you call the book before you; what
do you call it? A. It appears to me to be an accounts receivable ledger.
Q. And how would you describe the work sheet
before you?
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The Court: That has already been described as the accounts receivable summary.
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Q. Accounts receivable work sheet, is that it?
A. Yes.
Q. So you can say from your experience as an
accountant that that accounts receivable work
sheet must have been taken from some accounts
receivable ledger? A. Yes.
Q. And so far as you have examined, about how
many items have you compared? A. About a third;
almost a half.
Q. Almost half. Of how many, a total of about
how many? A. About eighty accounts.
Q. The total is eighty? A. About.
Q. So that you must have compared forty, about?
A. I have compared about eighty.
Q. You have compared about eighty as to the
names and the amounts and the items, and they
tally? A. As to the names, and the total amount.
Q. They tally? A. Yes.
Q. The book that we have referred to is Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 in evidence. Now, have you got a
work sheet there for accounts payable? A. Yes.
Q. Will you look at this book I show you now
—I see it has not been marked.
Mr. Podell: I ask that this book be marked
as an exhibit.
Mr. Marshall: I think we ought to have
some identification on that.
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor permit me
to ask a question from the floor?
The Court: Yes. You are addressing
whom now?
Mr. Podell: Addressing Mr. Djorup. This
book that I show you, was this also one of
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the books that you found in the office of
Fred Stern & Company at the time you came
up there in January, 1925?
Mr. Djorup: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: May I ask, as I asked you
before; you could not say the entries in that
book in January or February, 1924, were
the same, could you, of your own knowledge?
Mr. Djorup: Not of my own knowledge.
Mr. Marshall: And you cannot say
whether there were any other sheets in that
loose leaf book which may have been in there
in 1924 and may be out of there now; you
could not say that, could you?
Mr. Djorup: No, I couldn't.
Mr. Podell: Since 1925 you have not taken
any loose leaf pages out of this, have you?
Mr. Djorup: No, I have not,
Mr. Marshall: I would not even suggest
that,
Mr. Podell: At least they are in the condition he found them in.
Mr. Marshall: I assume so. That is admitted in the same way as the others, I
take it.
The Court: Yes, taken with the same reservation.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 17.)
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Now, take a half dozen items at random from
your accounts payable work sheets. Pick them at
random and check them as against that book, and
see if you can tell us whether the items on your
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accounts payable work sheet tally with the entries
in the book, Plaintiff's Exhibit 17. How many
items have you looked at? A. I have looked at
about six items.
Q. Did you pick those items at random? A. Yes.
Q. Do you find they tally with the entries in that
book before you, Plaintiff's Exhibt 17? A. Five of
them do, but there is one item that
Q. You find that they tally as to name and
amount, is that right? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which one is it that you are having difficulty
with? A. There may not be any difficulty. The
item I have difficulty with is the account of Huttonbach Lazarus & Sons. The balance on my work
sheet is a credit balance of $49.80.
Q. How much does it appear in the books? A.
On the ledger account, under date of January 1,
1924, the balance carried forward is $49.80, but I
do not find the sheet that has the December 31st
balance. It probably is the same, of course.
Q. Probably it is $49.80, you mean? A. Probably
so. This is a balance carried forward, but I do
not find the sheet from which it was carried forward. Not positively. The preceding sheet would
normally be the sheet.
Q. That is sheet No. 2, is it not? A. Yes.
Q. This is account No. 6, and that is account
No. 6? A. Yes, it is the same account apparently.
Q. And the preceding sheet, you say, should show
—what is this item here (indicating)? A. That is
an item $49.80.
Q. Well, it does show it, does it not, the preceding sheet? A. No. This item of $49.80 is in the
middle of the account. The item you are pointing
to is dated April 12th.
Q. What is carried forward out here as a balance
(indicating)? A. That is $49.80.
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Q. So you have that figure. The account as you
have it appearing three or four times in the hook,
haven't you, as $49.80? Here again it is $49.80
(indicating), is it not? A. That is in 1924.
Q. Yes. Well, you made your audit in 1924,
did you not? A. I am looking for the December
31st, 1923, balance. I cannot find the end of the
account.
Q. Was there a balance struck at December 31,
1923? A. Apparently so.
Q. Now, let us see. The last entry here is July
12th, is it not? A. July 11th.
Q. July 11th, is it? A. It looks like that to
me.
Q. July 12th is one entry and then July 11th is
another, and the last balance that appears under
the column of "balance" appears to be $49.80, does
it not? A. Yes.
Q. That is, under the column "balance," and
that is the last item that appears under 1923, is it
not? This is 1923, is it not? Is that right? A.
Yes, that is 1923.
Q. Now, the last balance that appears under the
column of "balance" on the sheet for 1923 is $49.80?
Mr. Marshall: Under what date, Mr. Podell, 1923?
Mr. Podell: July 12, 1923.
Q:. That would indicate to you, would it not,
that between July 12, 1923, and December 1, 1923,
there were no other transactions? A. No.
Q. Would not that indicate it to you? A. No.
Q. Have you got any transactions entered between July, 1923, and January 1, 1924; have you
got any entries of it at all? A. I don't see any
here.
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Q. All right. Now, at least so far as these items
are concerned, that would indicate to you there was
no other transaction between July 12, 1923, and
January 1, 1924? A. No, I wouldn't say that.
Q. You would not say that? A. No.
Q. Are there any items here which indicate that
there were any transactions in this book between
July 12, 1923, and December 31st, 1923, with this
concern, Huttonbach, Lazarus & Sons? A. There
appears to be part of the account missing from
July 11th to December 31st. The balance is the
same.
Q. The balance would be the same? A. There
may be other transactions, with that whole balance
left open.
Q. Both of these are on one page, on both sides
of one page? A. There seems to be some mix-up
of accounts.
Q. Is there a mix-up in the books or is there a
mix-up in your mind? Just wait a minute, please.
Is it not true the last item on the reverse side of
this one sheet is entered as of July 12, and the
one before that July 12, 1923; that is true, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. When you reverse the process and look at
this side of the page, it begins with January, 1924?
A. Yes.
Q. You would not say there is a page missing
in between those two, would you? A. No.
Q. At least the last balance that appears in this
book is $49.80, is it not, under the column of "balance" for 1923? A. I don't think so.
Q. Well, what do you read there? A. I see the
figure carried out.
Q. And under what figure is it carried out? A.
Under "balance."
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Q. And is it the last item that appears under
that column? A. It is the last item under that
column.
Q. That is all I asked you, sir, 'Now, the first
item that appears on the 1924 colmun, is how much
of a balance, under the head of "balance"; January
1, 1924, balance how much? A. $49.80.
Q. Now, how much is there on your account for
that date? A. $49.80.
Q. Now, is there any other item that you want
to check?
Mr. Marshall: May I ask him about that
item or would you rather have me wait?
Mr. Podell: Certainly, but let me finish
this first,
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Q. Are there any other items you want to check
to see if they tally with the book? How many have
you checked?
The Court:

Six.

A. I have checked six.
Q. And you said that you had picked them at
random? A. Yes.
Q. As an accountant, can you say to this jury
that that work sheet that you have there of accounts
payable was taken from this book for accounts
payable? A. No.
Q. You could not say that? A. No.
Q. Do you know of any other book that it might
have been taken from? A. It was taken from the
accounts payable ledger of Fred Stern & Company.
Q. And despite the fact that you have chosen six
items at your own free will, and that at least as
to the figures and accounts they appear in that very
book, you cannot tell this jury, as an experienced
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accountant, whether that work sheet was taken and
made up from that book, Plaintiff's Exhibit 17? A.
I can merely tell them that the figures that I have
checked agree with the balances, with figures shown
in this book.
Q. How many accounts payable ledgers did they
have, do you know? A. I don't remember.
Q. Have you got any record of how many accounts payable ledgers they had? A. No.
Q. Have you got any record of the books that
you examined? A. No.
Q. Is there any way from your papers that you
can tell what books you examined? Have you got
your time sheets? A. Yes.
Q. Will you produce them, please?
(Produced by Mr. Marshall and handed
to counsel.)
Mr. Podell: Let us mark his accounts
payable work sheets in evidence.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 15-B.)
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Mr. Podell: I offer the entries in both
as they relate to the Fred Stern & Company
account. I offer them in evidence, paper
produced by the defendants.
Mr. Marshall: No objection. I assume
here too, we can make transcripts.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 18.)
The Court: Let me ask you something,
Mr. Accountant: Is that a conclusion that
you draw based on the fact that your recollection fails you as to the identity of these
books, or is it based on the fact that you
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never saw these books at all and worked on
the work sheet supplied to you by your
junior?
The Witness: It is based on the fact that
I cannot recollect what the books looked like
or what they contained. I did see the books.
The Court: Let me get that clear. In
other words, your declination to say that
these are the books is based on the failure
of recollection as distinguished from the fact
that you do not say that they are not the
books. In other words, you fail to identify
them because of recollection?
The Witness: Yes.
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Q. For how many years did you work on these
books altogether? A. One only.
Q. Only 1923? A. Yes.
Q. Who did the work for 1922; do you know?
A. I don't recall.
Q. You are still with Touche, Niven & Co., are
you not? A. Yes.
Cross-examination

by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. Mr. Towell, you are loaned out at present,
are you not? You are not being paid by them?
A. No, that is right,
Mr. Podell: What does that mean? I do
not quite follow.
The Witness.: I have been doing some private work for a client and have a temporary
arrangement whereby I have not resigned
from the staff, but I have been doing some
private work, a tentative arrangement.
The Court: Private work under the control of somebody else?
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The Witness: Yes.
The Court: In other words, not being under the control as an employee of this defendant company?
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: You are still connected with
them in the sense that you are loaned out for
this particular purpose?
The Witness: Yes.
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Q. Now, this Huttonbach account, the books are
not closed and balanced for the year there, are they?
A. No.
(Witness excused.)

a witness called on behalf
of the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, testified as
follows:
HUGO W .

ROMBERG,

Direct examination by Mr. Podell.
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Q;. Mr. Romberg, you were at one time connected
with Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Just tell us from what period to what period?
A. Well, as to the years, I don't exactly recollect.
I can refresh my memory. Can I refresh my memory?
The Court: Refresh your memory from
anything you have.
The Witness: Well, when did Mr. Stern
die?
The Court: He died in 1925.
The Witness: I left in March, 1924.
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Q. You say you left— A. I left the company
some time in March, 1924, and was with them two
years previous to that,
Q. So that you would say that you were with
them from March, 1922, to March, 1924? A. From
March, 1922, to March, 1924, yes.
Q. About? A. Correct.
Q. And in what capacity? A. In the capacity
of being in charge of the books and accounts.
Q. Did you do any of the bookkeeping yourself?
A. Some of it.
Q. What system or set of books did they have
there? A. Double entry system with controlling
ledger.
Q. What books comprised that double entry system? A. One of them is a general ledger, which
has subsidiary records.
Q. A little bit louder. First, this general ledger?
A. Yes, which has its subsidiary records, like accounts receivable, accounts payable; then some of
those books have other subsidiary records, like sales
sheets, sales invoices, purchase records, contract
books and the information that goes with it,
Q. Now, of course, you cannot be expected and
I do not want you to misunderstand my question,
to remember all the items that were in all these
books. That is not what I am going to ask you
about. Mr. Romberg, could you identify the books
that you used during those two years? A. Yes,
Some of the books naturally I did not handle personally.
Q. I understand. But you supervised them? A.
I supervised them, yes, sir.
Q. What book is the one I show you now (handing to witness)?
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The Court: And you are referring to what,
Mr. Podell?
Mr. Podell: Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
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A. This is the general control ledger.
Q. And from what period to what period was it
used by Fred Stern & Company? A. From January
1st, 1922, to January 1st, 1924.
Q. That would cover those two years, the year
1922 and the year 1923? A. 1922,1923, to January
1st, 1924.
Q. What is the book to your left, Exhibit No.
4? A. Accounts receivable ledger.
Q. And from what date to what date was that
used by Fred Stern & Company? A. January 1st,
1922, to into 1924; some items appear March 5th,
some June, some even further than that,
Q. When you say March 5th and some June, do
you mean 1924? A. Right.
Q. So that it was used for the entire year 1923,
for the entire year 1922 and for part of 1924; that
is correct, is it not? A. From the entries here, yes.
Q. What is that book there to your right, Plaintiff's Exhibit 17? A. Accounts payable ledger.
Q. And from what date to what date was it used
as an accounts payable ledger by Fred Stern & Company? A. From January 1st, 1921, as far as December 30 th, 1924.
Q. Now, I show you another book and ask you
how would you describe that book (handing to
witness Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 ) ? A. The book
is marked "debit memo" book.
Q. And from what date to what date was that
used by Fred Stern & Company? A. July, 1923, to
December, 1924.
Q. What was the debit memo book; what was it
used for? A. It is a summary of the invoices of
merchandise sold.
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Q. A summary of the invoices for merchandise
sold and shipped, or just sold? A. Sold and
shipped.
Q. You do not make up your invoice until the
shipment is made, do you?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. I do not
think the witness has been shown competent
to answer that question.
Mr. Podell: He was in charge of the bookkeeping.
Mr. Marshall: That does not prove they
could not make up an invoice without shipping, or vice versa.
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Q. What was your practice so far as your supervising the bookkeeping department? Did you understand it to be that whenever a shipment was
made an invoice was made up? A. My supervision
of the bookkeeping department did not go over this
book.
Mr. Marshall: Referring to Exhibit 5.
The Witness: As a matter of fact, many
of the other exhibits.
Q. You saw that book there, did you not? A.
Yes.
Q. I do not quite understand. I would like to
get it clear. You mean you did not supervise the
entries that were made in this book? A. No. I
only seen the book once a month.
Q. But you were the head of that bookkeeping
department? A. Yes.
Q. And seeing it once a month was in the
course of your regular duties; that was part of your
work there; that was what you were paid for? A.
My mind was wandering a little bit, referring to
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your question , before—"Are you head of the bookkeeping department ?" There was a gentleman
there by the name of Mr. Eric Pam.
Q. I call it the bookkeeping department. I do
not care what you call it. I used that word to describe what I mean. A. I had some specific work
to do. I did some specific work.
Q. Yes, I know that. Now, did you not know,
or do you not know, that your practice—did you
ever see an invoice? A. Yes, sir.
Q. You saw a number of them, did you not?
A. Yes, a number of them.
Q. Saw them in the course of the performance
of your duties? A. Yes.
And was it not the practice in Stern & Company that the invoices were made out at the time
when the shipment was made? A. That didn't come
within my jurisdiction at all.
Q. I did not ask you that. I asked you whether
you knew it. I did not ask you whether it came
under your jurisdiction.
Mr. Marshall: I object. He says he cannot answer that question because it did not
come within his jurisdiction.
Mr. Podell: He did not say he could not
answer at all.
The Court: I will allow the question.
Q. You knew a good many things were done in
your business that were outside of your jurisdiction, did you not? Did you not know that you could
Hot make up an invoice until you got the weights?
A. Well, naturally.
Q. And the weights were put right on the invoice?
A. Correct,
Q. And you could not very well know the weights
until a shipment was made?
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that as a conclusion.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
A. That is right.
Q. So that you made up your invoice, and when
you made a shipment you sent an invoice to the
customer, did you not? A. I am answering the question that every invoice is made out that way,
whether it is this one or any other invoice.
Q. There is nothing involved. That is all I am
asking you. Now, this debit memo book that you
see there—I just want to get the successive steps,
Mr. Romberg, and you can help us if you will make
sure to understand the question; the successive
steps. You have spoken of various books you had
there. When you got an order, I suppose some
entry was made somewhere of the order, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. What book was that entered in? A. Contract
book.
Q. In the contract book? A. Yes.
Q. After the order was received, then the shipment had to be made pursuant to that order, is that
right? A. Right.
Q. Now, at the time the shipment was made there
was a shipping record made of that shipment, was
there not? A. I suppose so.
Q. Well, did you not see shipping record books?
A. No.
Q. How would you describe these books I show
you now (handing to witness) ? A. Those are shipping record books.
Q. They are shipping record books? A. Yes.
Q. Just look at the dates and tell us from what
date to what date those shipping record books were
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used, Exhibits 7 and 8? A. This book I have in
front of me now, numbered from 10,001 to 10,500.
Q. And the dates are what? A. Are from October 5th, 1923, to December 19th, 1923.
Mr. Limburg:
Honor.
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Q. From October, 1923, to what? A. To December 19th, 1923.
Q. And the book after that? A. The book from
10,501 to 11,000 is from December 18th, 1923, to
March 5th, 1924.
Q. Those two books undoubtedly cover the
months of December, do they not, that is, between
the two of them, 1923? A. Yes.
Q. December, 1923? A. Yes.
Q. Now, will you tell us, please, just what form
that is there, just how it is done? Look at the
form. Let us see. Is it a copy of invoice or does
it give the weights or what does it give? A. The
invoice is supposed to be made up from this record.
Q. The invoice is made up from this shipping
record? A. This shipping record.
Mr. Marshall:
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That is Exhibit 7, your

He said "supposed."

Q. That is what anybody who makes up an invoice would do there and did in Fred Stern's place,
is it not—he would look at the shipping record to
get his weights and other things, would he not? A.
This is an office shipping record. This is not the
actual shipping record.
Q. What is the actual shipping record? A. That
was done out at the pier or at the wharf or at
the bonded warehouse.
Q. When you speak of the office shipping record,
you mean by that what? A. There are subsidiary
records to this book yet.
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Q. But this book is supposed at least to contain,
shipping records in so far as the office could keep
track of them, is that right? A. This book is supposed to give the information to the clerk who
makes up the invoice from this sheet.
Q. That is right. It is a basis for the invoice?
A. A basis for the invoice.
Q. And, of course, every well organized office
must be certain that its invoices are correctly made
out—I will withdraw that. I will not press that.
In any event, just so the jury would not have to
look at each one of these pages, this contains the
date of the invoice, does it not? First, it contains
the date of the shipment, rather; is that right? A.
Yes, that is, the date of the shipment,
Q. The person to whom or concern to whom it is
shipped, and the address? A. Right.
Q. Then it has a blank line "payable to" and
"Chemical National." That means the account was
pledged with the Chemical National? A. Assigned
to the Chemical National.
Q. "Quantity twenty-five tons." That gives you
the weight, does it not? A. Right.
Q. "Grade standard ribbed—" A. "Smoked
sheets,"
Q. That is rubber, is it not? A. Yes.
Q. Standard ribbed smoked sheets of rubber? A.
Yes.
Q. Came from the steamship "Vastonia," is that
right? A. Yes. And the contract date.
Q. The date of the contract, the number of the
contract ; the price appears there too? A. Yes.
Q. The broker appears there? A. Yes.
Q. And the terms "net thirty days after date in
Boston," is that right? A. Right,
Q. What is that (indicating) ? A "Shipped from
the east direct,"
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Q. What does that mean? A. It went direct to
the Hood Rubber Company.
Q. Then it totals up the price of the total shipment, which in this particular instance comes to
115,162.21, does it not? A. Yes.
Q. And then you have specified the weights? A.
Gross weight,
Q. And the tare and the net weight? A. That is
right.
Q. What is that item "rubber stock book 550"?
What book does that refer to, do you know; what is
the rubber stock book? A. I think it refers to the
contract book. This contract. I am quite sure.
Q. Reference is on that page both to contract
books and also to other books there, the item may
be entered in or should be entered in, is not that
right? A. Yes.
Q. In other words, this shipping record is tied
up backward and forward with the rest of the
books? A. With the rest of the books, yes.
Q. Now, then, after that shipping record is made,
is it true that copies of invoices were made up, and
you had an invoice book for that purpose, did you
not? A. Right,
Q. And is the book I show you the invoice book
of Fred Stern & Company (handing to witness),
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3? A. Yes, that is the invoice
book.
Q. And from what date up to what date? A.
From January 3rd, 1923, to December 7th, 1923.
Q. It practically covers the year 1923, is that
right? A. Practically the year, yes. It is up to
December 31st, 1923.
Q. You want to correct your last answer so that
instead of saying December 7th, 1923— A. Instead
of December 7th, 1923, it is up to December 31st,
1923.
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Q. It is up to and including December 31st, 1923?
A. Yes.
Q. By the way, Mr. Romberg, so we will follow
the course of these things, you have spoken now
of the shipping record ; the order book first, then
the shipping record that is made up— A. The
order book I haven't seen yet,
Q. We have not marked it yet; but the shipping
record was the next set, and then came this invoice
book. Now, from the invoice book was there entries made in other books? A. The invoice book is
then summarized in that debit memo book which
you asked me about before. That analyzes it, giving the detail of the invoice number, the number of
cases, the rubber sold, whether it is any other sale
or any other type of sale, and then the accounts
receivable charge, the accounts payable charge, or
claim account charge or general ledger. In other
words, it analyzes all the invoices.
Q. That is one book, the debit memo book? A.
Yes.
Q. Would you not also have to make an entry
when you sent an invoice into the accounts receivable book of some kind? A. Yes.
Q. What book would that entry be in? A. The
entries are made from the invoices to the accounts
receivable and checking the debit memo book at the
same time.
Q. Just so we will understand, let us take one
thing at a time. From the invoices some entry is
made into the accounts receivable ledger, is it? A.
All invoices are entered into the accounts receivable
ledger.
Q. That is what I want to know. All invoices
are then entered into the accounts receivable
ledger? A. Yes.
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Q. Is it checked also with the debit memo book?
A. Yes, because that, which is a summary of all
invoices, contains some invoices that are recorded
in the accounts payable ledger, and a summary of
the accounts receivable column is a control. So is
the accounts payable column a control.
Q. In so far as any such entries are entered into
the accounts payable ledger, they relate to what
Fred Stern owes to someone else for that shipment?
A. Yes.
Q. Appearing on that invoice? A. Or it happens
to be a charge to someone.
Q. You mean someone to whom that shipment
has been sent? A. No. At one time I may buy
something from one concern and sell to the same
concern.
Q. That happened sometimes? A. That happened
sometimes.
Q. That was not quite customary, was it? A.
Oh, yes.
Q. Did you not make most of your purchases of
rubber from abroad? A. No. There were quite
many purchases made right in the market here.
Q. In the market? A. In the market.
Q. And then you would have some people to
whom you would sell? A. Some, people we would
sell and buy from.
Q. You do not mean that; you do not mean that
every one to whom you sold you also bought from?
A. Yes.
Q. Every one? A. Not every one, but some.
The Court: You mean buy the same merchandise right back again?
The Witness: That is possible too.
The Court: In the market?
The Witness: Yes. Just like trading, in
speculation.
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Q. That sometimes happen? A. Very often.
Q. You would not call it very often? A. Purchases and sales in the market are made on future
basis.
Q. You are speaking now of trade with dealers?
A. Yes, in the market.
Q. With dealers? A. Yes.
Q. Now, as to any merchandise that was purchased from abroad, I mean rubber purchased from
abroad, it was not customary that the people from
whom you purchased it, if they were abroad, you
sold them? A. No. That is an exceptional case.
That would be an exceptional case.
Q. You mean by that that it was not customary?
A. It was not customary.
Q. If it happened there it would be an exceptional case, it would be rather an unusual case? A.
Yes.
Q. So that we will follow these things in their
regular course, Mr. Romberg, you have identified
now the invoice book and then you have spoken of
the accounts receivable ledger, and you have identified that. Then, of course, from the accounts receivable ledger and from the accounts payable
ledger, the items were posted or at least were
supposed to be posted into the general ledger? A.
Into the general ledger, the postings came from the
summary books, like the debit memo book.
Q. Did you have the journal there? A. Yes. At
the end of the month there is one journal entry
made up, and the journal entry is then posted into
the general ledger.
Q. And how is that journal entry made up, on a
journal voucher? A. On a journal voucher, correct.
Q. Will you look at these papers and tell us
whether those are the journal vouchers for the
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month of December (handing to witness)? Look
them over carefully—December, 1923—that were
used in the office of Fred Stern & Company at that
time? I think there is one here for October too.
A. Some for November and some for December,
1923, and some for October, 1923.
Q. You recognize them and identify them as
journal vouchers that were used and made in the
months of October, November and December, 1923,
in the place of business of Fred Stern & Company?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Podell: I offer those in evidence.
Mr. Marshall : May I see them?
(Handed to counsel.)
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By Mr.

Marshall.

Q. Whose handwriting are these vouchers in?
A. Some of them are initialled by one of the clerks
who made them, "E. E. A."-—same, same, same,
same, same. This voucher has been—the detail of
this obviously has been made up by one of the
clerks. The cover has been made up by me.
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The Court: You recognize them as the
vouchers used at that time?
The Witness: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: I would like him to look
at every one, Judge.
Mr. Podell: I should think that would
be a proper subject for cross-examination.
Mr. Marshall: I think not.
Mr. Podell: He has examined them and
identified them.
The Court: I will let him answer. Look
at them.
The Witness : These vouchers that are in
my hand now, marked November, 1923, the
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upper part number is not a date, that is a
number of the voucher, Nos. 1 to 16; they
all have been made in the vouchers and
offices of Fred Stern & Company. Whether
these are in the ledger, I would have to check
up.
Q. Do you know whether they were made and
in the office there in January and February, 1924?
A. That I couldn't say.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. That was the time when these accountants
were there? A. Yes.
By Mr.

332

Marshall.

Q. Now, I show you journal voucher 12-26, and
ask you whether that voucher was in that condition
in January or February, 1924 (handing to witness) ? A. No.
Mr. Podell: There are some additions,
your Honor. I have not taken up each one
of these vouchers separately. When I see
each one separately, I will point out,
Mr. Marshall: If he wants to mark them
for identification, that is one thing.
Mr. Podell: The accountants both of the
defendant and us have gone over these things
and have put marks on some of them, and
when we offer them I will point out what we
put on and what was originally on them.
Mr. Marshall I do not think he can put
them in generally.
Mr. Podell: I am just putting them in and
your Honor is taking them as identified doc-
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uments that were used in that month and
nothing more than the extent of this witness testimony with regard to these Touchers, that they were made out during that
month.
The Court: The first page he clearly identifies.
Mr. Podell : He does not fail to identify
these. He says there was something added,
and what was added undoubtedly was added
by either our accountant or their accountant.
Mr, Marshall: I object to having it read,
your Honor.
Mr. Podell: I am not going to read it.
The Court: I think we can control that
as we go along, Mr. Marshall. I think I
can control that situation as we go along,
and eliminate that when we come to that
proposition.
Mr. Podell: I think so, your Honor. I
am told that this calculation that appears
within the red circle was not there, but the
only thing that was there were these two
lines, and as to that invoice that is all I
offer. Any method counsel wants to use to
block it out or cover it up is quite agreeable
to me. I do not want it before the jury. It
is just merely our work.
Mr. Marshall: I think it will be fair to
make a copy of the part he claims is genuine.
Mr. Podell: I do want the original to be
marked and be in evidence, though. I would
like the original to be marked. Will you
mark it subject to that correction?
Mr. Marshall: And my objection that they
are not properly identified.
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The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception. And, furthermore, that they are not binding on us.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Is this the October one that you say (handing to witness), and wherever you find anything
added by anybody, point it out to us? A. October.
Q. You say those are the journal vouchers made
up in Fred Stern & Company's place of business
during the month of October, 1923, is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. You identify them as those journal vouchers?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, look at December and go through the
same way, if you have not done so.
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Mr. Marshall: December contains that
journal voucher to which I referred.
Mr. Podell: That is the one of which we
will have a duplicate made. While he is
doing that, Mr. Stenographer, will you be
good enough to mark these, beginning with
October?
(October journal vouchers received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 19.)
Mr. Marshall: If you see any others that
have been altered, in December, please point
it out.
(November journal vouchers received in
evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 20.)
The Witness: With the exception of No.
12-26.)
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Q. Is that the only one that is different, that has
something added? You identify those as journal
vouchers that were made up and entered at the
time they are dated, in the place of business of
Fred Stern & Company, and that is in the month
of December, 1923? A. Without carefully going
into them, I take them as being those vouchers.
Q. You say they are those vouchers? A. Yes.
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Mr. Marshall: There are two documents
included in this file, your Honor, which are
apparently not journal vouchers at all.
The Court: Take them out then.
Mr. Marshall: One of them says journal
entries, but they are not journal vouchers.
The Witness: Some of those entries have
naturally notations on which I don't recall.
Q. These two documents appear on the file in
the invoice for the month of December, 1923. I
show them to you. You examine them closely,
please, and tell us what they are, and what you
know about them (handing to witness)? A. These
are entries that have to be reversed, some of them.
Q. No. Who made that up, do you know; who
made up those two statements? A. That I don't
exactly recall.
Q. That you do not remember? A. I don't recall,
no.
Q. What were they used for? A. They were entries made.
Q. I cannot hear you, Mr. Romberg. A. They
were entries made to adjustments, reverse entries
for the following year.
Q. And what else? A. Reverse entries for the
following year and closing entries, some of them.
Q. What is your best recollection about those
papers, Mr. Romberg? A. Very hazy about these
two papers.
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Q. Hazy as it is, what do you remember about it?
A. Can I see the general ledger for a minute?
Q. Certainly (handing to witness).
Mr. Podell: May those journal vouchers
be marked?
Mr. Marshall: I will note my objection
and exception to this exhibit, as before.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 21. )
Q. May I ask you whether it will refresh your
recollection at all if I say that those represent the
statement of corrections and adjustments that
Touche-Niven's man prepared at or about the time
of his audit; the corrections and adjustments that
should be made. Now, look at them and satisfy
yourself about that and if you are not sure, say so?
A. These are entries that I received from someone
of Touche, Niven & Co.
Q. Do they represent what I asked you, corrections, reversals and adjustments? A. Yes, on the
accounts.
Q. On the accounts of Fred Stern? A. Of Fred
Stern & Company.
Mr. Podell: Now, I would like to have
those marked separately, the journal vouchers.
Mr. Marshall : I have no objection, your
Honor. I would like, in that connection, if
I might, to have three of these journal vouchers independently marked also.
The Court: You mean as separate exhibits?
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
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The Court: Do you not think you had
better wait until you come to it?
Mr. Marshall: All right.
(Received in evidence and marked respectively Plaintiff's Exhibits 22 and 22-A.)
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Q. Now, just as quickly as you can, I want you
to look at these books, please. We have identified
the more important ones, I think. I want you to
pick up each one of them and briefly tell us what
it is, whether it is a book that was used by Fred
Stern & Company and what it was used for and
from what period to what period. A. This is marked
Exhibit 11, trial balance book, from January, first
trial balance January 1st, 1923, to December 31st,
1923.
Q. That is, accounts receivable trial balance? A.
Correct.
Q. For the year 1923? A. These are credit
memos.
Q. First, on the books that were used by Fred
Stern & Company ? A. Yes.
Q. And give the period? A. Marked Exhibit 13,
credit memos, summary of all returns.
Q. A book containing entries of credit memos
and returns? A. Yes.
Q. From what date to what date? A. From January, 1922.
Q. January, 1922? A. One entry in January,
1925.
Q. Up to January, 1925? A. Up to December
31st, 1924. Exhibit marked 12, debit memos, summary of invoices and charges from December, 1922.
Q. Summary of what? A. Invoices and charges
from September, 1922, to July, 1923. Exhibit
marked 6, I am not familiar with this book.

117
Hugo W. Romberg—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

Q. What about it? A. I am not familiar with
this book, marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 6.
Q. You are not familiar with it? A. No.
Q. You mean by that that you made none of
the entries in it? A. I made none of the entries
and never saw it.
Q. You never saw it? A. I never saw it.
Q. I show you a paper, Mr. Romberg, and ask
you whether you can recognize that paper as being
in your handwriting (handing to witness)? A.
That is in my handwriting.
Q. It is? A. Yes.
Q. See if it is not true that you made a copy of
those entries. A. Yes.
Q. That apears on that paper right from this
very book that you say you never saw?
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Mr. Marshall: Is he cross-examining his
own witness? That is very astonishing.
The Court: He may answer.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
A. I can say right offhand I did not make it from
this book. I may have made it from invoices, but
not from this book. I never saw that book before.
Q. Did you make it from this book at all? Do
you recognize this book I show you now (handing
to witness) ? A. Can I refresh my memory and see
the accounts payable ledger?
Q. Certainly. You may refresh your memory
from anything you like to look at. If there is any
answer that you have given that is incorrect, you
have a perfect right to correct it. Let me interrupt
you a second, to ask you, Mr. Romberg, whether
this is not in your handwriting. A. No, it is
not in my handwriting.
Q. Are you sure about it? A. Quite sure. This
is the same handwriting as this one is (indicating).
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Marshall: Referring to item on page?
Podell: On page 30.
Marshall: Of Exhibit 6?
Podell: Of Exhibit 6.

Q. When you say on this record here, this is the
same handwriting as this, it means nothing. Now,
what do you mean? A. It is the same handwriting
as this one here (indicating).
Q. Which is the same handwriting as which?
A. This one here (indicating).
Q. The item I have shown you on page 30 of this
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 you say is the same handwriting as the item appearing on the paper that I have
just shown you, is that right? A. Right.
Q. Whose handwriting did you say this was, referring to the paper that I have shown you? A. I
think this is by a man by the name of Utley.
Q. Was Utley working for Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes, he was working for Fred Stern &
Company.
Q. And you recognize his handwriting in this
book, Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, do you? A. Well, that
is the same handwriting as this. I am not quite
sure whether it is his handwriting, but it is one
of the employees down there who wrote this in this
one.
Q. You do know this book was written up and
kept by one of the employees of Fred Stern & Company from what date—the first invoice appears to
be March 2nd, 1920? A. Yes.
Q. And it continued right on to when?
Mr. Marshall: I object to his giving summaries of the books this way.
Mr. Podell: I am just fixing the time.
The Court: Did not already say he did
not see that book?

119
Hugo W. Romberg—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

Mr. Podell: I am asking him now, could
he identify the handwriting in it, and he
says he does, and that it was kept by an employee of Fred Stern & Company. He identifies the handwriting.
The Witness : I never had a hand in the
book myself.
The Court: Do you recognize the handwriting and recognize it as a book that was
kept and participated in the business of
Stern during the year 1923?
The Witness: Yes. I am sorry that was
shown to me on the first page here, handwriting that is absolutely strange to me.
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Q. That is what misled you? A. That is what
misled me entirely.
Q. As you look through the book you can identify this handwriting? A. Yes. This handwriting
and this handwriting and I recognize this handwriting (indicating).
Mr. Marshall: Some of the handwriting
you identify and some you do not?
The Witness: Some I do not.
Mr. Podell: I beg your pardon. He said
the first part. The first part, Mr. Marshall,
let the record show, it relates to entries made
in 1920. This is in evidence, your Honor,
so we can read from it.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Begging your Honor's pardon, please; in evidence for one purpose only.
The Court: Yes; so far it has not been
connected.
Mr. Podell: The paper that the witness
referred to as not recognizing the handwrit-
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ing, in fairness, I think, to the witness, it
ought to be stated
Mr. Marshall: That is what I am trying
to find out. Give us the page.
Mr. Podell: Pages 4 and 5. I think that
represents the very first page of the book.
There is nothing on pages 1, 2 or 3. That
is right. Nothing on page 1, nothing on page
2, and nothing on page 3. On page 4 is the
first entry, and it appears to be dated March
2nd, 1920. This witness was not then employed by Fred Stern & Company.
The Court: I understand. What we want
is from January 1st, 1923, to December 31st,
1923.
Mr. Podell: That is it.
The Court: To identify that book and its
entries as of that time.
Mr. Podell: That is it.
Q. Now, you look at this and answer the Judge's
question and see whether you recognize the handwriting beginning with page 20, the first item being United Baltic Corporation? A. Yes.
Q. And that they contain entries showing the
year 1923. You see that? A. Right,
Q. And you identify it as a book that was kept
by Fred Stern & Company? A. A book that was
kept by Fred Stern & Company.
Q. During that period? A. During that period.
Q. As a matter of fact, these items in 1923, as
they are contained in this book, relate first to the
United Baltic account, do they not, for specified
dates? A. I wouldn't be able to say there is a
heading here, United Baltic Corporation.
Q. An examination of some of these items, as a
matter of fact——-
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The Court: Let us get back to this proposition.
Mr. Podell: I do not think we need this
now for the present. As a matter of fact,
the handwriting or label on it is United
Baltic Corporation invoices beginning at
page 20, and Ruffer, page 100; that represents accounts of those two concerns.
Mr. Marshall: The witness said he never
handled the book. Ask him instead of leading him.
Q. Does it represent the accounts of those two
concerns for the periods therein indicated? A. I
don't know. I never handled the book. I recognize the handwriting, but for what purpose the
book was used
Q. You recognize it as a book that was used by
Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes.
Q. From an examination of it and from your
experience as a bookkeeper, can you not say from
the entries contained therein, that they relate—
well, perhaps, the documents speak for thmselves,
That is Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. And we will withhold these for the present, that is, that book. You
go right along and identify the others and let us
see if we cannot save as much time as possible.
What is the next book? First, state whether it
was a book kept by Fred Stern & Company? A.
The book marked Exhibit 14, bank ledger, all accounts with the various banks were kept from January 1st, 1923, to December 31st, 1923.
Q. Now, the next? A. These are evidently records of some trust receipts with invoices attached,
showing a memorandum of shipments made. That
was not kept by me.
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The Court: Covering what period?
The Witness: Right from September 12,
1923, to March 26th, 1924.
Mr. Podell: I do not think that has been
marked, your Honor.
Mr. Marshall: May I see it? (Handed
to counsel.) I object on the ground it has
not been shown that it was in this condition,
these documents were in here at the time
we made the audit, or that we saw these
documents at the time we made the audit.
The Court: You will have to reach out
further, Mr. Podell.
Mr. Podell: I do not know whether we
will have to do it now.
The Court: The others are connected. I
think we are at a point when this should
be
Mr. Marshall: I do not think the others
have been connected to us, your Honor.
Mr. Podell: He found them there in 1925.
The Court: You may find from him as to
whether those were the books worked upon
by these accountants at the time. That is
right, they have not been connected that far
yet.
Q. You can answer that question, can you not?
The books you have thus far identified were books
that were worked upon by these accountants?
Mr. Marshall: I object to him leading this
witness.
Q. Were they books that were worked upon by
these accountants? A. Some of them.
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Q. What do you mean by some of them? A.
For example that one you have in your hand there.
I haven't seen it, either. I do not think they saw
that one, nor have I seen it.
Q. You have not seen it? A. No.
Q. But all these others that you have identified—
A. No, they never saw this one.
Mr. Marshall: That is Exhibit 6.
Mr. Podell: And you are very happy to
have him say that.
Q. How do you know that? A. Because I know
what books have been turned over to the accountants.
Q. You helped Mr. Stern in some of his manipulations on these books, did you not? A. I wouldn't
exactly say that. That is one reason why I left
previous, prior to
Q. Won't you answer one question at a time?
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Mr. Marshall: If he is going to crossexamine his own witness, I will object to it.
Mr. Podell: I have a right to do this,
your Honor.
The Court: Yes, I think so.
Q. Do you say now that you did not help falsify
some of these records? A. I had knowledge of some
of them.
Q. Did you not make false entries yourself? A.
Yes, there were some of them were incorrect,
Q. And you knew them to be false? A. Exactly.
Q. You have testified to all this in the examination in bankruptcy? A. I am repeating exactly
what I said before. Is that correct?
Q. Now, Mr. Romberg, just one question : You
know that in this law suit the United Baltic ac-
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count is quite an important item? A. I believe that
was after I left.
Q. I did not ask you what was after you left or
before you left. Do you realize that in this very
lawsuit the United Baltic account is a very important item? A. I don't know anything about the
account.
Mr. Marshall: I object.
The Court: The objection is sustained.
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Q. Do you know that the plaintiff in this action
has made the claim that the United Baltic account
was falsified?
Mr. Marshall: This does appear to me to
be cross-examination.
Mr. Podell: I think it is, yes.
The Court : I think it is cross-examination, but it is not outside of the sphere.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. Will you answer that?

A. I don't know.

The Court: In other words, he assumes
the responsibility of it.
The Witness: I don't know.
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Q. Is there any particular reason why you are
reluctant to identify that United Baltic book? A.
No, none whatsoever.
Q. Is there any particular reason why you should
be so certain that these people did not see—I mean
Touche, Niven & Co.—did not see the United Baltic
book?
Mr. Marshall: I do not think, your Honor,
when the witness makes a damaging admission, that he should be
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Mr. Podell: Let me get this answer and
I won't go any further.
Mr. Marshall: I am making an objection,
and I do not care to be interrupted.
Mr. Podell: I did not mean to interrupt
you.
Mr. Marshall: I do think, when he makes
an admission that Mr. Podell does not like,
he should not be entitled to try to rip him
to pieces this way.
The Court : But an error is always subject to correction.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
The Witness : Accountants have a habit
of marking books sometimes. That has not
been marked.
Q. That has not been marked? A. That has not
been marked.
Q. Is that what you base your conclusion on,
that they did not see that book? A. Yes.
Q. Because it was not marked? A. It was not
marked.
Q. Do you know the mark of Touche, Niven &
Co.? A. No, I do not.
Q. Do you know how they marked the book? A.
There is no specific mark. They all have a certain
type of marking.
Q. Do you know the type of mark, what mark
Touche, Niven & Co. used? A. They may use any
kind of a single check mark, or double check mark.
Q. Either a single check mark or a double check
mark? A. Yes.
Q. Do you find a blue pencil check mark on these
various pages? Did you notice that, beginning with
page 37, there are blue pencil check marks?
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The Court: I am afraid you are going
into a sphere of cross-examination of this
witness, Remember he is called by you to
support your claim against these defendants.
Mr. Podell: He is called by me, your
Honor. I brought out what I think the
Judge and jury should know about this witness.
The Witness: Can I see the general ledger
for just one more second?
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Q. In order to answer my present question?
First, answer the question; is it not true that you
find check marks there as to those items? A. I
find some check marks here.
Q. You just stated that you do not know which
are the check marks of Touche, Niven & Co. and
which are the check marks of any other accountant,
is not that right? A. (No answer.)
Q. Did you conceal that book from anybody? A.
No.
Q. So far as you know, did anybody conceal it
from the accountants? A. No.
Q. You have identified it previously as one of
the books kept by Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Plaintiff's Exhibit 6.
Q. So that, so far as you know, had Touche,
Niven & Co. sought to see it or asked for it, it was
there available for them? A. Right.
Q. That is correct? A. Yes.
Q. Then, we will not take any more time with
that. Go on and identify these other books, please.
Just tell us what that next one is. A. Exhibit 9,
record of notes and trade acceptances due, notes
and trade acceptances receivable.

127
Hugo W. Romberg—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

Q. That is a book that was kept by Fred Stern
& Company? A. That was a book kept by Fred
Stern & Company.
Q.
A. They are the same. They all have been identified.
Q. Will you look at Exhibit 10, trial balance for
accounts payable? Just identify that and tell us
whether that was one of the Stern books kept at
that time? A. Exhibit 10, trial balance for accounts payable from January 1st, 1923, to December 31st, 1924.
Q. Now, to your knowledge, were all these books
that you have identified in the premises of Fred
Stern & Company at the time when these accountants were making their examination? A. Yes.
Q. And that covers the period of January and
February, 1924? A. Yes,
Q. January and February, and we will make certain about March, too?
Mr. Marshall: Is he asking a question or
making a statement?
Mr. Podell: I am asking a question.
Mr. Marshall: I object to the form of the
question.
The Court: Objection sustained. The
form is bad.
Q. Were they there in the month of January,
1924? A. I remember them in January, and I
think in February, 1924. I don't remember March,
1924.
Q. Now, to your knowledge, these accountants
used these very books, or did these accountants use
these very books at the time when they made their
audit in January and February, 1924? When I
say these accountants, I mean the firm of Touche,
Niven & Co.
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that. He has
already testified we did not see some of those
books, that they were not turned over to us.
The Court: There is one batch of papers
that is not an exhibit, and then Plaintiff's
Exhibit 6 that he said were not turned over.
Mr. Marshall: I did not understand him
to say that they saw all these others.
The Court: That is what we are trying
to find out. What is your answer?
The Witness: They saw some of the books.
The Court: Can you tell us what ones
they saw, what ones were actually there
when these accountants were doing their
work?
The Witness: All the books were actually
there, but not all of them were handed to
them for examination.
By Mr. Podell.

384

Q.
Do you mean to imply by that, that any of
them were concealed from them? A. They were
not concealed.
Q. They were in the place of business? A. Yes.
Q. If they asked for the accounts payable ledger,
if was given to them? A. Yes.
Q. And any books they asked for were given to
them, were they not? A. Yes.
Q. You were there at the time? A. I was there
at the time.
Q. And while you do not want to state that they
actually examined every one of these books, you
do say these books were in the premises and that
they used several of them? A. Correct.
Q. To your personal knowledge? A. To my personal knowledge.
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Q. Now, I would like to have you tell us what
you know as to whether—I will reframe the question. Look at the paper I show you and tell us
whether you cannot state that they were papers
that were on the files and records that were made
at the office of Fred Stern & Company, made or received or kept in the office of Fred Stern & Company on the dates that they appear or purport to
be dated?
Mr. Marshall:
cated question.

That is a pretty compli-

Q. First, were they papers that were in the files
of Fred Stern & Company?
The Court: In January and in February
of 1920 what?
Mr. Podell: 1924, when this examination
was made.
The Witness : I think some of them appear to be dated in March, 1924.
The Court: Exclusive of those.
The Witness: These are papers that
show——
Mr. Marshall: I object to what they show.
The Court: Sustained.
The Witness: I do not know whether they
were there in 1924 or at any other time.
Q. Do you know if they were papers that came
from the files of Fred Stern & Company? A. From
the handwriting that appears on the bottom of
some of those, from notations that appear on these
invoices and records, they were handled by Fred
Stern & Company.
Q. Examine them and see if you cannot identify
them as the original invoices received by Fred Stern
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& Company. You can use any other book that you
like.
Mr. Marshall: I object to trying to get in
what these things were in the record in such
manner.
The Court: I appreciate it, but I am going to allow it just the same.
Q. Original invoices received from the United
Baltic Company by Fred Stern & Company. Do
not guess, but study those documents.
389
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The Court: That may be, but this is quite
important at this point, in the Court's estimation, as to whether there was any knowledge on the part of these defendants as to
their existence.
Mr. Podell: That is something I intend
taking up in a subsequent part, your Honor.
I have got to go one step at a time.
The Court: They become a matter of record here. That is the danger.
Mr. Podell: I shall ask that.
The Court: I wish you would. I wish
you would predicate that part of the proposition.
Mr. Podell: He may not know about it.
The Court: Then, how can we say this
defendant knew?
Mr. Podell: I will show that they knew.
The Court: He says he does not know
whether they were ever there or not. He
recognizes handwriting on there which indicates to him that they had something to do
with the concern he was employed by, but
outside of his knowledge of the fact that
they were there, he knows nothing.
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Mr. Podell: I ask him to take up any
other book or record he chooses and tell us
specifically whether he cannot identify those
papers as the original invoices that were
actually received by Fred Stern & Company
on the date they purport to be dated, from
the United Baltic. He may know that. It
is called to his specific attention.
The Court: You mean that might refresh
his recollection as to identification?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Court: I will allow that, if he can.
Mr. Marshall: Do we not first have to
refresh his recollection as to whether he saw
those things?
The Court : Certainly. Now, he says he
is seeking to refresh his recollection, to see
if he can.
Mr. Marshall: If he cannot, it is not
competent for the second half or three-quarters of Mr. Podell's question.
Mr. Podell: I do not know what you mean
by that.
Q. I show you this paper (handing to witness).
Is this paper in your handwriting? A. It is.
Q. Look at it and see if it is not a summary of
these papers that I have shown you. A. This record is made out of two different things. One is
an original invoice and one is a trust receipt. The
original invoices do pass through my hands—they
don't pass through my hand, but they pass through
the office which I have charge of. I know they
come in and are received.
Q. I will reframe my question so it will have
nothing to do with the trust receipt and will relate
only to the original invoice. Does that enable you
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to answer it a little better? A. I know this original was never received. They are never received
by me nor handled by me. This record has my
original handwriting, as I recollect it now very
clearly, because originally it was. drawn up by
some one and made up very poorly, in very poor
handwriting, so I volunteered to copy it for him
and show it in a good record. I surmised it was
a summary of an account current with the United
Baltic Corporation, as the copy was marked 5 per
cent, basis, and then turned it over to the person
who was really supposed to keep it.
395
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Mr. Marshall: A person in Stern's employ?
The Witness: Yes, and, as you notice, it
is being continued from there on.
The Court: Let us see if we get that. I
want to get it clear now. In other words,
this sheet which has been handed to you,
this pencil memorandum here, has been
drawn by you not from any authenticated
records, but from a copy that was made by
somebody else; because of its poor condition, you re-wrote that in this particular
form.
The Witness: That is correct.
The Court: So you know nothing, as you
say, of the authenticity of the original entries made upon this sheet?
The Witness: No.
Mr. Podell: The sheet is not so much the
sheet I am offering. He said something else
that I want to ask him a specific question
about.
Mr. Marshall: May we mark those for
identification?
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The Court: Yes.
(Marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 23 for
Identification.)
Q. Do you identify or can you identify those
invoices that are before you and attached to those
papers, as the original invoices that came to Fred
Stern & Company on or about the times that they
purport to be dated?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that question.
The Court : Objection sustained for the
reason that he said that he never saw—that
they went through a course of business in
that place, over which he had no control,
and based on this copy that was handed to
him, he made up this other sheet. He said
he never saw the originals at any time. Did
I understand you to say that, Mr. Romberg?
The Witness: That is correct.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Marshall: I understood him to say
that of the trust receipts, your Honor.
The Court: Yes, I understood him to say
that about the trust receipts.
Mr. Marshall: The trust receipts, he said,
had never been in the office.
The Court: Let him answer. We are
arguing at cross purposes. What do you
say?
Mr. Podell: If your Honor will permit
me to ask the question just this way first:
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Did not the invoices pass through the office
that you had charge of?
The Court:

He said they did.
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A. The invoices, as I look at them now—as I
would look at them at any other time, naturally
would have passed through. I never saw it. I
personally didn't handle them.
Q. Who would handle them? A. They were handled by three employees.
Q. There were three employees that handled the
invoices as they came in? A. Yes.
Q. Who were those employees, do you remember?
A. If I have a list showing the employees of that
time, I may recall. I may recall the name, but I
can't remember now.
Q. Will you look at your list, if you want to,
and tell us who were the clerks? We want to get
somebody who will identify them, if we must. A.
It wouldn't appear on any one of those books, I
don't think. The name, the clerk's name, would
not appear on any one of those books.
Q.
were two girls who handled them and a fellow by
the name of Utley. The girls' names I can't recall
any more.
Q. Do you recognize the handwriting of those
people on them? A. Yes, I recognize some of the
handwriting.
Q. Of the employees of Fred Stern & Company?
A. Certain employees of Fred Stern & Company.
Q. What are the dates of those invoices as far
as they purport to be dated? A. This one is dated
September 3, 1923.
Q. When an invoice was received by Fred Stern
& Company, was there any mark made on it, denoting the date of receipt? A. No date would be
put on it. There is some notation of entries on
the various records. Maybe those records will show
the date.
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403

Q. Will you look at those records and verify and
tell us whether entries were made concerning
those— A. It says contract hook——
Mr. Marshall: Do not read from that.
The Court: Do not read it aloud. Read
it to yourself.
The Witness: It shows there are some
entries made from this invoice.
Q. Made in what? A. In various records.
The Court; What we want to get to as
quickly as possible is whether or not those
entries will help your mind to be refreshed
as to whether or not those records were in
the office of Stern in January and February
1924. Can you say whether they were or
were not, or don't you know?
The Witness: May I see the accounts payable ledger?
(Handed to witness.)

404

Q. Will you look at Exhibit No. 6 and see
whether that will refresh your recollection?
The Court: That is not 6.
Mr. Podell : Let him look at anything he
likes first.
405
Q. Mr. Romberg, will you look at Exhibit 6 and
see if that refreshes your recollection?
Mr. Marshall: I do not know how he can
be asked to refresh his recollection from a
book which he says is in the handwriting
of some one else and which he only identified by reference
Mr. Podell: I suggest, your Honor
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Mr. Marshall: May I finish my sentence,
please? By reference to this Exhibit 23 for
Identification.
The Court: I think he did say he knows
nothing about the entries made in this book.
Mr. Podell: He identified the entries as
in the handwriting of employees, and knew
that it was a book; he was misled, he said,
at first by the first two pages, because it
contained handwriting that he had never
seen.
The Court: That is right.
Mr. Podell: Now, your Honor, a man can
refresh his recollection from anything.
The Court: I will allow the question.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. Would you look at the lot number on that
invoice; that might help you. Look at the lot
number at the top of the page. A. Yes; I located
the shipment.
Q. You have located the shipment? A. Yes,
Steamship Diomed
Mr. Marshall: Do not read, please.

408

Q. Is there anything in that book that refreshes
your recollection so that you can say that that invoice was on the files of Fred Stern & Company at
or about the time that it purports to be dated? A.
It does not refresh my recollection. I can locate
that invoice.
The Court: As having been in the files
in February and January of 1924?
The Witness: I don't know that. I can
locate this invoice recorded in this book.
The Court: We are not interested in that
at all. We are trying to find out whether or
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not you can locate that invoice as being in
the files of this Stern & Company in Jannary and February of 1924. That book, if
anybody looked for it, they would find it
there. That is what we want to know.
Would it be there for anybody to find it if
they went to look for it?
The Witness: I am sorry. These records were kept by someone else. I cannot
say whether they were there in January,
1924, or not. They most likely were there.
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike that out
as a guess.
The Court: Strike it out. That does not
mean anything to us. If you do not know,
say so. If you do know, say so, and if you
say they were not there, say so. Now, whichever it is, say so. You know or you do not
know. It is either one or the other.
The Witness: I can locate any entry in
any one of the books by looking at some
records. I can locate any memorandum on
any one of the books if they are recorded
properly, from notations that are made on
invoices.
Q. Let me have that invoice a moment, When
Fred Stern & Company received an invoice what
mark did it put on the invoice, if any, to denote its
receipt? A. This is a notation on Fred Stern
& Company's part (indicating). This is a notation entry (indicating). This is an entry (indicating). This is a number that is being given
(indicating). This is an invoice (indicating). This
is an invoice like that is being given and checked
accordingly (indicating). This is the exchange
rate at that time at 4.50 (indicating).
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Q. Of all these marks that were made by Fred
Stern & Company or its employees at the time of
the receipt of the invoice, which one of them denotes the time of its receipt? A. None of them.
Q. Well, which one of them denotes the time
when it was entered in other books? A. There is
no definite time. If the invoice is dated September
3rd and mailed from New York most likely on
September 5th and 6th and passed through various
hands and entered.
Q. Can you tell by looking at the cross references? Take this invoice (indicating). That was
entered in what book? A. Contract book, folio 28.
Q. Was it entered in any other book? A. Just
this book that I find now under the heading of that
steamer.
Q. The Diomed, that is the name of the steamer?
A. Yes.
Q.
date it was entered ? A. I notice there is a TR out
here, which means trust receipt. That means the
date of the trust receipt. It says "TR September
12, 1923."
Q. That invoice, from all records that you could
inspect, was unquestionably in the file of Fred
Stern & Company at September 12, 1923; was it
or was it not?
Mr. Marshall: I object to the word "unquestionably."
The Court: Was it or was it not? Strike
out "unquestionably."
Mr. Marshall; If he knows,
The Witness: I am not the one who handled this.
Q. Who did handle it? Can you locate the person who handled it? A. That I don't know.
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Q. Try and answer my last question. You have
not answered it yet. Assume this entry now that
you have in that book. It was not the practice of
Fred Stern & Company to make out a trust receipt
without having an invoice, was it? A. The trust
receipt is not made out by Fred Stern.
Q. The banks would not make out a trust receipt without having an invoice, would they? A.
On the face of it, this has been entered as of September 12, 1923.
Q. That means the invoice must have been there
at September 12, 1923? A. Yes.
Q. No doubt about that, is there?

415
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Mr. Marshall: He said "must have been."
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. The only question in your mind is whether
that invoice remained on the files of Fred Stern &
Company, so that it was there in January and
February of 1924, when these accountants were
there? A. That is correct.
Q. And that is something that you cannot say?
A. I cannot say.
Mr. Podell: We have at least got that
much. Now, we will mark this, with your
Honor's permission, we will mark this invoice in evidence simply to the extent that
the testimony indicates it to be admissible,
and no further.
The Court: As of September 12, 1923.
Mr. Podell: I offer that, and may I, to
save time, if this witness will make the same
identification with respect to the other invoices, giving us the date, the date appears
on the face of the invoice, I shall offer all
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of them unless counsel prefers to have me
ask all of these questions with respect to
each one of the invoices.
Mr. Marshall: I will assume he is asked
the same question with respect to every invoice, and I nevertheless object, that it is
not binding on us in any way and it does
not show that it was there when we audited
the books, and that we saw or passed on it.
The Court : Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
The Court: That does not say it was
there. It is only in so far as the witness has
testified, for the purposes of connecting it
with this concern up to the time of its alleged date, and all of the other invoices similarly described, and still we have the connection to make with this defendant, as yet.
Mr. Podell: All right. May I ask that
those original invoices be marked in evidence?
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 24.)
(Whereupon, at 4.20 o'clock P. M., adjournment was taken until to-morrow, April
2, 1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.)
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New York City,
Tuesday, April 2, 1929, 10 o'clock A. M.
(Trial continued.)
(Same appearances.)
SECOND D A Y .

Mr. Podell: May we call Mr. Rea out of
order, your Honor?
Mr. Marshall: Could we not wait a few
minutes for Mr. Romberg?
The Court: Yes.
422
W. ROMBERG, witness on behalf of the
plaintiff, resumed, further testified as follows:
HUGO

Direct examination

(continued)

by Mr.

Podell.

Q. Now, Mr. Romberg, just these two books, just
look at them and tell us if you recall them, and if
they were used by Fred Stern & Company and from
what period to what period, and what they are?
A. I recognize by the handwriting that they have
been used by Fred Stern & Company. This stock
certificate is dated May 16, 1922. They all have
the same date; common stock. And this one here
being preferred stock, also dated May 16, 1922.
Mr. Marshall: You mean the first entry
is dated that?
The Witness: Yes. The first entry is
dated May 16, 1922.
Q. Those are the stock certificate books of Fred
Stern & Company? A. Fred Stern & Company,
both common and preferred.
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Mr. Podell: I offer them in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: No objection.
(Common stock book received in evidence
and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 25; preferred stock book received in evidence and
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 26.)

425

426

Q. Mr. Romberg, you have seen this certified
statement, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 for Identification
(handing to witness) ? A. Yes, I have seen that.
Q. Do you remember about when it was furnished to Fred Stern & Company? A. Some time
in 1924.
Q. About what month? A. I cannot exactly recall the date; from the letter here, evidently it is
February 26, 1924.
Q. It is dated February 26th? A. Yes.
Q. Does that refresh your recollection at all as
to when— A. Some time in February.
Q. And who was it that delivered them? A. It
was delivered to Mr. Fred Stern personally.
Q. And who made the deliveries, who gave them
to him? A. A messenger, in a big envelope, with
several other statements.
Q. How many such statements were furnished?
A. I believe at that time they were given six.
Q. And how many were furnished shortly afterwards? Were there any furnished shortly afterwards? A. I think they were furnished some time
afterwards. Just how many, I would not be able
to recall.
Mr.
about
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Marshall: I will concede there were
thirty.
Podell: Thirty-two.
Marshall: Thirty-two, if you say so.
Podell: Thirty-two copies.
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427

Q. Were they all duplicate originals? A. Well,
they were actual duplicates of the original.
Q. Now, do you remember a conversation between you and Mr. Rea, with respect to your signing some letters?
The Court: Who is Mr. Rea, to refresh
my recollection?
Mr. Podell: Mr. Rea is one of the defendants' senior accountants.
Mr. Marshall: He is the staff manager of
Touche, Niven & Co.
Mr. Podell: In charge of this audit.
428

A. If you tell me some more about it, I may
recall it.
Q. I beg your pardon? A. Perhaps if you will
tell me some more about it, I may recall the conversation.
Q. Where he asked you to sign a certain letter
with respect to liabilities, and you at first declined
to sign it? A. Can I see the letter?
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out Mr.
Podell's statement about that.
Mr. Podell: I will show
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. Let us
have his testimony. I will produce the letters if you want them, but it is his recollection and not your testimony we want.
Mr. Podell: Let me have the letters.
The Court: Strike it out, if there are the
letters.
Mr. Marshall: Certainly (handing letters
to counsel).
Q. Now, just look at these letters (handing to
witness); and tell the Court and jury first whether

429

144
430

Hugo W. Romberg—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

they help to refresh your recollection as to what
transpired. Just answer that yes or no. A. I
recollect these letters.
Q. And do you also recollect what happened before you signed those letters? A. Yes. I recollect
something that happened before I signed these letters, too.
Q. And did you then have a talk with Mr. Rea?
A. I recollect some conversation, but just what it
was I couldn't definitely say.
Q. I want you to look at this paper then that I
show you now, beginning at the top of the page
431

Mr. Marshall: What page?
Mr. Podell: 1759.
Q.
lection as to what took place (handing to witness) ?
The Court: Does that help your recollection, those two pages?
The Witness: Those do help quite a great
deal.
Q. Will you be good enough to tell the Judge
and jury, please, what happened between you and
Mr. Rea with respect to these letters? A. It happened just exactly as it is written down here.

432

The Court: Tell us that.
Mr. Marshall: Do not read it, though.
Q. Do not read it. Just tell us what happened.
A. I believe Mr. Rea dictated some letters in the
office, those two letters that were shown to me
beforehand, and asked me to sign them. It was
stated in here that I point-blank refused to sign
them. Not exactly in that many words, but I hesitated and did not want to sign them, and asked him
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to see Mr. Stern first. He went in to see Mr. Stern
and came out and said Mr. Stern wanted to see me.
I then went in and after certain things Mr. Stern
promised to do, I signed the letter, and he also
signed the letter himself.
Q. Now, you say you hesitated to sign them. I
would like to know just what you said to Mr. Rea.
A. No reason was given at all.
Q. Did he ask for any reason why you would
not sign them? A. No.
Q. He just put them before you and asked you
to sign? A. Exactly.
Q. And you told him you would not? A. I told
him I would like to have Mr. Stern sign them first;
show them to Mr. Stern first.
Q. Did you not so testify, that you refused to
sign them? A. Well, I refused to sign them first,
and refused to sign them until I said, "You better
see Mr. Stern on those letters."
Q. You know what the substance of these letters
is, do you not? A. I do.
Q.
A. Mr. Rea would not make the audit, or would
not give us a certified balance sheet unless those
letters are signed.
Q. Now, here I want to ask you whether this is
a correct statement of what transpired—of course,
you gave the testimony that I am reading from,
some time ago, did you not? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall: I object to his putting it
in that way. He is trying to refresh the
witness' recollection by reading this. I object to having him read testimony here.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: If your Honor please, your
Honor permitted me to cross-question this
witness before.
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Was Mr. Rea insisting
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The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: And where there is a decided
difference between what he says on the witness stand now and something of importance
here in this testimony, it seems to me I have
a right to bring it to his attention, even if
only to correct a mistaken statement made.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Q. Did you not testify in so many words

437

Mr. Marshall: This is the same question,
your Honor. I object.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Q. Now, will you look at the page that I show
you now
Mr. Marshall: What page?
Mr. Podell: Third question and answer,
page 1759.
Q. And tell us if that is a correct statement?

43S

Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: I will allow that,
Mr. Marshall: Can he not ask whether
that refreshes his recollection?
The Court: He can serve the same purpose in another question.
Q. Go ahead? A. The third question?
Q. Yes, the third question and answer.
The Court:
please.

Come along, Mr. Witness,

A. The contents of the answer is absolutely correct. I do not say that I exactly said the same
words. I cannot recall those same words.

147
Hugo W. Romberg—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

439

Q. Well, what is the last? I did not get it. A.
The meaning was exactly the same. I may not
have used the same words.
Q. Is it not correct to say that when he asked
you to sign those letters, you refused to sign them?
The Court:

He said he did.

A. I did.
Mr. Podell: Now, I offer these two letters
in evidence, your Honor.
Mr. Marshall: No objection.
(Letters received in evidence and marked
respectively Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 27 and
28.)

440

Q. Was Mr. Rea insistent that unless you signed
those two letters he could not give you a certified
statement? A. Can I amplify it?
The Court:
answer is.

Yes.

Let us see what your

A. The entire conversation both between Mr. Rea
and myself was not on definite yes or no or refusals or anything like that. My answers were just
evasive.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor——
Mr. Marshall: I insist he has got to take
the bad with the good, your Honor.
Mr. Podell: I am willing to take the bad
with the good, but I am entitled to an answer.
(Question repeated as follows: "Was Mr.
Rea insistent that unless you signed those
two letters he could not give you a certified
statement?")
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The Court: That can be answered yes or
no. Was he insistent?
The Witness: Yes.
Mr. Podell: Now, if your Honor would
like to have the whole conversation, I would
be very glad to have it.
The Court: Yes, let us have it.
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Q. Let us have everything that took place between you and Mr. Rea with regard to these two
letters. A. For example, as to these letters, you
asked me whether Mr. Rea was insistent. Mr. Rea
asked to have the letters signed. There was no
insistence about it on the man's part, and my answer to him was in such a way that it wasn't altogether a refusal, but just an evasion.
The Court: Go ahead now; what happened after that?
The Witness: Then I asked him to go in
to Mr. Stern and see what Mr. Stern says
and have him sign it; and he went in to Mr.
Stern, and Mr. Rea came out and called me
in, to go in to Mr. Stern. I went in all
alone, and the end of the matter was after
certain promises Mr. Stern made, that I
signed the letter with him right there. Then
I came out and asked Mr. Rea to go into
Mr. Stern's office and the letters, signed,
were turned over to Mr. Rea.
Q. Do I understand you correctly that you tried
to avoid signing those letters? A. Yes.
Q. And you so stated to Mr. Rea?
Mr. Marshall: He did not say that, your
Honor. That is just what he did not say.
Mr. Podell: He said to your Honor, Mr.
Rea insisted. He said he refused to sign.
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Mr. Marshall: He said, not a refusal,
The Court : We cannot see the physical
motions of people who are transacting that
particular thing, and language may state
very definitely what the physical conditions
were as of the time, so that the conversation that has been given, I think, describes
the situation fully.
Mr. Marshall: Evasion.
Mr. Podell: May I have my question read,
please?
(Question repeated as recorded.)
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I would like to
ask that question.

445
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Q. Did you state to Mr. Rea that you preferred
not to sign those papers?
The Court:
is language.

That is a question, and that

Q. Did you say that to Mr. Rea?
The Witness:

I did.

Q. Were you present when Stern asked for the
thirty-two copies, the number of copies of the certified statement? A. I do not recollect. I don't
think so. I don't know.
Q. You have no recollection of it? A. No recollection.
Q. Did any one in your presence—was there any
talk in your presence at any time between Stern
and any one representing Touche, Niven & Co., as
to why they wanted so many copies? A. No.
Q. You were not present? A. No.
Mr. Podell: May I read the letters which
have been marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 27
and 28?
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The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: Both letters are dated February 21, 1924, and may the record show, your
Honor, that the letters we have been questioning this witness about this morning are
Plaintiff's Exhibits 27 and 28?
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: They are on the letterhead
of Fred Stern & Company. They are addressed to Touche, Niven & Co., at 80 Maiden
Lane, New York. (Reading Plaintiff's Exhibit 27.) They are signed, "Fred Stern,
President of Fred Stern, Inc., Hugo Romberg, Cashier."
Mr. Marshall: Is that Stern's signature
on that letter?
The Witness: Yes.
Mr. Podell: There is no dispute about
that.
Mr. Marshall: I wanted to have it on the
record.
Mr. Podell: The record may have that.
The next letter is dated February 21, 1924,
addressed to Touche, Niven, on the letterhead of Fred Stern & Company (reading
Plaintiff's Exhibit 28 to jury).
Mr. Marshall: And that other exhibit
also contains the signature of Stern?
The Witness: Yes.
Mr. Podell: Yes. The signature of Stern
and Romberg.
Q. Messrs. Touche, Niven & Co. made the audit
for Fred Stern & Company for the year 1922, also,
did they not? A. Yes.
Q. Did they ask you for any such letters for
that year? A. I don't recall; I don't know.
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451

Q. Do you not know that this is the first time
that they ever asked any letters from you? A. I
think you are right.
Mr. Podell:
Cross-examination

You may examine.

by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. Now, yesterday, Mr. Romberg, you were asked
to identify certain books. I suppose you could
not say at this time that those books were in precisely the same condition they were in when you
left Stern's office, could you? A. No.
Q. Your memory would not go to each item of
those books any more? A. Not only that, but I
left before. I left way before Fred Stern & Company continued, and they continued in business
after I left.
Q. But you could not say that there were no
changes in the books that were there when you
left since you left, could you? A. No.
Q. Some of these books were loose-leaf books,
were they not? A. Yes.
Q. And you cannot say for sure, can you, that
all leaves are there now that were in those looseleaf books when you were there? A. No.
Q. And can you say for sure whether there were
no new leaves entered in those books since you
left? A. No, I cannot say.
Q. Now, the accounts receivable control ledger,
you remember that book? A. Yes.
Q. That could be posted directly from duplicate
invoices, could it not? A. Yes.
Q. And it frequently was so posted, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. Without reference to the journal vouchers?
A. At no time is there a reference to the journal
vouchers.
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Q. You say, Mr. Romberg, that you left Stern in
March of 1924, is that correct? A. Right.
Q. Before this period, Stern had bought rubber
from Ultramares, had it not, from the plaintiff
here? A. I think so.
Q. And it had owed Ultramares money and paid
it, had it not?
Mr. Podell: That is objected to. There
has been no proper foundation laid for it.

455

Q. Have you any recollection of any sales or
transactions between Stern and Ultramares prior
to March, 1924?
Mr. Podell: I object to it as not proper
cross-examination.
Mr. Marshall: I will withdraw the question at this time.

456

Q. You left Stern in March, 1924? A. Yes.
Q. Prior to that time, had you not resigned in
November, 1923, from Stern's employ? A. Twice.
Q. Did you at that time tell Stern that you did
not care to continue to make false statements for
him? A. I did.
Q. Did you then agree to continue in his employ
so as not to endanger Stern's home, did you tell
him that? A. He made certain promises.
Q. Did you tell him that you would continue in
his employ even though you did not want to continue to make false statements, because you did
not want to endanger Stern's home? A. I did
practically.
Q. The false statements that you referred to,
that you had been making and did not want to
continue to make, what kind of false statements
were those? A. I would have to refresh my memory on that.
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Q. You cannot remember the kind of false statements that you made for Stern? A. Let us
Q. Yes or no, can you remember? A. I do not
remember anything definite. I can remember it
if I see the statements or the supporting entries.
Q. Were the trial balances that you had taken
off for Stern that way false? A. The trial balance
sheet that Stern got personally from me always
showed the true condition.
Q. Did you make any false trial balances for him
prior to 1924? A. For him personally, never. All
changes he made personally.
Q. Did you make any false trial balances for
any one prior to 1924? A. Not over my signature.
Q. Did you make any, whether you signed any
or not, did you prepare any? A. No, not directly.
Q. Did you prepare them indirectly or in any
way, any false balance sheet prior to March, 1924?
A. May I amend the answer?
Q. Yes. A. Mr. Stern asked me to make a balance sheet, and I made it up according to the actual
condition of the books.
Q. When? A. Prior to December 31, 1924, some
time in July and August, Mr. Stern made some
changes on those and returned them to me and
said, "Have that typed." It was typed and I saw
that the typing was correct, and he signed them,
and what he did with them, I do not know.
Q. You do not know whether he made a false
statement or not? A. Naturally, he made changes.
Q. And those changes falsified the account? A.
Yes.
Q. And you knew it?
Mr. Podell: Falsified that particular balance sheet?
The Witness: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
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Q. After you left Stern in March, 1924, you continued to do work for him? A. No. Very little.
Q. But some? A. I was called in from time to
time.
Q. You had the general ledger in your possession,
did you not? A. I was given the general, possession
Q. Just yes or no. A. Yes.
Q. And you had that general ledger in your possession at the time that Stern committed suicide?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you make any entries in that ledger?
A. No.
Q. You were paid for your services up to November 29, 1924, were you not? A. No.
Q. You were not? A. No.
Q. You are sure of that? A. I am quite sure
of it.
Q. In 1924, did you prepare for Stern, or did
you assist Stern in preparing, a false balance sheet
of about June 30, 1924? A. No.
Q. You are sure you did not? A. Quite sure.
Q. You prepared no balance sheet at that time?
A. No balance sheet for him.
Q. Do you remember being examined in the
Bankruptcy Court in the Fred Stern matter? A.
I do.
Q. Do you remember the following colloquy:
"Q. I show you a copy of the statement and ask
you whether you ever saw the original of it (handing it to witness)?"
Mr. Podell: What page is that ?
. Mr. Marshall: 43.
Q. (Continued) "A. Oh, yes, I saw that. Q. Who
prepared that statement ? A. Let me explain this.
Mr. Stern wanted the figures to be prepared accord'

155
Hugo W. Romberg—For

Plaintiff—Cross.

ing to his suggestions. I only did the adding of
it, and so forth, for example, I kept some of the
figures I had. I brought them with me. Those I
gave to Stern, showing the changes on the back,
if any, which were made. This is a statement he
wanted me to make up of June 30." Do you remember that? A. Correctly.
Q. That was the truth? A. That is absolutely
the truth.
Q. "Q. In whose handwriting is this statement
which you show me? A. That is my handwriting.
Q. That statement which you made out as of June
30, 1924? A. Those are just figures, not a statement, just figures. Q. Just figures? A. Yes. Q.
And where were those figures taken from? A. No
place. Q. No place? A. They were not taken from
anywhere, because there was no general ledger in
existence. Q. Are they imaginary figures? A.
Imaginary figures based upon previous statements
of approximately how much the figures should be."
Do you remember that? A. Yes.
Q. And that is true? A. Yes.
Mr. Podell: This relates to an alleged
statement of some kind prepared along subsequent to the delivery of the statement to
us, that is, June of 1924. I would like to
have that statement produced. That was
never furnished to us.
Mr. Marshall: I am going to ask you to
produce it. You have it.
Mr. Podell: You are making a few reckless statements there.
Mr. Marshall: It is subpoenaed.
Mr. Podell: Does that prove that we have
it?
Mr. Marshall: Let us, get to that in the
proper order.
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Mr. Podell: Then, why do you shout that
way in the midst of what I am showing to
the Judge when you do not know what you
are talking about?
Mr. Marshall: You know what I am talking about.
Mr. Podell: Please do not address me.
Talk to the Judge.
The Court: Stop.
Mr. Podell: We have never produced that
statement and we have never had that statement. Counsel is asking a lot of questions
about it. I do not want to clutter the record
up with a lot of objections. We want to
know what that statement is.
The Court: Have you got it, Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Marshall: I have never seen it.
Mr. Limburg: The trustee's counsel produced it in the bankruptcy examination.
The Court: That does not say that they
know anything about it.
Mr. Limburg: They are asking about it.
The Court: They are asking about it from
a record. That is no implication that they
have it.
Mr. Limburg: We do not claim they have.
Mr. Podell: It should be produced. Anybody talking about the contents of a statement should produce it. It is confusing.
The Court: There is nothing confusing
about that. He is directing his examination to an alleged statement of June.
Mr. Podell: June, 1924.
The Court: 1924?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Court: Oh.
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Mr. Marshall: This witness stated he left
the employ of Stern at that time.
Mr. Podell: He left in March.
Mr. Marshall: I want to show that he
did not leave in March and that that was
untrue. I want to further show that there
was consistent conspiracy on the part of this
man and Stern to fake books.
Mr. Podell: We do not deny that, and I
will stipulate it.
Mr. Marshall: I want to bring it out in
my own way.
The Court: It is very material to these
defendants whether or no under fake books
or conspiracy of what it may have been, if
of such a character that the ordinarily prudent man would not have detected it, then
it is a very material thing to them that there
were figures so hidden that they would have
followed.
Mr. Podell: That is what we are here to
try. I maintained to the jury in my statement that those books were faked and that
Stern faked them and that this man helped
in it. There is no dispute about that. We
do not have to go into statements of June,
1924, to prove that. My contention is that
this was so crudely and visibly done that
these men were bound to have seen it.
The Court: I think we are going beyond
the relevant necessity under the concessions
that have been made.
Mr. Marshall: I wish to ask a few more
questions.
The Court: Yes, you may. Now, we have
it openly and notoriously stated by counsel
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for the plaintiff that these books were faked,
conspired about and connived about, resulting in falsified reports.
Mr. Podell: Certainly.
By Mr.

Marshall.

Q.
Absolutely correct.
Q. Did you or did you not prepare a subsequent
report for Stern, or participate in the preparation
of a false report or statement as of June 30, 1924?
473

474

Mr. Podell: I object to that.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Podell: I respectfully except. It is
immaterial and incompetent and after the
event having no bearing on the issues before
this Court.
A. A similar question you asked me before, and
my recollection of that answer was that I did not.
If you read this answer that you have read to me a
little while before, the statement when I came into
Stern's office was prepared in his own handwriting, and there was a question only of putting it in
the shape of a balance sheet form. In that, I did
assist him.
Q. You assisted him in putting that false statement in the balance sheet form in your handwriting? A. Yes.
Q. Do you know what happened to that statement? A. No.
Q. Has the trustee got it?
Trustee's Representative: No.
Mr. Marshall: I would like to have it
identified a little later.
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The Court: Do not tell me about it.
cannot do anything about it.

475
I

Q. Taking from Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 21, journal vouchers 12-27, 12-28, 12-29, those represent
corrections which Touche, Niven requested be made
in your books on the audit as of December 31, 1923,
do they not? A. They are not only corrections,
but actual closing entries.
Q. To make the corrections which they recommended? A. Yes,
Q. You made those closing entries, or Stern made
those closing entries? A. Yes, they are closing
entries.
Q. I believe you said on your direct examination that not all of the records of Stern & Company were turned over to Touche, Niven, did you
not? A. Right.

476

Mr. Limburg: I do not believe he said
that.
Mr. Marshall: He said it just now.
Q. United Baltic invoices, these that I have in
my hand, part of Exhibit 24, were concealed from
them, were they not? A. I do not know.
Q. Do you not know as a matter of fact, that
they were not entered on the books of Stern & Company until after Touche, Niven had completed their
audit? A. I do not know, no.
Q. You do not know that? A. No.
Q. Do you say they were on the books of Stern
& Company at the time of the audit? A. I do not
know that, either. If I see the books, I may be able
to tell you.
Q. You have no recollection of that? A. No
recollection of that.
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Q. Is there anything that you want to refresh
your recollection with? A. The purchase record.

479

480

Mr. Podell: I again call the attention of
the Court to the fact that all we called this
witness for was just to identify books, and
that is all.
Mr. Marshall: This I understood was admitted in evidence.
Mr. Podell: As a paper or book that was
on the files of Stern & Company during that
period, and that is all. I did not go into
the question of contents.
Mr. Marshall: If you make no claim that
we saw them——
Mr. Podell: I make the claim that you
certainly should have seen them if you had
done your duty properly and you should have
insisted on getting them.
Mr. Marshall: You are making a speech
to the jury.
Mr. Podell: You asked me for a question
and I am answering.
Mr. Marshall: It did not require that
answer.
Mr. Limburg: Which book do you wish?
The Witness: The accounts payable book
I think will show it too.
By Mr.

Marshall.

Q. Will you see if there is anything in that book
that will help you to recollect whether, or not these
vouchers were entered at the time that the audit
was made? A. These entries were made by some
one else, but by looking them over I might be able
to locate them, just when the entry was made..
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481

Mr. Podell: I object to that as calling
for the contents of a book not in evidence
and as not proper cross-examination and in
competent, irrelevant and immaterial. I do
not purport to vouch for the credibility of
this witness.
The Court: I will allow the question.
Mr. Podell: I except.
Q. Can you refresh your recollection on
point? A. I will look through the entries.
one second. According to this ledger here,
invoice dated September 3, 1923——
Q. I only asked you whether it refreshed
recollection?

that
Just
this
your

482

The Court: Do not tell us anything about
its contents.
A. As to what?
Q. As to whether those invoices were entered in
the books at the time Touche, Niven made the
audit?
Mr. Podell: Is that the book in particular or the books generally?
Mr. Marshall: Whether that book refreshes his recollection, as to whether they
were entered in any books.
Mr. Podell: You are asking for the contents of all the books and I make the same
objection, and exception.
The Court: Same ruling.
A. It is not a question of recollecting. The entry is made here in 1924.
Q. Do you remember anything about when the
entries were made in the books respecting those
United Baltic invoices?
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Mr. Podell: My further objection is that
it does not appear that he made any entries
himself.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Podell: Exception.
A. I did not make the entries.
By the

Court.

Q. So that you do not know and it does not refresh your recollection? A. No, it does not refresh
my recollection. I could find the result.
485

The Court: Never mind the contents.
We do not want the contents.
By Mr.

486

Marshall.

Q. The audit that Touche, Niven were engaged
to make was a balance sheet audit? A. Yes.
Q. And you attended to that? A. Yes.
Q. You knew when the audit was completed that
it was false? A. I did.
Q. And Mr. Stern knew it? A. Yes.
Q. When you signed these certificates, Plaintiff's
Exhibits 27 and 28, you knew those were false?
A. I did.
Q. And Mr. Stern did? A. Yes.
Q. Do I understand that you said to Mr. Podell
in answer to the question, "Did you say to Mr. Rea
I prefer not to sign those papers, referring to Plaintiff's Exhibit 27, 'I did,' " is that your answer? A.
Not in those exact words, but I suggested that he
go and have Mr. Stern sign them first.
Q. When you said in answer to Mr. Podell that
what you said to Mr. Rea was not like a refusal,
but an evasion and you asked him to see Mr. Stern,
was that a correct answer? A. Right.
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487

Q. That was correct? A. That was correct.
Q. There was not a blunt refusal, but an evasion?
A. Not a blunt refusal.
Mr. Podell: I object to that, and I move
to strike out that statement.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Marshall: It is cross-examination.
The Court: Sustained. I appreciate that.
Q. I asked you whether you did not testify in
these bankruptcy hearings that at the time you
were requested to sign it, you signed it because it
was brought to you unawares, these two letters or
certificates? A. It was a surprise to me.
Q. And that is why you signed it? A. Not exactly. The signing of it was done exactly as repeated before. It was brought to me unawares.
Q. But you knew what you were signing? A.
Yes, I read it.
Q. And you knew that those certificates stated
that all of the liabilities were entered on the books,
did you not? A. Right.
Q. And you knew that was not so? A. I knew.
Q. And you knew that there were no future contracts for crude rubber that were not in the inventory? A. Yes.
Q. And you knew that that was not true? A. I
did not keep the future contract book record and
what has been shown of that to Touche, Niven &
Co., I would not know.
Q. But you signed it, anyway? A. Yes.
The Court: What are those exhibit numbers?
Mr. Marshall: 27 and 28.
Q. Now, Mr. Romberg, you remember that you
offered at these bankruptcy hearings to help the
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creditors in every way that you could, do you not,
the creditors of Stern? A. They asked me to testify and I said I would gladly tell them everything
I knew of the conditions.
Q. And you were told, then, by the trustee's attorney, "I think it is important for you to do so";
do you remember that? A. I do not. I do not
definitely recall it, no.
Q. Do you remember you were first asked
whether you would be willing to assist the receiver's accountant in getting true facts of the situation, and to develop facts of which the receiver
already was aware; do you remember that?
Mr. Podell: I want to call the Court's
notice to the fact that this is not any part
of the cross-examination. I did not ask him
a word about that on direct, and I still urge
the fact that the direct examination confined
itself exclusively for the purpose of identifying the books and nothing more and nothing
less. Your Honor excluded when I tried to
read portions of his testimony.
The Court: Now what?
Mr. Podell: I want to call notice to the
fact because I will ask your Honor to read
certain portions of this man's testimony on
redirect examination.
The Court: Now what?
Mr. Podell: I want to note on the record
that I shall ask your Honor that, in view of
the fact that counsel is reading a portion of
his testimony under 21-A, I shall ask your
Honor
The Court: Do you object to this testimony?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
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The Court: Then, the objection is sustained.
Mr. Podell: That is much better.
Mr. Marshall: Can I not show that this
witness is a biased witness?
The Court: You may, but not under this
cross-examination. Objection is sustained.
Mr. Marshall: Does your Honor rule that
I cannot show now that he agreed to help
the trustee and has been kept out of jail for
that reason?
Mr. Podell: Is that a fair statement? Did
we have anything to do with that?
Mr. Marshall: I did not say that you did.
Mr. Podell: Is that a proper remark to
make in the presence of the Court and jury
and charge that to us?
The Court: I do not see what there is
that is annoying you about his statements.
I have not the slightest conception as to why
you should be annoyed by any of his statements at all, except as a matter of identification. Objection sustained, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception. That
is all.
Mr. Podell: For the purposes of the record, I would like to offer in evidence the
statement of this witness beginning with the
top of page 1759 to 1761, so that it will appear in the record, and I would like to have
that portion of it either read into the record
at the proper time or marked for identification. It is testimony of this witness as the
same appears on pages 1759, 1760 and 1761.
Mr. Marshall: Are you offering that in
evidence?
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Mr. Podell: I have offered them. May I
renew my offer?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: Exception. I would like to
have them marked for identification, so that
the same will appear on the minutes.
Mr. Marshall: No objection to that.
Mr. Podell: I take it that that objection
and exception applies to each question and
answer separately.
The Court: Yes, on each of those three
pages.
(The testimony referred to will be found
at the end of the record of to-day's session.)
Redirect

498

examination

by Mr. Podell.

Q. You have been asked about some of these accounts. Do you remember an item on the rubber
sales account entered up in January or in December of 1923 aggregating the sum of approximately
$706,000? A. I have a recollection.
Q. Is this paper in the rubber book, the rubber
sales account? A. May I see the journal entry that
goes with it?
Q. Please answer my question first. A. This is
the rubber sales account.
Q. If you need any papers to answer my questions, I will get them for you. Do you see the last
item appearing in this book under the heading of
rubber sales account? A. Yes.
Q. Do you see the date of it? A. There is no
date, but just the months.
Q. Will you read the item the same as it appears
in this book, omitting this part, which I will stipu-
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with you, Mr. Marshall, if you wish, that it
subsequently written. This was written later
this was written later. Omitting the pencil
give us the ink item as the same appears.
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception to that.
Mr. Podell: I will offer the whole of it,
if you want it,
Mr. Marshall: I am objecting to the entry
being put in evidence.
Mr. Podell: The book is in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: For one purpose only.
Mr. Podell: No, it was not limited in purpose.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.

500

By Mr. Podell.
Q. Will you tell us what that item was, beginning with this last line? A. The last line reading
on the rubber sales account 12-29, 12 indicating the
month and 29 the number of the journal voucher,
$3061.92, a debit entry. On the credit side appears
an entry
Q. Do not read the pencil. A. No. 12-28, $706,843.07.
Q. Is there anything else in ink on that same
line? A. Debit balance
Mr. Marshall:

That is not on that line.

Q. On that same line is this there? A. I read
that.
Q. 12-28? A. That means the month 12 and 28
is a number.
Q. The number of the journal voucher? A. Yes.
Q. For that month? A. For that month.
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Q. Was that item in the book at the time when
Touche, Niven were auditing these books in January and February of 1924. Just answer that yes
or no. A. Yes.
Q. Was that a false item? A. May I see the
journal voucher?
Q. Can you not say that to this jury without
looking at any journal voucher or anything else,
that that item was a pure fabrication? A. You
want me to recollect my memory?
Q. Yes; what is your best recollection of it?
A. If I see the journal voucher, I can tell.
Q. Can you not tell without looking at the journal voucher? A. No.
Q. $706,000 is a very large quantity for one
month's sales, is it not? A. A lot of figures have
passed through my hands since.
Q. I am not talking about figures, but sales for
one month. Do you not consider that $706,000 was
a very large quantity of sales for your business for
one month? A. May I turn to the rubber sales account, to the page before.
Q. Tell me first in answer to my question
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as immaterial.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.

504

Q. Look at the previous item?

A. 12-9, $644,-

000.

Q. That represents $644,000 additional sales? A,
Yes.
Q. Taking the $644,000 of sales already entered
in December and the next item of $706,000 of sales,
that makes a total of $1,300,000 of sales for the
month of December, does it not, 1923? A. Right.
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505

Mr. Marshall: I object to the witness
reading from this book or the contents of
that book going into evidence.
Mr. Podell: It is in evidence.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Will you please tell this jury whether in any
one month to your knowledge that your concern
has been in business, it ever made sales of $1,300,000?
Mr. Marshall; I object to that.
The Court: Sustained.

506

Q. Will you look at the records and tell us
whether the records show that there were sales
anywhere near $1,300,000 in any one month?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. Can you by looking at this record tell us
whether or not that $706,000 entered of sales in
the month of December, 1923, was a pure fraud and
falsification? A. From this entry alone, no.
Q. What do you want to look at? A. The journal
entry.
Q. Is that all you want to look at? A. The invoice register and debit memo book.
Mr. Marshall: The trustee presented
some papers here and I do not like to keep
them in my possession and they may be impounded with the Clerk.
Mr. Podell: Do not charge me with the
responsibility of that.
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Mr. Marshall: Oh, no.
The Court: Sure.
The Witness: No. 12-28
By Mr. Podell.

509

Q. I want you to answer my question. My question is whether you can state to this jury, and you
can examine any books or papers you like, whether
or not that item of $706,000 is a pure falsification?
A. I answered that before. I wanted to refresh my
memory on it.
Q. Look at anything that you like. A. I cannot
find any supporting entry nor voucher for that
entry in the rubber sales account in the amount of
$706,834.07.
Q. And what is your conclusion from that?
Mr. Marshall: I object to his drawing a
conclusion from that.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.

510

Q. What is your conclusion as to my specific
question? What is your conclusion as to whether
or not that $706,000 is a pure falsification? A.
That is just exactly what it is.
Q. It is that? A. It is that.
Q. And the way you arrive at that is by looking
at the debit memo book? A. Right.
Q. The debit memo book is not a loose leaf ledger?
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out Mr.
Podell's statement of how he arrived at it,
and I object to any testimony of this witness
of how he arrived at it.
The Court: I will allow it,
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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Q. This debit memo book is not a loose leaf book?
A. No.
Q. There are no pages missing from the debit
memo book? A. No.
Q. They are all consecutively numbered 28, 29,
30 and 31? A. Yes.
Q. You did not conceal this debit memo book
from these accountants at any time? A. No.
Q. Did anyone conceal them from them to your
knowledge? A. No.
Q. Was the book there in January and February
of 1924? A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. To your knowledge did they not use this debit
memo book in making the audit? A. Yes.
Q. Will you turn to the supporting entries or
the place where there should be a supporting entry
for that $706,000 item and tell us if there is any?
A. There is no supporting entry for this.

511
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Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out the
witness' answer.
The Court: Strike it out,
Q. Turn to the page where consecutively in the
order of dates you have your entries in the month
of December, 1923? A. Page 33.
Q. Does that contain the entire record for the
month of sales, referring to Exhibit 5? Will you
find anywhere for the month of December in this
supporting book, the debit memo book, any record
of sales for $706,000? A. No.
Mr. Podell: May I just for the purposes
of identification mark page 33 for identification? The book is in evidence.
The Court: Yes.
(The same was thereupon marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 5-a for Identification.)
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Q. Have you got the journal voucher 28 that is
referred to in that item? A. Yes.
Q. By the way, this false item of $706,000 of
sales, that is the very last item of sales in that
account, is it not? A. Right,
Q. It is the last thing that is entered? A. Right.
Q. You know it is different in handwriting from
the handwriting that immediately precedes it? A.
Right,
Q. And the handwriting that immediately precedes it was whose handwriting, the preceding accounts? A. I do not recognize the handwriting.
Q. Mr. Siess, the accountant, has testified that
he wrote the items from 12-57 down to the end of
December, excepting the last item? A. That is
right.
Q. That is not in his handwriting? A. No.
Q. So that the handwriting, on that last item
was different from the handwriting of the previous
entries? A. Yes.
Q. And it is the last item? A. Yes.
Q. By the way, that very item refers to a journal
voucher? A. It refers to 12-28.
Q. And 28 meant the journal voucher? A. The
journal voucher number.
Q. Did you dig up the voucher No. 12-28, is
that it? A. That is 12-28.
Q. Does it contain other entries which are summarized in the account of the rubber sales?
Mr. Marshall: I object to this.
The Court: Sustained. It speaks for
itself.
Q. Can you tell us whether there is any entry
here contained showing rubber sales of $706,000
as entered there in that last item? A. There is no
entry on this voucher 12-28 in the amount of
$706,843.07.
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Mr. Marshall: I move to strike it out.
Mr. Podell: That voucher is in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: Yes, it is.
Mr. Podell: For the purpose of accounting, I think they have adopted the rule that
they will allow someone to summarize, the
contents of a lot of papers.
The Court: That is right.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Now, Mr. Romberg, was this paper concealed
from the accountants at any time to your knowledge? A. No.
Q. And speaking of this paper we are speaking
of, journal voucher, 12-28? A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever refuse to give it to them? A.
No.
Q. Was it in the files of Frederick Stern & Company to your knowledge? A. Yes.
Q. And you can say that this is the identical
journal voucher that bore that No. 12-28 and was
in the files in January and February, 1924? A.
Yes.
Q. In whose handwriting was this false entry of
$706,000? A. That is my handwriting.
Q. So that you know that you falsified it? A.
I know I made the entry.
Q. But you knew also that you were falsifying
it? A. Yes.
Q. And you did not falsify any items on this
journal voucher which you specifically referred to
in this last item? A. No.
Q. You did not? A. No.
Q. So that anyone comparing that item with the
supporting journal voucher referred to in this paper
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would have seen that it is not contained on the
journal voucher and has no support on the journal
voucher?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: That is all. May I have that
marked for identification?
(The same was thereupon marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 21-A for Identification.)
Recross-examination
521

522

by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. This journal voucher, 12-28, Exhibit 21-A, only
purports to cover the recommendations made by
Touche, Niven & Co. for closing entries after their
audit?
Mr. Podell: I object to that as an improper summary of the contents of the paper,
and leading and suggestive in respect to it.
The Court: I would like to have for my
own sake and for the jury's sake
Mr. Podell: We intended to show that by
accountants. I assume we will call some accountants. I will not press the objection.
The Court: That is the only reason. These
are closing entries made by Touche, Niven
& Co.
By Mr.

Marshall.

Q. That is all that paper purports to be?
Mr. Podell: What paper is that?
Mr. Marshall: 12-28.
A. There are some additional small changes and
adjustments, but that is all that it really is.
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The Court: Those are figures made by the
accountants.
Mr. Marshall: When we had finished auditing the books, we found that certain adjustments had to be made to put the books
properly in balance and we recommended
certain closing entries, as is always done at
the end of an audit.
The Court: And these represent those
closing entries?
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
Mr. Podell: That is what is confusing
about it and that is why I made the objection. Your Honor is being misled.
Mr. Marshall: I think not.
The Court: I was a little suspicious, but
both of you are at odds about what it was.
Mr. Podell: There is a decided difference
between us as to what it was. Counsel here
is talking about some corrections. Is this
entire paper consisting of such adjustments
and corrections?
Mr. Marshall: He said there were a few
minor things that were not.
Mr. Podell: He calls them minor things

523
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Redirect examination by Mr. Podell.
525
Q. Will you tell us whether this entire paper
and the entries consist of corrections and adjustment? A. No.
Q. The primary function of this journal voucher
is to furnish the supporting paper before this entry
is made in that book on the rubber sales account,
is it not? A. I do not understand that question.
Q. Is it not true that if that $706,000 item were
a true and correct item of sales that before the
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entry would be made in this book, there would be
some entry showing it on this paper?

527

The Court: By whom?
Mr. Podell: By the regular bookkeeper
in the premises.
The Court: Is that a bookkeeping record
of the people in the premises, this 12-28?
The Witness: That is a bookkeeping record by Touche, Niven & Co.
The Court: By Touche, Niven & Co.?
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: The accountants?
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: Not by the bookkeepers of
Stern & Company?
The Witness: No.
By Mr. Podell.
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Q. Tell me, did Touche, Niven & Co. keep your
books? A. No. During 1923 the books fell away
behind
Q. If the bookkeeper in the employ of Fred Stern
& Company had done his duty, it would have been
part of his business to keep that journal voucher
as part of his books? A. Yes, but he did not have
the time.
Q. He did not write them up? A. No.
Q. And so Touche, Niven & Co. wrote them up?
A. They assisted in the writing of them.
Q. So that there is no doubt now in your mind,
at least, is there, that Touche, Niven & Co. saw
this paper 12-28?
The Court:
get.
Mr. Podell:
The Court:
it, and I want

That is what I am trying to
I am trying hard to get that.
I do not think the jury knows
to be sure that they know.
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By the Court.
Q. Is this a bookkeeping record of Stern & Company? A. Yes.
Q. Even though it is made up by Touche, Niven
& Co.? A. Yes.
Mr. Podell: And your Honor should keep
in mind why it was made up by ToucheNiven.
Mr. Marshall: I object to Mr. Podell summarizing every time he opens his mouth.
By Mr.

Podell.
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Q. My last question is, there is no doubt, is there,
in your mind, that somebody from Touche, Niven
& Co. not only saw this paper 12-28, but wrote on
it? A. Yes.
Q. And wrote on it before this fake entry was
written? A. That I do not know.
Q. Wrote on it at the time, or before they supplied that financial statement? A. Yes.
Q. And before that financial statement
Mr. Marshall: I object to his statement
that we supplied a financial statement. We
made a balance sheet audit and supplied
copies of that,
Mr. Podell: I will correct that. Supplied thirty-two of them, so that it should
be in the plural.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. And that entry, $706,000, the false one, certainly was made before the financial statement was
supplied or those financial statements were supplied? A. Before the completion of the statement
by Touche, Niven & Co.
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Mr. Podell: That is all.
Mr. Marshall: That is all.
(Witness excused.)

GEORGE REA, called as a witness on behalf of the
plaintiff, being first duly sworn, testified as follows :

Direct examination

533

534

by Mr. Podell.

Q. Where do you reside? A. 54 Hazelwood Road,
Bloomfield, New Jersey.
Q. Mr. Rea, what is your business or occupation
or profession? A. I am a public accountant,
Q. And in 1924 whom were you associated with?
A. With Touche, Niven & Co.
Q. And in what capacity were you connected
with them? A. As a staff manager.
Q. How long have you been with them? A. At
that time I had been with them about four years
and a half.
Q. Are you with them still? A. I am.
Q. At this moment ? A. I am.
Q. What was your connection, if any, with the
audit of the business of Fred Stern & Company
for the year 1923? A. I was in charge of the examination which was made by our accountants,
Q. You saw the statement that was finally certified? A. I did.
Q. You know the number of copies that were
delivered to Mr. Stern?
Mr. Marshall: We have already conceded
that.
Mr. Podell: I want to know from Mr. Rea
what his knowledge was.

179
George Rea—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

535

Q. Did you know that? A. Yes, sir.
Q. There were twenty-four original copies delivered at one time, duplicate originals? A. I believe
so.
Q. Do you understand what the purpose and use
of those original copies was to be? A. I believe so.
Q. Will you tell us what was your understanding
that he would use those statements for?
Mr. Marshall: I object to it in that form.
The Court: It is a short form, but it will
do without a lot more questions. I will
allow it.
Mr. Marshall: It was only an objection
to the form and I will withdraw my objection.
A. For the purpose that any of our clients use
their balance sheets in submission to their stockholders and those interested in the financial condition of the company.
Q. I did not get the last part. You spoke of
submission to stockholders? A. And others interested in the financial condition of the corporation
that the books had been examined by ourselves and
had been found to be correct.
Q. You knew then, did you not, that among
others that were interested in the financial condition of that corporation were the number of its
creditors? A. I assumed that they would be.
Q. And a number of the banks? A. Probably.
Q. And a number of the people from whom they
intended borrowing money or financing them? A.
They might have been.
Q. You knew that, did you not? A. No.
Q. Did you not know that they intended using
that financial statement for the purpose of arranging their finances for the coming year? A. No.
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Q. Did you know that they intended using it for
any question that might arise during the course
of the next few months or the next month in financing his business? A. No.
Q. You did not know that? A. No.
Q. Mr. Rea, you are not attempting to favor the
concern you are working for? A. No.
Q. I want to read to you a question and answer
that was asked you under 21-A, and I would like you
to tell the jury whether it was a correct statement
that you made at that time. Mr. Rea, when I asked
you as to whether Mr. Stern told you the purpose
for which he intended to use the twenty original
copies of the audit, you asked me whether I wanted
your understanding or impression or your knowledge on the subject. That is at page 1109: "Q.
What was your understanding? A. My understanding was that he would use the balance sheets
for any purpose that might be, that might arise
during the course of the next few months or the
course of the next month in financing his business." Was that a correct statement of your understanding? A. Will you read the answer again?
Q. You want it again. Just the question or the
answer? A. The answer.
Q. "My understanding was that he would use
the balance sheets for any purpose that might be,
that might arise during the course of the next few
months or the course of the next month in financing
his business." Would you like to see the answer?
A. I understand it.
Q. Was that a correct statement of your understanding? A. Yes.
Q. "And in connection with financing his business you also had in mind the possibilty of obtaining loans from banks? A. Yes." A. Yes.

181
George Rea—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

541

Q. "Q. By the use of those audits? A. Yes." A.
Yes.
Q. Is it not also fair to assume that when a client
asks for twenty copies of a balance sheet with your
signature attached to the balance sheet, that he
is going to use that in connection with seeking
credit for his business purposes? What would be
your answer to that question? A. Will you read
the question?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling
for a conclusion.
The Court: Allowed.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. (Last question repeated as recorded.) A.
Not necessarily.
Q. You made this answer and see if you want
to change it: "That would not be an unusual purpose for which it would be used." A. I do not
see any conflict between the answers.
Q. Never mind the conflict. Is it a correct statement to say that that would not be an unusual purpose for which he would use these extra statements? A. It is.
Q. Now, do you not know from your experience
that when banks or any other creditors get these
certified balance sheets that they rely on their contents? A. They rely on them for what they purport to be.
Q. They rely on the accuracy of the statements
certified to by a firm such as yours? A. Yes.
Q. Now, Mr. Rea, just one question: What part
did you personally play or rather take in the making of this audit; just what did you do; what was
your position in connection with it? A. I conferred
with our office secretary as to the men who were
available
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Q. I am not asking you really for what you did.
I am asking it to find out what your relative position to the men was; what did you call yourself?
Are you senior accountant? A. I am staff manager.
Q. And are they all under you, all the people
that worked on this audit, were they all under you?
A. They were.
Q. Were you their superior? A. I was.
Q. Had you had anything to do with the 1922
audit of Stern's books? A. Yes.
Q. And how long had your concern been auditing
Stern's books? A. I think that the audit for 1923
was the fourth audit that we had made.
Q. The fourth one? A. The fourth one.
Q. So that for four preceding years or three
years, anyway, your concern had audited the Stern,
books? A. Yes.
Q. And had you personally had connection with
every such audit? A. Yes.
Q. And did you not know from that experience
that Stern always was a heavy borrower? A. Yes.
Q. That he always owed money to banks or factors or creditors? A. Yes.
Mr. Podell:
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Cross-examination

That is all.

by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. And you knew, did you not, Mr. Rea, from
the previous audits and from examining this balance sheet, that the bulk, the great bulk of the
obligations of Stern were secured, did you not?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, what did you do, with respect to Mr.
Towell in this audit of 1923, as staff manager? A.
I approved of his being selected by our office secretary as the man to do the audit, discussed the
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Q. You believed him to be a man competent to
do this kind of an audit? A. Yes, I knew he was.
Q. And what else did you do in the course of
the audit before the balance was finally certified?
A. I reviewed his working papers, inquired of him
as to the sources from which he got his information, the character of the information he had, and
his understanding of the work he had done and the
records that he had seen and the working papers
that had been prepared, and the balance sheet that
he had drawn from them.
Q. Did he explain to you each of the items in the
balance sheet?
Mr. Podell: I submit that is outside of
the scope of his direct examination, your
Honor.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, Mr.
Podell asked him what he did as staff manager.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell : I asked him specifically what
his position was.
The Court: You may make him your own
witness for that purpose at this time.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, this is not the
time. We are in the plaintiffs' case and not
on the defense.
Mr. Marshall: I am going to ask him
about three more questions.
The Court: Let us have it over with.
Mr. Podell: The trouble with those three
questions is that they will necessitate my
cross-examining this gentleman for a great
many more questions, because that is a subject-matter of the defense.
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The Court: That is true. It would necesitate a cross-examination and he should not
have to do it now, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully except.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor's ruling relates
solely to the order of proof, as I understand
it?
The Court: That is all. Not as to its
admissibility or its inadmissibility. Of
course, it is admissible at the proper time.
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Q. Now, Mr. Rea, did you ever hear that anybody was going to lend money on the strength of
this balance sheet? A. Not that I recall, no.
Q. Did you ever hear of any agreement by anybody to lend money if a balance sheet showed up in
a certain way?
Mr. Podell: I object to that. Nobody
claims any agreement here of any kind, or
whether he knew of any agreement.
The Court: I will allow it, sir.
Mr. Podell: Exception.
A. No.
Q. Did you ever know that anyone was going to
lend money to Stern at that time? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: That is all.
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Redirect

examination

by Mr.

Podell.

Q. Just what do you mean by that, Mr. Rea,
in view of the previous statements? Do you mean
to tell this jury that when these statements were
handed over you did not know they were going to
be used by Stern for the purpose of getting credit?
A. No.
.
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The Court: As a fact? You mean you
did not know as a fact in the future that
they would be used?
The Witness: Yes. I had no such knowledge.
Q. What was your understanding of the purpose
he was going to take them for? A. That he would
use our balance sheets, if he used them at all, for
financial purposes, that he would use it as collateral evidence as to his own representations to
others he was seeking credit from as to his financial condition.
Q. When you signed that certificate you knew
that you were also making representations, did you
not? A. I did not sign the certificate.
Q. Whoever it was that signed it on behalf of
your concern?

554

Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling
for a conclusion of law.
Mr. Podell: I will not press that.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. What you mean to point out is that at that
very moment when these certificates were handed
over to him you did not know of any specific person
to whom he said he was going to take that particular balance sheet and get a particular credit?
A. No. I didn't know he was going to use it at all
for that purpose.
Q. But you understood he was going to use it in
securing credit, that that was the purpose that he
was expecting to use it for in connection with the
conduct of his business? A. No.
Q. You did not understand that? A. No.
Q. What did you understand? Tell us again.
A. That he would use it as our evidence, just as
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it purported to be, that we certified that this was
a true balance sheet, and that he would use that
as collateral evidence to his own representations
as to his financial condition.
Q. For what purpose? A. Any purpose that he
might use in a financial way.
Q. What do you mean by "in a financial way"?
A. To get loans, extend loans, get credit, and possibly induce other people to put money in the business, buy stock, and so forth.
Recross-examination
557

by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. You did not know he would use it; you only
knew he might use it, is that what you mean? A.
Yes.
The Court: We will take a five-minute
recess.
(After short recess.)
Redirect examination

by Mr. Podell.

Q. Mr. Rea, you knew that this concern, Fred.
Stern & Company, was a closed corporation, did
you not? A. Yes.
Q. And how many stockholders did it have? A.
I think just the one real stockholder, Mr. Stern.
558

Recross-examination

by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. How long had you known Mr. Stern, Mr. Rea?
A. Not more than four years. I don't remember
whether I had met him the first year or not.
Q. And Mr. Romberg? A. About two years, I
think.
Q. And had you ever heard or seen anything to
make you doubt their honesty?
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Mr. Podell: I object to that as not proper
cross-examination at this time.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I
think I can shorten it tremendously if I can
put in these two or three questions.
The Court: I know it, but I do not want
to open up the door of cross-examination.
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception, respectfully, of course.
Mr. Podell: At this time.
The Court: Not as to its admissibility,
but as to this time.
Mr. Marshall: I think in view of his
questions about Mr. Rea's knowledge of the
use of the balance sheet, it is proper to show
even now, at any time, that he had perfect
faith in the integrity of Stern and Romberg
and in this balance sheet he was going to
put out.
The Court: I have not any objection to
that at all, as to what his opinion was as
to the balance sheet. None at all.
Mr. Marshall: That was going to be the
third question in my order. I will put that
now.
Mr. Podell: He can bring that out in the
same line of cross-examination, your Honor.
The Court: I will allow that question at
this time, Mr. Podell.
Mr. Podell: Then, will your Honor permit me, if this witness is not recalled, to
permit me to recall him for the purposes of
cross-examination ?
The Court: Certainly.
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Marshall.

Q. Did you at any time doubt the truth and honesty of this balance sheet and the certificate attached to it? A. No.
Q. That is Exhibit 1.
Mr. Marshall: I have no other questions.
Redirect
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examination

by Mr.

Podell.

Q. Do you really mean that, Mr. Rea? Did you
understand the question? The question is, did you
at any time doubt the truth or falsity of this statement? Do you mean your answer to stand as it
is? A. I had reference to the time when it was
issued.
Q. At a particular time. You know that it is
false, do you not? A. I do not.
Q. You know now that it is false? A. I do not,
Q. Have you not discovered that it is false? A.
I understand there are questions raised as to the
accuracy of it, sir.
Q. Is that all you understand? A. I have no
knowledge
Q. Do you not know that your own employee
marked certain accounts as purely fictitious?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, your
Honor. There is no basis for that statement,
and it is not so.
The Court: I do not know whether it is
or not. Therefore the witness, I think, can
say.
Q. You do not know that certain of these accounts are fictitious; you do not know that now
even, is that your statement? A. Not of my own
direct knowledge.
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Q. You have not looked at the books to verify
it? A. No.
Q. Your employees have reported to you, have
they not? A. They reported that certain things are
represented to be fictitious.
Q. Represented to be fictitious? A. Yes.
Q. By whom? A. By people who subsequently
examined the books.
Q. Did you not check up on them? A. No.
Q. Did not your employees check up on them?
A. No.
Q. Did you not send two of your accountants over
to verify them? A. No.
Q. As a matter of fact, Mr.
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The Court: The witness' answers are
clearly based on the fact from an accounting
standpoint, that he does not know of his own
personal knowledge; that what he does know
i s a matter of hearsay. Do not let us mince
words on things that do not mean anything.
Q. Did you not get that information from your
own employees? A. No.
Q. Do you know Mr. Letter and Mr. Montague?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you not send them over or did not your
concern send them over, to your knowledge, to
check up on these claims that were being made that
the statement was false? A. As I remember, they
were sent over to help Mr. Djorup check up on
some work he was doing on the books.
Q. And did not they come back and tell you
that those items, certain items, were false? A. No.
Q. Never told you that? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: I think we have pursued
this line of discussion far enough, your
Honor.

567

190
568

George Rea—For

Plaintiff—Redirect—Recross.

Q. You have said that nothing had happened to
arouse your suspicion about the concern ; is that
your statement? A. During the course of the audit,
yes.
Q. Nothing happened?
Mr. Marshall: I was not allowed to go
into that, your Honor.
Mr. Podell: That is exactly what he was
asked.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
569

Q. Do you not know or was it not reported to you
by the men working under you that they found the
inventory had been falsified to the extent of over a
quarter of a million dollars, before this statement
was certified? A. No. They didn't report it was
falsified. They reported that the inventory had
been overstated and that they had made corrections.
Q. Overstated in excess of $250,000? A. Yes.
Mr. Podell: That is all.
Recross-examination

570

by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. It is not unusual, is it, to find large overstatements in inventories and books that you audit?
A. No.
Mr. Podell: What was the inventory, Mr.
Rea?
Mr. Marshall: I am examining him. All
right, what was the inventory, Mr. Rea?
The Witness: I don't remember the details.
Mr. Podell : Look at your statement and
tell us what the total inventory was, and
then tell us the overstatement.
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A. The inventory as we finally determined it was
$131,000.
Q. And they were all pledged, the whole inventory? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Now, I think, your Honor,
I am entitled to ask him, in view of Mr.
Podell's question
Mr. Podell: I did not invite this, your
Honor.
The Court: No, sir, I am not going to permit it at this time.
Mr. Marshall: I do not want to press
your Honor as long as you come to that conclusion, but I think Mr. Podell has opened
the door by his last few questions.
The Court: The Court has ruled, and you
may have an exception.
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully except.
Redirect examination

by Mr.

572

Podell.

Q. In other words, on this question of inventory,
on an inventory of $131,000, you found that this
concern had overstated it by $250,000? A. What is
the question, please?
Q. (Question repeated as recorded.) A. Our assistants found that they had overstated it.
Q. And so reported to you? A. Yes.
Q. And that did not arouse your suspicion about
the integrity of a concern that does that? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: Then I think I have a right
to ask him about his understanding of the
integrity of these people.
The Court: Objection sustained, if there
be one.
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Mr. Podell: There is certainly one, at this
time.
Mr. Marshall: Mr. Podell has asked him
about a, suspicion as to integrity.
Mr. Podell: I did not invite this. I cautioned counsel if he asked questions of the
character he did, it would involve more
cross-examination.
Mr. Marshall: May I put on the record,
then, the questions I want to ask?
The Court: Anything you desire to put
on the record, you may, sir.
Mr. Marshall: Understand, there is going
to be an objection, and you are not to answer.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Have you ever seen or heard anything to make
you question the integrity of Mr. Stern or of Mr.
Romberg?
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Mr. Podell: That has been asked and answered.
The Court: He just wants it for the purpose of the record.
Mr. Marshall: It has not been answered.
The Court: That has not been answered.
It has not been allowed.
Mr. Podell: The very first question your
Honor did permit, you said you would not
object to having him ask that one question.
That is what brought out all this crossexamination.
The Court: But this question I did not
allow.
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Case.
Mr. Podell: I stand corrected. I thought
your Honor did allow a similar question. I
object to it at this time.
The Court: Declined at this time.
Mr. Marshall: Exception. I will state to
your Honor I have no further intention of
calling Mr. Rea,
Mr. Podell: I will call him for crossexamination, that is all.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. Podell: Now, your Honor, I would
like to read, while we are on the subject,
from the testimony of Mr. Clowes, who is a
partner of the defendant. He is one of the
defendants himself.
As an admission
against interest, I would like to read a
previous statement made by him.
The Court: This is in the examination before trial?
Mr. Limburg: In the examination in
bankruptcy.
Mr. Marshall: In the Stern bankruptcy.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Podell: I am reading from page 1453.
Mr. Clowes is one of the defendants and a
member of the firm of Touche, Niven & Co.
"Q. You realize, of course, a man in your profession, that this audit sheet report, or rather these
audit sheet reports, are used by a client for the
purpose of gaining credit? A. As a general proposition, yes, I know that to be a fact."
Mr. Podell: Now, I want to read also
from the testimony of Mendes, likewise one
of the defendants named here, a member of
the firm of Touche, Niven & Co.:
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"Q. You know, do you not

"

Mr. Marshall: What page, please?
Mr. Podell: Page 1615.
"Q. You know, do you not, as an experienced accountant and as a member of the firm of Touche,
Niven & Co. that banks rely on reports of certified
accountants such as your firm is in the habit of
certifying, and extending credit to various businesses; you know that, don't you? A. I have a
general understanding that they do."
581
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Mr. Marshall: I never questioned the general understanding. It is in the pleadings.
I do not know why he is going through all of
this.
Mr. Podell: Now, your Honor, is this
necessary at this time?
The Court: I think it is somewhat superfluous, Mr. Podell, because it is admitted.
Mr. Podell: What is admitted?
The Court: The fact that they knew generally that these reports would be used as
financial statements to banks or to creditors
or to stockholders or to purchasers or sellers.
Mr. Podell: I do not think their admission in the answer, your Honor, goes quite
that far, but I am perfectly willing to take
that, if they so stipulate.
The Court: I think that is the fact, is it
not, Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Marshall: It is right in the answer,
your Honor.
Mr. Podell: I beg your pardon. I will
read what is in the answer.
The Court: Well, if it is not, Mr. Marshall
says he agrees with the Court now, so how
further can we go?
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Mr. Podell: He did not until this minute
say that. All he admits, your Honor, in the
answer—he does not admit what your Honor
said he admits, as your Honor stated, unless he admits it now, which I am perfectly
willing to take. All he admits in his answer is they admit knowing that the balance
sheet so to be prepared by them may be submitted by Fred Stern & Company to some
of its bankers. That is all he admits. Now,
I would like to have that stipulation that
your Honor stated, and I understand Mr.
Marshall stipulates that is so. That settles
it.
Now, Mr. Levy, will you take the stand,
please?

583

584

S A U L LEVY, a witness called on behalf of the
plaintiff, being first duly sworn and stating his address to be 475 Fifth Avenue, New York City, testified as follows:

Direct examination by Mr. Podell.
Q. Mr. Levy, what is your professional occupation? A. I am a certified public accountant. I am
also a member of the Bar.
Q. How long have you been practicing your profession as a certified public accountant? A. For
the past ten years, a little over that.
Q. And are you practicing on your own account
or with some firm? A. On my own account, for all
of that time.
Q. And where are your offices? A. 475 Fifth
Avenue, Manhattan.
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Q. And has your practice included examining accounts and presenting certified balance sheets? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. From time to time? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you had occasion to examine certain
of the books and records of Fred Stern & Company?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you likewise had occasion to examine
them in conjunction with the statement certified,
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 for Identification, certified by
Touche, Niven & Co.?
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The Court: Have you not connected that
yet?
Mr. Marshall: They have not.
Mr. Podell: I will take that up. I think
perhaps your Honor's suggestion is quite
correct. I will take that up and connect it
now.
The Court: It is before the jury and being thought about, so let us have it in evidence rather than for identification.
Mr. Podell: I will withdraw the witness
and call Mr. Deetjen.
(Witness withdrawn.)
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Louis A. D E E T J E N , a witness called on behalf of
the plaintiff, being first duly sworn and stating his
address to be 159 Park Street, Montclair, New
Jersey, testified as follows:
Direct examination by Mr. Podell.
Q. Mr. Deetjen, are you connected with the
Ultramares Corporation, the plaintiff in this action? A. I am.
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Q. And in what capacity? A. I am the president
of the Ultramares Corporation.
Q. And how long have you held that office? A.
Since the 1st of January, 1925.
Q. And what was your office in January of 1925?
A. In December, 1924?
Q. Yes. A. Vice-president and treasurer. December, 1924.
The Court: December, 1924.
Q. December, 1924? A. Yes.
Q. When did you become connected with the
Ultramares Corporation for the first time? A.
When it was founded.
Q. Which was what year? A. In July, 1919.
Q. And you have been with them ever since? A.
Yes.
Q. In one capacity or another? A. Yes.
Q. And what was your connection with them in
the early part of 1924? A. I was vice-president
and treasurer.
Q. Were you also a member of the board of directors? A. I was.
Q. Who was the president of the concern at that
time? A. Mr. Von Goeben.
Q. Is he living? A. No.
Q:. When did he die? A. Two years ago.
Mr. Marshall: Get his full name,
Q. What is his first name? A. Alexander.
Q. And he was the president in the early part of
1924? A. He was.
Q. Who was the chairman of your board of directors at that time? A. Mr. Schlubach.
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Q. Now, will you look at this paper to your left,
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 for Identification, examine it
and tell us whether you have seen it before?
Mr. Marshall: Yes or no, please.
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A. I did.
Q. Do you recall when you first saw that document? A. The end of March, of 1924.
Q. And in what connection did you come to see
it? A. I saw it when Mr. Stern handed it over to
Mr. Von Goeben.
Q. And after it was handed over to the president of your company, did it then continue in the
possession of your company? A. I didn't understand that.
Q. Did it then continue in the possession of your
company? A. This statement, yes.
Q. Where was it that he handed it to Mr. Von
Goeben, where? A. Where he had it?
Q. Where was it, where was it that it was handed
by Mr. Stern to Mr. Von Goeben? A. In our office.
Q. Where was your office? A. 25 South William
Street.
Q;. Had anyone asked for any statement, to your
knowledge? A. Mr. Von Goeben.
Q. And after it was furnished, was it the subject of any discussion among the managers or
officers of the corporation?
Mr. Marshall: I object to any
Q. Just answer yes or no for the present.
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as not binding on us in any way.
The Court: I will allow that.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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Q. What is your answer? Was it the subject
of any discussion? Was that statement the subject of any talk among the directors or among the
managers of the company after it was delivered?
A. It was handled by
Mr. Marshall: Just yes or no, please.
Q. Just answer yes or no, whether after getting
this statement you talked about it among yourselves? A. Yes.
Q. That is what I want to know. Now, did you
discuss it in connection with extending any credit
—that is all.
Mr. Podell: I offer that statement in evidence, your Honor.
Mr. Marshall: I object to it as not binding upon us.
Mr. Podell: The statement referred to,
the record shows, is Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 for
Identification.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: It has not been shown yet,
your Honor, that it was given
The Court: Emanated from you.
Mr. Marshall: We admit it emanated
from us, but not that it has any bearing on
the cause of action at all.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
The Court: Your objection is based on the
fact legally that it is not binding?
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: As given by Stern to them.
How can that bind us or anybody else, what
Stern did to them?
The Court: I will allow it.
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Mr. Marshall: Exception.
The Court: On the pure proposition of
law.
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor understands
that is one of the basic propositions here?
The Court: I understand. And on the
whole, I will make certain reservations
which will protect that issue.
Mr. Marshall: I assume your Honor is
not ruling finally upon that issue?
The Court: Absolutely not.
599

(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.)
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Had Mr. Stern to your knowledge been in the
office on several occasions prior to the time when
that statement was furnished? A. Yes.
Q. How long before that?

600

Mr. Marshall: I object to any relations
between Stern and the witness before that,
The Court: Sustained. I do not see its
relevancy.
Mr. Podell: I will not press it at this
time.
The Court: Any cross-examination?
Mr. Marshall: Not at this time, your
Honor.
(Witness excused.)
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HERBERT S C H L U B A C H , a witness called on behalf
of the plaintiff, being first duly sworn and stating
his address to be 24 Prospect Avenue, Larchmont,
New York, testified as follows:

Direct examination

by Mr. Podell.

Q. Mr. Schlubach, what concern are you connected with? A. With the Ultramares Corporation.
Q. And in what capacity are you connected with
it now? A. As chairman of the board.
Q. And how long have you been connected with
the Ultramares Corporation? A. Since September,
1923.
Q. What was your position with the company
during 1923 and 1924? A. Chairman of the board.
Q. Does that mean that you were the chief executive officer of the company? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did that involve the duties of passing upon
credits? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Passing upon any application for credit? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. I wish you would describe to this jury, please,
what is the nature of the business of the Ultramares
Corporation; what was it rather in 1923 and 1924?
The Court: Is Ultramares a name?
The Witness: Ultramares Corporation.
Mr. Limburg: It means over seas. It is
the Latin for over seas.
The Witness: We are doing an import
and export business and factoring. That
means to say that we are buying and selling
merchandise and produce for our own account or foreign account on commission, and
advance moneys for such purchases and on
such produce.
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Q. By factoring, you mean you advance moneys
to others? A. To others.
Q. Who do a similar business? A. Who do a
similar business.
Q. Prior to April or March of 1924, had your
concern advanced any money, owed any money
to Fred Stern & Company? A. No.
Q. You had had some business transactions with
them, had you not? A. Yes.
Q. What was the character of those business
transactions; I am speaking now of prior to March
of 1924? A. We had sold rubber to Stern.
Q. Was it a large sale? A. No.
Q. What was it they averaged approximately?
A. Oh, several thousand dollars.
Q. How much? A. A couple of thousand dollars,
Q. Would you say that 10,000 was the maximum
of any one transaction? A. The maximum may
have been up to $15,000.
Q. Fifteen? A. Fifteen.
Q. And were they cash transactions? A. They
were cash transactions.
Q. And when you say they were cash transactions, just what does that mean, a letter of credit or
cash? A. No, cash.
Q. He would pay as he got the merchandise? A.
He would pay as he got the merchandise.
Q. C. O. D.? A. Against the delivery of the
merchandise.
Q. So if I understand you correctly, and be sure
that you state it correctly—you can use any papers
you want to refresh your recollection—at least for
the period of time that you were in charge of the
credit arrangements, you can state to the Court and
jury that prior to March of 1924 there was no
credit extended to Mr. Stern? A. Yes.
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Q. That is correct? A. That is correct.
Q. And there were no loans made to him? A.
No.
Q. And his purchases were all on a cash basis?
A. Yes.
Q. Had you had any requests for credit to Mr.
Stern prior to March, 1924? A. No.
Q. So that had you ever looked into the question
to determine whether he should get credit? Just
answer yes or no. A. No.
Mr. Marshall: Wait a moment. I object
to that.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out the
answer.
The Court: Strike it out.
Mr. Podell: Exception.

608

Q. Was there a request for credit to Mr. Stern at
any time in 1924?
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. I want to
know whether the witness—I think the question should be as to whether there was a
request to this witness.
The Court: Or if he knows of his own
knowledge, as the chairman of the board of
directors, it would naturally come before
him, I suppose.
Mr. Podell: Why, certainly. As chairman of the board of directors.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, the
bill of particulars here says that these transactions were all with Mr. Von Goeben.
The Court: I have never seen the bill of
particulars. Will you give me one, Mr. Limburg?
_
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Mr. Podell: There is nothing in the bill
of particulars, your Honor
Mr. Marshall: It has not anything to do
with this particular question, but I just
want to post your Honor what I am pointing at. If your Honor please, their bill of
particulars specifically shows, and I will
hand it to your Honor, that the arrangements between Stern and Ultramares, that
they claim were made, were made with Mr.
Von Goeben.
Mr. Podell: That does not preclude his
having passed on them as chairman of the
board of directors.
The Court: I will allow the question.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. Was there a request for credit to be extended
to Mr. Stern, to your knowledge, at any time in
1924? A. Yes.
Q. In connection with such a request——
Mr. Marshall: May the same objection
apply to that question?
The Court: Yes, certainly, and all this
line.

612

Q. Did you ask for a financial statement?
I did.
Q. By the way

A.

Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. I object
to that question as not being within the bill
of particulars, and being contrary to the
bill of particulars.
The Court: What is Exhibit A and B?
Mr. Marshall: That is the balance sheet
and the certificate, your Honor; and as be-
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ing contrary to their claim of the case. If
they gave us an incomplete bill of particulars, it was unfair and not properly within
the order of the Court,
Mr. Podell: We are certainly not deviating from the bill, not a dot nor a syllable.
Will your Honor permit me to ask a preliminary question of this witness? Will your
Honor permit me to ask one preliminary
question that will help you on this ruling?
By Mr. Podell.
Q. In the course of your duties, Mr. Schlubach,
would it be part of your function to pass upon all
questions of credit? A. Yes.
Q. To be extended to anybody? A. Yes.
Q. Was that one of your principal duties? A.
Yes.
Q. So that no matter to whom the request came
for credit, it would be referred to you, would it not?
A. Yes.
Q. You were what is commonly called or known
as the credit manager of this concern? A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Schlubach, if I may repeat the question,
in connection with passing upon the credit to
Stern, did you request that a financial statement
be furnished?
Mr. Marshall : Will you please say requested of whom?
Mr. Podell: I will ask him that next.
Mr. Marshall: I object to the question
then, until we find out.
The Court: That is right. I think he is
entitled to that.
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Q. Of whom did you request the financial statement?
Mr. Marshall: That presupposes that the
former question was allowed.
Mr. Podell: You won't allow me to ask
the former question.
The Court: That is in addition to the
former question.
The Witness: Of Mr. Von Goeben.
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Q. Made the request of Mr. Von Goeben?
Yes.
Q. Did Mr. Von Goeben

A.

Mr. Marshall: I object to any conversations between this witness and Mr. Von Goeben, as not binding on the defendants.
The Court: That is on the same theory,
you mean?
Mr. Marshall: That is on a different
theory. The other thing was not a conversation.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: This, your Honor, on the
subject of reliance. Reliance consists of and
deals with a frame of mind, a state of mind.
The cases are numerous. And I am sure
your Honor is fully familiar with them, that
we have the right to ask a man as to what
his state of mind was with respect to certain
things.
The Court: Yes. I think that is true.
Mr. Podell: Now, in order to prove reliance, of course we have to prove what he
had before him to rely upon. All I want to
show in connection with that very subject
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is: Here is a man charged with a duty of
passing on the credit and relying on something and extending credit thereon.
The Court: I do not think conversations
will be binding, conversations had between
him and the president of the company.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, supposing now
that they sat down and discussed the matter
of this statement among themselves and
reached certain conclusions. I am surmising it.
The Court: I will be very glad to have
the conclusions.
Mr. Podell: Just the conclusions?
The Court: Just the conclusions, but not
what the conversations were. In other
words, you want to show a frame of mind?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Court: In other words, the frame of
mind that they were in, but not based on
conversations with this party.
Mr. Podell: All I want to show with this
specific question—I have already shown that
Stern handed a financial statement to Von
Goeben—all I want to show is that that
financial statement delivered by Von Goeben
to him, pursuant to a request previously
made that a financial statement be secured,
that is all. In other words, your Honor, the
fact that a financial statement was furnished
by Stern, delivered to Von Goeben. We
want the fact that these gentlemen examined
it, or we will have that, and relied upon it,
as we claim. All I want to do with this
specific question is, that when the question
was presented to him, and it deals with the
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very question, the vital thing, reliance, he
said, "I want to see a financial statement."
That is an expression of his frame of mind.
The Court: You mean what he said to
Von Goeben.
Mr. Podell: To whomever he said it. He
requested, he wanted to have a financial
statement. In other words, in line with what
these very people have said, they knew that
creditors extending credit to these people
would rely on that.
The Court: What was the first question
that was objected to?
(Question repeated as follows: "Q. Mr.
Schlubach, if I may repeat the question, in
connection with passing upon the credit to
Stern, did you request that a financial statement be furnished?")
Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
Mr. Podell: It is expressive of his frame
of mind, that is all.
Q. Did you require a financial statement, did
you need it, did you want it?

624

Mr. Marshall: I object to it.
Mr. Podell: It is expressive of his frame
of mind in passing on this question.
Mr. Marshall: Not binding on us in any
way.
The Court: He may answer.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
A. Yes.
Q. After you expressed this request for a financial statement, was this financial statement, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 in evidence, delivered to you?
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that, unless it
shows from whom it came.
Mr. Podell: I will ask:
Q. Who did it come from? A. Mr. Von Goeben.
Q. Delivered it to you? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall: I object, your Honor, on.
the ground that the question and answer
called for conversations and transactions between employees of the Ultramares Corporation, and that they are res inter alios acta,
and that they are not binding on these defendants.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.

626

Q. When that statement was delivered to you,
did, you examine it in the course of your duties to
determine whether or not to pass credit to Mr.
Stern? A. I did.
Mr. Marshall: May it be understood that
this whole line is subject to the same objection and exception, because I do not want to
interrupt the whole course of the trial?
The Court: Yes, you may have a general
exception.
627

Q. And did you likewise discuss this statement
among members of the board of directors of the
corporation? A. Yes.
Q. Whom did you discuss it with? A. With Mr.
Van Goeben and also with Mr. Deetjen, who was
present while we were discussing it.
Q. And as a result of your examination of this
statement and a discussion of this statement, did
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you arrive at certain conclusions with respect to
whether or not you should extend credit to Mr.
Stern?
Mr. Marshall: I object to this on the further ground that it calls for a conclusion.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. Just answer that yes or no. A. Yes.
Q. Now, will you state what conclusion you came
to with regard to the request for credit after you
had examined this statement?
629

Mr. Marshall: Same objection,
Honor.
The Court: Same ruling.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.

your

A. That we would grant him the credit that he
had requested.
Q. And how much did you agree to grant him?

630

Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. Is this
supposed to be a conversation with Stern
or only with
Mr. Podell: I am addressing myself to
the question of reliance which deals with
the frame of mind. I want to know what
his frame of mind was after he examined
The Court: Then you say that you propose to follow it out by the proof of what
he did conclude and what he did decide relying on that, that he did do that?
Mr. Podell: Exactly.
The Court: All right. If you want the
fact, I will allow it.
Mr: Marshall: Exception.
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Q. What did you decide to do with respect to extending credit to Mr. Stern after you had examined
this statement? A. To grant him the credit that
he had requested.
Q. Which was how much? A. $100,000.
Q. Was that a line of credit for $100,000? A.
Yes.
Q. That was your decision at that particular
time? A. Yes.
Q. Now, in making that decision to extend him a
line of credit, of $100,000, did you rely on the
statement that was furnished you, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1?
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Mr. Marshall: Same objection.
The Court: Same ruling.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. Do you understand? A. Yes.
Q. Your answer is that you did? A. Yes.
Q. Did you believe at that time that statement
was a true and correct statement? A. Yes.
Q. Had you been informed—I want you to listen
to this, Mr. Schlubach, it is very important—have
you been informed, had anyone told you at that
time that Fred Stern & Company were insolvent?
A. No.
Q. If anyone had told you at that time that
Fred Stern & Company were insolvent would you
have had any business transactions with them at
all?
Mr. Marshall: Wait a minute. I object
to that as calling for a conclusion, and not
binding on us.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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Q. What is your answer? A. Certainly not.
Q. Now, thereafter, after making that decision,
did you as a matter of fact actually enter upon
transactions with Frederick Stern & Company?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, unless he
proves what the transactions are.
Mr. Podell: I will.
The Court: I will take that.
Q. Just answer that yes or no. A. Yes.

635

Mr. Podell: We will show every transaction, and may I state—I think I am reliably informed—the other side had every
opportunity to go over our books.
Mr. Marshall: We have had no opportunity to go over their books, your Honor.
Mr. Limburg: Everyone of these records.
You did it yourself, in my office, with your
representatives.
Mr. Marshall: We had an examination,
your Honor, of certain documents which we
called for, and they produced them. There
is no question about that. We did not go
over your books.
(Recess taken until 2 o'clock P. M.)

636
A F T E R RECESS.
HERBERT SCHLUBACH

Direct examination

resumed:

(continued)

by Mr. Podell.

Q. Mr. Schlubach, you spoke of the line of credit,
$100,000 you decided to let Mr. Stern have. Was
that subsequently confirmed in writing by Mr.
Stern, the paper I show you? A. Yes.
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Q. And that has the signature of Mr. Stern? A.
Yes.
Mr. Marshall: I only have the same general objection to this letter, that it is a
transaction between Stern and Ultramares,
and therefore not binding on us.
The Court: Are you offering it in evidence?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: I suppose your Honor
rules the same?
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Exception. I think there
was a reply to this letter that should go in
with it.

638

(The same was received in evidence and
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 30, and was
read to the jury.)
Mr. Podell: We have another letter under the same date from Stern on April 4th,
and another letter on April 5th, and then
comes our first answer. I will offer all of
them together.
Mr. Marshall: Subject to the same objection and exception?
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: And I assume that Mr.
Podell is not offering the pencil notations on
this one letter.
Mr. Podell: If you object to that, I will
not, I think they are helpful, but I do not
think I have the amounts and the lots and
you may decide not to object for that, but
for the present, so long as you are not certain, I will withdraw the pencil marks on
the copy of the letter.
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Mr. Marshall: If the witness will tell us
what they are, I will have no objection.
Mr. Podell: I will ask him later. I will
offer the letters without the pencil marks.
(The same were received in evidence and
respectively marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 31,
32 and 33.)
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 30 was read to the
jury.)
By Mr.
641

642

Podell.

Q. May I ask you, Mr. Schlubach, something has
been said about the rate of interest. Are these
terms the usual factor terms to your knowledge?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.
Mr. Podell: I do not think that counsel
should have left the impression that we were
charging usurious interest.
Mr. Marshall: I made no such claim.
Mr. Podell: You made the statement to
the jury that we were charging 26 per cent,
interest.
Mr. Marshall: No, sir. I did not say
there was any usury. I said it was a very
profitable transaction for these people because what they got in addition to the 6 per
cent. interest was commissions, which, taken
with the interest, totalled at the rate of 26
per cent. on the amounts loaned.
Mr. Podell: That statement will not bear
proof in the first place, and in the second
place, in view of that issue being injected
in the case
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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Q. Is that the usual or less than the usual factor's commission? A. Usual and less.
Q. As a matter of fact, what is the usual factor's commission aside from the 6 per cent, that is
charged?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: Sustained, what the usual
one is.
Mr. Podell: I just want to show that subsequently—well, I will ask it.
Q. These arrangements that are incorporated in
this letter, were they subsequently modified as between Mr. Stern and your company? A. They were
modified, yes.
Q. Was the line of credit subsequently arranged
to be increased or was that considered? A. No.
Q. Were there other arrangements made for each
transaction as it came along? A. Yes.
Q. In making all these arrangements did you
rely on the statement——
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. Let us see
who made the arrangements.
Mr. Podell: The documents will show
each of the arrangements. The arrangements are in writing and they will show
each one of them as we get along with respect to each specific transaction.
Q. In making those arrangements throughout
the period you dealt with Stern did you rely on
the truth of the certified accountants' statement as
furnished?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that on the
previous grounds and on the ground that
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there is nothing to show that this witness
handled the transactions at subsequent
times at all.
Mr. Podell: We will prove those transactions.
The Court: Allowed.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.

647

A. Yes.
Q. Had you known that this concern was bankrupt or that this concern, Fred Stern & Company,
had falsified that statement to the extent at least
of over $700,000 in the alleged accounts receivable, would you have done any business with them
at all? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: Same objection.
The Court: Same ruling, except that it
has already been answered before.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
(Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 31 and 32 were
read to the jury.)
Mr. Marshall: Who signed that?
Q. Do you know who signed that?
know.

648

Mr. Marshall:

A. I do not

I suggest

Q. Who was the president at that time? A. Mr.
Von Goeben.
Mr. Marshall: Is the original in the hands
of the trustee? We can stipulate that it
was signed by Von Goeben.
Mr. Podell: Very well.
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Q. Let us clear up these pencil corrections and
the figures that I have referred to. You find them
on this letter, Plaintiff's Exhibit 32, and on this
copy of letter, Plaintiff's Exhibit 31. Just the
pencil corrections and the figures, and also on this
copy of letter, Plaintiff's Exhibit 33. What are
the pencil corrections of the typewritten figures?
A. The pencil is just the sum of all these three different amounts that are contained here. It is just
the addition of these three sums.
Q. That is on Exhibit 33? A. Yes. I cannot
explain this one.
Q. Perhaps you can tell us which are the figures
that we should take here, the pencil figures or the
typewritten figures, do you know that? A. No.
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Mr. Marshall: Will you ask the witness
if he knows in whose writing that is on
Exhibit 32?
The Witness: I do not know.
Q. Who would know?

A. Mr. Manning.

Mr. Marshall: Is he here now?
Mr. Podell: No; we will get him.
Q. You speak in this letter of April 4 of financing approximately $100,000. value of Red Smoke
sheets by your company; what did that consist of?
A. It is rubber.
Q. But what did the financing consist of? We
advanced the money to Stern to buy rubber.
Q. For whom to buy?
Mr. Marshall: I object to his explaining
the transaction.
The Court: Do you mean the history of
it?
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Mr. Marshall: Yes.
The Court: I think so. There is no reason
why we should do that.
Mr. Marshall: We should have the original documents.
Mr. Podell: We will. We will give you
all the original documents, and I think we
have them all.
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A. We advanced Stern the money to buy rubber
which was imported and which he bought from importers or imported himself and had to pay here,
and also rubber that he bought in some instances
right here in New York.
Q. As to such rubber which he was to buy and
which was to be imported did you have any security
until that rubber actually arrived?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as a conclusion of law and I think that they should
produce the documents.
The Court: Yes, we are now at the point
where it is necessary that the transaction
itself be described.
Mr. Podell: There is reference in these
communications to a phrase "trust receipt."
Mr. Marshall: Let us have the trust
receipts.
Mr. Podell: Mr. Marshall, will you please
be patient enough to let me finish my question.
Mr. Marshall: I am sorry.
By Mr.

Podell.

Q. In the letter of April 5, 1924, you say "And
we accordingly hand you herewith our check for
$43,680." I show you a paper and ask you whether
that is the check you gave with that letter?
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that check alone
unless he shows the trust receipts and the
other documents.
Mr. Podell: I can prove only one thing
at a time. Give me a chance.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
A. Yes.
Mr. Podell: I offer that in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: Objected to on the same
ground as previously and on the additional
ground that it is only part of the transaction.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.

656

(The same was received in evidence and
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 34.)
Mr. Podell: I am advised that my statement a moment ago was not correct. There
were a number of these transaction that were
closed and liquidated. As to those we have
a receipt here from Stern showing that we
returned to him the trust receipts after
they had been closed out.
The Court: After the loan had been paid
out.
Mr. Podell: Yes; they may be in the
hands of the trustee and we will find that
out and if we get the originals, we will be
glad to use them.
The Court: You are showing a prima
facie loan.
Mr. Marshall: The clerk has those papers
here.
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Mr. Podell: Counsel wanted the trust receipts.
Mr. Marshall: They are here I think in
court and they were left with the court this
morning. The trustee's file are here in court,
Mr. Podell: If they are here we will produce them. The only function that they can
serve us is to let your Honor and the jury
know a typical case in one of these transactions and I am willing to take the first or
last but the trust receipts for all are in
the same form. I offer in evidence the original trust receipt executed by Fred Stern &
Company on April 5, 1924, and also one executed on April 4, 1924, and another one
executed on April 5, 1924.
Mr. Marshall: Let us ask the witness
whether those were received.
Mr. Podell: It is stipulated that they
were received.
Mr. Marshall: All right. By Ultramares
Corporation?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: At the time that the check
was given?
Mr. Podell: I do not know.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. When would you get the trust receipts from
them? A. Stern would send around these trust
receipts when he required money, as a matter of
convenience.
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out "as
a matter of convenience."
Q. What do you mean by "as a matter of convenience"? A. He would not be obliged to send
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the trust receipt right at the very moment because
the trust receipt referred to a certain lot of rubber
that he was going to purchase or pay for with the
money that he got from us.
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike it out
as not binding.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception. These exhibits
are under my same general objection and
exception.
The Court: Yes.
(The same were received in evidence and
marked respectively Plaintiff's Exhibits 35,
36 and 37 and read to the jury.)
Q. Mr. Schlubach, I want to ask you, this paper
acknowledges receipt from Ultramares Corporation
of certain merchandise, 50 tons of rubber. At the
time when this paper was delivered to you on April
5, did you have any 50 tons of rubber from Mr.
Stern? A. We had given the money to buy such
50 tons but we did not have it actually in our possession that very moment.
Q. And the reference in this paper is to the
Steamship M. S. Dollar, pier 16, Stapleton. Can
you state from that statement whether that particular 50 tons was to arrive by steamship? What
I am asking is whether this was imported rubber?
A. That was imported rubber.
Q. Was it due to arrive by steamship at a certain
pier? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Can you say now that it
was due to arrive or whether it had arrived
from that steamship?
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The Witness: It had to arrive by that
steamship but may have been just on the pier.
Mr. Marshall: It may have been there
already.

665

Q. It may have been on the pier and it may not
have been? A. It may have been and it may not
have been.
Q. So that there will be no misunderstanding
about it, at the time when you gave him this check
for $43,000. did you give him any rubber? A. Not
the actual rubber, but the money to buy that rubber.
Q. But you did not give him any rubber? A. No.
Q. He did not give you any rubber?
Mr. Marshall:

I object to that.

Q. Did he give you any rubber?

A. No.

Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: I will allow the question.
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor will allow
them to contradict the document?
The Court: No, I do not think it is contradictory. It is explanatory of the whole
transaction.
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Q. Did he give you any rubber at the time he
signed this paper or at the time you gave him the
check? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: That is subject to my objection that it calls for a legal conclusion.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. As I understand you, this check which you
gave, was a check given for him to purchase that
rubber? A. Yes.
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Q. Until he actually got it, you could give him no
rubber? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Same objection.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. You could not? A. No.
Q. And could he hold any rubber in trust for
you until he gave you that rubber?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: There are a number of these
transactions. I can go on and offer each
one of the letters and documents.
Mr. Marshall: I would suggest that you
give us the number and mark them in evidence as a whole.
Mr. Podell: We will take one or two more.
I offer in evidence the assignments of account covering the $43,000 item, which assignments are dated respectively April 2,
1923—that is, the invoices are dated April 2,
1923, one of them, and we received it per
copy of letter attached on April 7, and the
second invoice is dated April 8 and according to the copy of the letter we received it
April 10, and the third of these invoices is
dated April 17 and according to the copy of
the letter we received it April 21. Annexed
to each of these papers is likewise one letter
showing the notification to the customers of
Stern.
The Court: Is this for the purpose of historical fact or is it one of the actual loans?
Mr. Podell: Just historical. It is just a
typical case.
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Mr. Marshall: Just the general objection.
I have no other objection because they go
with the exhibits already in.
(The same were received in evidence and
marked Plaintiff's Exhibits NOS. 38, 39 and
40.)
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Mr. Limburg: This is part of the $100,000
and then we can stipulate that all of the
remaining transactions were in the same
form, and have a stipulation as to the date of
the advances and we can furnish that. I
have the tabulation prepared.
Mr. Marshall: What you put in now is
only under trust receipt No. 1.
Mr. Limburg: 1, 2 and 3.
Mr. Marshall: Those that you have put
in?
Mr. Limburg: Those that have been put
in so far.
Mr. Marshall: Thank you.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 38 was read to the
jury.)
By Mr. Podell.
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Q. What are these two numbers in the upper
right-hand corner of the invoice?
Mr. Marshall: If you know.
Q. Do you know what they mean? A. No, I do
not.
Mr. Marshall: Does H. N. Manning?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
Q. That closed that transaction? A. Yes.
Q. When you got the check on this assigned account? A. Yes.
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 39 was read to the
jury.)
Juror No. 1: There is marked here "net
cash." Prior to the time that you extended
the credit you claim you sold him goods for
cash. It is marked for cash thirty days. Did
you sell him on different terms?
The Witness: Yes.
Juror No. 1: What do you mean by cash
prior?
The Witness: Cash terms are net ten
days. We sold him cash.
Juror No. 1: Do you mean you sent him
C. O. D ?
The Witness: At the time I was with
the company
Juror No. 1: The $15,000 credit
The Witness: When I was with the
Ultramares Corporation, I entered in September, 1923
Juror No. 1: Did you ship him the goods
C. O. D. or he had to bring the check down
to get the goods?
Mr. Podell: You mean prior to this?
Juror No. 1: Prior to extending the
credit.
Mr. Podell: The juror is asking you about
the transactions that took place between you
and Stern before there was any certified
statement delivered to you.
The Witness: When we were selling rubber to Stern?
Juror No. 1: And you said cash?
The Witness: Yes.
Juror No. 1: How was that cash drawn?
Was it cash ten , days or cash C. O. D. or
before the delivery?

673

674

675

226
676

Herbert Schlubach—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

The Witness: It was cash against the delivery and cash ten days in one or two instances.
Mr. Podell: Supposing we get the actual
records of that, Then you can make sure
about how that was done.
Bp Mr.

677

Podell.

Q. Are you in a position to say, for instance,
in the entire year of 1923 before you got any statement or made any arrangements to advance him
credit, how much business did you do, what was
the volume of business that you did with Stern?
A. I entered the Ultramares in September, 1923,
and I cannot say anything before that time.
Q. As between September, 1923, and the end of
1923, what is your best recollection? A. Small
amounts. Just a couple of thousand dollars at the
most.
Q. Does this paper help you at all? This
paper has a record of all the years, including 1924.
Does it help you to tell the juror just what each one
of these transactions in 1924 was before the furnishing of this statement ?
Mr. Marshall: Might I see that paper?
Mr. Podell: Surely.
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Q. Take January or February, 1924, and give the
dates and the amounts? A. Yes.
Q. Give them to the juror? A. There were seven
cases of rubber, cash.
Q. What was the date? A. That was on the 6th
of February, $385.77.
Mr. Marshall: I will consent to put that
in as a summary.
The Witness: $385.77.
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Q. You have a record here, February 6, seven
cases rubber cash, $385.77. What the juror would
like to know was whether that meant cash ten days
or cash against delivery; is that correct?
Juror No. 1: What length of time was it?
The Witness: With reference to this special invoice, I cannot say. It must have been
cash against delivery.
Q. Would not your books show that?
Mr. Limburg: This is from the books and
it states which was cash and which was ten
days and which was against delivery.
Mr. Marshall: You may put it in evidence.
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Q. What is 6-27? A. June, twenty-seven cases
of rubber.
Mr. Podell: I offer this statement in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: No objection.
(The same was received in evidence and
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 41.)
Mr. Podell: That is a summary of all the
years from 1919 to 1924, inclusive. I must
say that the last three items appear to be
in months subsequent to the furnishing of
the statement, but the date appears there on
that statement.
Mr. Marshall: I assume that no claim is
made of any loss on these transactions.
The Court: Not at all. It is to instruct
the juryman on the very important question
of the frame of mind of the parties before
the receipt of the alleged statement.
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Mr. Podell: Mr. Limburg, will you be
good enough to check up so that we will be
sure to be correct. Does this mean cash
against delivery?
Mr. Limburg: Yes.
Mr. Podell: And where you have ten days
it means
Juror No. 1: It is not anywheres more
than ten days.
Mr. Podell: That is what I will call your
attention to, and I trust you will
Juror No. 1: I am interested prior to the
time they extended $100,000 credit.
Mr. Podell: It was between February 6
and May 1st, so that all these items above
May 1st were prior and preceding it. Now
you are coming to periods subsequent to the
furnishing of the statement and you will observe that it begins with cash thirty days
and cash sixty days.
Juror No. 1: The first date is June 24,
1924.
Mr. Podell: Yes.
Juror No. 1: And this first charge is
made after this one.
Mr. Podell: Yes. May transactions are
still cash, and the amounts of the purchases
in 1919 run from $86 up to $8,000. The
total of them you can see for yourself is approximately eleven or twelve thousand dollars for the entire year 1919. For the entire
year 1920 there was one large purchase of
$15,000 and all the others were $2201, and
it would total transactions for the year 1920
of $18,000. For the year 1921 everything
is in cash.
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Mr. Marshall: It speaks for itself.
Mr. Podell: And the total transaction for
the entire year 1921 approximately $13,000
or $14,000. In 1922 the total transactions
would not exceed eight or nine thousand dollars. It was all cash or cash ten days. In
1923 the total transactions did not exceed
eleven or twelve thousand dollars, or about
$13,000, and they were all strictly cash,
cash against delivery. In 1924 the first
transaction, February 6, seven cases was for
cash, $385, and the second was May 1st,
eleven cases of rubber for cash, $637, and
May 14 still cash, $344, and June 24th, fiftysix bales, amounting to $900, still cash, and
July 27th, twenty-seven cases of rubber, the
first time in their dealings that they extended them thirty days and then sixty days
for the next two transactions.
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By Mr. Podell.
Q. These transactions that the juror has just
questioned you about, so that there will be no misunderstanding, were different from these transactions that we are speaking about here in these invoices? A. Yes.
Q. Those transactions referred to in that exhibit
which I have just read, Exhibit 41, were cases
where you had sold these amounts of rubber to
Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes.
Q. Rubber that Ultramares had brought in? A.
Had imported.
Q. And he was a customer of yours in buying
these items that I have read? A. Yes.
Q. There was no financing of this character before the furnishing of this statement? A. No.
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Q. And it only came along after the statement
was furnished? A. Yes.
Q. Where you were factoring for him? A. Yes.
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Mr. Marshall: I object to the conclusion
that he was factoring.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Mr. Podell: I am advised, your Honor,
that this letter which I am about to offer
completes the balance of $100,000 advance.
Mr. Marshall: Same objection, same general objection, your Honor.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 42.)
Q. I ask you whether these are the two checks
you gave for those items of $54,432 (handing to
witness) ? A. Yes.
Mr. Podell: I offer those in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: Same objection.
The Court: Same ruling.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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(Received in evidence and marked respectively Plaintiff's Exhibits 43 and 44.)
Mr. Marshall: Now, one more detail to
complete this transaction, the invoices that
were actually assigned under this.
Mr. Podell: Yes; they were not sent to
us until later. Let us have every paper, Mr.
Limburg.
Mr. Marshall: If it would save time, I
would just as soon have you stipulate there
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were these invoices similar to No. 2 and 3,
which were in each instance assigned and
paid.
Mr. Podell: Yes, but I want to show when
we got them.
Mr. Limburg: Here they are (producing
papers).
Mr. Podell: Let us mark them, so the
transaction will be complete.
(Received in evidence and marked respectively Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 45 to 50, inclusive. )
Mr. Marshall: Now, may we have the
trust receipts that were forwarded with
those letters? Same general objection, and
exception.
Mr. Podell: The first one is trust receipt
No. 4 and that is dated April 7th.
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(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 51.)
Mr. Podell: The second is trust receipt
No. 5. That is also dated April 7th.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 52.)
Mr. Podell: The third is trust receipt No.
6, likewise dated April 7th.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 53.)
Mr. Podell: The fourth is trust receipt
No. 7, likewise dated April 7th.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 54.)
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By Mr. Podell.
Q. The trust receipts I assume are all dated on
the respective dates when you gave the checks to
Mr. Stern; they are all dated April 7th? A. Yes.
By Mr. MarshallQ. Those are the trust receipts referred to in the
letter from Stern asking that the money be advanced? A. Stern sent them in.
Q. With his request for the advance of the
money? A. With his request for the advance of
695 the money.
Mr. Podell: Now, I offer in evidence communication received April 9th, and for the
sake of clarity I may say that that concludes
the $100,000 arrangement.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. By April 9th you had advanced a total, according to these checks, of $98,000 odd. Did you
then receive this letter (handing to witness) ? A.
Yes.
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Mr. Marshall: Do you mean that he received it? Do you mean that you received
it personally?
The Witness: No. That the Ultramares
received it.
Q. Mr. Schlubach, at that time, on the date when
that letter was written you, had you received from
the assigned accounts on the first transactions any
of the money in payment of your advances of
$98,000?
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Mr. Marshall: Well
Mr. Podell: The evidence is, your Honor,
our first payment, according to these documents, came due on April 22nd, so I think
we may assume that by April 9th, when this
letter was written to us, we had not received
any of the money.
The Court: You mean under the assignments, that they were not to be paid until
that date credit was extended to, to the respective purchasers?
Mr. Podell: Yes. Our assigned accounts
did not fall due until April 22nd, so we could
not have received any part of that.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: I offer it in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: Same general objection,
as to relations between the two parties.
The Court: Same ruling.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 55.)
Mr. Marshall: May we have an explanation what the words "Inv. by Bearer"
means?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
699
Q. Do you know what the words "Inv. by Bearer"
means?
Mr. Marshall: Just read the letter and
see if that will give you any idea what those
letters mean.
Mr. Podell: Do you claim it means "Invoices by Bearer" ? I think that is what it
means. That is a fair inference.
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The Witness: That is what I think. I
don't know.
Mr. Marshall: We might agree that is
what it means.
Q. When was it put on, do you know anything
about that? A. No.
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Mr. Marshall: I should judge it is Stern's
writing.
Mr. Podell: I do not know. We will find
out perhaps from some other source. Now,
I offer in evidence letters bearing date April
10th from Stern to us and our reply of April
11th from us to Stern.
Mr. Marshall: The same general objection.
The Court: Same ruling.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
(Received in evidence and respectively
marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 56 and 57.)
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Q. When Mr. Stern made this request, as I understand it, you had already advanced $98,000 odd.
You had received no part of it yet; is that correct,
what I have stated? A. Yes.
Q. And he was making a request for additional
advances? A. Yes.
Q. Did you then consider as the credit manager
of the concern, whether or not you should make
additional advances?
Mr. Marshall: I object as to his state of
mind, in addition to the other objection.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
A. I did.
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Q. In considering that, did you have in mind,
did you consider the financial statement of the
man, as furnished to you?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that being without the bill of particulars, among other
things.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
A. Yes.
Q. And did you rely upon it? A. Yes.
Q. Did you believe it to be true? A. Yes.
Q. And did you in reliance thereon, decide and
actually make further advances to him? A. Yes.
Q. Now, if you had known that the man had
falsified his books, even as to one item of $706,000,
or if you had known that the man was bankrupt,
would you have had any business dealings with
him of any kind, either on secured or unsecured
basis?
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. What is your answer? A. No.
Q. Now, are these the two checks respectively
$47,688 and $53,200 which are referred to in this
letter (handing to witness)? A. They are.
Mr. Podell: I offer those.
Mr. Marshall: Same objection and exception.
(Received in evidence and respectively
marked Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 58 and 59.)
Mr. Podell: Those checks are dated respectively April 11th and April 14th.
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Q. Now, on the 14th of April, taking your aggregate of advances together, that would come close
to $200,000? A. Yes.
Q. And you had received nothing on that advance as yet from him, on the assigned accounts?
A. No.
Q. Now, then, you have, I assume, invoices and
trust receipts just exactly like in the first transaction? A. Yes.
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Mr. Marshall: I think he had better put
them in.
Mr. Podell: I will mark them all in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: Just mark them.
Mr. Podell: The dates of those invoices,
your Honor, and the dates of the trust receipts will be tabulated so we can have them.
And the trust receipts themselves may be
marked by either party. If I omit to mark
them, you may mark them. I will have no
objection.
Mr. Marshall: How many are you considering in under that?
Mr. Podell: I consider every one of them
in for that matter, excepting as to those
which were not paid, we will take them up
separately.
Mr. Marshall: That is up to 104?
Mr. Podell: Is it 104, the first one?
Mr. Limburg: 105.
Mr. Marshall: You concede that trust
receipts up to 104 were all paid?
Mr. Limburg: They were paid but we had
to pay back.
Mr. Marshall: I object to what they had
to pay back. They were paid, your Honor,
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by the people whose accounts were assigned;
is not that right?
Mr. Podell: You explain that to the
Judge.
Mr. Limburg: May it please your Honor,
we have here and we furnished them with
our bill of particulars, a complete detailed
statement of every payment, every loan we
had made up to and including January 31st,
1925, every charge we made for interest or
for commission, every payment we had received, giving the date and giving the
amount, giving the interest credits. Now, it
is my suggestion that that will save perhaps
a good deal of time because it covers everything. Then in addition we furnished the
statements of all amounts that we collected
since January 31st, 1925, and likewise
The Court: Do you credit that?
Mr. Limburg: When that statement was
prepared, which was the last statement rendered by us to Fred Stern, of course it
covered only up to January 1st, 1925, and
in the meantime he had been adjudged a
bankrupt, and therefore we furnished in our
bill of particulars the dates and amounts of
every dollar we have collected since and the
details of those statements, from whom, and
the date and all that, and likewise a statement of every dollar that we paid out subsequent to that because
Mr. Marshall: I object to the reason,
your Honor.
Mr. Limburg: We will cover that by
testimony then. I thought we could shorten

it.
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The Court: You mean it will be testimony going to your damage?
Mr. Limburg: Yes, sir, I am going to
testify to what I arranged to pay out because
of suits brought against us.
Mr. Marshall: That is immaterial.
Mr. Limburg: By people who claimed that
these accounts assigned to us, banks, had
previously been assigned to them, that they
were their property and that we had to account to them for the moneys we had collected and which we had credited Stern.
Mr. Marshall: That is obviously not binding upon us, your Honor.
Mr. Limburg: Surely. If our pretended
collection or the collection we had made
turned out to be one that we had to account
to some other institution for because it did
not belong to Stern at that time, why, it was
not any payment.
Mr. Marshall: You did not have to account, You settled.
Mr. Limburg: We settled very cheaply
and we saved you $150,000 by the settlement.
Mr. Marshall: Thanks. We would rather
have had the chance to deny it, sir. Now,
your Honor, I think it is highly improper
to have brought this up in this way by this
statement of Mr. Limburg's, and I take exception to it.
The Court: Overruled. It is immaterial.
We have not got it yet, so it is just a statement. It does not go on the record as evidence. It is just a statement for the instruction of the Court as to how far we can go and
as to how much time we can save, I am
querying as to the item of damage; that is
all that is in my mind.
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Mr. Marshall: May I ask your Honor
then to instruct the jury to disregard the
statement of Mr. Limburg?
The Court: Yes, that is just a statement,
not evidence.
Mr. Limburg: Can we save time, your
Honor, by putting in evidence everything of
which they have copies in the bill of particulars that we furnished?
The Court: I do not see any reason why
we should not. If they are to be disputed,
let them be disputed on cross-examination,
as a matter that was sworn to in the bill of
particulars. I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: And may we have the
statement that every one of the 104 trust receipts was paid and collected in full?
Mr. Limburg: I cannot make that statement except with the qualification that part
of it we had to pay back.
The Court: That I do not think is material at this point.
Mr. Limburg: This statement will show
just what we received.
The Court: That is what we are interested in; not what you have to pay back.
Can we get that?
Mr. Marshall: But it does not show there
were 104 trust receipts paid, your Honor.
That is what I want to show.
Mr. Limburg: Correct.
The Court: That is stipulated, that there
were 104 trust receipts in this particular
transaction.
Mr. Limburg: That these collections that
we made
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The Court: That is not the point. I see
what counsel wants, and that is a direct
question; or do we have to prove it; he has
demanded it be proved and I think he is entitled to it, whether or not in the transaction
that occurred between this plaintiff and
Stern, whether there had been in the course
of that transaction 104 trust receipts upon
which advances had been made, all of which
had been paid for in full?
Mr. Limburg: Yes.
The Court: Subject to the exception,
which I am not going to discuss now.
Mr. Podell: So long as your Honor does
not close the door on us.
The Court: I say, subject to the exception.
Mr. Podell; All right; that is stipulated.
The Court : That is clear, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall: That is fine, your Honor,
but I think the account is going to be put in.
The Court: No, it is not, except as you
get the conclusion and figures, that is all.
They are in the bill of particulars. I would
rather not have the account because that
shows the other thing.
Mr. Marshall: I mean the account in the
bill of particulars.
The Court: I do not think so. I have no
objection, however, to it, if you have not.
Mr. Marshall: I will bring out what I
want on that later.
Mr. Podell: I want to say in connection
with any of these stipulations that I think
almost every document that passed in connection with this, counsel" i s cordially wel-
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come to look at and offer them in evidence,
and I will have no objection, and that statement applies to what I have to say now. I
have here a tabulation of our dealings. Here
is a copy (handing to Mr. Marshall) of our
dealings from April 5th, 1924, to January
31st, 1925. In other words, the first and the
last transaction practically here between the
parties. I give the account number, the advances made by Ultramares, the interest and
commission charges, the collections from the
accounts assigned to us. I give them both
separately for each specified period; that is,
I have had it divided here in periods because
that is how these transactions shaped themselves. One of them begins there on April
4th and would end by April 22nd, so we will
take the period
Mr. Limburg: Statements rendered by us
to Fred Stern and acknowledged by him.
Mr. Podell: As I understand, periodically
a statement would be rendered by us to Fred
Stern, and those are the periods we took, but
the totals would naturally be the same regardless of the periods.
I have the total of advances totalled up,
the total of commissions, the total of collections. Now, if counsel will permit me to
offer that in evidence, I will be very pleased
at his request personally to mark any documents in evidence that he wishes me to, or
I will waive any possible objection to any of
the documents involved in these specified
transactions.
In computing the amount that we advanced to Stern on these transactions, which
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he failed to repay, we did not include either
interest or commission charges. We deducted those, as to those that he did not
pay.
Mr. Marshall: Not in your statement to
Stern, however.
Mr. Podell: Certainly not. If we could
have collected from Stern interest and commission charges, there is no reason on earth
why we should not collect it, but we did not;
that is the trouble.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I
welcome such a summary a little later, but
I think that we ought to have proof of the
advances that they claim were not repaid
and all of the circumstances of those advances separately. We have only covered
trust receipts 1 to 104. Now, we have got
105,106 and 107, 108, 109, 110 and 111. All
but 106 they claim have not been paid.
The Court: You mean the history of those
as to that?
Mr. Marshall: Yes, because that is the important part of their case.
The Court: Was there any difference in
the method or anything of that kind?
Mr. Marshall: I think the circumstances
are very important,
The Court: All right, if you do.
Mr. Marshall: These were made in November and December, a year after our balance sheet.
The Court: And on the question of contributory negligence?
Mr. Marshall: It is very important.
The Court: I see what you mean, yes.
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Mr. Podell: I have not any objection to
that, I thought Mr. Marshall was the one
who made the suggestion.
The Court: No. He said all of those up
to the point of 104; yes, let us have them,
because it becomes material in the history.
Mr. Podell: Even at the expense of that
time. I thought I was waiving some things
I did want to point out with regard to some
of these last transactions. May this statement go in and we will supplement it with
these specific proofs
The Court: That includes these payments
that were made by Ultramares since the
Mr. Podell: I think so.
Then we will mark that for identification
for the present?
The Court: Yes.
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(Marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 60 for Identification. )
(Whereupon, at 4 o'clock P. M., adjournment was taken until to-morrow, April 3,
1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.)
729
Exhibit referred to on page 166 is as follows, being pages 1759, 1760 and 1761 of the bankruptcy
proceeding:
"Romberg.
"Q. Now, will you tell us what happened? A.
Mr. Rea came to my desk and presented to me a
letter and asked me to sign it.
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"Q. Who had prepared it? A. Mr. Rea himself.
"Q. Yes? A. I refused to sign it.
"Q. What did you tell him? A. I didn't give him
any reason. I just refused. Just refused. He
asked me for an explanation. I says, 'I cannot.
There is no explanation. I just do not want to
sign it.'
"Q. Is that the letter (handing paper to witness) ? A. That is it, Wasn't there one more?
"Q. How about this one, too (handing paper to
witness) ? A. Both of these.
"Q. They are Trustee's Exhibits 1 and 2 of June
29th, 1926; photostatic copies. Now, will you tell
us what happened then? A. Mr. Rea presented
these two letters to me at my outside desk, and
asked me to sign them, and I emphatically refused.
"Q. Did you tell him why? A. No, I didn't tell
him the reason why; and he did not press me for
the reason.
"Q. What did he ask you? Did he tell you the
purpose that he wanted to use those letters for?
A. No, I don't think he did, because the purpose
he wants to use the letters for is explained in the
contents.
"Q. Who prepared those letters? A. Mr. Rea
himself.
"Q. And did he dictate them right in the office
there? A. Dictated them right in the office there.
"Q. Himself? A. Himself.
"Q. But he did not explain to you the purpose,
other than what appears in the body of the letter?
A. The body of the letter.
"Q. And you refused point-blank to sign? A. I
refused point-blank to sign.
"Q. What did he say? A. He says, 'Well, I cannot—unless this letter is signed I won't be able to
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give you a financial statement.' I says, 'You will
have to see Mr. Stern about that.'
"Q. What happened then? A. Then he went in
to Mr. Stern and came out again.
"Q. Who did? A. Rea did. And Mr. Stern
called me in.
"Q. You mean that Mr. Rea said to you that Mr.
Stern wants you? A. 'Mr. Stern wants you'—Mr.
Stern called me in.
"Q. And did you go in with Mr. Rea? A. No; I
went in alone first.
"Q. Was Mr. Rea there at the time? A. Mr. Rea
was not there.
"Q. But Mr. Stern was there. A. But Mr. Stern
was there.
"Q. Yes. A. And Mr. Stern told me that he expected to obtain a loan of $500,000 from a private
individual, and that everything will be straightened
out, and that it will be all right for me to sign the
letter, and so I went out and got Mr. Rea, and
Mr. Rea came in and I signed in his presence his
letter.
"Q. And you gave it to Mr. Rea? A. And I gave
it to Mr. Rea.
"Q. And that was given in connection with the
preparation of the audits as of December 31st,
1923? A. The audit as of December 31st, 1923,
correct.
"Q. Upon which Touche, Niven & Co. was at
that time working? A. Correct.
"Q. Was Mr. Rea insistent that unless you signed
those two letters he could not prepare a financial
statement for the banks? A. Correct.
"Q. Did he mention the banks in that connection? A. No.

734

735

246
736

Exhibits—Extracts from Testimony in Bankruptcy.
Q. All he said was that the financial statement
could not be prepared? A. Could not be prepared.
"Q. Did he refer at that time to the fact that he
was working on the audit? A. No. I saw them;
they were there quite some time working on the
audit right along."
New York, April 3, 1929, 10 o'clock A. M.
TRIAL CONTINUED.

(Same appearances.)
737

THIRD D A Y .

(Adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, April 4,
1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.)

New York, April 4, 1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.
TRIAL CONTINUED.

(Same appearances.)
FOURTH D A Y .

738

Mr. Podell (at bench) : The plaintiff moves for
the amendment of the complaint to include a second cause of action as per verified copy filed herewith. It is stipulated that the allegations may be
deemed to be denied without filing a formal answer
or denial.
Mr. Marshall: And it is further stipulated, as
I understand it, Mr. Podell, that the representations referred to in the second cause of action
added by this amendment to the complaint are those
made by Exhibits A and B annexed to the complaint.
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Mr. Podell: The latter in the nature of a bill of
particulars. The motion to amend, I assume, is
granted?
The Court: Is granted.
Mr. Marshall: I assume, your Honor, I will have
the right at the end of the case to move to dismiss
this part of the complaint?
Mr. Podell: You can move to dismiss any part.
Mr. Marshall: On the ground it does not state
a cause of action and that the cause of action has
not been proven.
The Court: Right.

740

(Amendment received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 61. It is printed on pp.
12-14 as part of the complaint.)

P L A I N T I F F ' S PROOFS

(continued).

witness on behalf of the
plaintiff, resumed, further testified as follows:
HERBERT S C H L U B A C H ,

Mr. Limburg: Mr. Marshall, we had included in Mr. Schlubach's testimony up to
and including 104.
Mr. Marshall: Trust receipt 104.
Mr. Limburg: Now, 105 was fully paid
-—not fully paid by January 31st, 1925, but
shortly thereafter; and 106 has been fully
paid. The papers are all here, but I thought
in the interest of the saving of time we
would go on then with 107.
Mr. Marshall: You now state that this
item of $7,922.58 which your bill of particulars shows unpaid under loan 105 has been
paid?
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Mr. Limburg: That is one of the amounts
that we subsequently collected, as set forth
in our bill of particulars.
The Court: 106 too?
Mr. Limburg: 106 we had stated in the
bill of particulars as having already been
paid.
Mr. Marshall: I think that will save time
if they go through with that because I am
going to prove 105 and 106 on cross-examination anyway, and I think it would be
much more convenient if we had it in the
regular way.
The Court: He said he would have to go
into it on cross-examination anyhow.
Mr. Podell: We have not the slightest objection.
Mr. Marshall: I think it would make it
clearer if he started on the 105.
Mr. Podell: Just a question or two.
When we covered this 104 there was one
stipulation or statement, there was some
things that occurred with respect to almost
each one of that 104 which I think your
Honor and a jury should know, so it becomes
necessary for me to ask general questions
about that practice on 104.
The Court: Up to 104?
Mr. Podell: Up to 104, just one or two,
and subsequent, and I want to show the
practice with respect to those 104 was practically carried on with the rest.
Mr. Marshall: May we have first some
questions to show what this witness' connection was with these transactions?
The Court: That is what he is getting at
now, I think.
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Mr. Marshall: I thought he was going to
ask some general questions as to what the
procedure was; and I want to know this
witness' relations to these transactions.
Direct examination

(continued)

by Mr. Podell.

Q. Did you have occasion to look into each one
of these transactions at the time they were presented to the office? A. Not each one.
Q. Not each one; but did you know of them as
they came along? A. Yes.
Q. Who took them up with you, Mr. Schlubach?
A. The president, Mr. Von Goeben.
Q. Now, from your knowledge of these transactions, do you recall that when an advance was
made, there was this trust receipt and subsequently
you received accounts receivable, assignments of
accounts receivable? A. Yes.
Q. Could you say from your knowledge of the
situation how much later as a rule, from what
period to what period, these accounts receivable,
these assignments of accounts receivable would
come in?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being a
conclusion.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: He can make a table from
.those papers. I am perfectly willing to have
that.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, the original
papers are here and are subject to counsel's
examination any time he wants them.
The Court: I will allow it.
Q. T am speaking now of these 104; about what
period of time would elapse before, on the average
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—you can give a minimum and maximum—before
you would get your assignments of accounts receivable? A. Three weeks.
Q. That would be the maximum, about three
weeks? A. No, that would be an average.
Q. It would be a little short of it or a little further away, but the average would be about three
weeks?
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Mr. Marshall: What is the question?
Mr. Podell: After the advances were
made.
Mr. Marshall: Do you mean the accounts
receivable, or collected them?
The Witness: The accounts receivable.
Q. I want to be sure you understand my question, Mr. Schlubach; I am not asking you now how
long after you would receive payment of the assigned accounts; you did not understand that to be
the question? A. No.
Q. The question is at the time—from the time
that you advanced the money—at the time you
usually got a trust receipt, you advanced the
money, did you not? A. Yes.
. Q. How long after that, on an average, would
it be before you received the assignments of the
accounts? A. About three weeks.
Q. You say that is an average. Approximately
how long after those three weeks would they be
payable? A. Thirty days.
Q. That was the average dating on these accounts receivable? A. Yes.
Q. I am told that would be the maximum. Some
were less? A. Yes.
Q. To your knowledge, some were ten days? A.
Yes.
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Q. The papers are all here? A. I don't know.
Q.
But thirty days you would say would be about
the majority? A. Yes.
Q. In all of these 104 was there a practice between you and Fred Stern & Company
Mr. Marshall: I object to the form of the
question. He has been leading his witness
a good deal.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: I will put it in this form:
Q. Did you always receive an assignment of the
accounts receivable which has been promised you
at the time that the advance was made? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: He said the practice was
they never received it at the time the advance was made.
Mr. Podell: My question is, did they
always receive that identical account? I
want to show there was a practice of switching accounts receivable and characteristic
of the 104 instances.
Mr. Marshall: The question was at the
time.
Mr. Podell: At what time?
The Court: I see what Mr. Marshall
means.
Mr. Podell: I do not. I would like to see
it, your Honor.
The Court: In other words, we have the
evidence here that no time when he paid out
the drafts did he receive any accounts receivable; that subsequent to that, making an
average of some three weeks, he said. Now,
the question would infer that at some time
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he did receive accounts receivable when he
gave the check.
Mr. Podell: Maybe my question is faulty
in that regard.
Mr. Marshall: Let us strike out the question and answer.
The Court: Yes, strike out the question
and answer.
Mr. Marshall: I might be able to help by
offering a stipulation here. I will stipulate
that there were substitutions of accounts receivable.
Mr. Podell: That is it. I think we ought
to know this.
Mr. Limburg: Let us get the facts.
By Mr. Podell.

756

Q. At the time when the advance was made there
were certain accounts receivable promised but not
actually assigned; is that right? A. Yes.
Q. Then within three weeks or thereabouts on an
average, you would receive actual assignments? A.
Yes.
Q. Your practice was not to send notice to the
assigned accounts at the time when the advance
was made, but at the time when you received the
assignment? A. Yes.
Q. That is the time you would send your notice
out? A. Yes.
The Court: That is notice to the parties
to whom the goods were shipped and of which
assignment had been made to them?
Mr. Podell: That is right.
Q. Now, in between the time when the loan was
made and the promise that you would get certain

253
Herbert Schlubach—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

757

assigned accounts and the time when they actually
delivered the assigned accounts, were there substitutions of accounts? A. There were.
Q. Tell us how that was done, and why?
Mr. Marshall:
done.

I object to why it was

Q. How did it come to be done? A. First Stern
would call up and mention that he wanted to send
off some lots first to some other client; that he had
promised or offered first; and whether we were
willing to accept that assignment ; and we didn't
care as long as the receiving firm was good and
the amount was sufficient to cover our advance.
Mr. Marshall: To save time, Mr. Podell,
do you think we could look at those 104 trust
receipts and the letters covering them?
Mr. Limburg: The five envelopes are here
and you can have any one of them at any
time you like as long as you keep them in
the same order.
Mr. Marshall: I ask you for them now.
Mr. Limburg: All right. Give them to
him, please.
Mr. Podell: May I, with counsel's permission in the interest of time saving, offer
all the documents, including the request for
a loan, the trust receipt and the assigned
accounts, all relations to transaction No.
105, advance 105?
Mr. Marshall: In all of these, your Honor,
they are subject to my general objection
against any dealings between Stern and the
plaintiff and any intra-office dealings between the plaintiff's various officers.
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The Court: The general exception is taken
to all of them.
Mr. Marshall: Yes, and may I take that
now to the balance, and this whole line?
The Court: Yes, and that will save the
objection being taken each time.
(Received in evidence and marked respectively Plaintiff's Exhibits 62, 62-A to 62-G,
inclusive.)
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Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I am offering
here a number of copies instead of originals.
There is no objection based on the ground
those are copies?
Mr. Marshall: None whatever.
Mr. Podell: And the only objection as I
understand it, is to preserve your general
contention of law?
Mr. Marshall: That is the only purpose.
The Court: That is how I understand it,
Mr. Podell.
(Last exhibits read from by Mr. Podell
to jury.)
Foreman of Jury: Is this a new transaction or is it from the beginning?
Mr. Podell: I do not think, your Honor,
that we made one thing clear. If I may be
permitted to state—and if it is incorrect, you
correct me—the last thing we took testimony on, your Honor, related to the first
$100,000; then the second $100,000. Now,
then, there were after that second $100,000,
to save time we just stated or the record
shows that there were a series of 104 transactions in which accounts were paid and more
moneys advanced and repaid and advanced
and repaid; regular course of conduct.

255
Herbert Schlubach—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

Mr. Marshall: There are 104 of these
transactions, all of which were paid.
Foreman of Jury: Each separate?
Mr. Limburg: Each separate.
Mr. Podell: And this is one dated November 25, 1924, and there are about five or six
others that will be taken up separately; and
may I state further that what we are taking
up now will lead to those that we did not
collect on and those that we lost on.
Mr. Marshall: I do not know if your
Honor caught part of this. On this loan 105
of November 25th, 1924, these assigned invoices were not received until December
15th, December 23rd, December 17th, another one December 23rd, another one December 24th; two of them on January 1st,
1925; another one on January 23rd, 1925.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, if there is any
question about what it usually took before
we got these invoices, that this is any different from previous transactions, I will have to
offer the previous bills. Now, all this witness gave
Mr. Marshall: The witness said three
weeks, your Honor.
Mr. Podell: Pardon me, that is just what
I am going to tell you. All this witness gave
was the average time.
The Court : Yes.
Mr. Podell: He said it was sometimes less
and sometimes more. As long as there is
going to be a question raised, in order not
to take up the time and offer each item, I
am going to try and have it tabulated as to
each one of the 104 transactions, to show
you—-
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The Court: What significance has that
got, Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Podell: I do not know, but counsel
seems to make a point of it.
The Court: I would like to know the significance, so if it is material, we can have it.
Mr. Podell: I assume he means we did
something different in these accounts where
we lost money on from what we had done
in all other accounts; is not that your point?
Mr. Marshall: My contention is, your
Honor, that they were not as careful as they
might have been and should have been in
following up their security and getting it
in in time.
The Court: I see.
Mr. Podell: My point is that we did
nothing in those transactions different from
what we had done in the one hundred instances before, substitution of accounts at
the time when the accounts were receivable.
The Court: That will be up to him for
cross-examination.
Mr. Podell: Surely.
Now, I want to offer in evidence the
checks aggregating the $50,000 advance.
(Received in evidence and marked, respectively, Plaintiff's Exhibits 63, 63-A and
63-B.)
Mr. Marshall: I would welcome a tabulation of the sort Mr. Podell suggested. In
fact, I suggested it before; I suggested we
tabulate these trust receipts.
Mr. Podell: We will not quarrel about
that. We will try and do it. It is a big
job, too.
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Mr. Marshall: I have a tabulation already
on the first seven, Mr. Podell.
Mr. Limburg: We will give you a tabulation on the 111.
Mr. Marshall: Fine.
Mr. Podell: The exhibits are: $25,000
check of November 26, 1924, $15,000 check
of November 25, 1924, and $10,000 check of
November 25, 1924, making a total of
$50,000.
Mr. Marshall: That is still under transaction 105?
Mr. Podell: Yes, that is that transaction.
The Court: What part of that $50,000,
Mr. Podell, if I may ask to clarify my own
mind, remained uncollected?
Mr. Limburg: None.
Mr. Marshall: That has all been paid.
Mr. Podell: That has all been paid, your
Honor; and I understood Mr. Limburg to
say that both 105 and 106 were all paid; is
that right, Mr. Limburg?
Mr. Limburg: That is correct.
Mr. Podell: This one also has all been
paid. Now, I offer in evidence the letter of
November 29th, together with the invoices
relating to trust receipt No. 106.
(Received in evidence and marked, respectively, Plaintiff's Exhibits 64, 64-A, 64-B
and 64-C.)
Mr. Podell:
in evidence.

And I will offer this check

(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 65.)
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(Mr. Podell reads from last exhibits to
jury.)
Mr. Marshall: May I read one of these
documents to the jury at this time, your
Honor? (Reading.) I think that is a little
different letter than accompanied some of
them.
Mr. Podell: I do not think counsel should
make those remarks. The letter speaks for
itself. The transaction is here.
Mr. Marshall: Pardon me, Mr. Podell. I
was explaining to the Court why I thought
it was necessary to read this transaction, in
view of the fact that the others had been
read.
Mr. Podell: I think after we get through,
your Honor, we will have to offer in evidence all the 104. I think we will have to
do it.
Mr. Marshall: Can we not tabulate it?
Mr. Podell: We cannot take the position
that this is the same, as long as counsel
makes the point to pick little differences. I
will show him where this same form of letter happened not once but a dozen times in
the previous 104 transactions.
Mr. Marshall: I am not pointing that out
as being a difference in this transaction, but
a very important item, that they went and
asked Ultramares frequently, if not always
—they may have- done it always—whether
they would be ready to finance them, and
that it was not under any general understanding that they were going to finance
Stern, and that each transaction was specifically taken up and a specific request made
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each time whether there would be a financing.
Mr. Podell: Has anybody claimed anything different, your Honor? We made a
first arrangement for $100,000. Then when
that was consummated, each transaction was
taken up and there were 104 transactions.
Each was paid. They requested whether we
would finance them in the same form you
saw that letter. We financed them and got
the invoices, and there was not anything different and there was not any other arrangement made.
There is one thing certain, your Honor,
so long as counsel has made that statement,
that had we known that this concern was
either dishonest or bankrupt, we would have
had no transactions with them, either secured or unsecured. That is our position.
The Court: The witness has so testified.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, it
might save a lot of time if Mr. Podell will
stipulate in each instance there was a specific request made for a loan and that the
loans were not advanced under any general
understanding; not that upon application
were they bound to grant any loans that
were asked.
Mr. Podell: Counsel is confusing what
he claims to be a general understanding with
a reliance and credit that we extended these
people on reliance and faith on their financial statement furnished to us through these
defendants, prepared by these defendants.
He is confusing the two.
Mr. Marshall: I am not confusing the
two.
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Mr. Podell: There is not any doubt that
our contention at least is that in making
every transaction, that we made with Fred
Stern & Company, we relied on the financial
statement of these people, whether it was a
separate transaction in each case, or whether
it was all the result of one transaction, or
whether it was several transactions.
The Court: So the witness said. But that
is entirely a matter for the jury.
Mr. Podell: That is what we claim. I do
not really know the occasion for this discussion.
Mr. Marshall: I think your Honor understands what my contention is.
The Court: I do, very clearly, sir.
Mr. Marshall: That is all I asked for. I
am sorry if Mr. Podell does not.
Mr. Podell: I will offer in evidence the
papers relating to transaction No. 107. I
think this is the first transaction, your
Honor, where there has not been payment;
107, I am advised, we partially collected on.
108 and 109, no part was collected.
(Received in evidence and marked, respectively, Plaintiff's Exhibits 66, 66-A and 66-B,
and Plaintiff's Exhibits 67, 67-A and 67-B.)
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, to clarify the
situation, will you permit me to state with
regard to these transactions, I think it will
be helpful to know
Mr. Marshall: This is in the form of a
stipulation, I understand.
Mr. Podell: This is in the form of a stipulation to be supplemented by proof, which
we are going to offer now, just so that the
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proof will be entirely clear; when we collected on all accounts receivable that were
actually assigned to us, our loss, in other
words, did not arise in full; we collected in
full on all accounts receivable that were
actually assigned to us, subject to that one
thing that your Honor has already in mind,
where we had to pay back.
The Court: Yes, sir.
Mr. Podell: Now, the loss that we incurred was the result of two things
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I
am not consenting to any stipulation that
they had any loss or that it was the result
of any two things.
Mr. Podell: I explained that to Mr. Marshall first, and I understood him to say he
had no objection.
Mr. Marshall: I want the facts and not
the conclusions that the loss was caused by
anything.
Mr. Podell: I do not say it caused the
loss, that is not part of any stipulation; that
is for the jury, of course; but I just want to
point out so that the proof that I offer will
be more readily understood. The loss was
occasioned rather by two things; we did not
get any rubber on the trust receipt, as it was
promised.
Mr. Marshall: There is, your Honor
Mr. Podell: I said on the trust receipt.
The Court: In other words, a trust receipt came and no rubber or bills paid?
Mr. Podell: No rubber, and
Mr. Marshall: The rubber described in
these trust receipts, as I understand it, was
non-existent.
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Mr. Podell: We could not find it was
non-existent and your Honor has in mind
with regard to the second one, although he
promised us accounts at the time he got our
money, it would take three or four weeks before those accounts would be assigned. He
did not fulfill that promise before he died,
as to certain of those promises of assignments.
The Court: Is not that stretching it a
little further than three or five weeks?
Mr. Podell: The 104 transactions will
show you, your Honor, that there were instances of three, four and five weeks before
he assigned accounts.
Mr. Marshall: He is describing his witness' action.
Mr. Podell: I am talking of the average.
I am not attempting in this statement to give
you any more than an idea, so that you can
follow the proof, and whatever I say will be
proved.
The Court: You never got any, so that
there would be no attempt at all.
Mr. Limburg: We did not get any until
108 and 111.
The Court: We have understood those
assignments for 108 and 111. Now, in 107,
what about that?
Mr. Marshall: Some of the accounts that'
were supposed to be assigned are in evidence,
and as to the others that should have been assigned, there were none received.
Mr. Podell: No assignments received.
Mr. Marshall: What is the statement?
Mr. Podell: There is no stipulation. I
am merely making an explanation.
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Mr. Marshall: If this is just a speech, I
object.
The Court: He is lining out what the
testimony will be.
Mr. Podell: Just to make it clear.
The Court: In other words, it is not anything except what he hopes to present as a
matter of evidence. We will see whether the
evidence is forthcoming and it just clarifies
the situation, if the evidence is forthcoming;
if not, there is 110 clarity to it.
Mr. Marshall: I had hoped that his opening remark would be a stipulation that
would be carried out.
Mr. Podell: If you do not take care, I
will give you one. I want to offer in evidence first checks dated December 9, 1924,
which I am advised covered those for 107,
108 and 109, aggregating in the sum of
$100,000.

787

788

(Checks received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 68 and 68-A.)
Q. Before reading this, may I ask you, Mr.
Schlubach, at the time you received the letter of
December 8, 1924, whether you had any information that there had been any difference in the financial condition of Stern & Company from that set
forth in the statement, that he was worth not less
than the statement showed; did you receive any
inkling or suggestion from anybody?
Mr. Marshall: May I ask if that be put in
different form, whether he received any information with respect to Stern's finances,
or were they better or worse.
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Q'. Did you receive any information as to Stern's
condition? A. I did, through our president, Mr.
Von Goeben, heard that Stern had been earning
well and that up to August of that year.
Q. August of what year? A. 1924.
Q. The statement was given you in the latter part
of March or April? A. Yes.
Q. And August following that, in 1924? A.
1924.
Mr. Marshall: May we have what Mr.
Von Goeben said on that point? I think you
interrupted.
791

792

Q. You can tell in August, 1924, finish your
answer. A. Until then he had earned and added
some $150,000 of profits to his capital, and shown
as of the statement of Touche, Niven & Co. of the
31st of December, 1923.
Q. In other words, he had bettered his condition
by $150,000? A. Yes.
Q. Over and above? A. The capital as shown by
that statement.
Q. By the statement shown? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you say you heard that in August? A.
No, I heard it later.
Q. How much later? A. In about October; end
of October.
Q. And certainly by December, had you any
inkling or had you heard anything to the effect that
Stern was financially embarrassed or anything of
that character? A. No. Nothing.
Q. And did you continue to rely upon the information that you had received from the statement
von had received? A. Yes.
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793

Q. In your transactions
Mr. Marshall: When you say "information that you had received," did you mean
the information that Von Goeben had given
you here?
The Witness: Yes, because I asked Mr.
Von Goeben, due to some other reasons, in
October or beginning of November, expressly
about the conditions and the financial situation of Stern.
Q. And the information was that it was $150,000
better than the statement? A. At least $150,000.
Q. He made a profit of $150,000 above? A. Over
and above what had been shown by the statement of
31st December, 1923.
Q. Now, then, on December 8, 1924

794

Mr. Podell: I will now read Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 66 (reading same to jury). And
may I along the lines of the questions that I
asked before ask you
Q. You certainly had received no word from
Stern or Von Goeben that any part of that financial
statement was withdrawn? A. No.
Q. You received no other financial statement by
any accountants?
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute; you mean
you personally received no other? Let us get
this straight.
Q. So that you claim Touche, Niven & Co. or any
other accountant did not furnish any other?
Mr. Marshall: No, I claim the statement
that Romberg prepared in the summer was
delivered to Mr. Von Goeben.
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Mr. Podell: Read Von Goeben's testimony.
Mr. Marshall: I shall in due time.
Q. Did you ever see any other statement at any
time prepared by them? A. I did not.
Mr. Podell: Please mark these papers for
identification.
(Four sheets received and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 69 for Identification.)
797

Q. Did you ever see this paper in your life before? Just answer yes or no. A. I did not.
Q. And you are the gentleman that had to pass
on credits? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall: May I see those.
Mr. Podell: The witness refers to Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 69 for Identification.
Mr. Marshall: That consists of four
sheets, may the record show that.
Mr. Podell: That comes from the files of
the trustee, your Honor. We do not want
the claim made that we had them in our
possession.
The Court: Yes.

798

Q. Now, this letter was received from Stern on
December 8, 1924 (reading exhibit to jury).
Mr. Podell: Then comes the trust receipt
dated December 8, 1924, the same date; that
is, the trust receipt for $29,700, specifying
rubber marks E. A. C. No. M. S. of forty
tons. I have missing trust receipts 108 and
109. That is marked. The trust receipt 107
is the one I referred to for $29,700, trust re-
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ceipt same date of December 8,1924, No. 108,
for $24,000. Trust receipt on the same date
No. 109, $38,700. The three of them were
$102,400, the amount in the record. We have
invoices one of December 30, the letter is
dated December 8th. The receipt is assigned
with this, dated September 30th, for $7,224,
for the Hood Rubber Company. On December 30th, again Hood Rubber Company $7,171, and we immediately sent out notice to
the Hood Rubber Company on December 31.
On December 30 we received assigned account of the Garlock Packing Company for
$13,064, and I assume we sent out notice of
that, although I have not got that notice,
that is in evidence. We sent out notice on
December 31 to the Garlock Packing Company of the assignment to that company.

799

800

Q. Now, can you state, Mr. Schlubach, whether
other than these assigned accounts—and Mr. Limburg, I will trouble you to follow this and make any
correction in the figures—other than these assigned
accounts or invoices of this request for $102,400
Mr. Marshall: Transaction 107.
Q. (Continuing) —107 and 108 and 109, did you
receive any other assigned accounts, do you know,
without looking at the papers? A. No.
Q. You could not tell?
Mr. Limburg: There were none.
The Court: Can you tell or don't you
recollect?
The Witness : Not that I know of.
The Court: He means that he can tell not
that lie knows if there were no others.
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Mr. Marshall: Can or cannot tell?
The Court: Cannot tell.
The Witness : Cannot tell.
Mr. Marshall: It was not part of your
duties to receive these assigned accounts?
The Witness: Not my duties.

803

804

Q. The amount advanced on this request of December 8, 1924, for a total of $102,400, the request
was stated in Mr. Stern's letter: "We would appreciate if you would put us in funds, i. e., $100,000
even to advance the above lots." And the checks
dated December 9, just one day after the request,
one of them is for $75,000 and the other for $25,000.
That is $100,000. The total amount of invoices
that he has listed with this letter aggregate
$382,400, but his request is only for $100,000, that
was what he requested.
The Court: And what was the total
amount of the bills assigned?
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, we cannot prove
it by this witness, but of course we will prove
it by the records.
The Court: As far as we have gone, I
mean?
Mr. Podell: By the records of the defendant.
Mr. Marshall: I am willing to stipulate.
The Court : That is what I want.
Mr. Podell: If you will stipulate it, that
will simplify it. Let us get the records
exact.
Mr. Marshall: Perhaps during the recess
—what do you want?
The Court: Stipulate those were all the
bills they got.
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Mr. Podell: Those bills are three in number. They aggregate $13,864.48 on one, $7,224.47 on the other; $7,171.01 on the third.
Mr. Marshall: I am a little confused in
this.
Mr. Podell: There is nothing confusing.
Mr. Marshall: May I ask a question, your
Honor, from Mr. Podell, for the record? I
want to get my record in shape.
The Court: I would like to follow this,
and I cannot, because I want to know.
Mr. Podell: I will tell you in a minute if
you will be patient. I will tell it to you
right now if you will be patient, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall: May I ask a question?
The Court: See whether you get what you
want; if not, we will give you a chance.
Mr. Podell: I do not want to give a wrong
impression, that is why I am so eager to
have your Honor know this. Your Honor
will gather the impression that we collected
on all of those assigned accounts from what
I have previously said, all of those three.
The Court: No, I did not get that impression.
Mr. Podell: That is what is puzzling me.
I did make the statement that all accounts,
assigned accounts, had been collected.
The Court : Yes.
Mr. Podell: I did not state to your Honor
that as to some of them, and this presents
one of the series
Mr. Limburg: That is all.
Mr. Podell: This is all there is of them—
those were accounts that had also been assigned to someone else and they are differ-
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ent; there are other items, because in the
other items we collected and had to pay back,
and here we did not collect any more than
a certain amount as a result of an agreement.
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor, I move to
strike out his remarks about what he had
to pay back, or ask for an instruction to the
jury to disregard that as not being proof.
The Court: Yes, that is not proof, gentlemen.
Mr. Podell: I do not want the jury to take
my statement as proof.
The Court: It is explanation. I have told
you before that no statement made by counsel is proof.
Mr. Podell: Of course not.
Mr. Marshall: In fact, sometimes it is
just the opposite.
Mr. Podell: Unless in the form of stipulation.
The Court: Or a question that is answered.
Mr. Limburg: The amount is in our bill of
particulars.
Mr. Podell: What is that? I just want
to get that distinction in your mind, about
collecting the bill in full and then paying
back and the general loss.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: I call your Honor's attention again to the fact that I am not bound
by any of their losses to third parties.
The Court: That is right.
Mr. Podell: I do not want to miss a word
you say, and I cannot hear you, Mr. Mar-
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shall, and if I go forward the jurors cannot
hear me.
Mr. Limburg: We collected on those
accounts.
Mr. Podell: When you are speaking of
those accounts
Mr. Limburg: Those are the ones we had
to sue on to collect, on the Hood Rubber
account, October 11, 1927, $6,523.26. We
collected on the Firestone Tire & Rubber account of January 13, 1928, the amount of
$5,543.05. We collected on the account of
the Garlock Packing Company on January
14, 1928, the amount of $7,177.42.
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor, I will not accept those figures because I understand that
at least as to the Garlock Packing Company,
that was the result of a settlement which
they made in a litigation.
The Court: I see.
Mr. Marshall: And I think we should
take those invoices on their full value until
it is a matter of proof.
The Court: Yes, they will be taken at full
value until proof is submitted, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Podell: May I suggest this: This is
in the nature of an admission as to the
amount we received; in other words, when
we received this assigned account, it was
not really payment to us. Payment to us
was what we received in the way of money
either by check or otherwise, and the order
of the proof now is simply to show what we
actually received as against what was advanced, and I think on that point
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The Court: Let me get an addition here,
and I will make a ruling.
Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Court: Do my figures add properly?
The total amount of the invoices was $38,859.95?
Mr. Limburg: Your figures must be
wrong, your Honor.
Mr. Podell: I gave the Judge the net
figures after deduction.
The Court: I want the gross figures first.
Mr. Limburg: I think your Honor's addition must he erroneous.
The Court: Have you it there? I was
trying to catch the figures.
Mr. Limburg: You mean the aggregate?
The Court: The aggregate amount, that is
what I asked before, I have now $13,064.
Mr. Podell: That is my mistake. I read
it eight.
Mr. Limburg: $13,064.48; $7,224.47; $7,171.01. About $27,000 or $28,000.
Mr. Podell: $27,459.96.
The Court: $27,000 odd.
Mr. Marshall: That is right—$27,459.96.
The Court: That is right. Is the other
right, $19,263.47, the amount received?
Mr. Podell: Mr. Limburg is adding it up.
Mr. Limburg: $19,243.73.
The Court: Is that $19,243?
Mr. Podell: That is the sum we collected.
The Court: What is your difference?
Mr. Podell: The loss on those assigned
accounts that we lost as the result of litigation was $8,263.23. The point that I am
making, your Honor
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The Court: I understand you, Mr. Marshall. The Court has admitted in evidence
at this time, as a matter of proof, that there
were on these transactions, irrespective of
how it was done, a loss of $8,263.23 to them.
Having admitted that in evidence as a total
of $27,459.96, I am giving you your exception in relation to the admission of that
amount, based on the understanding that we
had this morning.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I want to be
sure that the record is clear about that, when
you say a loss of $8,263.23, you mean on
these three invoices ?
The Court: That is right.
Mr. Podell: On the whole transaction 107,
108 and 109?
The Court: No, on the result of these
three transactions which you say went into
litigation and which were fixed in some way,
I am taking the difference of $8,263.23, upon which I have made the reservation, as I
have described to you this morning.
"Mr. Marshall: And which I understand
is, unless they prove
Mr. Podell: Would not you be safer to
have the record show, rather than saying it
is a loss, in just having the record show that
on this advance of $100,000 we received
those sums of money?
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: I mean we received the sum
of $19,243.73, so far as the proof at this
point shows. In other words, I am proving
that I advanced $100,000, and I am going
to prove whatever I collected, and thus far
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I will admit on the record that I received
out of these three invoices $19,243.73.
The Court: That is one way of doing it.
Mr. Podell: That does not involve a conclusion. That states a fact.
Mr. Marshall: I am not quite clear where
that leaves me on the record.
The Court: I will tell you where it leaves
you, that I am leaving a difference of $8,263.23 which I am admitting in proof over
your exception. The other is admitted without that exception. That is the only difference.
Mr. Marshall: And that your Honor reserves the legal question?
The Court: Yes, the legal question for
future determination, after the determination of this case.
Mr. Marshall: On the question of the
settlement?
The Court: Yes, sir. Are you clear on
that?
Mr. Marshall: I think so; your Honor
said pursuant to our agreement this morning, and I want to make sure that agreement
or understanding was on the record.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: I want to offer in evidence
the papers relating to trust receipt No. 110,
and the papers relating to trust receipt 111.
Mr. Limburg: That is all.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 70 and 70-A.)
Mr. Podell: I offer in evidence the check
for $25,000., dated December 13, 1924.
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(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 71.)
Mr. Podell: I offer in evidence check for
$40,000., dated December 23, 1924.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 72.)
Mr. Podell: I offer in evidence also a
letter written by Fred Stern & Company to
the Ultramares Corporation of December 9,
1924.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 73.)

824

Mr. Podell: And the letter written by
us to Frederick Stern under date of December 18, 1924.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 74.)
Mr. Marshall: May I see Exhibit No. 72
a minute. That is the check, was it not?
Mr. Podell: Exhibit No. 72 is the check
for $40,000. Now, on December 13th, there
is a check for $25,000, that is Exhibit No.
71. On December 12 there is a request for
that $25,000, which I shall read: "Attached
herewith you will find assigned trust receipts as follows"— (reading to jury). That
is dated December 12. The check is December 13. Attached is a trust receipt for $25,000, trust receipt 110, marked A. F. E.;
R. S. S. 45 tons is the amount in the letter.
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On December 9th there is a letter to the
Ultramares Corporation, saying:
"Dear Sirs:
Confirming our telephone conversation regarding our loan of $100,000., kindly be
advised that we will make arrangements to
liquidate this loan within a week's time.
Thanking you for your efforts in this
matter we remain
Yours very truly,
FRED STERN & Co., INC.
827

P e r FREDERICK

STERN."

Q. Do you know how that letter came to be
written, Mr. Schlubach?

828

Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Podell: In any event, he promises
to liquidate this loan of $100,000., that is
the previous advance.
Mr. Marshall: In one week.
Mr. Podell: Now, on December 18th, this
was after the $25,000. had been advanced,
that was dated December 13th, and before
the $40,000. was advanced the date of the
$40,000. is December 23rd.
Mr. Marshall: Advance on 111 was the
$40,000.
Mr. Podell: You mean trust receipt 111?
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
Mr. Podell: But the date is what I wanted
to call attention to. This letter I am going
to read now was written by us to Fred Stern
& Company, between those two checks. They
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had already advanced the check of December 13 for $25,000., but had not yet advanced the check for December 23, for $40,000. ( Reading letter to Fred Stern of 11th
of December to the jury.)
Now then, the extension of time was from
December 18th until December 24. Then
on December 23rd, Stern wrote this letter.
(Reading.) The trust receipt is the same
as the others dated December 23, 1924 for
rubber marks, amount 70 tons sold to Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, 70 tons, total
amount $40,000., and on the same paper,
trust receipt, the check is dated December
23, 1924, for that $40,000.
By Mr.

829

830

Podell.

Q. Was that the last advance that was made to
Stern? A. Which one?
Q. December 23 for $40,000.; if you are not certain, say you are not certain. We will have it
checked up.
Mr. Marshall:

That is the last one.

A. I am not quite certain.
Mr. Podell: It is stipulated that is the
last one we advanced. Now, had you ever
received or will you stipulate that we have
never received invoices of the $100,000., the
$25,000, and the $40,000, making a total of
$165,000., except the item of $19,243.73, am
I right in that? Mr. Limburg adds to that
except in so far as our collections on previous loan might give a credit. There might
have been something remaining from some
previous assigned accounts.
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Mr. Marshall: It is in the bill of particulars. I think they had better prove that,
your Honor.
Mr. Podell: I thought we would simplify
it.

833
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Mr. Marshall: I will stipulate there was
no rubber representing merchandise described in these trust receipts and that there
were no a c c o u n t s assigned to you on the
trust receipts Nos. 107, 108, 109, 110 and
111, if that will help you.
Mr. Podell: I think in substance I will
take that stipulation; but the fact of the
matter is, your Honor, there is the account.
We do not know whether he had rubber or
not. We were unable to locate any such
rubber. The fact that we will prove is
that our investigation disclosed that the
money which he took from us with which
to purchase this rubber—that was the essence of the transaction, he was to receive
money and pay for certain rubber—but he
never used it for that purpose and diverted
it. There was some rubber, but we could
not identify it as ours, and somebody else
had a lien on it, so that the only thing I can
say is that we never got any rubber.
The Court. I SEE.
Mr. Podell: I will put Mr. Manning on
to prove exactly what he did in that connection, and that we never got any rubber
pursuant to the trust receipt, and never got
any asigned accounts only those which were
proved.
The Court: I do not think counsel has
any objection to that stipulation.
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Mr. Marshall: I did not know that was a
stipulation. I thought that was an explanation.
The Court: I am asking you whether you
have any objection to so stipulating.
Mr. Podell: We never received any rubber on the trust receipts and never received
any assigned accounts other than those.
Mr. Marshall: I will stipulate that if
they say they will put Manning on the stand.
Mr. Podell: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Fine.
By Mr.

Podell.

Q. So that the record will show, did you see
anything of Stern in the latter part of December?
A. I myself, no. I have never seen him.
Q. Did he call on the premises at all? Did he
ever call at your offices? A. He did.
Q. I mean in the latter part of December, did
he ever call at your office? A. I do not know.
Q. You do not recall seeing him there? A. No.
Q. What I am driving at is, do you know what
happened to Stern in the early part of January?
A. I was told that he had died on the 2nd of
January.
Q. 2nd day of January? A. 2nd day of January.
Q. So long as you are telling what you were
told, were you told that he died by suicide; is
that the report that was carried about? A. No,
it was not the report.
Q. You were not told of that? A. No, I was
not told of that.
Q. Did you personally go over his books or records after that time? A. I did not.
Q. You say that Mr. Stern did visit on your
premises; you saw him there? A. I did not see
him.
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Q. But you knew of his visit, you, personally?
A. Because I was told by our president, Mr. Von
Goeben, that Mr. Stern had been there.
Q. Did you personally, in passing upon the credit
to be extended, did you ever have occasion to examine any of his books or records; I mean during
the year 1923? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: That means you personally, that question.

839

Q. Either you personally, or did you ever send
or cause any one to make any such examination?
A. During which time?
Q. During 1924. A. Mr. Von Goeben did, and
reported that he saw
Mr. Marshall: I ask that we have the
rest of that answer, your Honor.
The Court: Let us have the answer.
(Question repeated as recorded.)
The Court: That he saw what?
The Witness: That he saw sales contracts,
and contracts of purchases of rubber, and
that he convinced himself that the prices
paid were correct, according to the situation of the market, and that prices obtained
in the sales were netting him a profit.

840
Q. Well now, I am not talking about Von Goeben's examination of the contracts of sale to find out
whether there was a profit; did he ever tell you
in words or substance that he examined any or all
of the books of account? A. No.
Q. Did you personally cause anyone to go over
there at any time to examine the books of account;
I mean in 1924? A. No.
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Q. And did you at all times rely upon the financial statement that was furnished you, Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1, as to the worth of Frederick Stern &
Company?
Mr. Marshall: He answered that question several times, I think the last time
Mr. Podell: I have asked with regard to
specific instances and want to now cover it
generally.
Mr. Marshall: I think he also relied on
the same information which Von Goeben
had given him, which had been given him
by Stern, as to the profit Stern was making.
Mr. Podell: The statement was the basis
that he had made $150,000. and over. There
was no other financial statement.
The Court: Don't say those things, Mr.
Podell.
Mr. Podell: Counsel provokes them.
The Court: There is no necessity for it
at all. The objection is sustained, as being
already answered a number of times.
Mr. Podell: If your Honor considers it
has been answered, I won't press it any
further.
Q. Did you ever receive any dividend or payment
from the Bankruptcy Court? A. No.
Mr. Podell: Will it be stipulated that
Frederick Stern was petitioned into bankruptcy.
Mr. Marshall: That is admitted by the
answer.
Q. Did you ever receive any dividends from the
bankruptcy? A. No.
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Marshall.

Q. Of course, I cannot finish in fifteen minutes,
your Honor
The Court: I did not imagine you would.
Mr. Podell: If I may presume to suggest,
we would all probably welcome two minutes
recess.
The Court: You may have it, certainly.

845

81(5

Q. Now, Mr. Schlubach, how long have you been
engaged in business? A. Over thirty years.
Q. And what kind of business have you been engaged in in that time? A. Always in import, export and factoring.
Q. And what business were you in just prior to
the time that you joined the Ultramares Corporation in 1923? A. In my firm at Guatemala, Central
America.
Q. And you have been associated in your business with banking firms and done business with
banks to a considerable extent? A. Not as a partner.
Q. No. I mean in the course of your business—
The Court : Business experience, he is
driving at now.
Q. You have had a good deal to do with banks,
have you not? A. Yes.
Q. In connection with the Ultramares and other
business, you have been associated, for example,
with J. Henry Schroder Company of London, a
banking firm, have you not? A. Yes,
Mr. Podell:
bank.

I object, that they are a
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Q. They are a banking firm. So that you have
at all times expert banking advice if you should
think that you needed it? A. Yes.
Q. You could have gone to them at any time
for banking advice, if you had needed it? A. Yes.
Q.
experience what a bill of lading is? A. Yes.
Q. And would you describe in a few words to the
jury what you understand by a bill of lading? A.
A bill of lading covers the receipt of goods which
are shipped.
Q. It is a representation by the carrier or shipper
on the railroad that the goods have been delivered
to him and that he will deliver them to the bearer
of that certificate? A. Yes,
Q. And you know from your business experience
that these bills of lading are used to convey title
or give title to the merchandise described in them,
don't you? A. Yes.

847

Now, I suppose you know

848

Mr. Podell: I do not think that is a sound
statement of the law with regard to bills of
lading. He is asking the witness a question
of law.
Q. Frequently it conveys title?
Mr. Podell:

Sometimes.
849

Q. You understand, do you not, that bills of
lading are very often bought and sold instead of
the merchandise itself? A. No.
Q. And you can buy a bill of lading and never
get delivery of the merchandise, cannot you? A.
You buy the goods which are represented by the
bill of lading, but not the bill of lading.
Q. Put it that way, if you want. Now, do you
know what a letter of credit is? A. Yes.
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Q. Now, will you tell the jury what a letter of
credit is, as you understand it? A. A letter of
credit is a confirmation by a banker or banking
house
Q. A little louder, please. A. A letter of credit
is a confirmation by a banker or banking house that
a certain credit is at the disposal of the beneficiary.
Q. And do you know that in most instances a
letter of credit used in the foreign trade provides
for payment or acceptance of a draft against delivery or documents of bills of lading, don't you?
That is customary? A. Not always.
Q. But it is very customary, is it not? A. I do
not understand exactly your question.
Q. Is it customary that the bank does not accept
a draft under a letter of credit unless it receives
with the draft, bills of lading or other documents
covering merchandise? A. A bank may accept
without a bill of lading.
Q. It may; but the custom in foreign trade is
usually to have the documents accompany the draft,
is it not? A. No. Not customary.
Q. You say it is not? A. It is not customary.
Q. Did you ever hear of the documents of bills
of lading accompanying drafts drawn under letter
of credit? A. Yes, but it is not always the case.
Q. But it is the usual case, is it not? A. I do
not know about that.
Q. You could not say? A. I could not say that.
Q. After all your years of foreign trade? A. I
would add that there are just as many drafts drawn
without attached bills of lading.
Q. What is a trust receipt, as you understand
it? A. It is a receipt of goods which are in trust,
Q. In other words, the man who gives the receipt says that he holds the goods in trust for the
man to whom he gives the receipt? A. Yes.
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Q. And he holds the goods for that man? A.
That he received.
Q. That he received the goods, or holds them for
that other man? A. Yes.
Q. Now, you understood, didn't you, when you
got these first 104 trust receipts from Stern, that
you were getting some kind of security under those
trust receipts? A. (No reply.)
Q. Did not you believe you were getting some security under these trust receipts? A. Not the moment we received those trust receipts from Stern.
Q. You thought you were just getting a piece of
paper? A. It was almost a piece of paper, just
advising what he promised to assign.
Q. Didn't you say a moment ago, Mr. Schlubach,
that you understood a trust receipt to be a document by which a man declared he held in trust
certain merchandise for the benefit of another man?
A. Yes,
Q. Did not you understand then Stern's representing and saying that he was holding certain merchandise in trust for you? A. After he had paid
for them.
Q. But immediately upon payment he would
have held that merchandise? A. He would have
held that merchandise for us.
Q. Did you ever inquire from Mr. Stern whether
there were any shipping documents, any of these
bills of lading covering this merchandise? A. I
personally did not,
Q. Whose duty would it have been to have made
that inquiry? A. The president's duty.
Q.
Q. His sole duty, no one else's duty? A. I could
not say—or the other gentlemen attending and
helping me and assisting me.
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Q. I will ask you whether you know who would
be the man? A. I do not know.
Q. You could not say who handled that of your
concern? A. Mr. Von Goeben handled it.
Q. Now, you have in the course of your long business experience had occasion to see a great many
balance sheets, have you not? A. I have seen some.
Q. Well, one hundred, a thousand, or what would
you say? A. Certainly not thousands, but probably
a hundred.
Q. In thirty years you have only seen one hundred? A. (No reply.)
Q. In thirty years you have only seen a hundred?
A. Yes, because I have been an executive only
lately, and during the past ten years, and not before then.
Q. Will you look at Exhibit 1, please. Now, were
you acquainted at all with the rubber market during the year 1924? A. May I ask—acquainted—I
do not understand.
Q. Did you watch the rubber market and see
what the prices of rubber were during the year
1924? A. Not very closely.
Q. Have you any recollection about whether that
was a steady market or a fluctuating market? A.
It was a fluctuating market so far as I can remember.
Q. Is it not a fact that there were considerable
fluctuations—there were considerable fluctuations,
were there not ? A. I do not recollect,
Q. Whose duty besides your own would it have
been to keep track for the Ultramares Corporation
of the market in rubber; who would have watched
that market for you? A. The manager of our import department, especially our salesmen of rubber.
Q. Who was that? A. I do not recall who it was
at that time.
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Q. When you were lending money to Stern,
didn't you think it was important to keep advised,
to keep yourself informed as to the rubber market;
will you answer so that the stenographer can take
it down?
Mr. Podell: You will have to say yes or
no.
A. I have not spoken yet. I am thinking. It was
not my duty, so I did not do it.
Q. Whose duty was it in your concern, just the
export manager? A. Or the president's duty.
Q. That is Mr. Von Goeben's? A. Yes.
Q. Now I ask you again didn't you think that it
was important when you were financing a rubber
concern such as Stern, to keep yourself or your
company informed as to the prices of rubber? You
may answer that yes or no, I think. Do you want
the question read again?

860

Mr. Podell: Let him think first. If he
does not understand, he will tell us.
Mr. Marshall: I am sorry.
A. May I just ask again—you say whether it was
"important" ?
Mr. Marshall: Will you read the question.
Q. (Question repeated as recorded.) A. Yes,
Q. You were in charge of credits for Ultramares,
I think you have testified? A. Yes.
Q. And now I understand you also to say that
you did not consider yourself as the credit man of
Ultramares to keep yourself informed of the rubber prices during that year? A. Not regularly.
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Q. Now, you noticed, didn't you, on this balance
sheet, Exhibit 1, which is before you, an item at
the bottom of the liabilities, "Sterling contracts
£165,000 covering purchase commitments," and
carried over to the right-hand side—$737,300? A.
Yes,
Q. Carried as a contingent liability, you see that,
don't you? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall: I think I had better point
out to the jury the item that I am referring
to. This is the last item here (indicating).
863

864

Q. Now, what did you understand by "sterling
contracts covering purchase commitments"? A.
They were contracts of purchases in pounds sterling, English pounds sterling.
Q. In other words, they were open contracts
which Stern had which had not yet been closed by
the delivery of merchandise? A. Yes.
Q. Now, fluctuations in the rubber market might
have caused either a considerable profit or a considerable loss on this item of purchase commitments of $737,000, might it not? A. If he had not
sold the goods at the same time and covered himself.
Q. Did you ever inquire of Stern the nature of
these commitments? A. No.
Q. Did you ever inquire of him whether he had
sold at the same time? A. I didn't.
Q. Do you know whether anybody of your concern did? A. Mr. Von Goeben.
Q. Do you know that he inquired? A. Yes.
Q.
spect to his sterling contracts covering purchase
commitments? A. I couldn't say whether he made
a personal inquiry about these sterling contracts,
but he did ask about the contracts.
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Q. He did ask about them? A. About contracts
in general.
Q. And what did Mr. Von Goeben report to you
that Stern said about those contracts? A. May I
ask which contracts?
Q. The contracts you say that Von Goeben discussed with Stern? A. Purchase contracts.
Q. What did he say about them? A. That he was
buying at prices which were in accordance with the
market.
Q. Did you ask the prices? A. I think the prices
were told me at the time.
Q. Now, let me get this clear: Are you talking
about these contracts referred to in this balance
sheet? A. No.
Q. I was afraid that you were not. You are talking about contracts— A. In general.
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Mr. Podell: Ask him, Mr. Marshall. I
asked you specifically what contracts you
were talking about?
Mr. Marshall: May I not be interrupted?
Q. You are talking about contracts that Stern
made after this balance sheet was presented to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, did you make any inquiry with respect
to these contracts referred to in the balance sheet?
A. No.
Q. Which were reported to be open in December, 1923? A. They were reported as contingent
liability.
Q. But you made no inquiry as to this item of
contingent liability? A. No.
Q. And yet on that item there might have been,
as you said before, great loss if the rubber market
fluctuated down? A. Yet the amount was well
within the assets on the other side.
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Q. But there might have been a considerable
loss on that item? A. I don't know.
Q. Well, now, Mr. Schlubach, let us get this
straight. You say you know that there were considerable fluctuations in the rubber market during
the year 1924. There is carried on the books as a
contingent liability as of December 31st, 1923, an
item on unfilled contracts of over $700,000. If the
market in its fluctuations dropped, would there not
be a considerable loss to Stern on that item? A.
May I come to figures? As a business man, I
figured
Q. No.
SOD
Mr. Podell: If your Honor please, the answer to that has been, that if they did not
resell; if they did not resell.
Mr. Marshall: And he said he did not
know whether they had.
Mr. Podell: I beg your pardon; he said
he did know that they had resold.
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Q. Did you say that? A. I said that Mr. Von
Goeben had ascertained that he had sold, bought
and resold.
Q. On this same— A. Not on the sterling contracts exactly, but as a general rule.
Q. That is what I am trying to find out, whether
he ascertained it on these sterling contracts? A.
I don't know.
Q. As far as you know, no inquiry was made
with respect to whether he resold to protect himself on those sterling contracts? A. I don't know
whether Mr. Von Goeben did or not.
Q. And he did inquire whether that was the
usual practice of Stern, and Stern said it was the
usual practice for him to resell; is that what you
mean to say?
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Mr. Podell: What is that question?
(Question repeated as recorded.)
A. I don't know.
Q. I am sorry, Mr. Schlubach, to have to go over
this again. Did you not say just a minute ago,
after Mr. Podell's remarks, that Stern had told
Von Goeben that it was his practice to resell to
protect himself on purchase commitments of rubber? Did you not say that? A. Mr. Von Goeben
told me that he had.
Q. That Stern had told him that? A. That he
had seen the purchase contracts and the sales contracts.
The Court: Let us confine ourselves to
this 735,000 or whatever it is,
Mr. Marshall: That is what I am trying
to do, Judge.
Mr. Podell: That has been asked and answered. He asked him specifically about
that, your Honor. At least he gave it and
he only knows from Von Goeben, what Von
Goeben told him.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor pleases,
may we not have the witness' testimony and
not Mr. Podell's?
Mr. Podell: I am not seeking to give testimony.
Q. Now, I ask you once more to look at this last
item of liabilities, and to say whether you know or
whether any investigation was made by your concern as to the cost of this rubber covered by these
purchase commitments or whether Stern had protected himself, had hedged on this contract by reselling this rubber, this very rubber discussed
there, mentioned there? A. I say no.
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Q. So far as you know, no such inquiry was made
as to these particular contracts? A. As to this
particular contingent liability.
Q. Mentioned on this balance sheet, Exhibit 1?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, will you turn, Mr. Schlubach, to the
item of inventory of crude rubber pledged under
trust receipts in the assets column? A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whether anybody of your concern at any time made any inquiry as to the cost
of that inventory? A. No.
Q. Do you mean that you do not know or you do
know that they did not do it? A. I do not know.
Q. Whether it was done or not? A. Whether it
was done or not.
Q. But you were the credit man? A. I was the
credit man.
Q. You did know though, as I understand from
what Mr. Von Goeben told you, that Stern made
further purchases of rubber during the year 1924?
A. Yes.
Q. And as I understand, Stern went over with
Von Goeben the purchases of rubber and showed
him his purchase bills, or invoices or what? A.
Purchase contracts.
Q. Purchase contracts? A. Yes.
Q. And he told him, kept informing him of the
value of these contracts from time to time during
1924? A. Yes.
Q. Did he ever report to you whether Stern was
making a profit or loss on these contracts? A. Yes,
he reported that he was making profits.
Q. That is Von Goeben reported to you? A. Yes.
Q. And did Von Goeben tell you where he got the
information from about this profit? A. From the
contracts of sale that Stern showed him.
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Q. Now, did he not also give figures at one time
as to how much profit Stern was making during
that year? A. In some instances, he may have.
Q. Well, do you not remember one instance in
which Von Goeben said that Stern had made a
profit of a hundred and fifty thousand dollars during the year 1924; I think it was up to about
August, you said? A. Yes.
Q. And Von Goeben said he got that information
direct from Stern, did he not? A. Yes.
Q. Did he tell you whether Stern had presented
him with a trial balance to show that? A. No.
Q. You mean he said he did not, or you do not
know whether he presented it or not? A. He did
not say.
Q. But he may have seen the statement ?
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Mr. Podell: I object to what he may have.
Q. As far as you know.
Mr. Podell: I object to that.
The Court: Sustained.
A. I don't know.
Mr. Marshall:
that.

All right.

I won't press

Q. Now, will you turn to the balance sheet again,
Mr. Schlubach. You notice
Mr. Marshall: I wonder whether there is
another copy of this balance sheet we can
give to the jury, and they can follow it and
save time (handing to jury).
Q. You notice the first item of assets is "cash"?
A. Yes.

879

294
880

881

882

Herbert Schlubach—For

Plaintiff—Cross.

Q. And I suppose you noticed when you looked
at this balance sheet, that out of $206,000 odd of
cash, there was held by the banks in anticipation
of maturity of acceptances under letters of credit,
185,000 odd dollars, did you not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, the next item of "notes and trade acceptances receivable"; did you notice that out of
$208,000 of notes, trade acceptances, there was
pledged as collateral to acceptances approximately
$156,000? A. Yes.
Q. And did you notice that under trade accounts
receivable, that out of approximately two and a
half million dollars, there was over $900,000 pledged
as collateral to trade acceptances? A. And out of
$2,461,000 there were $903,000 pledged as collateral.
Q. You noticed that, too? A. Yes.
Q. And you noticed that the inventory of crude
rubber pledged under trust receipts, under that
item the entire inventory was pledged, did you not ?
A. The entire inventory here of $131,000, yes.
Q. And you noticed, did you not, that under the
investments there was pledged two small items as
collateral to acceptances, 7 per cent, preferred stock
of Ames Holden, Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd., and Howe
Rubber Corporation preferred stock; you noticed
that, did you? A. The $7,800 and $6,200?
Q. That is right. You noticed that? A. Yes. A
total of $14,000.
Q. Now, will you turn to the liabilities again.
Did you notice the first statement there, "Secured
by assets pledged per contra and by borrowed
securities aggregating $1,402,278.03," out of a total
of $1,479,000—that is wrong. This item secured
by assets pledged per contra and by borrowed
securities aggregating 1,402,000 odd dollars ; liabilities of 1,362,000 odd dollars; you noticed that?
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A. May I repeat, against the current assets of $2,371,000 there were current liabilities of $1,479,000.
Q. Will you please answer my question? A. I
want to be sure that I understood.
Q. My question is whether you noticed that there
was a liability of 1,362,000 odd dollars shown on
this balance sheet to be secured by assets pledged
of 1,402,000 odd dollars? A. Yes.
Q. And you noticed that of the accounts
Mr. Podell: Where do you get the $1,402,000?
Mr. Marshall: Right here (indicating).
Mr. Podell: The difficulty arises from the
fact that I understood counsel to say that
out of 1,349,000 odd of accounts receivable
there was $903,000 pledged. That is not correct.
Mr. Marshall: Payable, accounts payable.
Mr. Podell: I am talking now as to accounts receivable as assets, total accounts
receivable, according to his statement, was
2,461,000
Mr. Marshall: That is not right,
Mr. Podell: That is what is confusing.
Mr. Marshall: I think not.
By Mr.

Marshall.

Q. Were you confused by that last question? A.
I feel confused.
Q. I will ask it again. Strike out the answer,
if your Honor will permit.
Mr. Podell: Mr. Marshall, I am sure you
do not want to mislead anybody as to the
figures.
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Mr. Marshall: I am going to repeat the
question so there will be no question about
it.
Mr. Podell: Let us get one thing clear—
Mr. Marshall: May I continue my crossexamination?
The Court: Yes. Let him continue his
cross-examination.
Mr. Podell: May I call to your Honors
attention, in connection with this balance
sheet, I do not want anybody to be misled
about it. I understand counsel to state,
and if I am in error I will stand corrected,
that out of the $1,349,000 on the left side
here, $1,349,280.43 accounts receivable, there
was $903,000 paid?
Mr. Marshall: You understood wrong.
Mr. Podell: Then the proper figure is
that it was $1,400,000 of accounts receivable,
and out of that $900,000 was paid?
Mr. Marshall: We have already passed
that, and now Ave are on the liability side.
Q. And I am asking you whether you noticed
that against 1,362,000 odd dollars of current liabilities there had been pledged $1,400,000 assets?
A. Yes.
Q. As security? A. Yes.
Q. And that of the liabilities of 1,479,900 odd
dollars, the unsecured accounts payable amounted
to only 117,600 odd dollars, approximately; you
noticed that? A. Yes.
Q. Now, did not that impress upon you the fact
that Stern was doing a business of borrowing
against security, that that was his method of doing
business? A. He was borrowing against pledged
collateral.
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Q:. Yes; and you understood that as soon as you
saw this balance sheet? A. Yes.
Q. Now, you were making short loans to Stern,
were you not? A. Stern was making short loans?
Q. You were making short loans, short time loans
to Stern? A. Yes.
Q. And you were naturally interested therefore
in the cash position of Stern, were you not? A.
Yes.
Q. Now, did you make any inquiry at about this
time, April, 1924, as to the due dates of the accounts receivable which Stern had as assets? A.
No.
Q. Of course, that would have had some bearing
upon his cash position, would it not, when his accounts receivable became due? A. Yes.
Q. But you made no inquiry? A. No.
Q. So as far as you know, no inquiry was made?
A. No.
Q. Now, these being short loans, it was also
rather important for you to know at that time, was
it not, in April, 1923, whether Stern's business was
making money or losing money? A, 1924?
Q. 1924, yes; pardon me. A. Yes.
Q. That was an important thing for you to know?
A. Yes.
Q. You noticed, did you not, that there was no
profit and loss statement accompanying this balance
sheet? A. Yes.
Q:. Did you ever inquire for one, from Stern? A.
I didn't.
Q. Did anybody from your concern that you know
of inquire? A. Mr. Von Goeben inquired how
much he was making.
Q. That was in about April, 1924? A. March,
April—the end of March, 1924.

889

890

891

298
892

893

894

Herbert Schlubach—For

Plaintiff—Cross.

Q. Now, let me get this straight. You did not
have any profit and loss statement from Stern? A.
No.
Q. But you wanted to know whether his concern
was making money or losing money in March and
April, at about March and April, 1924? A. Or before that.
Q. Yes. You wanted to know whether he was
making or losing money? A. Yes.
Q. Before you advanced any money to Stern,
you wanted to know whether he was making or losing money before you made any advances, did you
not? A. Naturally.
Q. Certainly. And so Mr. Von Goeben inquired
of Stern whether he was making or losing money
at that time, did he not? A. Yes.
Q. The stenographer cannot get your nods. A.
I cannot say with clear certainty he did right at
that moment.
Q. He reported to you that he had so inquired?
A. That he had inquired.
Q. And what was the result of his inquiry, did
he say to you? A. That he was making money.
Q. That Stern was making money? A. Yes.
Q. And did he give you any figures at that time?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. And that was part of the information that
you had when you made these first loans? A. When
I went over this statement.
Q. When you went over this statement for the
purpose of determining whether to advance credit
to Stern? A. Yes.
Q. So that this statement was used by you as
collateral information to Stern's own statements
about his business position at that time, is not that
correct? A. As principal information.
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Q. Do you object to the use of the word "collateral"? A. Yes, sir.
Q. But it was used together with this other information, was it not? A. The only information
that I could really see from a reliable source.
Mr. Marshall: I ask to have that stricken
out as not responsive to my question.
Mr. Podell: I submit that is a fair answer.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Podell: Was what?
Mr. Marshall: Was this statement.
The Court: Indicating Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 1.
Q. That statement was the only information
which you had from a reliable source, is that right,
Exhibit 1? A. No, not the only one.
Q. Did you not just say that it was the only
one? A. Mr. Von Goeben had given me also information.
Q. And you regarded him as a reliable source?
A. I regarded him, too, yes.
Q. And his information came from Stern, did it
not? A. I don't know. He said so.
Q. Well, did you not regard Stern as a reliable
source? A. I didn't inquire.
Q. Would you say that you did not regard Stern
as a reliable source? A. I considered Mr. Von Goeben's information as reliable.
Q. And Mr. Von Goeben said that he got his information from Stern? A. Or perhaps from other
sources.
Q. Did he not give you information about the
profit that Stern was making, and he got that in-
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formation from Stern, did he not? A. Generally,
yes.
Q. Your answer is he got that from Stern? A.
Yes.
Q. Did you not consider Stern a reliable source?
A. Which is the same question which I just couldn't
answer.
Q. You mean that you did not consider him a
reliable source? A. It wasn't put up to me to consider that,
Q. Now, Mr. Schlubach, you were the credit man
of Ultramares; you were the chairman of its board
of directors; you say that you passed upon the question of whether advances should be made to Stern?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you tell this jury that you do not know
now whether you regarded Stern as a reliable
source of information in March or April, 1924?
A. When we consider credits, then we do not go
after the information that we got from the one
soliciting credits.
Q. May I have an answer to my question?
Mr. Podell:
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You have got the answer.

Q. I asked whether you regarded Stern as a reliable source of information? A. That question did
not come up.
Mr. Podell: He does not claim to have
spoken to Stern or claim to have gotten any
such information.
The Court: That is not the point and
that is not the question, Mr. Podell. We
want to get his attitude at the time advances
were made, and what his thoughts were at
that time.
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Q. Did you trust Stern in April and March, of
1924? Now, you can answer that yes or no, I
think. A. How far trust?
Q. Did you trust him; did you believe him? A.
I never was in a position to consider that, whether
I trusted him or not,
Q. You won't tell me whether you trusted him or
not, whether you believed him or not?
Mr. Podell: I object to counsel lecturing
the witness.
Mr. Marshall: I was not lecturing him.
I was just asking whether he won't tell me
that.
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Q. You cannot answer that? A. As a general answer I would say that we do not trust creditors
asking credit unless we convince ourselves from
statements and everything how their position is,
and they must be offered through neutral sources.
Q. You got this from Stern himself, did you not,
this balance sheet? A. From Stern himself,
through Mr. Von Goeben.
Mr. Podell: Got which from Stern himself?
Mr. Marshall: Exhibit 1.
Mr. Podell: Which?
Mr. Marshall: Exhibit 1.
Mr. Podell: But it is a statement by
Touche-Niven.
Mr. Marshall: We know that,
Q. Will you say that you did not trust Stern
at that time? A. I didn't know anything of Stern
until that time.
Q. Mr. Von Goeben did, did he not? A. Yes.
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Q. He had known him a number of years? A.
Apparently.
Q. Had he not? A. He told me so.
Q. And he told you that Stern was a reliable
man, did he not? A. That he considered him a
reliable man.
Q. Yes, that in his opinion Stern was a reliable
man? A. Yes.
Q. That in his opinion was an honest man? A.
I don't know about that.
Q. Well, he did not suggest that he was a dishonest man, did he? A. He did not.
Q. And you believed, as far as you knew, that
Stern was an honest man? A. I did.
Q. Now, was there ever a time prior to January,
1925, that you did not trust Stern? A. No.
Q. You trusted him throughout that period? A.
Yes.
Q. If you had not trusted him, you would not
have made any advances to him, would you? A.
No.
Q. You believed him to be honest during all that
period? A. Yes.
Q. Now, Stern used to come into your office, the
office of Ultramares, during the year, did he not?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he talk to you? A. No.
Q. Whom did he talk to? A. To Mr. Von Goeben.
Q. Anybody else? A. I don't know.
Q. How many times did you meet Stern? A.
I never met him.
Q. You never met him? A. No.
Q. So you relied largely on the judgment of Von
Goeben? A. On what?
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Q. On Stern's personal honesty and his personal
character?
Mr. Podell: He was trying to make an
answer and you stopped him. On what?
The Witness: I relied upon the informations that were submitted to me through Mr.
Von Goeben.
Q. And that information included something
about the character of Mr. Stern, too, did it not?
A. Yes.
Q. Von Goeben's opinion of his character? A.
From remarks.
Q. As a matter of fact, is not a good character
just as important as a good balance sheet when
you are making loans? A. Sometimes one dispenses
with a good character but never with a good balance sheet,
Q. You do not mean that, do you? A. I do.
Q. You mean if Stern had a fine balance sheet
and you believed him to be crooked, you would
have advanced him money anyway? A. If I believed the balance sheet was crooked or the statement put before me, no.
Q. If you believed the balance sheet was good
but you believed Stern to be crooked, would you
have advanced money to him anyway? A. I would
have hesitated.
Q. I do not suppose you handled these individual, these 111 individual transactions at all? A. I
did not.
Q. But as each obligation of Stern, each one of
these 104 obligations was met, your faith in Stern
grew, did it not? A. It was not disturbed.
Q. After you do business with a man for a while
and lend him large sums of money, as you loaned
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to Stern, and he keeps paying them and paying
them promptly, does not that improve your opinion
of the man, as to his financial condition? A. Of
his financial condition, the way it had been.
Q. It does improve it? A. It does.
Q. So that as he kept paying the sums of money,
these 104 different loans, you began to place some
reliance on his prompt payments, as a sign of his
good financial condition, did you not? A. Yes.
Q. Certainly.

911

Mr. Marshall: Now, if your Honor please,
I think if we adjourn now I could go on a
little faster after lunch, because I want to
start a new line of examination, and I think
it would be a little more convenient not to be
interrupted, as we would have to repeat.
The Court: All right. Recess until 2
o'clock, gentlemen.

A F T E R RECESS.
HERBERT SCHLUBACH

Cross-examination
912

resumed.

(continued)

by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. May we have the last question read?
(Last question and answer repeated as
recorded.)
Q. Will you look at the certificates annexed to
Exhibit 1; did you read that certificate in March
or April, 1924? A. I did, yes.
Q. Did you look at it before money was advanced to Stern? A. Yes.
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Q. Did you notice that that certificate stated
that the annexed balance sheet was in accordance
with the accounts of Fred Stern for the year ended
December 31, 1923, and with the information and
explanations given to Touche, Niven & Co.; did
you notice that? A. Yes.
Q. Did you at any time personally make any inquiry as to what information and explanations had
been given to Touche, Niven & Co.? A. No.
Q. Did you ask anybody else ever to? A. No.
Q. Did you ever discuss this balance sheet with
Touche, Niven & Co.? A. No.
Q. Did you ever ask anybody connected with
your company to do so? A. No.
Q. Now, you noticed further down, didn't you, in
that same certificate that the accountants certified
that the statement presented a true and correct
view of the financial condition of Fred Stern as at
December 31, 1923, in their opinion? A. Yes.
Q. Did you notice that? A. Yes.
Q. They did not say outright that it represented
a true and correct view of the financial condition
of Stern as at December 31, 1923, but they expressed their opinion on that?
Mr. Podell: I object, as an attempt to
summarize the contents of a paper which is
in evidence.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Marshall: I asked whether he noticed
that.
Mr. Podell: He noticed every part of it.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Q. What was the capital of Ultramares Corporation in 1924? A. $1,060,000;
Q. $1,060,000? A. Yes.
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Q. Now, will you say to this jury that you
placed no reliance upon trust receipts which you
received, when you made these advances to Ultramares? A. I did not make any advances to Ultramares.
Q. I beg your pardon—to Stern; will you say
that you placed no reliance on these trust receipts
when you made your advances to Stern? A. May
I ask—on which behalf?

917
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The Court: I did not catch that.
The Witness: I did not catch what reliance
The Court: I did not hear what the witness said.
Mr. Podell: He wanted to ask a question
—on which behalf. He does not understand
the question.
The Witness: I do not understand the
question.
Q. Each time money was advanced by Ultramares to Stern, Stern sent with his application one
of these trust receipts that is in evidence? A.
Yes.
Q. Will you say now that when you advanced
this money to Stern which Stern requested, you
placed no reliance upon these trust receipts as security? A. Yes.
Q. You say now
Mr. Podell: I do not know what the answer means.
Mr. Marshall: I will try and find out.
Q. You say now that you did not rely upon those
trust receipts? A. No.
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Q. Will you say, Mr. Schlubach, that you placed
no reliance upon the accounts receivable that
Stern was to assign to you as security when you
made advances? A. I placed reliance on the accounts receivable.
Q. Did you place reliance on the accounts receivable? A. Yes.
Q. You thought those trust receipts were just a
scrap of paper? A. Like a letter.
Q. You thought they amounted to nothing? A.
Just as much as a letter.
Mr. Marshall: May I have one of those
trust receipts, please?
Mr. Limburg: Take the file.
Q. Where did Stern get this form of trust receipt, do you know? A. I do not know.
Q. Don't you know that Ultramares supplied
Stern with these forms of trust receipts? A. I do
not know.
Q. Now, I hand you Exhibit No. 32, and ask
you to look at it. Read the last line. A. "We
would appreciate if you would hand bearer some
trust receipt forms."
Q. Now, don't you know that Ultramares supplied the form of trust receipt to Stern? A. I do
not know. It was not my duty.
Q. Whose duty was it? A. The president's duty.
Q. Mr. Von Goeben? A. Mr. Von Goeben.
Q. You would not say that Ultramares did not
supply the forms? A. I would not say.
Mr. Marshall: This is Exhibit No. 32,
I was asking the witness to look at, Gentlemen of the Jury. (Reading) "We would appreciate if you would hand bearer some
trust receipt forms."
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Q. Now, there is no, question in your mind, however, that you did rely upon the accounts receivable that were to be assigned? A. Yes.
Q. And you were very insistent that those accounts receivable should be promptly assigned to
you, were you not? A. Yes.
Q. When Stern was a few days' late in the month
of May, 1924, in delivering these assigned invoices,
Ultramares wrote to him demanding those invoices,
didn't they?

923

Mr. Podell: I object. I think we are entitled to have the letters, as he is referring
to the contents of the letter, I think he
ought to have the letter.
Mr. Marshall: Strike that out. I will
ask him.
Q. Do you know whether your company did demand invoices from Stern in approximately May,
1924, when they were a few days behind? A. Yes.

924

Mr. Marshall: Now, will you produce the
letter, May 5, 1924, Ultramares to Stern,
please?
Mr. Podell: It is in evidence.
Mr. Limburg: Have you a copy?
Mr. Marshall: My copy is all marked up.
Mr. Limburg: Perhaps I can identify it.
What is the date?
Mr. Marshall: May 5, 1924, and at the
same time, the trust receipts.
Q. While we are waiting for that, will you look
over this file of trust receipts and tell me the
dates of trust receipts 17 to 21 (handing)? A.
17 to 21?
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Q. Yes. A. No, 17, April 30th. No. 18, April
30th. No. 18, April 30th.
Q. They are original and duplicate? A. They
are just the same, yes, sir. No. 19, April 30th.
No. 20, April 30th. No. 21, also April 30th.
Mr. Marshall: Have you found that letter yet?
Mr. Limburg: Yes, here it is (handing).
Mr. Marshall: This letter is produced by
Mr. Podell from the files of the Ultramares
Corporation, and I offer it in evidence.
Mr. Podell: No objection.
(Received in evidence and marked Defendants' Exhibit A.)
Mr. Marshall: This is a letter dated May
5, 1924, addressed to Fred Stern & Co.,
Inc. (reading Defendants' Exhibit A to the
jury) : "We presume that we will receive
from you to-day invoice from the Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Company, and would appreciate your advising us when we may expect the invoices covering the advance made
on merchandise represented by Trust Receipts, Nos. 17 to 21 inclusive." Those were
the trust receipts that Mr. Schlubach just
identified as having the date of April 30—
"Thanking you for your kind attention to
this matter, we are, Very truly yours—
Cashier."
Q. That is the cashier of Ultramares? A. Yes.
Q.
Q. Will you now say, Mr. Schlubach, that you
did not advance money against merchandise represented by trust receipts? A. We did advance
money against merchandise.
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His initials are H. M.
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Q. And that merchandise was represented by
trust receipts, was it not? A. Not at the moment
that we advanced the money.
Q. Mr. Schlubach, will you read this letter
again at the bottom, and see whether Mr. Manning
did not state that he wanted the invoices covering
merchandise represented by Trust Receipts 17 to
21 inclusive? A. Yes, they were contained and
indicated in the trust receipts.
Q. Precisely; and the trust receipts represented
merchandise, didn't they? A. They indicated certain merchandise.
Q. You make a difference between the use of the
words "indicated" and "represented"? A. Yes, because I considered the trust receipts in this case
as indicative
Mr. Marshall: May I ask you not to
volunteer. I asked you a question, and I
think you have answered it.

930

Q. Have you been told anything by any lawyers
about these trust receipts, and what they represent as a matter of law; have you discussed that
with your lawyers at all? A. No.
Q. You have not discussed these trust receipts
at all with your lawyers at any time? A. Yes, I
have, but not with regard to fraud.
Mr. Podell: What?
The Stenographer: Fraud.
Q. Have I said anything about fraud, Mr.
Schlubach? A. I do not hear very well.
Q. Have I said anything about fraud? A. I
thoroughly understood so.
Q. I do not think I have mentioned the word to
you to-day, sir. A. I am sorry.
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The Court: Keep your voice up, please.
Mr. Podell: When you do not hear, let
Mr. Marshall know, and he will repeat the
question.
Mr. Marshall: Very glad to repeat it if
you do not understand or do not hear it.
Q. Now, you say these trust receipts "indicated"
merchandise? A. Yes.
Q. And you were particular that these trust receipts should indicate specific definite merchandise, were you not? A. No.
Q. You did not care whether or what merchandise they represented? A. As long as the value and
amount seemed sufficient to cover advances.
Q. As long as the value and amounts were sufficient to cover your advances you did not care what
the merchandise was? A. Not exactly.
Q. You noticed, didn't you, Mr. Schlubach, that
every one of those trust receipts described definite
shipments of merchandise, didn't you? A. Yes.
Q. Giving the marks? A. Yes.
Q. The ship from which they were to be delivered? A. Yes.
Q. And the number of tons? A. Yes.
Q. Now, you were interested, were you not, in
the fact that these trust receipts covered the merchandise described in them, were you not? A. Not
specially.
Q. In other words, you did not care if the trust
receipt described merchandise marked A. F. T.;
R. S.; Ex. SS. City of Yokohama, forty-five tons,
you did not care whether you got forty-five tons
marked M. S. 1, 84, from the SS. Madion? A. Not
especially.
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Q. It did not make any difference to you what
the merchandise was? A. As long as we got sufficient amount assigned afterwards to cover our advances.
Q. Yes; but you wanted to be sure that this sufficient amount was the same amount mentioned in
this trust receipt, didn't you? A. Or a similar
amount.
Q. In other words, if they said to you—we are
giving you merchandise marked so and so from the
SS. City of Yokahama, forty-five tons, you did not
care whether they gave you entirely different merchandise under that trust receipt? A. We did not.
Q. Were you not interested in the description of
the rubber? A. No.
Q. You did not care what kind of rubber you
got? A. No. Not especially.
Q. Did you care about the prices at which the
rubber was purchased? A. Yes.
Q. Did you care about the prices at which the
rubber was sold? A. Yes.
Q. Did you want to know that before you advanced any money? A. I personally did not inquire, but I considered it the duty of the president
to find out.
Q. What the prices were of the merchandise? A.
Yes.
Q. And the sales price of the merchandise? A.
Yes.
Q. Before you advanced any money? A. Not
before we advanced the money.
Q. I mean each time that you advanced money
on a definite shipment, you did not care? A. Not
necessarily so.
Q. It was not necessary to know the prices then?
A. No.
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Q. Or the sales price; it was not necessary to
know the kind of rubber? A. It was not necessary.
Q. Or the description of rubber? A. It was not
necessary.
Q. Do you know the signature of Mr. Manning?
A. Yes.
Q. And the letterhead of the Ultramares Corporation? A. Yes.
Q. I hand you a letter dated May 1st, 1924, produced by the trustee in bankruptcy of Stern & Company, and ask you whether that is on the letterhead
of your company and whether the signature is Mr.
Manning's signature? A. Yes.

937

938

Mr. Marshall: I ask to have it marked
in evidence.
Mr. Podell: May I see it—no objection.
(Received in evidence and marked Defendants' Exhibit B.)
Mr. Marshall: This is on the letterhead
of Ultramares Corporation, Gentlemen of
the Jury (reading Defendants' Exhibit B.).
It is to Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. on May 1,
1924, from H. Manning, Cashier.
Q. Now, didn't you know as a matter of fact,
that these applications of Stern's did not include
the prices at which the merchandise had been sold?
A. It did not include them.
Q. And they did not include
Mr. Podell: Are you sure you are talking about the same thing? I do not want
any confusion. What applications are you
referring to?
Mr. Marshall: Certain applications.
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Mr. Podell: The figure there, I would
like to know what it is, whether it is the
price or sale or what it is. There is always
the risk, your Honor, of asking the witness
as to the contents of documents which are
in evidence and I think these applications
did state the price at which they were sold
to various people, namely, the people and
the price.
Mr. Marshall: I think I am entitled to
test this witness' knowledge of what this
business was.
Mr. Podell: He is testifying of his recollection. I do not want to interfere with
that, but I do not want any misinformation.
Mr. Marshall: I think I know what I
am doing, Mr. Podell.
Q. Will you look at this letter. Now this is
one of the applications, and tell us whether or not
you were correct in saying that the price was not
on the applications that Stern sent you, the sales
price? A. It was not.
Q. It was not? A. No.

942

Mr. Podell: That depends upon what you
mean by price. Repeat the question. (Question repeated as recorded.)
A. The sales price was not.
yes.

The amount sold,

Mr. Podell: You mean the dollars and
cents?
The Witness: The sales price, I was asked
whether the price was on.
The Court: What he means by the sales
price, let us get the distinction there; what
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do you mean, the total amount, or the
amount, which would indicate what it was
per pound for rubber?
The Witness: The total amount was
noted, but not the sales price.
Mr. Podell: If you sold $20,000. worth,
it was put in there, but it did not state the
price per pound at which it was sold.
Q. The sales prices is not in there; it is the total,
that is the only thing that is in there? A. The total,
yes.
Q. There is no description of the rubber, however, in this application, is there? A. Not that I
recall.
Q. Do you recall any application in which there
was a description of the rubber? A. I do not.
Q. As far as you know, Ultramares made no
other attempt to get a description of the rubber
covered by the trust receipts at the time that the
loan was made? A. It was not my duty, so I do
not know.
Q. But as far as you know, you know nothing?
A. I do not know.
Q. Whose duty would that have been? A. The
president and his assistants.
Q. And who was his assistant? A. The cashier
in this case.
Q. Mr. Manning? A. Yes,
Mr. Podell: I may state if you wish me
to that Mr. Manning is here, and he wrote
most of those letters, and I intend to call
him as soon as you get through with this
witness.
Q. Now, even after April and May, when the delivery of the assigned accounts was delayed, you
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would ask Stern to deliver them to you, would you
not? A. Yes.
Q. Those were your instructions to Manning
and Von Goeben, were they not? A. I did not
give any special instructions about the details.
Q. Did you expect them to follow up the delivery of these accounts receivable? A. Yes.
Q. Now, is it not true that it was just the merchandise and these accounts receivable especially
to which you were looking in the first place for the
return of your money ; you expected to collect these
accounts receivable and get repaid that way, didn't
you? A. Yes.
Q. And Stern, you only looked to Stern to pay
if the accounts receivable which you received were
not paid promptly? A. Yes.
Q. That is true, is it not? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall: May I have the letters of
November 3 and November 5 referred to in
the bill of particulars?
Q. And there is no question in your mind now,
is there, that the money was lent against security?
A. Was advanced.
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Mr. Podell: I object to that as calling
for a question of law, from the facts adduced.
The Court: Yes, I think that is true, Mr.
Marshall.
Mr. Marshall: All right; I won't press
the question.
Q. Do you recognize this letter which I hand you
dated November 3, as being written on the letterhead of Ultramares Corporation, signed by Von
Goeben; you do not have to read it. A. Yes.
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Mr. Marshall: I offer that in evidence.
Mr. Podell: May I see it—no objection.
You want the answer, I suppose.
(Letter received in evidence and marked
Defendants' Exhibit C.)
Q. And do you know the signature of Stern?
A. I think I recognized it from the letters.
Q. Does this letter dated November 5 on the
letterhead of Stern & Company bear the signature
of Stern? A. It seems to me right.
Mr. Marshall: It was produced by your
counsel so that there is no question.
Mr. Podell: Yes, there is no objection.
Mr. Marshall: I offer that in evidence.
(Received in evidence and marked Defendants' Exhibit D.)
Mr. Marshall: Gentlemen of the jury, I
will read that; that is the first one, is a letter
on the letterhead of Ultramares, signed by
its president, Von Goeben, to Stern, dated
November 3, 1924. (Reading.)
I will give your Honor the letters.
The Court: Just a little louder, please.
Mr. Marshall: I am sorry; I will face
this way. (Reading Defendants' Exhibit E
to the Court and jury.)
That is signed by Ultramares Corporation,
Von Goeben, president.
The next exhibit is a letter signed by Fred
Stern as president of Fred Stern & Company, addressed to the Ultramares Corporation, dated November 5, 1924, two days after
the letter from Ultramares, reciting in precisely the same language this understanding.
I would like your Honor to look at this.
The Court: I follow this.
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Q. Now, as a matter of fact, Mr. Schlubach, you
could have obtained, if you had wanted to, delivery
orders for merchandise at the time you advanced
the money, could you not? A. Those were not the
terms that Fred Stern had offered us.
Q. He had never offered you those terms? A.
I do not recall.
Q. I hand you a letter dated March 31, 1924, and
ask you whether you ever saw that letter? A. I
did not see this letter.
Q. Is there anything to indicate to you who
would have seen it? A. I cannot say.
Q. There are no initials on there that you recognize? A. I do not.
Mr. Marshall: Let us just mark it for
identification at this time.
(Letter received and marked Defendants'
Exhibit E for Identification.)
Mr. Podell: I do not know how counsel
comes to be in possession of the original letter.
Mr. Marshall: It comes from the trustee's
file.
Mr. Podell: It is not ours.

951

Q. So that you did not have to lend money to
Stern unless you were satisfied with the security
that he gave; is not that so? A. It depended on us,
yes.
Q. You had the say at any time a loan was asked
for, whether you would grant it or whether you
would not? A. Yes. May I add—you refer to the
Ultramares Corporation and not to me personally?
Q. Yes, to the Ultramares Corporation, and your
answer is the same as you made before? A. Yes.
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Q. Now, you considered very carefully, didn't
you, the credit standing of the various accounts
which Stern offered to assign? A. Yes.
Q. And he offered to assign to you accounts that
you considered good? A. Yes.
Q. In each instance? A. Yes.
Q. And those accounts included such companies
as Firestone Tire & Rubber Company? A. Yes.
Q. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company? A. Yes,
Q. Michelin Tire Company? A. Yes.
Q. Detroit Insulating Wire Company? A. I do
not recall all the names, but they were among them,
I think.
Q. Do you recall the General Electric Company?
A. Yes; the Ford Motor Company.
Q. Johns-Manville Company? A. Yes.
Q. Endicott-Johnson? A. Yes.
Q. Lovell Manufacturing Company? A. I do not
recall.
Q. Brunswick-Balke-Collender? A. Yes.
Q. The DuPont Company? A. I do not recall
all the names.
Q. The Ford Motor Company? A. Yes.
Q. The Hood Rubber Company? A. Yes.
Q. The Garlock Packing Company? A. Yes.
Q. And you considered all of those accounts as
good also? A. Yes.
Q. Now, on November 25, 1924, that is the time
when loan 105 was made, do you know whether
your company was fully covered on all previous
advances? A. I do not know.
Q. Who would know that? A. To-day?
Q. Yes; whose business then was it to know
about that? A. Mr. Von Goeben.
Mr. Podell: Who would know that to-day,
Mr. Schlubach?
The Witness: Mr. Manning.
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Q. Mr. Manning? A. Yes.
Q. Well, if you did not know that at that time,
how could you pass upon the application for loan
105? A. I inquired from Mr. Von Goeben how it
was, and he told me.
Q. You relied on him? A. Yes.
Q. And did Mr. Von Goeben come to you each
time a loan was made? A. Not each time, because
I was sometimes away.
Q. But when you were there, did he come to you
every time? A. Yes.
Q. And you then relied upon him for certain information before passing upon the loan? A. Yes.
Q. When you were not there, Von Goeben had
the full authority to pass upon the loans, didn't he?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whether you passed on loan 111,
the last loan? A. How much was it?
Q. $40,000 on December 23, I think? A. Yes.
Q. You personally passed upon that? A. Yes.
Q. Now, did you know at that time that invoices
had not yet been received in full on loan 105 of
November 25th? A. Yes.
Q. You knew that at that time? A. Yes.
Q. Did you know at that time that Stern had
defaulted on the payment of $125,000 in loans 107
to 110, made on the 9th and 10th of December?
Mr. Podell:

I object to that.

A. Yes, but he had not defaulted.
Mr. Podell: That is just it. You answered
so quickly. I object to it on the ground
that it assumes facts that are not proven.
There is no proof that he had defaulted on
any loan.
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Mr. Marshall: We will just see. I would
like Exhibit No. 74.
Mr. Podell: I wish to say
Mr. Marshall: Mr. Podell, do not testify
or guide this witness.
Mr. Podell: I am asking the Court for his
ruling.
The Court: That has been ruled on. I
am striking out that answer until such time
as it is shown that is a fact upon which the
hypothesis is based.
Q. Now, you know that loans 107 to 110, inclusive, made on the 9th and 10th of December, 1924,
were supposed to be paid one week after that date?
A. We wanted him to pay that.
Q. Well, did not he agree to pay them then?
Mr. Podell: I object to that, your Honor;
that is an assumption of fact; it is not
proved in the record.
Mr. Marshall: I am asking him whether
he agreed to it.
The Court: He can ask whether he did or
not agree to pay.
Mr. Podell: The transactions are in writing, the same accounts in previous transactions.
A. He agreed.
Mr. Podell: Assigned accounts.
Mr. Marshall: I think Mr. Podell is in
error and I will show your Honor that.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Marshall: From their own letter.
Mr. Podell: Let me finish my statement.
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Mr. Marshall: Won't you stand up so
that I know when you are talking.
Mr. Podell: The transaction is identical
for the reason that counsel would not permit
me to ask. An arrangement was made
whereby Mr. Stern was requested to anticipate the payment and pay it within a week,
and he agreed to do that.
Mr. Marshall: That is just what I am
getting at.
Mr. Podell: And wrote subsequently, and
I asked how that letter came to be written
and counsel objected and I could not get
that, that the time was extended.
Mr. Marshall: Now, then, as Mr. Podell
has coached his witness, may I proceed?
Mr. Podell: Do you think that is a proper
remark?
Mr. Marshall: I do.
Mr. Podell: Is there anything I have said
that is not already before this jury?
Q. Mr. Schlubach, was not there an arrangement
by which Stern was to pay within one week those
loans made on the 9th and 10th of December?
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Mr. Podell: I object, as that is not proving the entire arrangement, and, furthermore, the arrangement is evidenced in writing by the documents which are already in
evidence, and it calls for this witness' conclusion of what that whole arrangement
was.
The Court: Overruled.
Q. Read the question back. (Question repeated
as recorded.) A. I did not know that there was an
arrangement.
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Q. You did not know that? A. No.
Q. You did not know that at the time, or you do
not remember it now? A. I do not remember it
now.
Q. You do not remember that Stern was to pay
back $125,000 to you, one week after the 9th or
10th of December, 1924? A. Whether it was exactly one week, I do not recall. I do recall that it
should have been paid back before the 31st of December.
Q. Do you not know that it was on the 16th of
December, 1924, that this sum was to be repaid?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Will you read this letter, Exhibit 74, please
(handing to witness). Now, I ask you to read Exhibit 73 (handing to witness). Now, is your recollection refreshed at all on the question of when this
$125,000 loaned on the 9th and 10th of December,
1923, was to have been paid? A. Yes.
Q. When was it to have been paid? A. Before
the 23rd of December.
Q. On December 16th? A. It was afterwards
agreed that it would be paid between
Q. I know that. But it was first agreed that it
should have been paid on December 16th? A. According to this paper, yes.
Q. Well, does not that refresh your recollection
as to it? A. I didn't go through the details so I
cannot just answer every detail.
Q. Who did go through the details of this? A.
The president of the company.
Q. That was Mr. Von Goeben? A. Mr. Von
Goeben.
Q. And when you passed upon this loan of December 23rd, you did not go into this detail? A.
I did not go into this detail.
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Q. Mr. Von Goeben went into this detail for
you? A. Into this detail of writing the letter?
Q. As to when this loan ought to be paid then?
A. He submitted this paper and then we agreed
what should be written, and he wrote the letter.
Q. Then, do you not remember that on December
16th, 1924, Stern was supposed to have paid
$125,000? A. According to this letter, yes.
Q. You do not remember of your recollection?
A. No.
Q. Did you know it at the time; did you know
at the time about this arrangement on this $125,000
loaned on the 9th and 10th of December? A. I remember I had given instructions that I wanted to
have the money back until Christmas.
Q. That you wanted it back on the 16th? A. I
didn't state that fixed date.
Q. You remember that? A. That fixed date, I
don't remember.
Q. But you remember that you wanted it back
in a short time? A. I wanted to have the accounts
cleaned up before Mr. Von Goeben left.
Q. When did you first know that Mr. Von Goeben
was going to leave? A. That he was going to
leave?
Q. Yes. A. The beginning of November.
Q. And when did he leave? A. On the 31st of
December.
Q. And do you know where he went when he left
your concern? A. That day, yes.
Q. Where did he go? A. To Fred Stern & Company.
Q. Into their employ? A. Into their employ. It
may have been on the 30th.
Q. Now, when you made this loan on December
23rd, loan 111, the last one, and you passed upon
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that, had you caused any investigation to be made
as to where the merchandise was that was described in trust receipts 107 to 110? A. No.
Q. Whose duty would it have been to make that
investigation, if anyone's? A. If there was any,
our president's duty.
Q. Well, can you say whether it was his duty or
not; did you expect it of him? A. I didn't specifically expect him to check up just this one. In a
general way, yes.
Q. Did you expect him to check up the existence of the merchandise covered by the trust receipts described in the trust receipts? A. No.
Q. You did not expect him to? A. No.
Q. To find out whether there was any merchandise covered in the trust receipts? A. No.
Q. You just took Stern's word for the fact that
there was that merchandise? A. Yes.
Q. Did you ask him whether he checked up to
see whether there were any sales contracts with
the people named in the trust receipts? A. I don't
recall that I asked him.
Q. Did you expect it of him? A. Not necessarily.
Q. You were just willing to take Stern's word
for the fact that he had resale contracts with these
people? A. Yes.
Q. Mentioned in the trust receipts? A. Yes.
Mr. Podell: I do not know that counsel
wants to leave that impression, your Honor.
We sent copies of the assignment of each account.
Mr. Marshall: That was later. I understand that. This was upon the receipt of
the trust receipt I am talking about.
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Q. At the time you made the advances against
the trust receipts, you made no investigation? A.
No.
Q. You trusted to Stern's word that the sales
had been made? A. We trusted also to the statement that he was worth a million.
Q. Mr. Schlubach, did I ask you anything about
that statement? A. No.

977

978

Mr. Podell: I submit, your Honor, counsel ought not to quarrel with the witness, because
Mr. Marshall: For volunteering.
Mr. Podell: It is a perfectly fair answer.
Mr. Marshall: May I continue, your
Honor.
The Court: Yes, sir.
Q. Did I ask you anything about that statement?
A. No.
Q. Was there anything in the statement referring to these resale contracts that were described
in trust receipt 111? A. May I ask in which statement?
Q. In the statement you referred to, pointing to
the one before you. A. The financial statement?
Q. Yes. Is there anything? A. No.
Q. Why do you always tell me that you relied
on that statement also?
Mr. Podell: I object to that. He does not
always tell him that, your Honor. He has
mentioned it for the first time this afternoon, and he may have mentioned it a dozen
times.
Mr. Marshall: I will withdraw that question.
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Q. Have you been told by anybody that it is important for von to show that you relied upon this
statement? A. No.
Q. Did not discuss it with anybody? A. I did
it on my own accord.
Q. You did not discuss that with your counsel?
A. I did discuss all—many questions with my counsel.
Q. Did you not discuss this with your counsel,
on the reliance? A. I pointed out myself that I
completely relied upon this.
Q. Did you discuss with counsel whether it was
important to your case whether you relied on that?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. Now, Mr. Schlubach, you did rely on
Stern's statement on December 23rd, 1924, that he
had made these sales referred to in the application
for loan 111? A. Will you kindly read the question?

979

980

(Question repeated as recorded.)
The Witness: Yes.
Q. And you did rely on the statement contained
in the trust receipt, that there was merchandise described in that trust receipt? A. Yes,
Q. And you knew on December 23rd, that the invoices due on the loan made November 25th, had
not all been delivered to your company? A. Yes.
Q. And you knew also that Stern had not paid
back the money on loans 107 to 110 on the day that
he had agreed to pay them back? A. Yes.
Q. And, in spite of that, you went on and loaned
$40,000 on December 23rd? A. Yes,
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by Mr. Podell.

Q. Now, you said something here, when you were
asked about relying on Stern's statements and looking to Stern to pay, if there was no collection of
accounts receivable. I want to ask you
Mr. Marshall: I omitted one question.
Mr. Podell: Go ahead.
By Mr.
983

984

Marshall.

Q. Now, I remember you saying—let us see if I
get this right—on direct examination, that due to
some other reasons you asked Von Goeben especially about the financial condition of Stern in October, 1924.
Mr. Podell: He did not say that.
The Witness: Mr. Von Goeben tendered
his resignation.
Mr. Podell: I object to an improper summary. He said on another occasion, as I
understand it. You asked him about March,
and he is telling about some other time.
Mr. Marshall: May I ask him whether he
said for some other reason he asked
The Witness: Reasons in that respect,
that Mr. Von Goeben had tendered his resignation, and that is why I wanted to be quite
sure that everything was in good order.
Q. And as Von Goeben had resigned from your
firm at about that time you wanted to make a special inquiry as to what his opinion was of Stern's
financial condition? A. Yes.
Q. And it was in connection with that that he
told you that Stern had told him that he had made
so much money during the year 1924? A. Yes.
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Mr. Podell: And when was that?
The Witness: That must have been the
beginning of November or the end of October.
Foreman of Jury: Your Honor, I do not
know whether I am allowed to ask a question.
The Court: I will tell you when I hear it
whether it can be answered or not.
Foreman of Jury; Had all the prior bills
been paid until the date?
The Court: Yes, you can ask that.
Mr. Podell: All the bills prior to what?
The Court: Had all the bills prior to
these unpaid loans which they had received
been promptly paid?
The Juror: This particular three items,
When they advanced the $40,000 there was
a question the man has not paid his bills
promptly, because it was supposed to be paid
on the 16th, I understand, and he didn't pay
that. Did he pay prior to that, the bills?
The Court: All other bills prior to that?
The Juror: Yes.
The Court: Had they been promptly
paid?
The Juror: Yes.
The Court: All of the bills?
The Juror: I don't say that.
The Court: The general run, had they
been promptly paid?
The Juror: On the date.
The Witness: They were assigned on
those dates. In some cases these did not
come in as promptly as we expected them to
come in; there was sometimes a delay, a
little small delay or a larger delay, but they
were always paid.
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The Juror: You mean from the customers?
The Witness : Yes. There was, for instance, accounts receivable of goods sent into the interior, further away from New
York, and the amounts, they wouldn't come
in very often right the very day that they
were due; there was a delay sometimes.
The Juror: This particular bill—were
they supposed to be paid from Stern?
The Court: These three?
Mr. Podell: I think I can clear that up
with a series of questions I intend to ask. I
have it on my list. I will get the exact facts
and then if the juror would like to ask another question, he may. See if I can bring
out the facts and then if you have any other
questions, you can ask them.
The Juror: All right.
Redirect examination

990

Plaintiff—Redirect.

by Mr. Podell.

Q. There has been reference made here to the
loan of $100,000 and then $25,000 in December, I
think it was? A. Yes.
Q. Now, was there any difference in the way that
loan was made, that is, trust receipt, accounts receivable, and so forth? A. No.
Q. As compared with all previous loans? A. No.
Q. Done exactly the same. And did you expect
to receive that money from the assigned accounts?
A. Yes.
Q. Just as you had done in the past? A. Yes.
Only we wanted assigned accounts which were due
shortly.
Q. And you did collect some of that money from
assigned accounts? A. We did.
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Q. Now, before those assigned accounts were
due, was Mr. Stern personally asked—you said, I
think, before Christmas or before December 31st,
he should clean up that account personally, that
very money that was due on assigned accounts?
A. Whether he was asked personally to clean up?
Q. Yes. A. Yes.
Q. And did he say that he would try to do that
by the 16th of December? A. Well, I don't recall
the date exactly, but
Q. Well, that is in a letter? A. Yes.
Q. Then, did he ask for a week's extension of
time in order to pay that, and that was granted? 992
A. Yes.
Q. Well, in any event, at that time, by the 16th
of December, the $100,000 and the $25,000 had already been advanced, had it not? A. Yes,
Q. And the advance had been made on trust receipts and on accounts that he was supposed to
assign? A. Indeed.
Q. And some of them he did assign? A. Yes.
Q. Now, what the juror, I think, would like to
know is whether before that transaction where he
was advanced $100,000, on the previous transactions, had all of the assigned accounts been paid?
A. To my knowledge, yes.
Q. Now, were they always paid promptly as
993
promised? A. As promptly as we could expect.
Q. As promptly as you could reasonably expect ?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you had occasions when you had to wait
a week or ten days? A. Yes.
Q. Was it anything unusual for either Stern or
the account to be delayed a week or ten days? A.
No.
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Q. That had happened before? A. Yes, that had
happened before.
The Court: Does that clarify what you
wanted, sir?
The Juror: Yes.
Mr. Podell: There is only one thing I
want to ask—you say all the previous accounts had been paid. And, your Honor, I
cannot help referring to this.

995

Q. I suppose that includes some of the accounts
where you had collected money and afterwards
had to pay back some of it? A. Oh, yes.
Q. And did you have to pay back
Mr. Marshall: There is nothing in the
evidence, I understand, about paying back.
The Court: Not yet. It is just a matter
that will come out,
Mr. Podell: I do not think it would be a
correct statement unless I had that in, that
is all.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: May I have that question?
(Question repeated as recorded.)

996

Q. Now, Mr. Schlubach, of course, you have
stated that you did rely upon the accounts receivable? A. Yes.
Q. That you relied in a measure on this paper
which you called this trust receipt? A. Yes.
Q. And that you relied on statements that Von
Goeben made and on some statements that Stern
made? A. Yes.
Q. Now I ask you whether in spite of the fact
that you relied on all these things if at any one
of these transactions that have been spoken of you
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had been informed that Stern was bankrupt
whether you would have done any business with
him?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. What is your answer? A. No.
Q. If you had been informed that Stern had on
his records accounts that had been assigned to different people, the same account, would you have
done business with him?
Mr. Marshall: Same objection.
The Court: Same ruling.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.

998

A. No.
Q. If you had been informed that a suspicious
entry for $706,000 was on his books, unsupported
by supporting books, would you have done business with a man of that kind?
Mr. Marshall: Same objection.
The Court: Same ruling.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
A. Certainly not.
Q. If you had been informed that accounts receivable of his were long overdue, in the hundreds
of thousands of dollars, and had been included in
the financial statement, would you have done business with a man like that?
Mr. Marshall: Same objection.
The Court: Same ruling.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
A. No.
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1002

Honor understands that the record does not
show that these matters have been brought
out yet.
Mr. Podell: Of course, we intend to supply the proof.
The Court: General objection has been
taken, subject to connection.
In other
words, all these facts must be established
by the accountants. We have not had them
yet at all. If they are to be established at
all. And taken subject to such evidence.
Mr. Marshall: And I move to strike out
this evidence because in any event there is
no duty upon the accountants after the balance sheet to do anything.
The Court: I do not hear you, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall: I say, there is no duty
upon the accountants after they have submitted and finished the balance sheet to do
anything.
The Court: Objection overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. Now, had you been informed even of this,
Mr. Schlubach, that when these accountants first
looked at the books they found that the inventory
of $131,000 had been padded to $370,000, would
you have done business with a man who did that
sort of thing?
Mr. Marshall: I object to the word
"padded."
The Court: Sustained.
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Q. Had been exaggerated.
Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: That is a question that I
will take subject to connection.
Mr. Podell: Subject to the proof. I will
show that.
Mr. Marshall: To say that it was padded
or exaggerated is to characterize it.
The Court: I think it would be better if
you say the inventory had been reduced.
Q. If you had been informed that the man's
original inventory to the accountants as given was
for three hundred and seventy odd thousand, and
that the accountants after looking into those records reduced it to $131,000, by over a quarter of a
million dollars, or thereabouts, would you have
done business with a merchant who does that sort
of thing? A. I guess not.

1004

Mr. Marshall: That sentence is not very
good—that question.
The Court: You guess not. Which is it?
The Witness: I would not.
Q. Would you have done business with a man
who did that sort of thing? A. I would not.
Q. You have made some reference here to the fact
that Mr. Von Goeben was going with Fred Stern
& Company. When did you first hear of that?
A. If I remember right, the very last days of December.
Q. When had Von Goeben given you his resignation? A. The first days of November.
Foreman of Jury : 1924?
The Witness: 1924.
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And continued with the

Q. When was Von Goeben's resignation to take
effect? A. It was of the 12th of November, to take
effect as of the 31st of December, 1924.
Q. And to your knowledge did Von Goeben
think or believe that he was going to have a real
opportunity with Stern & Company? A. No. He
only mentioned that he might have a chance to
improve his salary and position.
Q. His present salaried position? A. Yes.
Q. Did he make, to your knowledge, as a condition of his going with Fred Stern & Company—
did he say to Fred Stern that he would have to
have an additional statement from Touche, Niven
& Co. before he would accept any connection with
them? A. Yes.
Q. And was such a statement sent up by Touche,
Niven & Co.? A. That is what Von Goeben told me.
Mr. Marshall: Did he tell you, he, Mr.
Von Goeben, was promised by Touche, Niven
& Co., or by Stern?
The Witness: By Stern.
Mr. Podell: Let us see. My impression
was it was by Touche, Niven & Co.

1008

Q. Now, at that time was there any question
in your mind but what Von Goeben believed that
this statement that had been furnished represented the true and honest condition of Fred Stern
& Company?
Mr.
The
Mr.
dulge

Marshall: I object to that.
Court: Objection sustained.
Podell: If your Honor will just inme one second, I want to find that
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part. Now, to avoid any possible confusion—I was in error about that, your Honor.
I was in error about it. If counsel wishes,
I will read Von Goeben's statement to him,
what that was.
Mr. Marshall: No objection.
The Court: The witness answered it.
Mr. Podell: Von Goeben was asked
Mr. Marshall: I would welcome his reading it, What page is that?
Mr. Podell: Page 238.
Now, Von Goeben was asked:
"Q. Was any other statement given to
you by Mr. Stern as to the financial condition of the Stern Corporation? A. No.
When I spoke to Mr. Stern, or rather when
he had a conference, I told him I would request a statement for the year of 1924."
That is about the matter of his employment.
"And he then proposed to close the books
November 30th, so that Touche-Niven would
have the month of December in making up
their report."
That is 1924. "And it was agreed that
after the receipt of that statement I should
join the firm. He told me he had made
in 1924, up to November, approximately
$240,000, bringing the capital up to $1,300,000."
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Now, as a matter of fact, you have been
asked some questions here about this trust receipt.
Quite regardless of what name you give that paper, was it your understanding or arrangement or

1009

1010

1011

338
1012

Herbert Schlubach-—For

Plaintiff—Redirect.

practice with Mr. Stern that this money that you
were advancing was to he used in paying for this
merchandise? A. Was to be used to pay for such
merchandise, yes.
Q. So that he certainly did not have any merchandise on hand at the time you advanced the
money to him? A. No.
Q. Could he very well give you any assigned accounts until he had made shipments of that merchandise? A. He could not.

1013

1014

Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling
for the witness' conclusions.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, he has been
asked considerable about the practice in the
business.
The Court: I understand that.
Mr. Podell: The jury should understand.
At least probably most of them do, but we
are not all engaged in that business.
The Court : I appreciate it. I am not
myself.
Mr. Podell: They should understand the
reason for the delay of three or four weeks
before the assigned account would be sent
over to him, and that is all I am inquiring
about. I have no other purpose.
The Court: I think we have it pretty
clear and I think the jury has it pretty
clear.
Mr. Podell: If your Honor thinks it is
clear, I shall not ask another question
about it.
Q. You have been asked a series of questions
here about the pledged assets, pledged accounts.
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As a matter of fact, can anyone get a letter of
credit, or is it not customary when you do get
letters of credit, that you must pledge something
or have the cash on hand at the bank for the letter of credit; is not that right? I mean, when
you go to a hank for a letter of credit, does not
the bank have to get the credit before it issues the
letter? A. Give the credit, of course, before you
get the letter, yes.
Q. So that that ties up a certain sum of money,
does it not, when the bank issues a letter, that
there is a credit in its account? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. That is
not accurate.
The Court: That does not mean that the
money would have to be put up, however.
Q.
Q.
have
Q.

1016

Well, does it not? A. No.
What does it mean? A. The credit would
been put up.
Of what nature?
The Court: The bank may give it to you
just on your good name?
Mr. Podell: That is right.

Q.
your good name, you have to put up the collateral?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, what is the customary and usual practice with regard to importers and exporters? Do
they not, as a rule, have to pledge a great deal in
that business all of the time? A. They have.
Mr. Marshall: Certainly.
Mr. Podell: I am glad we agree.
does not often happen.

That

But if the bank does
1017
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Q. Now, have you observed also in your dealings
with Mr. Stern, that a number of these so-called
contracts for the purchase of rubber from abroad,
that his practice was to make contracts of resale
just as soon as he could? A. Yes.
Q. In fact, is not that the principal business of
importers and exporters? A. It is.
Q. And when they do not do that, they are taking
what they call a position in the market, are they
not? A. Yes.
Q.
That is in the nature of a gamble, is it
A. Or speculation.
Q. Or speculation. You do not like the word
"gamble"? A. No.
Q. And then that will be subject to possible
chance of loss in fluctuation? A. Yes.
Q. Where a careful importer who sells at a profit
and buys thereafter is on reasonably safe ground?
A. Yes.
Q. If he sells to good houses? A. Yes.
Q. And these certainly were all good houses,
were they not? A. Yes.
Mr. Podell: I am omitting a good deal
here, your Honor, so we can save time.

1020

Q. What are the usual datings and terms in the
rubber business; do you know? A. Of sales?
Q. Yes. A. Cash against delivery, or terms.
Q. What are they? A. Manufacturers, up to
thirty days.
Q. About thirty days? A. Yes.
Mr. Podell: Will you let me have ToucheNiven's statement for 1922?
Q. You were asked some questions about the
operating profit of Stern. I mean, you were asked
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on examination of that statement whether Stern
had shown operating profit for the year 1923. Was
there on your files, to your knowledge, a copy of
the 1922 statement? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: You could not compare it
because you did not have it?
The Witness: No.
Mr. Podell: Now, has the 1922 statement
prepared by Touche, Niven & Co. been
marked in evidence?
Mr. Marshall: Statement of Stern?
Mr. Podell: Statement of Fred Stern &
Company.
Mr. Marshall: It has not been put in
evidence. I will be glad to have it.

1022

(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 75.)
Mr. Podell: I think—see if I am correct
in my statement—capital and surplus account, as shown in the statement prepared
for the year 1922 by Touche, Niven & Co., of
Fred Stern & Company, shows $974,304;
am I right? Capital and surplus. Net
worth increased, according to these two
statements, increased over $100,000 during
1923.
Mr. Marshall: Only $100,000?
Mr. Podell: Only $100,000. That is all.
Mr. Marshall: I would like to ask a
couple of questions.
Recross-examination

by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. You would not say, would you, Mr. Schlubach, that the mere fact that there was a large re-
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duction in the inventory of a concern, would make
you think that that 'concern was carrying on a
fraudulent business? A. No.
Q. You did not mean to give the jury that impression? A. No.
Q. Or that the mere fact that inventory adjustments were made so as to reduce the inventory
considerably, would make you refuse to give credit
to a concern? A. No.
Q. Now, you said, I believe, you knew that most
merchandise shipped from abroad is covered by
bills of lading, did you not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And after the merchandise gets off the ship
and is on the dock, there is either a warehouse receipt or a dock delivery order given for it, is there
not? A. Yes.
Q. Now, when you advanced this money for the
purchase of this merchandise, did you ever ask for
either a bill of lading covering the merchandise or
a dock delivery order? A. No.
Q. Or a warehouse receipt? A. No.
Redirect examination
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by Mr. Podell.

Q. As a matter of fact, was not the very essence
of your arrangement that he was to take this very
merchandise and ship it to his customers? A. Yes.
Q. And give you the accounts receivable? A.
Yes.
Q. And most of this merchandise had already
been sold? A. Yes.
Q. So that he could not very well give it to you,
could he? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling
for a conclusion, and move to strike it out.
The Court : Strike it out.
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Q. Does not this matter of the reduction of the
inventory, is not that a matter of degree, Mr.
Schlubach? Did it make a difference to you if a
man had an inventory of $10,000 and reported it
to be $100,000? A. It would, yes.
Q. Or if a man has an inventory of $131,000? A.
Yes.
Q. And his accountants found he reported it to
them at $340,000, would that make any difference?
A. Yes, it would make a difference.
Q. Would you consider that in connection with
the reliability of a man, such a thing? A. I would
ask for an explanation.
Q. If you knew about it, I say, if you were told
about it? A. If I knew about it.
Q. This statement does not tell you anything
about it, does it? A. No. It does not explain anything.
Recross-examination

by Mr.

1027

1028

Marshall.

Q. You have seen a great many balance sheets, I
think you said? A. Yes.
Q. At least a hundred? A. I would not account
exactly for the one hundred.
Q. And you have seen a considerable number of
balance sheets connected with your own concerns,
have you not? A. Yes.
Q. Concerns with whom you have been connected? A. Yes.
Q. Did they show the reductions in inventory
that the accountants may have made? A. Yes.
Q. Did the balance sheets themselves show the reductions of inventory? A. Balance sheet reductions of inventories against former balance sheets,
yes.
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Q. No.
The Court: After reduction of inventory,
did the balance sheet show?

1031

Q. When you see an inventory item in the balance sheet, does it ever show the amount that the
accountants always reduced the inventory from the
inventory carried on the books? A. No.
Q. So that you would not expect to see on a balance sheet the amount the inventory may have been
reduced by the accountants, would you? A. No.
On the balance sheet itself, no.
Q. If you were interested in the fact that the inventory had been reduced, you would have had to
ask someone else, the accountants or Stern, in this
case? A. Yes.
Q. And you never did that, did you? A. No.
Redirect examination
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by Mr. Podell.

Q. Have you not very often seen financial statements, Mr. Schlubach—with a lot of footnotes? A.
Yes.
Q. A lot of explanations? A. Yes.
Q. Of just such items? A. Yes.
Q. Items of inventory? A. Balance sheets, yes.
Q. Do you know of a single case that has come
within your experience among those one hundred
of statements, where they have shown, where the inventory had been reduced by a quarter of a million
dollars on an actual inventory of $100,000? A. No,
I do not know of any.
Q. And if some note—do you find any notes or
explanations of any kind in that statement? A.
No.
Q. Is it not very frequently that accountants in
furnishing a financial statement, make notes and
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give explanations? A. They would indicate something in the accompanying
Mr. Marshall: Please, I am making an
objection. I object to that, unless he shows
some statement to which he refers.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, Mr. Marshall
asked this witness about the one hundred
statements. I did not.
The Court: I will allow it.
Q. Do you find any qualifications or explanations or notes or addenda?
The Court: There are none on this statement.
Mr. Podell: There are none. I just want
to ask one other question. You go ahead,
Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall: No, I will wait for you.
Mr. Podell: I think that is all.
Recross-examination

1034

by Mr. Marshall.

Q. Would you think that it was anything
astonishing or unusual or suspicious, that an inventory had been reduced 50 per cent.? A. If I
was told, I would say yes.
Q. You would say yes? A. Yes.
Q. Something that should be inquired into? A.
Yes.
Q. Would you think that it might be dishonest?
A. Not necessarily.
Q. It would not be dishonest?
Mr. Podell: He said not necessarily.
Mr. Marshall: I understand. That is all
at this time.
Mr. Podell: That is all, sir.
(Witness excused.)
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Case.
Mr. Marshall: I will offer in evidence an
exhibit in connection with this witness' testimony. Mr. Podell said he would have no
objection to it.
Mr. Podell: Let me see it.
(Handed to counsel.)
Mr. Marshall: It is a statement of the
high and low market prices of rubber between December, 1923, and January, 1925,
and I would like to offer it in evidence. We
have got it from a source which I think Mr.
Podell will recognize.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Podell: We will concede, your
Honor, if a witness were called, he would
testify to these figures and that the witness
would be qualified to testify to them. It
will not necessitate Mr. Marshall calling
anybody for this. If your Honor thinks it
admissible at the proper time. This is part
of his case.
The Court: He is offering it now.
Mr. Podell: I object to that at this time.
Mr. Marshall: It is in connection with
the testimony of this witness in which he
said he did know to some extent the value
in the rubber market, but could not quite remember.
The Court: I think that would be your
case. I will admit it now.
Mr. Podell: I object to it.
The Court: I do not mean as a matter of
admission now. I am taking it as subject
to Mr. Marshall's case when it comes; or
mark it for identification, which would be
better. You mean in relation to what the
existing market was at that time?
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Mr. Marshall: Yes.
The Court: That is a matter which you
may need to dispute the examination of this
last witness.
Mr. Marshall: I am not offering it for
that purpose, but the witness said he did not
have a clear recollection of the market, and
in order to have it on the record
Mr. Podell: The market went up, your
Honor. I might just as well admit it.
Mr. Marshall: It went down in the middle
of the year.
Mr. Podell: A little in the middle of the
year, but away up at the end of the year.
If Stern had been honest, he would have
made a lot of money.
The Court: Why not mark it in evidence
then?
Mr. Podell: We might just as well.
The Court: You will note, Mr. Stenographer, that there is no objection now to the
admission of that particular exhibit on the
part of counsel for the plaintiff.
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(Received in evidence and marked Defendants' Exhibit F.)
Mr. Marshall: I think it shows a fluctuation between 20 cents a pound—between
somewheres around 18 and 40 cents, in those
fourteen months.
Mr. Podell: Whatever that paper shows.
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W. MANNING, a witness called on behalf
of the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, and stating that his address is 37 Bellville Turnpike, North
Arlington, New Jersey, testified as follows:
HORATIO

Direct examination

1043

1044

by Mr.

Podell.

Q. Now, Mr. Manning, what was your connection with Ultramares Corporation? A. I was
cashier.
Q. And I think I stated here—you were present
when I stated you wrote most of these letters and
documents relating to these transactions with
Stern; is that correct? A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. You did; who are you with to-day? A. Harrison National Bank.
Q. And in what capacity are you with them? A.
Cashier of the bank.
Q. You left Ultramares Corporation? A. I did.
Q. Were you there throughout the year 1924?
A. I was.
Q. And at that time you were the cashier? A.
I was.
Q. With reference to these last trust receipts
and accounts receivable, after Stern's death were
you the one that made the investigation to find the
rubber, if there was any rubber there with regard
to those trust receipts? A. I did.
Q. First, what did you find that he did with the
money that Ultramares had given Stern?
Mr. Marshall: I object to it as immaterial.
Q. Did he use it to buy up rubber?
Mr. Marshall: I think that is immaterial.
The Court: Sustained. You mean what
Stern did with it?
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Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Court: You did not get it back.
Mr. Podell: Don't you think, your Honor,
we would have the right to show he did not
use that money to buy rubber with?
The Court: I do not think it makes a
particle of difference. It may inject something else in it, too.
Mr. Podell: If they do not make a point
of this thing, I have no purpose in it, but I
do believe that if they do, we ought to be
permitted to show that.
The Court: Yes, I will permit you to
show it if such a thing arises.
Mr. Marshall: I don't exactly know what
thing he is talking about.
The Court: What Stern did with the
money which he got from this plaintiff.
Mr. Marshall: I do not know and do not
care.
The Court: Neither do I.
Mr. Marshall: I have made the contention there was no rubber covering these
trust receipts.
Mr. Podell: The evidence thus far is that
when he got this money, one of the last
things brought out, that he got it on the
understanding that he was going to go and
pay for a certain quantity of rubber.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: Now, if he never paid for that
rubber, we could not very well be expected
to get it.
Mr. Marshall: I will withdraw my objection, your Honor. I have no objection to
his asking the question.
The Court: All right, go ahead.
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By Mr. Podell.
Q. Now, I am speaking now of the month of
December, 1924. There were at least three advances—one for $100,000, one for $25,000, and then,
toward the end of the month, one for $40,000. Did
you inquire or examine from the records of Stern
& Company, after his death, as to what he had done
with those sums of money? A. I did.
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Mr. Marshall: This covers what trust
receipt, please?
Mr. Podell: Covering the last trust receipts.
Mr. Limburg: 108 to 111.
Q. What did you find he had done with those
moneys? A. He used that money to pay bank obligations.
Q. Bank obligations? A. Yes.
Q. Did he use any of it, from your investigations,
to pay for any rubber? A. He did not.
Q. Did you find any rubber—were you able to
find any rubber applicable to those trust receipts?
A. I did not.
Q. Now, with regard to the accounts receivable,
did you handle all the details of these transactions?
A. I did.
Q. Have you been advised that Mr. Marshall requested you to be present in court? That is so,
is it not, Mr. Marshall? I just want to bring out
the fact. I have him primarily at your request
and you may ask him any questions.
Mr. Marshall: I do not know whether he
is primarily at my request. I asked that he
be here, yes, but you called him as your
witness.
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Mr. Podell: I called him as my witness
and I assume full responsibility for whatever he tells you.
Mr. Marshall: That is fine. Go ahead.
The Court: Are there any questions of
this gentleman, Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Marshall: Yes, your Honor.
Mr. Podell: Just a question.
Q. You live in Jersey now? A. I do.
Q. Is your bank in Jersey? A. The bank is in
Jersey.
Q. So that you were not subject to any subpoena?
A. I was not.
Cross-examination

by Mr.

1052

Marshall.

Q. You came at the request of your old friend,
Mr. Deetjen? A. You always do things for your
friends.
Q. Now you say that
Mr. Podell:
not mind.
By Mr.

Just one question, if you do

Podell.

Q. Did you personally have anything to do with
the passing of credit? A. I had not.
By Mr.

Marshall.

Q. It was part of your duty, however, to keep
track of the security that was received on the
Ultramares Company's loans, was it not? A. It
was.
Q. Under whose direction did you attend to
that? A. Mr. Von Goeben.

1053

352
1054

1055

1056

Horatio W. Manning—For

Plaintiff—Cross.

Q. Now, do you recollect whether Stern was a
frequent visitor at Ultramares during the year
1924? A. By "frequent," what would you mean?
Q. Well, I will withdraw the question. About
how often, would you say, Stern did come into
Ultramares during 1924? A. I would say three or
four times a month, to my knowledge.
Q. And whom would he talk to when he was
there? A. Principally Mr. Von Goeben.
Q. Anybody else? A. He might talk to Mr. Van
Duren, our import man.
Q. Did he talk to you? A. Occasionally.
Q. What did he talk about? A. Usually about
his accounts. I would ask him whether or not this
was due or that was due, or he would probably be
inquiring. Just general questions.
Q. The only thing he talked about? A. That was
all to my knowledge.
Q. Do you know what he talked about to Von
Goeben? Were you ever present? A. Two or three
times in Von Goeben's presence.
Q. Did he talk about anything else to Von
Goeben? A. He did not.
Q. Did he ever talk about his business? A.
Stern's personal business?
Q. Yes. A. Positively.
Q. Positively yes or no? A. Yes. We were
engaged.
Q. Do you remember what he said about his
business? A. He said that he was doing a good
business.
Q. And he said that frequently during the year
1924? A. That is a foolish question.
Mr. Marshall: Well, now, if your Honor
please
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The Witness : I beg your pardon, but I
could not recall every time what he would
ask about his business, or something of that
nature.
Q. I did not ask you that, Mr. Manning. A. I
will answer that with I do not recall.
Q. Do you know whether he frequently discussed
his business? You can answer that yes or no.
Mr. Podell: Did he not answer that already by saying three or four times a month?
Mr. Marshall: No. He said he came up
there three or four times a month.
The Witness: I would say yes, because
his calls were not social.
Q. You yourself were pretty friendly with Mr.
Stern, were you not? A. Not friendly. I never
knew him before we commenced business.
Q. But after that you became pretty friendly?
A. We did not, except in a business capacity.
Q. That is the only relationship you had with
him? A. That is the only relationship I had with
him.
Q. Did not ever ask him for favors? A. The only
favor I ever received from him was to have him
get me a tire from the General Rubber.
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Mr. Podell: He gave you a tire?
The Witness: He got one for me at a
reduced price.
Q.
He got two for you, did he not?
tires.
Q. He got two for Mr. Stempf, was it? A. I
believe he did.

A. Two
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Q. You were not on bad terms, at any rate? A.
Pardon me?
Q. You were not on bad terms, at any rate? A.
No. I would do the same for any other friend,
a business acquaintance.
Q. Anything to help a friend? A. Well, you
would go and get a discount yourself, if you can.
Q. I say, you would do anything to help a friend?
Mr. Podell: Get a discount, yes,
A. I would, yes, if it is within reason.
1061
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Mr. Marshall: Your Honor, I think we
can make progress if we go on to-morrow.
The Court: This man is in a bank and
he wants to get away and does not want
to come back.
Mr. Marshall: There are some papers I
wanted I have to subpoena. I did not know
Mr. Manning would be on to-day.
Mr. Podell: What papers are those, Mr.
Marshall?

Q.
Now, Mr. Manning, do you recall s
any time, at any place, that these advances to
Stern & Company were made upon security? A.
I don't recall it, but perhaps in my remarks at
various times I have stated that we had obtained
trust receipts as security for our loan until the
accounts receivable were obtained.
Q. And that would be a true statement, would
it? A. That would be a true statement.
Q. And you still maintain that the loans were
made upon the security of the trust receipts until
the accounts receivable were assigned? A. That
is true.
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Q. And after that the accounts receivable stood
as security? A. That is correct.
Mr. Marshall: I am trying to eliminate
things I covered with Mr. Schlubach that I
thought I would have to take up with this
witness, so I won't go as fast as I had hoped.
Q.
receipt which is in evidence here? A. I do not.
Q. Do you know whether you did or Stern did?
A. We did not. It came from Stern's office.
Q. But it was satisfactory to you? A. It was
satisfactory to us.
Q. Did you pass upon that alone or did Mr. Von
Goeben pass upon it? A. Mr. Von Goeben also.
Q. Do you know whether Mr. Schlubach passed
upon it? A. I presume that he saw them. I
couldn't say as a fact.
Q. But you do not know whether he specifically
passed upon the form? A. No. They were in the
private office safe.
Q. While we are waiting for that, do you remember whether Stern used to show you or Mr.
Von Goeben the purchase contracts which he had
and the sales contracts when you advanced the
money? A. He did at times.
Q. He did to begin with, did he not? A. Yes.
Q. And about how long after the beginning of
these loans did that practice discontinue? A. I
should say that continued for several months.
Q. But by October and November and December
he was not any longer submitting his purchase and
sales contracts? A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. You would have been the man to see them,
would you not? A. I didn't examine the purchase
and sales contracts.

Do you know who p
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Q. But they would come through your hands?
A. Ocassionally.
Q. Well, you were the man who passed upon the
security? A. No. I knew nothing concerning the
rubber market. That was out of my jurisdiction
and Mr. Von Goeben would pass upon the prices
and the contracts. I was interested in the trust
receipts and the accounts receivable.
Q. I see. Now, did you ever investigate prior
to Stern's bankruptcy whether there was any merchandise which these trust receipts purported to
represent? A. I did not.
Q. At no time prior to his bankruptcy? A. At
no time.
Q. Did you ever investigate prior to the bankruptcy whether there was rubber of any given description before you got the trust receipts or did
you just take the trust receipts, stating so many
tons of rubber, without description? A. I did not
examine them.
Q. You did not investigate the kind of rubber
you were getting? A. I did not.
Mr. Podell: Is it fair to suggest, your
Honor, that most of this rubber was bought
on the high seas?
Mr. Marshall: I do not think it is fair
to suggest that.
Mr. Podell: All right,
The Court: I do not know whether it
was or not. It may have been on the dock.
Q. Did you ever ask Stern for documents such
as bills of lading or dock receipts covering this
rubber? A. We did not.
Q. Did you ever investigate whether this rubber
had been pledged to anyone else? A. It could not
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have been pledged to anybody else because we received the accounts receivable.
Q. Did you ever investigate at the time you received the trust receipts whether this rubber was
pledged to anyone else? A. No.
Q. Now, you trusted Stern's word for the fact
that there was rubber covering this merchandise?
A. We did.
Q. And you assumed that this rubber was not
pledged? A. We assumed that because he was to
use our money to pay for the rubber.
Q. That is, he said he was to use that money to
pay for the rubber? A. That is correct.
Q. You did not go out and watch Stern pay over
any money for any rubber at any time, did you?
A. We did not,
Q. Now, when you got these trust receipts—
may I have a form of trust receipt (handed to
counsel). You notice, and you recall maybe, that
at the bottom it says "Sold to So-and-so and Soand-so" (handing to witness)? A. That is correct.
Q. Did you ever communicate with those purchasers before you sent them the assigned invoice?
A. Only after the death of Stern.
Q. But during the year 1924, did you ever communicate with these people to whom the rubber
was supposed to have been sold, before you sent
on assigned accounts? A. We did not,
Mr. Podell:

When?

Q. Or the assigned invoices. You understood
my question? A. I understood the question. We
would have no occassion to.
Mr. Podell: Immediately we received it,
we sent it to the people who owed the money.
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The Court: What he is asking is, in between—on a certain question of law that is
involved here—whether in between the receipt of the trust receipts they ever made
any inquiry if there was a delay in the delivery of the assigned bills, whether such a
sale had been made to the Goodyear Rubber
Company or the Ford Company.
Mr. Podell: There was not one such instance. There is not one dollar of loss we
suffered by reason of that.
The Court: I understand that.
Mr. Podell: Every account that was received——
The Court: That is on a point that Mr.
Marshall is making, as to contributory negligence.
Mr. Podell: I know. That is what he is
trying to show.
Q. You never found out, did you, at the time that
you advanced the money, whether the accounts
that he promised to assign in those trust receipts
were good and genuine accounts? A. The accounts
did not exist before the delivery of the rubber.
Q. Mr. Manning, is it not a fact that you understood at that time that this rubber was sold, that
he had contracts to sell this rubber at the time you
got the trust receipts? A. Sold under contract.
Q. Yes, sold to the persons whose names appear
on this trust receipt? A. That is true.
Q. Did you ever communicate with the persons
whose names appear on this trust receipt, at or
before the time you advanced the money on it?
A. We did not.
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Q. That is all I want. Did you ever see a balance sheet of Stern's prepared as of sometime in
the summer of 1924? A. I did not.
Q. Or trial balance? A. I did not.
Q. Statement of any kind? A. No.
Q. Do you know whether Mr. Von Goeben had
such a statement? A. At that time, no.
Q. At any time after that? A. The only statement I saw after Stern's death was the certified
statement of Touche, Niven & Co.
Q. Do you know whether Von Goeben at any
time received a statement subsequent?
The Court: In between, around August?
The Witness: I do not. I do not know.

1076

Q. You knew in November, 1924, that Von
Goeben had resigned? A. Yes, I did.
Q. And you knew shortly after his resignation
that he and his son were to go with Stern, did you
not? A. I wouldn't say shortly after the resignation. It was unknown where they were going.
That is, to the general office.
Q. His son was also employed at Ultramares?
A. He was.
Q. You yourself did not pass upon the credit,
as I understand it? A. I did not.
Mr. Podell: Will it be stipulated, Mr.
Marshall, that Touche, Niven & Co. audited
the accounts of Stern & Company just once
a year? That will save the necessity of asking any questions or calling any witnesses.
Mr. Marshall: Once a year. I am perfectly willing that there should go in evidence the four balance sheets that Touche,
Niven & Co. prepared.
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Mr. Podell: Touche, Niven & Co. prepared four balance sheets and they were
annual balance sheets as of December 31st.
We have two in evidence.
The Court: 1922 and 1923.
Mr. Podell: Now, they prepared two
others.
Mr. Marshall: Yes. And I want to offer
them.
The Court: You said four balance sheets?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Court: As of 1923?
Mr. Podell: I am wrong. I did not mean
as of 1923.
The Court: You mean for 1920, 1921,
1922 and 1923?
Mr. Podell: Yes, sir.
The Court: But that they prepared no
balance sheets in the interim between one
and the other; just the annual one as of
December 31st of each year?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: I would like the other two
to be admitted in evidence.
Mr. Podell: I would like to see them before they are marked; subject to my examination, before they are marked.
The Court: Subject to your examination.
(Whereupon, at 4.10 o'clock P. M. adjournment was taken until to-morrow, Friday, April 5, 1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.)
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New York, April 5, 1929,
10 o'clock, A. M.
TRIAL CONTINUED.

Same Appearances.

witness on behalf of the
plaintiff, resumed, further testified as follows:
HORATIO W . MANNING,

Cross-examination (continued)

by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. Now, Mr. Manning, when we closed yesterday,
I think you had testified that it was not your duty
to pass upon credits; is that correct? A. That is
true, yes.
Q. That it was your duty, however, to check up
and see that the security came in; that you handled
the various documents that were supposed to be
the security? A. That is correct.
Q. Mr. Von Goeben did not attend to details
such as that, did he? A. No. Matters that were
under question we brought up to him.
Q. Yes. But the general run of matters you
would take care of? A. I would.
Q. If there was any delay in the sending of securities at any time, it would be you who would
take up the matter, and not Mr. Von Goeben, in
the first instance? A. I would call it to Mr. Von
Goeben's attention and he would tell me to take
it up with the office.
Q. Yes. Now, did you at any time see or ask
to see any bills of lading covering any of the merchandise described in the trust receipts? A. I
did not.
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Q. Do you know whether Mr. Von Goeben did?
A. I couldn't answer.
Q. Did you at any time see or procure warehouse
receipts covering any of the merchandise described
in the trust receipts? A. None of this rubber was
warehouse.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I object to that.
The Court: I will allow the question.
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Q. So that you did not see any such warehouse
receipts? A. I did not.
Q. Did you at any time procure or see any dock
delivery orders for any of this merchandise? A.
We did not.
Q. Now, in the beginning, you were pretty
prompt, were you not, in calling to the attention
of Stern any delay in the sending of these accounts
receivable? A. We were prompt all through the
entire course of procedure.
Q. You remember that in one of the earliest instances, five days after a loan you called his attention to the fact that the invoices had not yet been
received?
Mr. Podell: I object to that as not a correct summary of the contents of that letter.
The letter was merely an inquiry as to when
the invoices would be furnished.
The Court: I think that is right.
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor, it is an inquiry just the same as when they were
Mr. Podell: Ask him for a date.
Mr. Marshall: As to when it would be
furnished, and it is five days after the loan
they make that inquiry already.
The Court: I understand.
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception.
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Marshall.

Q;. Now, Mr. Manning, you wrote this letter,
Exhibit B, did you not (handing to witness)? A.
I did.
Q. Did you ever make any attempt to follow that
up and see that the description of the rubber was
put in the applications for loans made by Stern?
Mr. Podell: Is that letter in evidence?
Mr. Marshall: That is Exhibit B.
A. The descriptions were usually described—
that is, the rubber was usually described in the
sales contracts, which were shown to Mr. Von
Goeben at the time.
Q. So that you never insisted that it be described
in the— A. Not in the trust receipt.
Q. In the trust receipt? A. No.
Q. Because Mr. Von Goeben saw the sales contracts? A. Saw the sales contracts.
Q. He did not, however, see all of the sales contracts at the end, I understood you said yesterday?
A. I don't believe all to the end.
Q. So that at the end he would not, therefore,
have any information as to the description of the
rubber covered by all of these trust receipts? A.
That I couldn't answer definitely.
Q. Now, who was Mr. Stempf, who I think you
mentioned yesterday had received two tires at a
discount from Stern at the same time you did? A.
Mr. Stempf was one of our men in Uutramares,
employed in the import department.
Q. Were you acquainted with the account of
Fred Stern with Ultramares—were you at the
time? A. The actual account I did not keep, but
I saw the regular accounts current that were sent
out.
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Q. Do you recollect what the total interest
charges were that were made? A. I do not.
Q. IS there any way that you can refresh your
recollection?
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Mr. Podell: The interest charges were
never in excess of 6 per cent. per annum.
The factor's commission was charged in addition. If counsel wants a stipulation as
to that, I will be glad to give him exactly
what it is.
Mr. Marshall: I would be perfectly willing to put it in the record just what the
commission was.
Mr. Podell: Now, your Honor, I have no
objection to this detailed account being
marked in evidence. These are marked in
evidence, your Honor, with the bill of particulars, and we stipulate that the total advances, in the aggregate, of course, were
$2,343,818.59; commission charge in the
aggregate was $40,144.05. Now, I should
like to couple that with the statement that
that total of advances includes the equity,
and that, I believe, we can show that at no
time did our extension of credit to Fred
Stern & Company exceed the sum of approximately $300,000. It was a revolving credit
which in the end aggregated that total
amount. That is correct, is it not?
Mr. Marshall: I do not understand the
last part.
Mr. Podell: There was no one point
where there was an advance of more than
$300,000, and most of it was less.
Mr. Marshall: I do not know anything
about that.
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The Court: It does not make very much
difference one way or the other.
Mr. Marshall: I offer this in evidence,
then, as a summary of the previous exhibit,
Mr. Podell: I am told by Mr. Limburg
there was one occasion when they slightly
exceeded $300,000, but in the main they were
below that.
(Received in evidence and respectively
marked Defendants' Exhibits G and G-1.)
By Mr.

Marshall.

Q. Now, Mr. Manning, I understand that you at
no time charged more than 6 per cent, interest.
Is that correct, that that was your usual charge
to Stern? A. That is correct.
Q. Will you tell us from that sheet in front of
you, Exhibit G-1, what 6 per cent. interest was on
the moneys loaned? A. Aggregate amount?
Q. Yes. A. $12,657.59.
Q. And now will you tell us what 1 per cent.
of that would be?
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The Court: 1 per cent. of what?
Q. If 6 per cent. is that figure of $12,657.59, what
would 1 per cent. be? A. One-sixth of that.
Q. If that is interest at the rate of 6 per cent.,
what would interest at the rate of 1 per cent. be?
Mr. Podell: I object to that, your Honor.
The Court: One-sixth of that, I should
think.
Mr. Marshall: I should think so, your
Honor, too.
The Court: I will allow it.
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Q. Will you calculate that, please? A. $2,109.59.
Q. Now, if $2,109.59 is interest at the rate of
1 per cent. per annum on the sums advanced, how
many per cent. per annum would $40,144.05 be?
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Mr. Podell: Now, your Honor, is there
any question that a factor has a right to
charge a commission? If so, then there are
about 100 factor concerns in this country
that ought to go out of business as illegal.
Every one of them charges a normal commission, and there is no proof nor any claim
in the defense or in the answer that we
charged any excess commission, that we
charged any more than the usual charge.
Now, why inject an issue that has no basis,
no foundation and no plea of any kind? The
figures are here. Counsel can make any
argument he chooses based upon the figures
that are here.
The Court: I think that is right.
Mr. Marshall: This is just a graphic way
of putting that fact before the jury. I think
we are entitled to put it in to show that there
was a great interest on the part of this company to maintain this account, as it was a
good account and paying them well, and that
is the purpose of this inquiry.
The Court: Those are the figures, but I
do not see the application of comparisons
of interest. Objection sustained.
Mr. Marshall: I am just showing the rate
of the commission, that is all, your Honor.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Marshall: Exception. Will your
Honor permit me to prepare a table to show
this thing I am trying to show now?
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The Court: Yes, you may prepare any
table you like.
Mr. Marshall: Is the Clerk of the United
States District Court here?
(No response.)
Mr. Marshall: Have you got the pleadings in the case of Equitable Trust Company
of Baltimore against Ultramares?
Mr. Limburg: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: May I have them?
Mr. Limburg: Here is the complaint
(handing).
Mr. Marshall: And the answer?
Mr. Limburg: Here is a copy (handing).
The original is probably on file.
By Mr.

1099

1100

Marshall.

Q. I hand you copy of the answer Mr. Limburg
assures me is a copy of the answer in the action
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York entitled, "Equitable
Trust Company of Baltimore against Ultramares
Corporation," and I ask you whether you remember
verifying that answer? A. I do.
Mr. Marshall: I offer in evidence the
complaint and answer in that action.
Mr. Podell: May I see them?
(Handed to counsel.)
Mr. Podell: I object to it, your Honor,
as having no materiality. I do not want to
take the time to read it now.
The Court: I do not hear you, Mr. Podell.
Mr. Podell: I beg your pardon. I object
to it as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial to these issues; no bearing.
The Court: What is the materiality?
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Mr. Marshall: The materiality is, your
Honor, that in this action the Equitable
Trust Company of Baltimore claimed that
certain accounts receivable
Mr. Podell: I certainly object to a statement in the presence of the jury what he
claims. I have never seen those papers in
my life, and they are very bulky, your Honor.
The Court: Come up here.
(Counsel confer with Court at Bench.)
The Court: Mark them for identification
now.
1103

(Marked Defendants' Exhibits H and I
for Identification.)
The Court: Is that all of this witness?
Mr. Marshall: Just one moment, your
Honor. I think that is all, your Honor.
By Mr.

1104

Marshall.

Q. Did you inquire, Mr. Manning, when the advances were made whether the ship which was
named in the trust receipt as having the merchandise or bringing the merchandise described in the
trust receipt had arrived in New York or not? A.
I did not.
Q. In no instance? A. In no instance.
Mr. Marshall: That is all.
Redirect examination

by Mr. Podell.

Q. Mr. Manning, was there a single account receivable that had been assigned to your concern
that was actually assigned that was not a correct
and bona fide account ? A. There was not.
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Q. All of them were collected? A. All were collected.
Q. Were there any accounts receivable that had
been assigned to Ultramares—we are talking now
of accounts receivable that had been assigned to
anybody else. Do you know that? If you do not
know, say so.
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling
for a conclusion of the witness.
The Court: I allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
1106
Q. Do you not? A. I do not.
Q. You do not? A. No.
Q. Mr. Manning, are you familiar with the usual
factor's commissions? A. I am not.
Q. Are you familiar with the charges made here
by way of commissions? A. I am familiar with
them only as they appear in the accounts current.
Q. At the beginning your charge, as I have stated
it, was one-half cent per pound of rubber for commission? A. That is correct,
Q.
Was that subsequently modified? A. It was
later reduced.
Q. Reduced? A. Yes.
Q. Now, in what way was it reduced? A. If I
recall correctly, it was 1 per cent. of the total 1 1 0 7
advance.
Q. 1 per cent. of the advance? A. That is correct.
Q. As the commission? A. As the commission.
Q. That was figured on the amount of money
actually advanced? A. That is correct.
Q. Without regard to time limit? A. Without
regard to time.
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Q. So that it was 1 per cent. whether they kept
the money three months or one month? A. Regardless of the time outstanding.
Q. It was based and figured on the amount advanced? A. That is correct.
Q. And that proved to be less than a half cent
per pound? A. It was.
Recross-examination

1109

by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. And this 1 per cent. commission was charged
even where the loan was to be outstanding for only
a week, is that true? A. The same as if it was
outstanding thirty days; the same commission,
regardless of time.
By Mr.

Podell.

Q. That included a service charge, did it not, for
whatever services was rendered? A. That included
all service charges.
By Mr.

Marshall.

Q. What services did you render Stern in this
connection? A. The handling of the papers that we
were sending out, the insuring of them, registration, and so on.
1110

Mr. Podell: Tell everything. You cannot be heard.
Mr. Marshall: May I conduct this examination?
The Court: I cannot hear you. Won't
you talk up?
Mr. Marshall: Read the answer, please.
(Answer repeated as recorded.)
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Marshall.

Q. In other words, the mailing of these invoices
to Stern's customers? A. That was correct.
Q. That was your service? A. That was our
service.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. You do not mean to say that was all your
service. Didn't you have to keep books and accounts of those items, this multitude of items? A.
Naturally we had a lot of detail in connection with
that.
Q. That is what I want to know. Did you have
to take out insurance? A. The insurance on the
merchandise?
Q. Yes. A. We did not.
Q. What insurance did you have? A. The insurance of registered letters where there were documents of importance.
Q. How about your mailing of those invoices?
Did you have to have clerical help for that? A.
Yes.
Q. What were the services that a factor usually
renders?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that—what
services a factor usually renders. We are
discussing now what he claims $40,000 for
doing.
The Court: Tell us what you did.
Mr. Podell: Nobody is making any point
of that claim against Touche-Niven. Our
statement has eliminated commission on
amounts that were not paid. Since counsel
injected the issue here of alleged claim of

1112

1113

372
1114

Horatio W. Manning—For

Plaintiff—Recross.

excess charges, I think we have a right to
show that he made no more than the usual
factor's charges, whatever their services.
Mr. Marshall: He said once before he
did not know what the usual factor's charge
was. Now he is asking him an entirely different question. He is asking him what the
usual factor's services were. That is immaterial.
The Court: Objection sustained.
By Mr. Podell.
1115

Q. Tell us, please, what your concern had to do
in the way of keeping records and taking care
of this account in the office.
The Court: I think we know that, Mr,
Podell, the usual office things that take
place, the entering and mailing out and the
stamp they put on the envelope and the insurance for the security of the papers.
By Mr.

Marshall.

Q. You kept those records for your own benefit,
didn't you? A. Yes.

1116

By Mr. Podell.
Q. Who forwarded the bills of lading to the customers? A. We forwarded the railroad bills to
the customers.
Q. And who arranged for the weight certificates?
A. The weight certificates were arranged by Stern.
Q. And who arranged for the registration? A.
We arranged for that.
Q. And did you have a bookkeeping staff? A.
Yes.
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Q. In connection with these multitudinous accounts? A. We did.
Mr. Podell: I want to offer in evidence
a tabulated statement as .far as we have gone
of the 104 items
Mr. Limburg: It is complete——
Mr. Podell: The complete tabulation of
the 111 accounts, showing the date of the
loan, the date of the assignment of accounts
and the date of payment.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. In addition to those things that you mentioned, were there any legal services connected with
these matters? A. There were no legal services.
Q. Who passed on the forms of document?
Mr. Marshall:

1118

He already testified.

A. Those were passed on
Mr. Podell: We won't discuss that. I
offer that in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: Subject to confirmation, I
have no objection.
The Court: All right.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 76.)
Mr. Podell: Now, gentlemen of the jury,
I do not know whether it is entirely clear
to you
Mr. Marshall: Do you think this is the
time to read it?
The Court: He is not going to read it,
Mr. Podell: This gives the date of loan,
April 5, 1924; the date of assignment, April
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2, 1924. That is the assignment of account
(referring to Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 76).
The date of payment, April 27, is shown.
Now, here you have one of April 7, and you
have got the assignment 4, 19 and 17, and
payments were made. You will see over
here the different dates of assignment after
the date of the loan and the accounts. They
are all tabulated. I think that will give you
the date that we discussed the other day, as
to each one of the 111 loans, the same items.
Mr. Marshall: May I ask another question, your Honor?
The Court: Yes.
By Mr.

1122

Plaintiff—Recross.

Marshall.

Q. I understand you to say, Mr. Manning, that
you did get some railway receipts for the merchandise? A. Railroad bills of lading.
Q. Railroad bills of lading? A. Yes.
Q. That was after their being shipped to the
customer? A. After the rubber had been prepared
for shipment to the customer.
Q. After they had been taken off the ship? A.
Yes.
Q. So that you did have these bills of lading?
A. We did.
Q. You were interested in keeping records of
these payments for your own sake, were you not,
to check up and see that your security was coming
in? A. We were.
Q. So that in any event, no matter what security
you had received, you would have to keep books,
would you not? A. We did.
Q. You would have to do so no matter what they
had given you for security? A. We would have
had it.
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Q. That was the way in which you got your payment, was it not, from these customers? A. From
the accounts receivable.
Mr. Marshall:

Yes.

By Mr. Podell.
Q. That is the first time I ever heard of the
questioning of the propriety of that. There is
nothing in the answer whatever about it. These
bills of lading that you sent to customers, of course,
your accountant sent them only when the accounts
had been actually assigned to you? A. Yes, they
were attached to the accounts.
Q. The attachments were? A. Attached to the
assigned accounts.
Q. And you got bills of lading after the accounts
had been assigned? A. We did.
By Mr.

1124

Marshall.

Q. You insisted upon sending those out yourselves? A. We always did.
Q. You wanted to make sure that you had these
accounts receivable in your own hands and sent
out by you and not by Stern? A. As the party
who received the money.
The Court: All right.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. Marshall: I do not know whether
this is the time, your Honor, but I would
like to put in evidence the date of arrival
of the vessels named in these trust receipts
107 to 111, the date of arrival in New York.
Mr. Podell: I object.
The Court: Sustained.
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Case.
Mr. Marshall: May I understand your
Honor's ruling. Your Honor's ruling is that
it is irrelevant or immaterial?
The Court: I am ruling that it is not
proof of the arrival of this merchandise on
those steamers.
Mr. Marshall: Ishall not offer it for that,
your Honor. That is what I wanted to make
certain. I was offering it as proof of the
fact that the vessel named in that trust receipt had in almost every instance here arrived a few days before the date of the application for a loan, and therefore they could
have gone to that vessel or that dock and
found out whether there was any merchandise there. That is my point.
Mr. Podell: After the arrival, how do you
know that she had not sailed again?
Mr. Marshall: The merchandise would
have been on the dock. They could have
found whether she arrived with the merchandise.
The Court: I do not know whether it was
or not.
Mr. Marshall: They could have inquired
whether the merchandise was on the vessel
after she had arrived.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception. I
understand, so that we may get this clear,
this is not objected to on the ground that
proof is incompetent?
Mr. Podell: Oh, yes, objected to on all
grounds. I will make no stipulation with
regard to that.
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Case.
Mr. Marshall: All right, I will get somebody to testify so as to remove the question
of competency.
The Court: All right, sir.
Mr. Podell: I would like to read, your
Honor, or rather offer in evidence, the testimony of Mr. Alexander Von Goeben that
was examined by and on behalf of the trustee—it is Alexander Von Goeben that was
examined on behalf of the trustee in bankruptcy proceeding under 21-A.
Mr. Marshall: I object to the admission
of that, your Honor.
The Court: Why?
Mr. Marshall: Because we have absolutely
no chance to cross-examine, your Honor.
There are some things I might permit to be
admitted.
The Court: No opportunity to crossexamine?
Mr. Marshall: No. It was under 21-A.
Mr. Podell: I understood counsel to
state that we could stipulate what Von
Goeben did; but if counsel presses the objection, there is no doubt he was right on his
objection. There was no opportunity for me
or him to cross-examine.
The Court: I am not going to argue about
that. Is it coming in or going out? Do you
object to it?
Mr. Marshall: I object.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Marshall: I am perfectly willing to
meet with Mr. Podell afterwards and possibly we can agree on parts to go in.
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The Court : Do that between yourselves.
The Court cannot regulate your own rulings
on these propositions.
Mr. Podell: The man being dead, we ought
to have everything that was said on the subject about it; but if counsel wants to try and
edit it, I will consider that and see if we can
get any part of it. Mark it for identification.

1133

(Deposition of A. Von Goeben received
and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 77 for
Identification.)
Mr. Podell: You say he was our man. He
was not in our service on March, 1925, at
the time of this.
Mr. Marshall: No, but he was before.
Mr. Podell: Now, Mr. Saul Levy, will you
take the stand?

S A U L LEVY

resumes the stand:

Direct examination
1134

(continued)

by Mr.

Podell.

Q. Mr. Levy, I believe you have already stated
that you are a certified public accountant and have
been practicing for several years in the City of New
York? A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Marshall: Ten years, he said.
Q. Ten years. With offices at 475 Fifth Avenue?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you had occasion—or tell us in your
own way just what you have done in connection
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with going over the books and records of Fred
Stern & Company and any other data that was
furnished to you in relation to the certificate or
statement Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. A. I examined
certain records of Fred Stern & Company in conjunction with certain photostatic copies of working
papers of Touche, Niven & Co., which working papers were prepared or compiled in connection with
their balance sheet as of December 31, 1923.
Q. Have you got those photostats? A. I have
them in my bag.
Q. Just take your bag, so that you will have the
papers and every one of those statements. A. Those
are the working papers I had reference to—that is,
the photostatic copies (indicating).

1135
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Mr. Podell: Is there any dispute about
their being true and correct photostatic
copies? I would like to have a stipulation
with regard to those.
Q. Is that one of the photostatic papers? A.
That was in the batch of papers. It is not the
photostat.
Q. While Mr. Marshall is looking those over, so
that we will be clear, those photostats, just what
are they composed of? Explain that in your own
way. A. Well, they are copies of the papers, the
schedules, the memoranda, certain correspondence
that were in the files of Touche, Niven & Co., which
were prepared or secured in connection with the
audit of the books of account.
Q. Which Touche, Niven & Co. made? A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Prior to the statement of December 31, 1923,
is that right? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that includes their working sheets they
had prepared at that time? A. Yes, sir.
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Mr. Marshall: Some of these are copies
of the work papers and some of them are
not.
Mr. Podell: All I want from Mr. Marshall now is the statement that in so far as
we used photostatic copies, that they may be
used in the place of originals, subject to such
objection as counsel may have as to materiality and relevancy.
Mr. Marshall: I suggest that he offer the
original work sheets which are here.
Mr. Podell: I think they have been
offered.
Mr. Marshall: Only part of them, some
of them offered in evidence and some for
identification, and then he can work from
these photostatic copies as he goes along.
Mr. Podell: I have no objection to that.
Mr. Marshall: I have no objection.
The Court: All right. What are the
originals?
Mr. Limburg: They are marked Exhibit
No. 15 for Identification.
The Court: It will be No. 15 in evidence
now, formerly marked for identification.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 15.)
Q. We are going to take up for the first time
the matter of inventory and the investigation
thereof, and get your papers together so that you
are in a position to have them available in that
regard. From these records that you have examined, can you state, Mr. Levy, what was the
amount of inventory as originally reported and
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appearing on the books of Fred Stern & Company?
I mean as originally reported to Touche, Niven &
Co.
Mr. Marshall: Are you testifying to what
the work sheets show? That is your basis
of your testimony?
Mr. Podell: I ask "from the information
and papers he had.
Mr. Marshall: We want to find out
whether this information is coming from the
work sheets or from some outside source.
The Witness : I will state in my answer
in each instance what is the source of my
information.
Mr. Marshall: Can you tell me now?
The Witness: Among the work sheets of
Touche, Niven & Co., I find a paper marked
"Inventory, December 31, 1923," showing an
amount of $347
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute, so that I
can follow you on that.
The Witness: That is page 67.
Mr. Marshall: That is what I want.
Thank you.
Q. Go ahead.
At the bottom of
sheet as handed
to be signed "S.
Q. Towell?

A. Showing a total of $347,219.08.
this page is a notation, "Summary
to me for audit," and it appears
Towell."

Mr. Podell: So that we will identify him,
Mr. Marshall, he is the gentleman who has
been a witness, and I think he said he was
the senior accountant on the job.
Mr. Marshall: That is right.
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Q. All right. Go ahead, finish your answer, and
cell in your own way what you found on the records
with regard to that item of inventory, referring specifically to your source of information every time
you make reference to anything. A. I also found
in the Touche, Niven working papers, page 3, which
is part of the trial balance as of December 31, 1923,
in the columns marked "Balance before closing,
December 31, 1923," the item "Merchandise in transit, $347,219.08," which is the same item, indicating
that this item appeared in the ledger account at
the beginning of the examination of Touche, Niven
& Co.
Q. Can you stop right here and show us that
ledger account and where it did appear? Would
that be feasible, or would it be breaking into the
order of events? I want you to state those yourself. A. I would like to cover the working papers
first.
Q. Then cover the working papers first. Then
go ahead. A. Then, among the working papers, I
find pages 160 to 168, which contain journal entries.
Mr. Marshall : Just one second till I get
that, Mr. Levy. Now, all right.

1146

Q. Go ahead. A. Journal entries apparently prepared by Touche, Niven & Co. Many of those entries affect the inventory account and other collateral accounts. I have summarized those entries.
I have traced them to Touche, Niven's general ledger trial balance working sheet, and from that to
the balance sheet prepared by them. I have also
traced those entries to the books of account,
Q. You are speaking now of the entries relating
to the inventory? A. To inventory, and to the
merchandise account generally.
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Q. Yes. A. And also to certain related asset and
liability accounts.
Q. But gravitating around the subject of inventory? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, have you got that summary? A. I have
that summary, yes, sir.
Q. Now, will you go on and tell us what you
found with respect to those items?
Mr. Marshall:
first?

May I see the summary

Q. This is a summary of what Touche, Niven &
Co. did, is that it? A. Yes, sir.

1148

By the Court.
Q. Prepared by you? A. Yes, sir.
The Court: That is a matter of evidence.
I do not see why you should have it, Mr.
Marshall.
Mr. Marshall: All right.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. First let me ask you, did Touche, Niven &
Co. make any corrections or changes in that inventory as a result of those entries? A. Yes, sir.
Q. I prefer you to state it in your own way. I
do not want to break in. A. I will summarize it
first and then discuss the entries themselves.
Q. All right, go ahead. A. Touche, Niven & Co.
made adjusting entries through which they reduced
the inventory by the amount of $215,795.27. They
reduced accounts receivable $20,465.03.
Mr. Marshall: How much?
The Witness: $20,465.03. They increased
the acceptances payable, a liability account,
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in the amount of $67,602.90. The sum of
those items being $303,863.20, a reduction in
the net assets of Stern in that amount.

1151

Q. Now, these that you are speaking of now—
A. I was going on with the reduction of inventory.
They reduced the inventory from the original
amount submitted to them of $347,000 in round
figures, to $131,000.
Q. These three items that you have mentioned,
which aggregate and bring a net reduction of assets of $300,000, were they all in relation to the
inventory items? Were they all necessary in relation to the inventory items? A. They all related
to the inventory item or to merchandise purchases.
Q. Now, just tell us what you found from their
own work sheets necessitated those corrections or
adjustments.
A. The first entry, which they
marked "Journal entry No. 5," charged—debited
the purchase account
Mr. Marshall: Will you tell me on what
page this is on?
The Witness: Page 161. Debited the purchase account in the amount of $8,426.30 and
debited inventory $87.45 and credited acceptances $8,513.75.

1152

Q. Now, just in simple language explain so that
we will all understand, first, what they found
Stern's books showed in regard to that item and
what they did. A. Their entry contains a very
concise explanation right on their working sheets.
Q. Which is? A. They stated, "To record the
following shipment," and then they give the details
of that shipment—lot 7440, 195 cases.
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Q. Just what does that mean? I do not think
it is quite clear. A. It means then they say——
Q. What does it mean that Stern had done which
they had to undo? That is what I want. A. This
represented the cost of 193 cases sold to Dunlop
Tire & Rubber in December, 1923. This was an
instance of merchandise which had been sold by
Stern and paid for before December 31, 1923, but
for which no liability was as yet entered on the
books, and so the accountants
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike that out
as a conclusion and not what this paper
deals with at all, and he is going outside of
this paper for information.
Mr. Podell: He is not going outside of
any of the work sheets of Touche, Niven &
Co. He is using their own work sheets. He
is talking of sheets, and they are bound to
know.
Mr. Marshall: That is a good speech.
Mr. Podell: It is not a speech, but it is
from their own facts and figures, as they
have reported them.
The Court: Well, you have it in your own
mind that you do not grasp it.
Mr. Podell: I want this witness to explain.
The Court: Maybe you do, and I do not.
Mr. Marshall: He is giving information.
The Court: I believe that is a conclusion
without knowing the basis upon which it is
worked, because I do not understand what
it is based on.
Mr. Podell: I do not either, and I will
ask the witness to make it clear.
Mr. Marshall: Strike it out.
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The Court: Strike it out at this point.
Mr. Podell: I will have to go over it again
and explain it.
Q. Mr. Levy, what we would like to know in
simple, clarified English is just what it is that
Stern had done which Touche, Niven & Co. saw
fit to adjust or correct.
The Court: And upon what do you base
that?

1157

Q. Show the figures as you have found them
there. What did you base that on?
Mr. Marshall: As I understand it, the
witness is now interpreting the work sheets
on page 161.
The Witness: 161, yes. I have before me
a journal entry and an explanation of that
journal entry
Q. Made by whom? A. Made by Touche, Niven
& Co.
Q. There is no question about that, they made
that entry?

1158

The Court: In the journal.
Mr. Podell: That they made that explanation. He is speaking now from papers prepared by Touche, Niven & Co. themselves.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: This is part of their work
sheets. One of the journal entries they
recommended and insisted be made to correct the books. There is no question about
that.
The Court: Yes.
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Mr. Podell: Is counsel going to take the
witness stand to testify? What is the occasion for interruption? Is there an effort being made to confuse this witness?
Mr.Marshall: Oh, Mr. Podell. I appeal
to your Honor.
Mr. Podell: If counsel interrupts we shall
not get anywhere.
Mr. Marshall: The Court asked a question and I was explaining.
The Court: I asked Mr. Podell. Go ahead.
Q. Mr. Levy, go along and answer that question.
A. The explanation contained on this working sheet
reads as follows: "To record the following shipment
"

1160

The Court: Now, does that mean to record
it in some book where it is not?
The Witness: Precisely.
The Court: Why did you not tell us that,
because I did not know it. I am not a great
accountant or bookkeeper, either.
Mr. Marshall: That is why I tried to make
that suggestion before.
The Court: Do not interrupt, please.
Q. Go ahead. A. And then it gives the details
of that shipment; and then, at the bottom of the
explanation, it states, "That this merchandise was
sold to Dunlop Tire & Rubber Company and paid
for by them December 18, 1923."
Q. Paid for to whom? A. To Stern.
Q. And was it still included in inventory? Had
it been included by Stern in inventory? A. No, sir.
This is an instance of a purchase by Stern which
had been omitted from the books entirely, although
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that very merchandise had in large part been sold
by Stern to someone else and the money collected
for that sale, and this is a correcting entry by the
accountants.
Q. And the situation, as I understand it, is this:
Stern had bought a certain amount of merchandise
from this Dunlop Tire & Rubber Company?
Mr. Marshall:

1163
1164

Stern had?

A. Stern had sold that merchandise.
Q. Who had he bought it from? Does it show?
A. It merely indicates the lot number.
Q. What is it Stern had omitted to do? A. They
had omitted to place upon their books the liability
to their creditor for the merchandise they had purchased.
Q. That was not on the books at all of Stern
& Company? A. No, sir.
The Court: Liability to the creditor?
Mr. Podell: Stern had sold merchandise
and collected $8200 from somebody.
The Court: Yes,
Mr. Podell: And put it in and kept it,
but owed for that merchandise to someone
whom he bought it from and never paid for
it, and the books did not show he owed
that money.
The Court: Stern's books?
Mr. Podell: Stern's books.
The Court: This is a correcting entry to
have it put in the books?
Mr. Podell: That is right.
The Court: Let us have it.
Mr. Podell: I want to show your Honor
that anyone examining those books was
bound to come to the conclusion that they
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were irregular, that they were dishonest. It
was not one instance of a mistake, but a
series.
Mr. Marshall: I object to his summing
up this way, your Honor. It does not show
anything of the kind. It shows we did a
good job.
Mr. Podell: You will be very proud of
that job before we are through. Before we
are through with you, we will show you what
a wonderful job you did.
Mr. Marshall: I do not pose.
Q. In the first place, all these corrections that
were made, if you assume that Stern had made
these errors, all those that we are going to talk
about in the inventory, assume now that they were
mistakes; assume, however, that Stern did not want
to be dishonest, but what I want to ask you is, did
you find all these mistakes were in Stern's favor,
all these mistakes that we are going to take up
now? A. No, sir, not all of them.
Q. About how many of them?
Mr. Marshall: I think he ought to give
them, and not proportions. I think that is
a guess.
The Witness: I was going to embody that
in my summary after I cover the specific
items.
Mr. Marshall: That would be a fairer
way.
The Court: I think so.
Q. Do we understand that first item correctly,
that Stern originally omitted from his books putting down what he owed for merchandise, although
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he had pocketed the money he had received from
selling? Is that right? A. Yes.
Q. From the original books, and Touche & Niven
corrected that on that first item, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, the next item. A. The next item is
journal entry No. 6. I am still on page

1169

1170

First Juror: Where can we find the information about that he owed for that?
Where was that?
Mr. Marshall: I do not get that.
Mr. Podell: Where and how did Touche
& Niven find that he, Stern, owed for that
merchandise? That is the juror's question
The Witness: I cannot answer that on
my personal knowledge, but they probably
found this from the shipping records.
The Court: The examination of the shipping records disclosed that fact ?
The Witness: This is contained right on
Touche, Niven's working papers. I did not
find that. I did not discover those.
The Court: You see the difficulty. You
see, Mr. Juryman, these papers from which
this witness is reciting are the work sheets
of the defendant. In other words, the photostatic copy of this which counsel has in his
hand, which was used by the accountants at
the time that they were going over the books
and papers of Stern & Company, and those
are what counsel for plaintiff are attempting to show—these particular things which
Stern & Company did, intending to indicate
that there was knowledge upon the part of
Touche, Niven & Co. that those things were
bad, and, being bad, be careful how you go—
in the vulgar vernacular. Is that the theory?
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Mr. Podell: That is the theory.
The Court: I have cleaned up that much.
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, taking each one of these
items separately
Mr. Marshall: Don't you think your
Honor ought to say
Mr. Podell: Your Honor has answered
the juror's question.
Mr. Marshall: Don't you think you ought
to say you have formed no opinion on that?
The Court: Not at all. I am describing
what they might show as evidence.
First Juror: I want to get it, and the
others do not get it, so that I get it in my
mind
The Court: It makes no difference whether
that gets on the record or not.
Q. Mr. Levy, when you say that they had been
paid for this merchandise and had not made an
entry—that is, Stern, in his books, showing that
he had paid for it, are you quoting what Touche
& Niven themselves say in that work sheet? A. I
am referring to what they did. They entered that
bill and added that amount to the liabilities of
Stern.
Q. So that would show that that is what Touche,
Niven did in connection with that account? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you have a number of such items there,
aggregating a total, as I see it, of $312,550.70? A.
A number of journal entries.
Q. Can you deal with that as a whole, or must;
you take up each item separately? A. Well, I can
do either.
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Q. Well, which is the simpler method? A. I
think perhaps if I ran through these journal entries I can do it rather briefly, and read from the
working papers.
Q. All right, go ahead. A. And then summarize.
Journal entry No. 6, on Touche-Niven's working
paper page 161, charges the purchase account and
credits inventory with the amount of $19,031.65,
and the explanation by Touche, Niven & Co. is as
follows: "To charge the purchase account with the
following lots which have been included in the inventory twice"—and then they enumerate these
items, which amount to, in terms of English currency, and then convert them at the rate of $4.343/8
per pound, getting the amount of $19,301.65.
Q. In simple language does that mean that they
found that Stern had taken certain items and had
duplicated them in making up his inventory? A.
Precisely.
Q. That is, he had $19,000 worth of merchandise
which he entered up twice? A. Exactly.
Q. Instead of it being just $19,000 worth of merchandise which he had, when he got through adding
it up, $38,000? A. Exactly.
Q. And that is what the Touche-Niven papers
show, is that right? A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Marshall: May I understand one
thing: You do not mean, when you say that
Stern put that in twice, that he did it personally, do you?
The Witness: I am referring to the accounts of Stern & Company.
Mr. Marshall: And that one of the employees might have done it?
Mr. Podell: I do not think, your Honor,
with the greatest respect, that that inter-
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ruption is necessary. I do not think it is
plain that Stern himself did the bookkeeping.
The Court: It is his servants.
Mr. Marshall: He said Stern, and I want
to know.
The Court: Everything contained here is
what Stern did through his representatives.
Mr. Marshall: It may make it clear
whether Stern himself made the mistake or
whether one of his employees did it.
Mr. Podell: I object to that discussion,
which tends to confuse us.
The Court: It does. You can ask when
the times comes, Mr. Marshall. Let us get
along on this or we will never get through.
Make a reservation on your cross-examination and bring that out.
The Witness:
Journal entry No. 7
charges the purchase account and credits
acceptances in the amount of $5,473.12, and
the explanation on Touche-Niven's working
paper is as follows: "To record the following shipment not entered in purchase account till January, 1924, but sold to Hood
Rubber Company December 26, 1923, invoice
17, 9, 78," and then it gives some details.
Q. Does that in plain English mean the same as
the first item? A. Yes, sir.
Q. That is to say, received certain merchandise
for which he had been paid, he had sold it to somebody. He had been paid and kept the money, but
did not have on his books a record of the money
that he owed to the man he bought it from. Is
that correct? A. Yes. I may say that this entry
does not refer to whether or not he had paid for
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the merchandise, but that won't matter. He had
not taken it upon his books. He had not shown
that there was a liability for it.
Q. If he had paid for that merchandise, he would
have a liability for it, and then an item or entry
showing he had paid for it? A. If he had paid for
the merchandise, and if the corresponding liability
had not been entered, then the payment would appear as an asset on his books instead of being offset
by the liability.
Q. Is that correct to say that there was neither
a charge nor a credit? That is to say, neither a
debit or credit in respect to that item as to payment for merchandise? A. This entry merely indicates that the liability had not been taken on
the books and Touche, Niven & Co. increased
Stern's liabilities by that amount.
Q. All right, of course, the three items you have
spoken of thus far are $8,426.30, $19,031.65, $5,473.12. Those were mistakes made by Stern. Every one
of those mistakes was in favor of Stern, was it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And would increase his assets, would it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now then, the next item. A. Journal entry
No. 8 charges purchases and credits inventory
$14,807.84, the explanation being "To eliminate
from the inventory of December 31, 1923, lot 7586,"
with a lot of detail, "which was sold and charged
to Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Company in December, 1923."
Q. In other words, he had sold the merchandise
and he claimed to still have it in the inventory,
and at the same time he had entered in accounts
receivable, showing that there was money due him
from the person who had bought that merchandise,
is that right? A. Yes, sir.
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Q. So that instead of having his assets there
$14,000, he doubled his assets and made it $28,000?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He counted the same item of merchandise—I
hope to make myself clear, your Honor—he counted
the same item of merchandise both as having it in
his premises and as having sold it to somebody who
owed him money for it?
The Court:

Yes.

A. Journal entry No. 9 appears to cover some
similar items.
Q. If the last item we spoke of was a mistake
on Stern's part, it was also a mistake in his favor
of fourteen thousand odd, was it not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now then, item No. 9? A. Charges purchase
and credits the inventory—that is, it reduces the
inventory—in the amount of $18,728.20, and the
explanation being "To eliminate the following lots
from inventory, same having been sold in December,
1923." And then the detail follows.
Q. Well, he had doubled on that item, too, by
counting it as merchandise in hand and part of
the inventory and also counted it as an asset, being
an account receivable, having sold it to somebody?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was a mistake in Stern's favor, if
it was a mistake, of $18,000 worth? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, coming to item No. 10. A. Item No.
10 charges purchases in the amount of $225,590.94.
It credits—that is, it reduced the inventory $178,229 and it credits acceptances—that is, it increases
liabilities in the amount of $47,361.94.
Q. What note is there? A. The explanation is,
"To eliminate items taken in inventory which were
not received until January and drafts for which
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are not reported by banks as having been accepted
in December, 1923, and to set up as liability other
items in the inventory which were not put through
books till January, but drafts for which were accepted by Huth & Company in December." This
is a little complicated, because it really consolidates the two journal entries. First we have a
reduction of the inventory of $178,229, and with
regard to that reduction in inventory, the explanation is "To eliminate items which were taken in
inventory but were not received until January, and
the liability for which was not incurred until January." The other part of the entry
Q. Do you mean by that that the man had included merchandise in inventory of $178,229 but
had failed to charge up— A. No, sir.
Q. —as an indebtedness the money that he owed
for it? A. No, sir. Not as to that part. As to that
part, he had merely included in his December 31
inventory merchandise which he did not get until
January. It simply was not there on December
31, and he had not assumed the liability for it,
and he was stating an inventory as of December 31.
Q. Yes? A. In which were included items that
did not come along until subsequently, January.
Q. The subsequent year?
The Court:

There are two parts to it.

Q. Yes. A. The other part of the entry relates
to the items that you have just asked me about.
There the accountants increased the liabilities to
the extent of $47,361.94, and the explanation as to
this increase of liabilities is "To set up as a liability for items in the inventory which were not
put through the books until January, the drafts
for which were accepted by Huth & Company in
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December." In other words, there was $47,000
worth of merchandise included in the inventory the
drafts for which had been accepted but the liability was not taken on the books until January,
so, of course, the accountants made it clear
Mr. Marshall:
that answer.

Let us have the rest of

Q. So, of course, the accountants made that adjustment? A. Made that adjustment,
Q. If we assume that was all a mistake on the
part of Stern, how much of a mistake was it in
dollars and cents? A. $225,590.94.
Q. He made one big mistake for $225,000?

1190

Mr. Marshall: Let him finish.
The Witness: Yes. This embodies numerous items which are summarized.
Mr. Marshall: I think we ought to be fair
there. It was not one mistake.
The Witness: A great many mistakes.
Q. But they were all in his favor, were they not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All these mistakes were likewise in his favor,
were they not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And they aggregate a total of $225,590? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. And how much of that—did it all operate to
reduce his assets or increase his assets by that
amount? A. It operated to increase his net assets.
Q. By how much? A. By $225,590. It decreased
his inventory by $178,000
Q. As a matter of fact, if we call it a mistake,
it increased his assets by $225,000, and then the
accountants corrected that alleged mistake and reduced his mistake on that? A. Yes, sir.
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Q. If I understand you correctly, that all—as to
that $178,000, all that Stern did was to include
in the inventory as of December 31 $178,000 worth
of merchandise which he never had in his place
on December 31? A. Which he did not get until
January.
Q. Until some time in January? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, how would that affect his assets, assuming that he included it and made a charge that he
owed for that merchandise $178,000; would not
that equalize his accounts? A. If he had done that,
it would not have affected his net assets.
Q. That is the— A. But he had omitted the
liability.
Q. In other words, he included that $178,000
worth of merchandise but did not charge himself
for that merchandise the price that he owed for that
merchandise? A. Exactly.
Q. So that it tended immediately to increase his
assets by $178,000? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, Mr. Levy
Mr. Marshall: I do not understand that,
your Honor. Are you testifying from this
paper or outside of it?
The Witness: From this paper.

1194

Q. From the work sheets of Touche, Niven, is not
that correct? A. Certainly.
By Mr.

Marshall.

Q. Is this page 162? A. Page 162, yes, sir.
Mr. Marshall: All right.

399
Saul Levy—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

1135

By Mr. Podell.
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, what I am going to ask you
now is—I wish you would clearly understand, and
before you give me a correct answer
Mr. Marshall: May I interrupt ? I think
you made a mistake in the question. You
did not mean $178,000 are liabilities?
Mr. Podell: $178,229. I beg your pardon.
That is another item.
Q. Mr. Levy, Mr. Marshall says that the liability
that was not set up was $47,000 and not $178,000.
A. That is another item that he refers to.
Q. You mean that is an additional item? A.
Yes.
Q. But the $178,000 was one item; there was no
liability entered for that, although he included it
in the inventory? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the $47,000 was an additional item where
he had credited—you had better tell us in your
own language what that $47,000 item is. A. The
$47,000 represents merchandise that was included
in inventory
The Court: To be delivered in January?
The Witness: No, we are on the second
half of it now.
The Court: I understand.
The Witness:
That merchandise was
there, but the liability for it was not set up
on the books.
Q. In other words, the $47,000 he had received
in time before December 31 and it should have been
included in the inventory as it was? A. Yes, sir.
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Q. He included the merchandise but he did not
put down in his books that he owed for it, is that
it? A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Marshall: All right,

1199

1200

Q. Now, Mr. Levy, you have heard of inventories
being padded. No, I am speaking seriously. I
just want to make a certain distinction there that
I want to make clear, and see if I am right. You
have heard of that in the course of accounting?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. A merchant will very often place a higher
value on certain merchandise than the market allows, won't he? A. That is frequent, yes, sir.
Q. Sometimes he will take it at cost and cost is
higher than the prevailing market, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And sometimes he will take it at market
value, and that is higher than cost, where he might
have taken it at cost? A. Yes, sir, attempts to do
that will often be made.
Q. And sometimes he will take it at a higher
value than cost or market, to show a large statement and large assets—that sometimes happens?
A. That sometimes does.
Q. Now, you have made a certain allowance for
inventory, a certain percentage sometimes. I mean,
you either reduce it or increase it, according to
what the particular client did, in the audit of accounts, sometimes, don't you? That is normal, is
it not? A. We correct all errors that we discover,
yes, sir.
Q. I am speaking now of the different types of
errors, that is what I am driving at. A. None of
these errors related to the price of merchandise.
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Q. That is what I am driving at. Were those
errors where a man attempted to increase the value
of merchandise that he had, or were they exclusive
of entries deliberately made in the exclusion of
liabilities and the inclusion of assets? That is
what I am driving at.
Mr. Marshall: I object to the suggestion—attempted and deliberately made.
Mr. Podell: All right, I will reframe my
question and bring out what I have in mind.
Q. Mr. Levy, I want you to state in your own
way, so far, at least, from these items alone that
you have given, what would an ordinary, reasonable, prudently careful accountant, having in mind
a man who did nothing extraordinary—just exercising prudent care—what would be the conclusions that he would be justified in drawing if he
found those errors or corrections or alleged errors
in the books?

1202

Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court : Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
A. I think it is quite obvious that here is an
attempt to fraudulently pad an inventory.
Q. Now, there is no doubt that these mistakes
aggregating $225,000 were in Stern's favor, as were
all the others, if they were mistakes? A. They
were in Stern's favor; that is, they overstated his
net assets.
Q. Now, then, as to the mistakes which he made
against himself, what were they? Were there any?
A. Yes, sir. I think one comes up in the next
entry.
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Q. Yes, item No. 12? A. No.
mistake against himself.

1205

1206

That was not a

Q.
a different type of adjustment, This entry added
to the inventory or charged the inventory with
$6,254.09 and credited the Konig Company, who
was a creditor, with the same amount.
Q. That was another reduction from inventory,
was it? A. No, sir. This was added to the inventory and added to the liabilities. This did not
affect the net worth of the concern one way or the
other.
Q. This was just an item where he had received
merchandise and had sold it, is that right? A. No,
sir. Shall I read Touche & Niven's explanation?
Q. Yes. A. "Invoice drawn for"—and then it
gives the detail—"in December, but not set up in
F. S. & Company books till January." This was
a December invoice and should properly have been
entered in December so that the amount would be
added to inventory and added to liabilities. Stern
did not enter it. He omitted it entirely, and did
not enter it until January, and so the adjustment
was made by the accountants.
Q. At least, if it was not a mistake against himself, it was not a mistake in his favor; that is what
you mean. It did not affect— A. In view of the
amount, I think we can say it was a mistake which
was neither against nor in his favor.
Q. Now, then, as to the next item. A. The next
item, journal entry No. 16, was a mistake which
Stern made against himself.
Q. And how much was that? A. The accountants
showed the inventory increased inventory $8,687.50
and credited the purchase account, and their explanation is "to correct error in original inventory
figures," and they give the details of the correction.
The amount there is $8,687.50.
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Q. That was a mistake that Stern made, if that
is a mistake, in his own favor? A. Yes. Apparently an error in computation.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
was a

Marshall: That was not a fraud.
Podell: I beg your pardon?
Marshall: That was not a fraud. It
mistake.

Q. Go ahead.
Mr. Podell: Get all the comfort out of
this you can.
Mr. Marshall: I am just laughing at it.
Q. Go ahead, sir. A. No. 17 is a very small itemQ. Do not pay any attention to that. A. $27.
Q. Leave that out. A. No. 29, on page 166 of
the working sheets, charges the purchase account
and credits accounts receivable in the amount of
$6,439.64; the explanation being, "invoice 18,006,
sold in December for purchase, not charged to the
rubber purchases until January," and then there
is further detail.
Q. How does that affect the net result? A. And
the note this was charged—there is a further note
there, but it is immaterial. It relates to the wrong
account being charged.
Q. Yes, A. The effect of this was to reduce their
assets $6,400. That is the effect of the accountant's entry, was to reduce Stern's assets.
Q. It was a mistake that Stern had made, if we
call it a mistake, in the sum of $6,439? A. Yes, sir.
Q. What he did there was to sell the merchandise in December and collect or rather credit himself with that amount of money due from the person to whom he had sold it, but it was not until
January that he set up the entry in his books show-
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ing that he owed money for that same merchandise, having bought it, is that it? A. Yes, sir.
The Court: Let us take a few moments'
recess.
(After short recess.)
Q. Just one more of these items, Mr. Levy, and
that will conclude that branch of it, I think— A.
Journal entry No. 30, page 167.
Q. Can you not shorten it by just saying it was
another mistake that he made in his favor, if it
was a mistake, in the sum of $14,025?
1211

1212

Mr. Marshall: What are you referring to
now, please?
Mr. Podell: Journal entry No. 30, page
167.
Mr. Marshall: You had better explain it.
I object to the summary.
Q. All right. You explain it in your own way.
A. In this entry, Touche, Niven & Co. charged purchases and credit accounts receivable; that is, they
reduce accounts receivable in the amount of $14,025.39; and their explanation is as follows: "To
adjust the following accounts for invoices at cost
paid for in December and charged to accounts, but
invoices not credited to creditor's accounts. All
this merchandise was sold in December." And then
it gives the details of the sales.
Q. Well, to summarize it in popular language,
what had Stern done and what had Touche-Niven
done in regard to this 14,000? A. Well, they had
sold this merchandise in December and had charged
accounts receivable with that and
Q. Called it an asset of $14,000? A. Yes, sir.
And had omitted the liability to creditors for it.
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And Touche-Niven made the adjustment by reducing the customers' accounts for the cost of that
merchandise.
Q. $14,000? A. $14,000.
Q. So that it was again an instance where Stern
had increased his assets by $14,000 in that way?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The total? A. May I summarize these entries?
Q. Yes, summarize it.
Mr. Marshall: May I have a copy of the
witness' summary, if he is going to read from
it?
The Court: Yes, you will have it.
Mr. Marshall: May I have one now?
Mr. Podell: You may have a copy of anything we have.
The Court: Have you an extra copy of
it?
The Witness: Yes (handing to counsel).
Mr. Marshall: Which schedule are you referring to now?
The Witness: The one that is number 2.
The net result of the journal entries which
I have read are as follows: They debit the
purchase account in the aggregate amount
of $312,550.70.
Q. In plain language, does that mean that
Stern— A. I beg your pardon. I think if I may
summarize it after giving the total debitsQ. All right. A. They debit the purchase account $312,550.70. They debit the inventory $15,029.04. They credit acceptance account $67,602.90.
They credit inventory $230,824.31. They credit accounts receivable $20,465.03. They credit the pur-
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chase account $8,687.50. And after eliminating offsetting entries, all of these journal entries boil
down to this: They reduce the inventory $215,795.27.

1217
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Mr. Marshall: Just a second. Where are
you getting this from?
The Witness: It is my summary.
Mr. Marshall: Not on this table?
Mr. Podell: It is not on any table.
The Witness: But I can show you how
it is made up from that table.
Mr. Marshall: Have you got it before
you there; might I follow?
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, that includes a
number of comments. I am perfectly willing to give counsel tabulations, but I do not
think he ought to have our comments just
now.
The Court: No, he cannot give you that
because he has just got that one comment
for himself and him, I suppose, for the purpose of the examination.
Mr. Marshall: I would be interested in
knowing what he is testifying to.
Mr. Podell: I have no objection if counsel will consent to have the accountant's
complete report go in evidence. I am satisfied to have that go in.
Mr. Marshall: Blind, without seeing it?
Mr. Podell: You can read it. At the
proper time I will offer it, very glad to offer
it.
Q. You say that the net result was what? A.
The net result of all of these entries was as follows: The inventory was reduced $215,795.27.
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Q. Let me interrupt to ask: Does that mean that
Stern in the manner and method that you have
described from Touche-Niven's own work sheets
had increased his inventory originally by $215,795.27? A. Yes, sir. He had overstated his inventory.
Q. He had overstated his inventory in that
amount? A. Yes.
Q. Had he overstated his accounts receivable,
and in what amount? A. He had overstated his
accounts receivable in the amount of $20,465.03.
Q. And then the accounts payable, had he understated those? A. The accounts payable or the acceptances payable had been understated by the
amount of $67,602.90.
Q. Now then, so that there will be absolutely no
confusion about it: He had in his records represented that he had $215,000 more merchandise than
he actually had? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that correct? A. Than Touche-Niven
found that he had.
Q. He had represented
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Mr. Marshall: To Touche-Niven?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
Q. He represented that he had $20,000 more accounts receivable than he really had? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And he had represented, rather his records
as he kept them, showed that he had understated
the moneys that he owed by $67,000?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that question
in that form. If he wants to say that he represented to Touche-Niven, I think that is allowable.

1221

408

1222

1223

1224

Saul Levy—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

Q. Did his books show that in the keeping of
his books—well, in what form did he represent;
state in your own words? A. I will put it this
way: That the working sheets which I have examined show that Touche-Niven discovered that he
had oversated his net assets in the amount of
$303,863.20, and that they had passed through correcting entries for those.
Q. And that overstatement was in the manner
and method that you have described in detail? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Now, I want to ask you this question: Mr.
Levy, from your experience as an accountant, acting just in a normal, prudently, reasonably careful way, I mean without any extraordinary care,
any accountant, acting with ordinary care, finding
this condition, this overstatement of assets in the
sum of $303,000, in the manner that is described
in these very work sheets of Touche-Niven, what
was he bound to do, in connection with any audit
that he was making of those books?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling
for a conclusion.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: This witness is not competent.
The Court: Overruled. You are not objecting on the grounds of qualifications or
anything of that kind?
Mr. Marshall: I do not regard him as
qualified.
Mr. Podell: If he objects to qualifications, go ahead and satisfy yourself.
Mr. Marshall: You satisfy me.
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Mr. Podell: If counsel wants to ask him
any questions as to his qualifications, let
him ask him.
The Court: Did you qualify him at the
start?
Mr. Podell: I asked him whether he had
ten years experience.
The Witness: On certified public accounting.
Q. State your experience, what you have done
as a certified public accountant, so the jury will
know some of your ability to pass on these things.
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The Court: Or to render this opinion.
Q. Or to render this opinion? A. I have been
in active practice in New York City as a certified
public accountant for the past ten years, a little
over that.
Q. Tell us some of the organizations that you
have audited books for? A. I prefer not to go into
that.
Q. Mention some of them? A. I have done
Mr. Marshall: I would not ask that. Let
us see the kind of audits he made.
Mr. Podell: That might be disclosing
confidential information?
Mr. Marshall: Yes. I do not think he
should be asked that.
Q. Tell us anything that you are in a position
to tell us, with regard to your qualifications? A.
I have been in active practice for all of that period
of time; and during that time I have personally
conducted and have supervised my assistants in the
conduct of perhaps hundreds of audits. I have
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certified to balance sheets that have been relied
upon by bankers and others granting credit. And
I engaged generally in the practice of accountancy
during all of that time. Prior to that time I had
been doing public accounting work for a period
of approximately three years, making my total accounting experience total about thirteen years; and
prior to that time for five years or more, I did
bookkeeping work.
Q. Generally, without mentioning names, you
represented large organizations? A. Large, yes, sir,
large and small.
Q. You made audits of institutions whose worth
is in excess, really in excess of a million dollars?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have had occasion to check up the
work of your subordinates on the job in connection
with those matters? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, will you tell us any accountant that
finds a condition like the one you have just described
Mr. Marshall: May I ask him some questions on accountancy?
The Court: Yes. This is not in relation
to the accounts. This is in relation to qualifications to render an expert opinion.

1230

By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Have you ever audited the books of a rubber
concern? A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever audited the books of a company in the kind of business that Stern was in?
A. In the importing business, yes, sir.
Q. Have you practiced for yourself ever since you
have been an accountant? A. Yes, sir. And I have
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conducted practice in my own name. Of course,
I have a staff.
Q. I understand that. Have you ever been connected with any other firm of accountants? A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Whom? A. For a short, for a very short time,
with Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Company.
Q. How long was that, and when? A. That was
just a matter of a few months, in 1917, I believe;
and prior to that time I was on the staff of Mr.
Jacob Schapiro, for a period of over a year.
Q. That is in this city? A. Yes, in this city. I
think the firm name is now Schapiro & Schapiro.
Q. What other firms have you been connected
with? A. I was in the government service for a
period of eighteen months; I was plant accounting
officer at the Western Electric Company.
Q. Where is that? A. For the government, representing the government.
Q. The government at the Western Electric Company? A. At the Western Electric plant.
Q. When was that? A. That was in 1918, I believe.
Q. Well now, you have brought us up to 1918,
have you? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you go on and tell me
A. I will have
to go back to tell you whom I have been employed
by.
Q. That is what I am trying to find out. A.
Because in 1919 I commenced practicing in my own
office, at 120 Broadway, New York, and I have
been engaged in practice by myself during all of
that time.
Q. By yourself? A. By myself during all of that
time, yes, sir.
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Q. There are no other firms you were with prior
to the time you had started for yourself? A. Not
as a public accountant. I have done bookkeeping
work and other similar work for the United Press
Associations, for Symons, Krausman Company,
cigar manufacturing concern.
The Court: Go back to the question,
please.
(Question repeated as recorded.)
By Mr. Podell.
1235

Q. What was he bound to do in approaching
the balance sheet audit or an audit of the books
for the purpose of issuing a statement, a certified
statement?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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A. He was bound to regard the whole situation
with very strong suspicion, and to look for similar
irregularities, to make a very searching examination with respect to items, so as to guard against
overstatements in other accounts.
Q. Now, tell me, in discovering these things that
they did discover, that you have described, did
they have to go to the supporting books, the books
supporting the ledger? A. Certainly.
Q. They could not have discovered those things
without going to the supporting books, is that
right? A. I am sure they could not.
Q. They could not. Now then, will you turn to
the rubber sales account. You made an examination of that account? A. Yes, sir.
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The Court: What part of the Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1 does this inventory account refer;
where is it on that?
The Witness: May I show your Honor?
The Court: Yes.
(Witness indicates.)
Mr. Podell: I think, your Honor, if I
may show it to the jury also
The Court: Yes. I would like to have
the jury see it.
Mr. Podell: Is it the item "Inventory
crude rubber"?
The Witness: $131,000.
Mr. Marshall: Pledged.
(Shown to jury.)
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Q. That is the reduced inventory? A. Mr.
Podell
Q. May I ask you one question: This $131,000
appears to have been pledged. Can you tell this
jury whether this increase of $215,000, which Stern
originally had, had that been pledged or was it unpledged; did you know? A. I don't know.
Q. Their work sheets do not show that?
Mr. Marshall: I think he described what
happened to those items already.
Mr. Podell: Will you permit me, please,
to ask a question, Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Marshall: I raise an objection to it.
Q. Of course, not having had that merchandise,
he could not have pledged it, could he?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as a statement. It does not show that he did not have
that merchandise. Some of it came in later.
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Some of it had already been sold; but to say
he did not have the merchandise
Mr. Podell: That is not so at all, and I
object to any such statement. This is a pure
fraud and a falsification. That is what we
claim.
Mr. Marshall: May I finish something,
your Honor?
Mr. Podell: Counsel would like to smooth
it over by saying some of it came in before
and some of it came in after. That is all
talk that tends to confuse.
The Court: I apparently started something by asking a question, have I not?
Mr. Podell: Your Honor cannot be blamed
for his statements.
Mr. Marshall: Let us have the question.
Mr. Podell: I will withdraw that question for the present and go along.
The Witness: I meant to call your attention to another working sheet of ToucheNiven. I have here the working sheets which
cover all of the journal entries which I have
read, and then
Mr. Podell: I would like to mark them in
evidence. They all relate to Schedule No. 2?
Mr. Marshall: They are in evidence.
The Witness: Yes, sir, they contain other
entries as well, but these sheets contain those
entries relating to inventory and purchases
which I have testified about.
Mr. Marshall: May we have the number
of the page?
The Witness: That was page 160. I believe the last entry was on page 167. Then,
in addition to that is the summary sheet,
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page 67, as handed to Mr. Towell for audit
by Stern, which shows the entry of $347,000,
and then another working sheet, page 65,
which shows the inventory of $131,000
which
Mr. Podell: Where is the one that shows
$347,000?
(Handed to counsel.)
Mr. Podell: This is one of the sheets,
gentlemen, "summary sheet as handed to me
for audit", signed by Towell. And you will
notice it says, "inventory December 31st,
1923, $347,219.08." Then, readjusting inventory which shows the inventory to be $131,423.81.
By Mr.

1243
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Podell.

Q. This is from Touche-Niven's working papers?
A. Yes, sir. That is a photostat copy of them.
Mr. Podell: Will it be stipulated as to
whose handwriting appears on those two
sheets, Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Marshall: Page 65 is all in the handwriting of either Mr. Siess or Mr. Towell.
Page 67 is in the handwriting of some employee of Stern, who gave that as the inventory of Stern. Then, except at the bottom,
"the summary sheet as handed to me for
audit S. Towell," is in Mr. Towell's handwriting.
Mr. Podell: I take it they concede it,
that that inventory sheet was given to Mr.
Towell when he came there to begin his
audit, as a statement of inventory of that
date by some one of Stern's employees?
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Mr. Marshall: Sometime during the audit.
I do not know just what date.
Mr. Podell: Surely before he made the
audit which resulted in these adjustments.
Mr. Marshall : Before he went over the
inventory.
Mr. Podell: Yes.
By Mr. Podell.
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Q. Now, Mr. Levy, will you turn to rubber sales
account. You say you have made an examination
of that, and I would like you to tell what you
found, using the papers of Touche-Niven, and such
other papers as you will refer to in making that
examination?
Mr. Marshall: Is this the general ledger?
The Witness: General ledger.
Mr. Marshall: I object to the witness testifying from this book. There has been nothing to identify the condition of the book
at the time when
The Court: I cannot hear you.
Mr. Marshall: At the time the audit was
made. I say, there has been no proof so
far of the condition of the book at the time
the audit was made.
Mr. Podell: The condition of the book,
there has been. Mr. Siess has testified.
The Court: I will allow it. Objection
overruled.
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully take an exception, and may I note now an exception
to any and all testimony of this witness referring to these books, to any of these books?
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The Court: Of any of them?
Mr. Marshall: I will take them one at a
time then. Of this book.
The Court: I cannot follow every one of
them, but I believe this one has been connected.
Mr. Marshall: All right, Judge. Exception.
The Witness: This is the rubber sales
account in the general ledger, that covers
the year 1922 and also the year 1923. It
shows a balance for the year 1923 of $10,492,387.64, representing the total net sales
for the year, and that same balance appears
in the work sheets of Touche, Niven & Co.,
page 4.
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute.
The Witness: In the column marked
"balance before closing December 31st", and
alongside of the item "rubber sales". Examining this account, I find on its credit
side each month a large amount appears, representing the total sales for the month.

1249

1250

Q. Does more than one such item appear for
any month prior to December, 1923?
Mr. Marshall: May I look over your
shoulder?
The Witness: Yes. During the year 1922,
there are a total of twelve such items on the
credit side, one for each month of the year.
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out 1922.
The Court: No. I will allow it because
it is in evidence that he made the examination of 1922.
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Mr. Marshall: Exception.
The Witness: And during 1923, I
one such credit item for each of the
eleven months of the year, but during
cember I find two such credit items in
rubber sales account.

find
first
Dethis

Q. Read the items, if you please? A. One for
$644,758.17, and another credit item in December
for $706,843.07.
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Mr. Marshall: I move to strike that out
now, as the contents of a book not in evidence.
The Court: Denied. That is a general
objection. You do not need to take any
more exceptions. Put it on the record as a
general objection and exception as to the
admissibility of this particular testimony
based on the figures in the books from which
they are taken.
By Mr. Podell.

1251

Q. Mr. Levy, one of the jurors asked me—there
are two columns appearing on that sheet. One is
debit and the other is credit. When you speak of
one item for each month, what are you referring
to? A. I am referring to the credits only and the
credits represent total sales made during the
month. The debits would represent the offsets consisting of any returns or allowances or other chargebacks.
Q. But credits, deducting the offset, you get the
net assets, the net sales? A. You get the net volume of business, the net sales.
Q. Go along in your own way and just explain
that account ? A. Yes, sir. Each one of these credit
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entries makes reference to a voucher number. For
instance, these items of December, 1923, refer, in the
first case, to 12-9, journal voucher for the twelfth
month of the year, December voucher No. 9. The
second credit, sales credit in December, of $706,000,
refers to journal voucher No. 28, of December.
Q. Are those customary references to supporting
books? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Supporting records? A. Yes, sir. The ledger is always posted up from some underlying
record.
Mr. Marshall: I object to that statement
and move to strike it out, because of the
specific statement of Romberg here the other
day, that this book was posted from invoices
and not from these journal vouchers.
The Court: I think that is so, Mr. Podell.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, that is not the
question now. The question is what is the
usual customary thing with regard to references. I am perfectly willing——
The Court: You mean Stern & Company
should have had a book that they put them
in first and then into this?
Mr. Podell: Yes. And if it was irregular,
they had notice of it. If there was anything
irregular about it, different in Stern's case
from any other case, they certainly had notice of it and are chargeable with notice of
it.
Mr. Marshall: That is a conclusion and
summary.
The Court: I think it is, Mr. Podell. I
will sustain the objection.
Mr. Podell: You mean the witness is testifying to a conclusion?
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The Court: No. I sustain the objection
that counsel originally made, that it having
been testified that these particular entries
were made right from the sales bills themselves——
Mr. Podell: I think he is in error about
that.
Mr. Marshall: I will show it to you.
Mr. Podell : Now, if your Honor please,
I know what the witness said. The witness
said that he referred to three items. He referred to the journal vouchers, the debit
memo book—remember that black book—he
referred to that too as one of the supporting
books. He referred to the journal too.
The Court: A journal?
Mr. Podell: I think so. Shipment record.
He referred to that, and specifically identified the volumes; but it is not material one
way or the other. What we are driving at
is something different. I want your Honor
to know as we go along.
Mr. Marshall: I will call your Honor's
attention to page 190 of the record, where
Mr. Romberg was asked: "Q. That could
be posted directly from duplicate invoices,
could it not?"
The Court: Could be.
Mr. Marshall: "A. Yes."
"Q. And it frequently was so posted, was
it not? A. Yes.
"Q. Without reference to the journal
vouchers? A. At no time is there a reference to the journal vouchers."
Mr. Podell: What does that show?
The Court: I will allow the question.

421
Saul Levy—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

Mr. Marshall: He says that he did not
enter it from the journal vouchers.
Exception.
The Witness: I may say this book is the
general ledger, not the accounts payable
ledger. The accounts payable ledger might
have been posted up from the individual invoices, but this is a summary ledger.
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor, is this witness going to be allowed to describe the practice of Stern?
The Court: I think that is explanatory.
I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
By Mr.
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Podell.

Q. Now, we have been talking about the item
of $706,000, which is one of the two that appear
for December? A. Yes, sir. The fact that there
are two such entries in December is unusual on
the face of this ledger account, and because that
second amount comes through at the very end of
the year, it calls for further examination.
Q. It is the very last item, is it not?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as a conclusion.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. It is the very last item, is it not? A. It is
the very last item in this account, yes, sir.
Q. Now, assume further, Mr. Levy, as has been
testified to by Mr. Siess, that he wrote up every
item after May 7th, 1923, that it was in his handwriting, appearing on that account, every single
one item below that, and that the last item that
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he had entered was the one of $644,758, and that
the item of seven hundred and six thousand and
odd dollars was not in his handwriting and was
entered by someone else, would you take that as
an additional circumstance calling for a very close
investigation? A. Certainly.
Q. Now then, tell us what the normal ordinary
reasonable investigation would have consisted of,
and what it would have disclosed? I am not asking you for anything extraordinary, Mr. Levy. I
just want ordinary reasonable care, the ordinary
prudent examination. What would that have
shown with regard to that last item? A. Well, I
would take both items and examine them, of course.
Q. Well, you mean now both items in December?
A. Both items in December, yes. And that would
call for journal vouchers 9 and 28, of the month
of December.
Q. Now, you dig them out just as though you
were making your ordinary examination. Take
them out. Let us have those vouchers?
Mr. Podell: They are in evidence, your
Honor.
Mr. Marshall: Which are you referring
to, first?
The Witness: I am first referring to journal voucher marked 12-9.
Mr. Marshall: I object to the use of that
document on the ground that document has
in no way been connected with the case.
Mr. Podell: Specifically referred to in
the ledger.
Mr. Marshall: But it has not been connected as having been in that condition at
that time.
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Mr. Podell: It is produced from the Trustee's files and so identified by Mr. Romberg.
Mr. Marshall: I think it was not identified.
Mr. Limburg: It is part of Exhibit 21.
Mr. Podell: It was marked in evidence;
I am sure that I marked them, identified
them and marked them in evidence at the
time.
Mr. Limburg: Exhibit 21 is the entire
vouchers for December.
Mr. Podell: Marked all the vouchers in
evidence, Plaintiff's Exhibit 21.
Mr. Marshall: They were marked in on
the requirement of certain proof being necessary to connect them up finally.
The Court: Subject to connection.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, Mr. Romberg
identified them definitely; examined each one
of them and identified them as journal
vouchers that were on the files at the time,
and continued on the file. There was not
any doubt about it. The record will show
it. I am positive.
Mr. Marshall: He said, on cross-examination, he could not say whether any of those
documents were in the condition they were
in.
Mr. Podell: He said what any man on
this witness stand would be bound to say.
How could any human being say any one of
the books or vouchers or any documents
were exactly as they were. That is for the
jury to say after we get through here. You
cannot expect a human being to come here
and tell you a thousand or a million figures
were exact.
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Mr. Marshall: The man who wrote them,
ought to know.
The Court: Are those particular vouchers identified, being part of the make-up of
the record of Stern & Company at that time?
Mr. Podell: Absolutely. January and
February, 1924. They are marked in evidence Plaintiff's Exhibit 21.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully except, on
the ground that the record shows no such
thing as Mr. Podell stated.
The Court: You may have an exception.
The Witness: Journal voucher 12-9 contains five debit entries and eight credit entries and among the credit entries is a credit
to the rubber sales account, in the amount
of $644,758.17, which is the amount which
appears in this ledger account. This journal voucher appears to be a summary of a
detailed sales record. And referring from
this voucher to that, I understood referred—
Q. What is this detailed sales record that you
would refer to in order to check up and verify that
item further? A. It is called the debit memo book.
Q. Have you got it here, please?
Mr. Limburg: It is Exhibit 5 (handing).
Q. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. Let us see what it is
marked, to be sure. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.
Mr. Marshall: I have the same objection
to this book, that it has not been tied up,
and was only conditionally admitted.
The Court: It is allowed.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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Podell.

Q. Now, would your normal examination, the
ordinary examination, would that take you on down
to this debit sales book, to make certain of that
six hundred and forty-four thousand odd item? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. And what would you find if you examined
that debit sales book? A. Referring to page 33,
which shows the totals for the month of December,
1923, I might say that this book appears to be a
sales journal. That is, it contains in numerical
order the sales for the month of December.
Q. Yes. What is the total of sales given there
for the month of December? A. And comparing
the totals for the month of December with the totals which appear on this journal voucher 12-9, I
find all of the details supported in this record.
Q. In other words, this paper 12-9, is really almost a copy or summary of the details as they appear in this sales record, is that right? A. Yes,
sir. It is a restatement of the details which appear in this sales record, so that my examination
thus far would make it appear that this entry in
the rubber sales account
The Court: 644,000.
The Witness: 644,000 is quite regular.
Now following the same line of examination
with the other entry, the credit for $706,843.07, I refer to journal voucher 12-28
Q. That is the reference that is contained in
this very ledger opposite that item, is it? A. Yes,
sir.
Q. 12-28? A. Yes, sir.
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Q. What do you find on 12-28? A. But I do not
find a credit of $706,000 to the rubber sales account.
It is not there.
Q. What would you conclude from that, and
what would you do? A. Well, I would have to go
further.
Q. Then where would you go? A. I would refer
to the debit memo book again to satisfy myself
that all of the sales for December were contained
on the prior voucher, that there were not any other
sales.
Q. Just to be absolutely certain, there are some
loose leaf books. Is that debit memo book a, loose
leaf book? A. No, that is a bound book.
Q. A bound book. And are the pages all in consecutive order, in successive numbers? A. I have
not gone through the entire book.
The Court : Yes.

1278

Q. As far as you can see there? A. They are,
in December.
Q. Did you find support there for that item of
$706,000? A. No, sir, no support there at all.
Q. Now, to make absolutely certain, what would
you have done then, go further; could you have
gone any further? A. Well, examining the records,
I would have gone to the invoice file.
Q. Yes. A. Supporting this debit memo book.
That is, to the record containing copies of original
sales invoices sent to customers?.
Q. Yes? A. To see if all of those invoices had
been entered in this debit memo book, to see if
there were any other invoices there, which were
not entered in this debit memo book, which would
help to explain the seven hundred and six thousand dollar item.
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Q. What other methods would you pursue? A.
I would also have in mind going to shipping
records, but that would come in at—probably as
a later step.
Q. The invoices are not in any bound book; they
are usually loose documents, separate documents,
are they not? A. Usually they are.
Q. And they could be easily duplicated? A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Or fabricated, if we may use the term? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. To make certain they were not fabricated,
in the ordinary course, where you find no support
in the debit memo book, and no support in the
journal voucher to which specific reference is made,
would you have gone to the shipping records? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Would that have given you a reasonable certainty that the goods had been shipped or had not
been shipped? A. It would. I might have gone
further than that, depending on the circumstances,
because those shipping records might have been
fabricated, too.
Q. As a matter of fact, one of the safest methods,
particularly where you find a suspiciously large
item—is not that one of the safest methods, to
communicate with the people who are supposed to
owe this money and check up as to whether they
really owed it? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And where you find these number of suspicious circumstances, is not that what an accountant in the ordinary course of his duty, whether a
client likes it or not, is bound to do? A. Well,
the accountant is bound to insist upon doing it.
He cannot
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Q. Either that or refuse to certify to the statement? A. Or he refuses to certify, yes, sir.
Q. He always has that alternative? A. Yes, sir.
Q. I mean an accountant is free to certify or not
certify unless certain things he asks are done? A.
Yes, sir, or he can qualify his certificate, setting
forth the circumstances.
Q. In that event, would you not consider, if he
qualified or explained his certificate, that in fairness and honesty he would have to explain that
seven hundred and six thousand dollar item?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
1283
A. Yes, sir. I base that answer upon my complete examination. I haven't finished my testimony.
Q. You go along and finish your testimony now
with regard to that item. A. Referring to the sales
invoice records.
Q. Yes, let us have those.
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Mr. Marshall: May it be noted I make
my same objection to the use of this book,
that it has not been identified as being in
this condition at the time Touche, Niven &
Co. audited the books?
The Court: Yes. You may have an objection and exception. What is this entry
we are getting at? Is this a new one?
The Witness: I am still tracing the sales
credit of $706,000. I find no trace of it in
the journal voucher 12-28, and no trace of it
in the debit memo book, so I am going back
further into the records, into the sales invoices; examining this file of sales invoices
I found seventeen invoices here.
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Q. Yes. A. Which total the exact amount of
$706,000. These seventeen invoices total exactly
$706,843.07, which is the amount in the ledger, but
none of these invoices appear in the debit memo
book.
Q. And none of them appear in the journal
voucher? A. And none of them appear in journal
voucher 12-28.
Q. And the debit memo book is not a loose leaf
book, and the invoices are loose leaf, are they not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where you find the condition like that, did
you examine the invoices—I mean in the exercise
of ordinary care, in the ordinary audit, would you
have examined the invoices closely and suspiciously? A. I certainly would.
Q. Did you do that? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what did you find? How would you conduct such an examination; would you compare
them with all other previous invoices? A. I would
first look at these invoices generally to see what
they appear to be; and then I would trace them
into the customer's ledger, and I would make comparisons with the usual invoices that they had.
Q. Have you done that? A. Yes, sir, I have.
Q. What did you find? A. I found on the face
of these invoices, a number of unusual things.
Q. In what respect are they different from the
ordinary and regular invoice that the concern sent
out, first, were they regular invoices consecutively
numbered? A. They were consecutively numbered,
but these numbers were entirely out of line.
Q. You mean the numbers on these seventeen
invoices? A. On these seventeen invoices; they run
from 18235 to and including 18252, with one number omitted.
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Q. Yes. A. And the debit memo book indicates
that the last sales invoice entered in December is
18010. That is, there appears to be a gap between
18010 and 18235. That would indicate that there
is some irregularity about these invoices; they were
not prepared in the ordinary course of business, because in the ordinary course of things, the numbers would run consecutively.
Q. You go along. A. And then, right alongside
of the invoice number, glancing at other invoices,
I find that in every instance practically there are
two numbers appear. After the invoice number
of 18,000 there is a number beginning ten thousand
and something. Upon inquiry, I learned that that
second number is the shipping record number.
Q. You are speaking now of a regular invoice?
A. Yes.
Q. That contains a shipping record number? A.
An invoice number, and alongside of it a shipping
record number.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I
think that the record should show that there
are two sets of numbers there on those other
invoices.
Mr. Podell: Wait until he finishes. He
has not finished yet.
Mr. Marshall: I thought he gave the impression there was only one number on these
invoices.
Mr. Podell: Do not rest on impressions.
The Court: I thought so, too, Mr. Podell.
Mr. Podell: He has not finished his
answer.
The Witness: Let me explain. These are
carbon copies and they are presumably carbon copies of an original invoice. The origi-
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nal invoice usually goes to the customer and
on the other invoices, we have in carbon typewritten one number alongside of the other.
We have two numbers.
Q. Which other invoices? A. We have in typewriting an invoice number, and alongside of it a
second number.
Q. Yes. A. On these invoices we have typewritten but one number.
Q. You say about "these". We do not know
what you are speaking of? A. The seventeen invoices.
Q. You have what? A. We have only one typewritten number.
Mr. Marshall: The other is a written number?
The Witness: There is another number,
which is a written number, but that is a
totally different series. The other numbers run in the ten thousand series, and
these written numbers run 2600. The written number up there would appear to be
some bookkeeping reference. That is, it does
not appear from this that the written number was on the original invoice which went
to the customer, whereas from all of the
other invoices
Mr. Marshall: I certainly object to that,
as the wildest kind of a guess.
Mr. Podell: He has a right to show differences between the two sets of invoices.
That is all he is doing.
The Court: But he cannot say how it
would compare; that the other number was
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not on the invoice. He can show the distinction.
Mr. Podell: The point I am making is
that he is asked to tell what the ordinary accountant would have done and would have
concluded, and that involved an examination of the papers.
The Court: I would be glad to have him
do that, but I do not want him to render
a mental conclusion which he does not know
anything about unless he can show he does.
Mr. Podell: He has a right under that
question to state to your Honor what reactions he would have had in the ordinary examination.
The Court: Yes, and what he should have
done.
Mr. Podell: And he is entitled to say this
is what he would have concluded, where two
typewritten numbers or carbon copies of
typewritten numbers were on the usual ordinary invoice. On this invoice there appears
to be one typewritten carbon copy number
and one written in number. He would have
concluded, as he examined it, that the written number was not on the original sent to
the customer, but was a mere bookkeeping
item. That would have been his conclusion.
What that might have led him to do, remains to be seen.
The Court: I see what you mean.
Q. You go along.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
The Witness: As I say, the significance
of that number to me was that, in the first
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place, there is a difference there that I asked
about. In the second place, when I made
the inquiry, I was told that that second number was a shipping record number.
Mr. Marshall: I object to what he was
told by somebody else, and I move to strike
that out.
The Court: Strike that out. Tell us anything you found.
The Witness: I found it was a shipping
record number.
By Mr. Podell.
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Q. Now, you go along and tell us the differences
between these two sets of invoices?
The Court : Is this a summary of what
you are going to describe now? A summary
of your conclusion?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: Go right ahead.
The Witness: Further making a comparison between these seventeen invoices and the
invoices as they run in this file, I find that
in the center of most invoices appears a
number, a third number; and upon looking
at a copy of the form used, the original invoice form, I see that has provision for the
customer's order number, but on none of
these seventeen invoices is there such a customer's number.
Looking through the regular flies, I find
that practically all of these invoices refer
to some steamship, or give weight slips or
other data relating to the shipments, so you
could identify the particular shipment, the
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net weight; and none of these seventeen invoices have any reference of that character
to the steamship carrying the rubber. None
of them make a reference to a weight slip
or to a bill of lading.
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Q. Have you got one of the seventeen; are they
all in the file? A. They are all in this file.
Q. Is it possible to take one of them out? A.
It would make it much more convenient if we could
take all seventeen out.
Q. Go ahead. We will see if we cannot have
a copy made for a comparison? A. In tabulating
these seventeen invoices, to see what they totalled
up to, I also observed that they were for large
amounts. They ran $21,500 to $64,600; the seventeen of them averaged over $40,000; and looking
at the—glancing through the invoice file, I find
these are all unusually large items for Stern. Stern
had made some large sales in the past, but the
ordinary run of invoices would run—here I have
a batch before me, which shows invoices $2900,
$14,000, $2500, $9300, $1300, $5900, $2900. These
are all very large amounts.
Mr. Podell: May I hand to the jury, if
you will pardon me, a regular invoice, and
I have phtographs of these seventeen invoices, some of them.
The Court: Just hand them, one of each,
so there may be a comparison. The witness
testifies and the Court can see with its own
eyes that the seventeen run in about the
same way as distinguished by what has already been testified to as to the old invoices.
Mr. Podell: You mean, each one of the
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seventeen is pretty much the same as distinguished from all the others?
The Court: Yes.
(Recess until 2:05 o'clock P. M.)

A F T E R RECESS.
S A U L LEVY

resumes the stand.

Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I have a few
photographs of original invoices; I mean the
regular invoices.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: And photographs of these
seventeen invoices. I would like to have
them marked in evidence or marked for identification. I think better in evidence, and
let the jury see them.
Mr. Marshall: I make the same objection to their going in evidence as I did to
the originals.
The Court: Yes. Exception is granted.
Mr. Podell: I think you can mark them
as one exhibit and that will save time.
Mr. Marshall: And having been in, it is
stated that at the time we examined the
books I have no objection.
Mr. Podell: I show them to the jury as
examples of what you have already in.
The Court: Yes, they are in evidence.
(The nine papers were received in evidence
and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 78.)
Mr. Podell: There are nine out of the
seventeen and there are four regular invoices; some of them are duplicates, but
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there are nine physical exhibits. I think
you have enough to pass around to the jury.
Direct examination

1307

1308

(continued)

by Mr.

Podell.

Q. When you spoke of the second number at the
top on the seventeen, in ink, you meant the figure
appearing up above, a little above the typewritten
figure to the right in handwriting? A. Will you
tell me what invoice?
Q. Take the invoice of November 17th to the
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Company? A. What
number is that?
Q. 18,235, and the handwriting appearing in
the upper corner of the right appears 6668. A.
Yes, sir, that is the handwriting that I referred
to as distinguished from the typewritten number.
Q. There appears on this 18,235 a change which
says "Due February 15", and that is crossed out
and marked 1st? A. It is marked 3/1/—March 1st.
Q. Does that appear on other invoices, or just
on that one? I mean out of the seventeen, those
are all the same? A. There are other changes of
that sort.
Mr. Marshall: May the record show, your
Honor, that Mr. Podell is showing these exhibits to the jury at this time?
The Court: Oh, yes,
Q. When you spoke of the absence of weights,
what did you say about that? There appears to
be on this one of the seventeen, there appears to
be 139,339 pounds? A. I think you misunderstood
me, Mr. Podell. I said that there is no notation
on any of these invoices to the effect that a weight
slip is enclosed or a bill of lading is enclosed;
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whereas on other invoices that very frequently appears, "The weight slip herewith." "Bill of lading
herewith."
Q. What are the pencil
Mr. Marshall: This number frequently
appears.
The Court: That is what he says.
Q. What is the handwriting in the lower righthand corner of B-10? A. What invoice are you referring to?
Q. The regular invoice of December 31, 1923, to
the Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Company,
that appears to be one of the regular invoices. Then
this one of the seventeen invoices is the same one,
18,235, and there is a B-10 in the lower right-hand
corner? A. That would be a posting reference.
That would indicate that the account had been
posted to the customer's ledger, account 10 under
the letter B.
Q. This seventeen won't— A. They are all
posted to the customer's ledger.
Q. But in tracing whether or not sales have been
made, you find the condition that you have desscribed, that there was no posting or record of a
sale in the debit memo book or in the journal book,
and this was the difference that you found in the
appearances of the invoices? A. That is so, I have
not fully completed that though.
Q. And the seventeen, the last in the book, the
last invoices for that year? A. They are the last
in the book, yes, sir.
Fifth Juror: There are dates on the ones
previous to December 31, and the latter ones
in are November 17th.
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Q. A juror is asking the witness a question—
did you find that to be the situation? A. That is
the situation.

1313

1314

Mr. Marshall: I think that to get this
clear, certainly there is nothing to show the
order in which these loose leaf things were
in this book at that time. There has been
no identification at all. They have been gone
over in lots of hands since then. I do not
think we should be bound by the present
order of these documents in this book.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, the testimony
is that these books were in the premises on
January and February at the time they examined them and in conjunction with all of
the circumstances that we have here, all we
want to show, and have a right to show, and
I think the juror very properly asked the
question, is that here is an entry of $700,000
which is the last entry in the customer's
ledger.
The Court: I will let it stand as it is.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
The Court: Your accountants may show
differently. I do not know whether they
will or not.
Mr. Marshall: I am not discussing the
figures.
The Court: I do not mean that, but their
position.
Mr. Marshall: But their position in the
book, and the condition of this loose leaf
book.
The Court: Yes, that may be proven differently. I do not know whether they can
or not.
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Mr. Podell: We will check up on that.
We have another way.
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully take an exception.
The Court: All right, sir.
The Eighth Juror: What is the difference
in the terms of the two invoices?
Q. The juror refers to the difference in the terms
between the two invoices that you have spoken of
here? A. Yes, sir, I have not spoken of it yet, but
that is another matter that I came across in the
course of my examination.
Q. The comparison of these two? A. Yes, sir.
Not only were those amounts unusually large but
there was abnormal dating; that is, dating that
was greater than the usual dating, as shown by
the regular invoices in this file, and as shown by
the customer's accounts of these very same customers.
Q. Take the specific instance, if I may interrupt
you. I hold invoice 18,235, dated November 17,
which had at first the dating of February 15th, and
that was changed to March 1st, and that would
give it a dating of more than three months, would
it not, from November 17, the date of the invoice,
to the due date would be over three months, November 17, you see? A. November 17, yes, over three
months,
Q. Now, you have heard the testimony that the
usual dating is 30 days maximum? A. That customer's usual dating is thirty days, as shown by his
ledger account.
Q. And that was another point of difference?
A. That was another suspicious circumstance.
Q. Now then, there has been some question here
as to the order in which these invoices were in
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the book. You say that appears to be the last batch,
as you have the book now? A. I understood the
juror meant the order they were in here now.
Q. That is all right. You stated that appeared
to be the last invoices in there? A. Yes.
Q. Now in the order I was numbering, are not
the numbers appearing on those invoices—there is
a gap; the numbers are subsequent to the numbers
of the preceding invoices? A. Yes, sir, certainly.
Q. So that you got that order as to numbers
fixed. If those invoices were entered, as you see,
in the accounts receivable ledger, reference to the
accounts rceivable ledger would show the order in
which they were made up, would it not; it would
be apt to show it, would it not? A. It will show
then that there are some invoices dated November.
I have before me in this number 18,236, which is
dated November 18th, the ledger would show that
that was posted in December.
Q. In December? A. In December, yes.
Q. Would it show that it was posted after the
posting of an earlier sale than that one? A. Well,
if it were in the same account.
Q. Yes, that is what I mean. It is entered up
in the respective accounts; you could check that
up, of course? A. There is a separate account for
each customer in that ledger.
Mr. Podell: You can check that up. We
will go along with something else, because
I do not want to take too long.
Q. Now, seeing these various invoices, and the
difference in appearances between the invoices, and
seeing further the character of this last entry, and
having in mind the irregularities as to inventory
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that you have testified to—by these surrounding
circumstances, would there have been any doubt in
your mind that these invoices were fictitious?
Mr. Marshall: Same objection.
The Court: Same ruling and exception.
A. I certainly would have strongly suspected it.
It would have been at least one thing more to question.
Q. Before you ever allowed yourself to certify
such a statement, what would you have done? A.
I would have examined the shipping records, and
I would have insisted upon communicating with
those customers, particularly when I found, as I
did, that there was no record in the shipping book
that there had been shipments as indicated by
these invoices.
Q. You looked at the shipping book and you
can testify now there is no record of any of those
shipments? A. Not of those shipments, that is so.
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Mr. Marshall: The same objection as before.
The Court: Yes.
Q. I know no record of shipments
Mr. Marshall: May I point out to your
Honor, and I want your Honor to have a
chance to rule on all the facts before you,
that the witness Romberg said that was the
shipping book, he specifically stated he could
identify it in any event.
The Court: That is true. It has been
testified to here, I think, by one witness that
that was the shipping book that was there,
but he does not say it was in the condition,
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or he could not swear it was in the condition
it was now at the time they made their examination.
Mr. Marshall: That is correct; or that
it was in the condition it was at the time
this witness made his examination?
The Court: Yes, I will take all of that,
and we will see what they have to say about
it.
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor understands
I do not want to have any question that I
did not bring up all the facts to your Honor
at the time you made an important ruling.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Those are the shipping books, are they—let
me have those?
Mr. Marshall: What is the exhibit number?
The Witness: Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7
and 8.
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Q. Those are the books that contain the record
of shipments for the month of December 1923,
don't they? A. Those books cover November and
December 1923, and go back a little further than
that.
Q. And you can state you have examined those
books and you have found no record of any of these
shipments of these seventeen invoices? A. I beg
your pardon
Mr. Marshall:
exception.

The same objection and
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Q. I mean as to the description of the books?
A. Yes, sir, I was correct about that.
Q. And you have found no record of any of those
shipments? A. I found no record of any of those
shipments.
Q. In the shipping records? A. In the shipping
records, yes, sir.
Q. And your statement is that you never would
have allowed yourself to certify an account without communicating then with these alleged customers and verifying whether or not these accounts
receivable were really in existence or whether they
were pure fraud? A. Certainly, I had to have
further proof, because at this stage it would seem
quite clear that there was something wrong about
these accounts.
Q. And you would want to be convinced? A.
Certainly.
Q. And you would not consider that you were
doing anything extraordinary in that? A. Certainly not under those circumstances.
Mr. Podell: Now, will it be stipulated
that the $706,000 is fictitious or must we
read these depositions?
Mr. Marshall: It is stipulated as to some
of them.
Mr. Podell: As to those that we have
depositions of?
Mr. Marshall: No. Some of your depositions do not show.
Mr. Podell: The records were destroyed.
We have examined all these accounts comprising $706,000 by taking the depositions
of the various customers that were supposed
to be owing money to Stern to show that
they did not owe it.

1327

1328

1329

444
1330

1331

1332

Saul Levy—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

The Court: Have you all of the accounts?
Mr. Podell: All of them except some of
them saying that their records were destroyed by fire.
Mr. Marshall: I am perfectly willing to
stipulate that if somebody were called who
was competent from those concerns, they
would testify to this effect
Mr. Podell: They have testified.
Mr. Marshall: May I finish my remarks;
so that he does not have to read these into
the record.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Or waste time. I do not
want to concede the fact, but I will concede
that they would so testify.
The Court: That they will so testify—
that is a summation, Mr. Podell, which will
save a great deal of time, that counsel will
concede that if each one of these respective
parties named in these bills were called, that
they would testify that they never had any
such account with Stern & Company.
Mr. Marshall: Not any such account—
just as to these particular items.
The Court: I mean these seventeen. I
refer only to the ones in question, those
seventeen alleged customers, these items.
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor permit me
to add to that statement that we have their
depositions here?
Mr. Marshall: Some of them.
Mr. Podell: In substance they testify to
that effect, with the exception of two, whose
records were destroyed by fire, and that will
be satisfactory.
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Mr. Marshall: You have not got them
all. I will give you a concession anyway.
Mr. Podell: If you had given the concession in time, we would not have to take
the depositions.
Mr. Marshall: I did not know about it,
The Court: Are you going to read them
anyhow?
Mr. Podell: No. We served notice on
your office, Mr. Marshall.
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, does that about cover the
situation with respect to these seventeen alleged
invoices aggregating $706,000, or is there something else that occurs to you in connection with
it which you would like us to know? Pardon me,
but may I make just one thing a little clearer about
that. You spoke of the second number on the top
of the invoice; that usual second number in typewriting is the very number that refers to the shipping record, is it not? A. Yes, sir, and that is the
very number that I find in the shipping record with
respect to all other November——
Q. Regular invoices? A. November and December regular invoices.
Q. And you could not find any other number
except the ink number at the top and that was
not a reference to the shipping record, was it? A.
It was not.
Q. And the other number that is missing, is
the customer's order number; that is, in the other
invoices, the regular invoices, there is always the
customer's order number, is there not? A. There
usually is.
Q. They are not on these. Of course, these accountants examining these books, and finding that
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condition, could have asked for the original orders
from customers, too, could not they? A. Yes, sir.
The record that an accountant would ordinarily
ask for would be the shipping record though; that
is, there always is a shipping record.
Q. Well, this time, the invoice is made out when
there is a shipment made? A. Usually the invoice
is made from the shipping record, after there has
been a shipment, but other concerns keep its shipping records, and it is always there on the premises.
Q. You have spoken now of certain accounts in
December. Have you likewise examined these accounts for the month of November, 1923? A. Yes,
sir. Having come across these irregular invoices
in the month of December, I examined the records
further back to see
Mr. Marshall: Is this calling for a conclusion now?
The Court: Yes, I think so—having
found those irregular invoices.
Mr. Podell: Those invoices that you speak
of.
The Court: It may be a question as to
whether they are irregular or not.
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Q. Those irregular invoices in the form which
you have described, did you check up? A. I went
back further; I glanced through my debit memo
book for the month of November, and also through
the invoice file of November, looking for similar
items.
Q. And did you find some invoices had no support in this debit memo book? A. I might say that
I also checked back the shipping records for the
month of November as well as December, and in
checking back these shipping records I found en-
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tered in the debit memo book in the month of
November, four items on page 27, invoices Nos.
17,790 to 17,793 inclusive, four invoices, which totalled $250,474.00, and referring to the invoice file,
I found carbon copies of those invoices in here,
and they appear to be similar.
Q. The same as the seventeen invoices? A. As
the seventeen. They had many of the same earmarks.
Q. Yes? A. But there is no record of these
items having been shipped.
Q. In the shipping record? A. No, sir. Those
items were in the debit memo book, and the numbers were in order.
Q. In the debit memo book? A. In the debit
memo book, but there is no record of their having
been shipped, of any merchandise being shipped
in support of these invoices, and the four invoices
in this file had several of these other indications
on them.
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out the
word "indications".
The Court: Yes.
The Witness: I will describe what I
mean.
The Court: Yes, you have to; are they
of the same dates?
Q. Point to them and describe them? A. There
are only four of them. They have not any shipping number at the top, and they have not any
customer's order number. There is no notation
that the rubber was coming on any particular
steamship. There is no notation that a weight slip
or bill of lading is enclosed. They are all for very
large amounts. They average over $60,000 each.

1339

1340

1341

448
1342

Saul Levy—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

Q. And what is their dating? A. March 15,
April 1st, March 1st; one of them May 1st, and
those are all November invoices.
Q. Now, would you insist before certifying to
any statement, that you communicate with the people mentioned in these accounts? A. I certainly
would.
Q. Would you have signed a statement if the
client refused to allow you to communicate with
them? A. I would not have given that certificate
unless I stated in that certificate the circumstances
I had found.
1343

Mr. Marshall: That is subject to
same objection and exception.

my

Q. Is that something unusual or extraordinary
that you would have done, or is that customary
with accountants? A. All these circumstances are
unusual and extraordinary.
Q. I am not talking about unusnal circumstances. A. I should not do otherwise.
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Mr. Marshall: I think the question should
be answered whether it was customary or
usual to circularize customers.
Mr. Podell: Where accountants find discrepancies.
Mr. Marshall: That was the question. I
think the question should be answered as
given originally.
The Court: It is the same thing.
Q. When you have found all these things that
you have described, what is the thing an honest
accountant would do? A. It would be to employ
every means in his command to verify these items,
and one of these means would be to communicate
directly with the customer.
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Mr. Podell: Will it be conceded if those
communications had been sent, it would
have been found that these invoices aggregating $250,000 are fictitious?
Mr. Marshall: I will not make that concession.
Mr. Podell: Then we will read the depositions.
Mr. Marshall: I will make the same concession as in the other case.
Mr. Podell: That may leave some question in the mind of the Court or jury that
these were fictitious, and I will take time
to read them at the proper time, to read
those depositions. They are not very long.
The Court: Very well.
Mr. Marshall: I am perfectly willing to
make the same concession as to the others,
but he asked me a different thing.
Mr. Podell: All right. May I offer in
evidence the tabulation the witness has with
regard to these accounts receivable. I have
not offered the tabulation that he had with
regard to the inventory, but I offer Schedule
2 which relates to the inventory items he
has testified to.
Q. What schedule is that on; is that about accounts receivable, Mr. Levy, Schedule 1? A. That
is Schedule No. 1.
Mr. Podell: Yes, I offer in
Schedules 1 and 2.

evidence

Q. Have you this page? A. Mr. Podell, this
schedule relates to certain examinations I have
made concerning which I have not testified to.
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Q. You mean Schedule 1? A. Schedule 1.
Q. Or does that include besides these
A. I
examined the individual ledger accounts in the
customer's ledger with respect to each one of these
items.
Q. Yes. A. And I found that these invoices had
all been posted up.
Q. Yes, you have said that. A. And I also traced
these items in the Touche & Niven working papers, and through those working papers into the
balance sheet which they prepared, and I found
that these invoices, these seventeen invoices in December and four invoices in November, totalling
$957,317.07 were included in the balance sheet.
Q. In Plaintiff's Exhibit A? A. Yes, sir, in the
item, I think "Trade accounts receivable".
Q. And you got that from the working papers
of Touche, Niven & Co.? A. Taken in conjunction
with the customer's ledger.
Q. So that there is no doubt that this $957,000
of accounts receivable was part of the $2,400,000
accounts receivable which appears in the statement
annexed to Plaintiff's Exhibit A? A. That is so.
Mr. Marshall: There is no question about
that.

1350

Q. Is there anything else on this Schedule 1
which you have not testified to? A. There are certain comments which appear. Those comments are
all based upon my examination of the individual
customer's accounts. That is, in some instances,
I find transactions during the same month, with
this customer on the regular terms, that is, on the
usual terms as shown in the ledger account itself,
and as shown by this schedule.
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Mr. Podell: I offer Schedule No. 1 and
Schedule No. 2 in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: I object, your Honor.
The Court: Why?
Mr. Marshall: On the ground in the first
place that I have not had a chance to check
them up.
Mr. Podell: Take them subject to any correction as to figures that counsel wishes to
make.
Mr. Marshall: And in the second place,
I object to them because they are based upon
books of Stern's which have not been identified as being in the condition that they were
in at the time that we made the audit.
The Court: Yes. I will take them subject to the first stipulation and subject to
their correctness.
Mr. Podell: The checking up as to the
figures.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
The Court: Yes, and I overrule the objection.

1351
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(Schedule No. 1 was received in evidence
and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 79.)
(Schedule No. 2 was received in evidence
and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 80.)
Q. Now, will you turn to the United Baltic
Corporation account. In the statement that you
made with respect to Schedule 2, correction of inventory, you referred to instances where merchandise had been bought by Stern, had been sold by
him and he had credited himself with accounts receivable therefor, but had failed to make an entry
of moneys that he owed for the purchase of that
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merchandise. Do you recall those instances? A.
There are certain technical things in your question that are incorrect,—had not credited himself
with accounts receivable—he had entered the account receivable on his book.
Q. That is a credit to himself, it adds to his
assets then? A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. My technical knowledge in accounting is surely bad. Do you know what instance I refer to? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, do you find—I say, first finding such
a condition with regard to inventory; what would
1355 have been your attitude with respect to all purchases and all sales and accounts receivable in
connection with any audit? A. I would have been
on the lookout for similar items, for suppressed purchased invoices; that is, for invoices covering merchandise that had been purchased, which were
omitted from the records. I would have been on
guard against that.
Q. Now, have you made such an examination
with regard to the accounts, the accounts payable
particularly? A. I have examined the United
Baltic account in the accounts payable ledger.
Q. Now you tell us about that. A. I might say
that prior to doing that I examined the Touche,
Niven Co. working paper relating to accounts pay1356
able.
Q. All right. Let me ask you this question with
regard to the Touche-Niven working paper relating
to accounts payable on the United Baltic account.
Did you find something in their own working papers that aroused your suspicion with regard to
the account; just tell the jury what their own working papers show with regard to that account?
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Mr. Marshall: What page?
Mr. Podell: May I have that original,
please. What one is that?
The Court: He is trying to locate it,
Mr. Marshall: We do not know the page.
The Witness: Pages 108, 109 and 110.
Mr. Podell: All right. Will you let me
have the originals of those papers. Will it
be stipulated as to whose handwriting they
are in, Mr. Marshall?
The Witness: And also page 171.
Mr. Marshall: Either Towell's or Siess'.
Mr. Podell: And the first being the senior
and the second the junior accountant; is that
right?
Mr. Marshall: That is in the record.
Mr. Podell: Next, what page?
The Witness : Page 171.
Mr. Podell: And may it appear, your
Honor, that these originals are produced
from the files of Touche, Niven & Co., the
defendant; that is, not being in our possession at any time.
The Court: Yes.
Q. Will you talk about them and tell us what
you found on your own working? A. Pages 109
and 110 are headed "Accounts payable" and appear to be a schedule of the open balances in the
accounts payable ledger, in the individual accounts
in that subsidiary ledger, and included in that
list——
Q. Have you another photostat of that by any
chance? A. I have not.
Mr. Podell: Have you another photostat ?
There is no other photostat, your Honor.
We will do the best we can to follow.

1357

1358

1359

454
1360

Saul Levy—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

Q. Go ahead, Mr. Levy. A. Next to the last item
in that alphabetically arranged list, is the United
Baltic Corporation, a debit balance of $.113,199.60,
and alongside of that amount, a notation "Sterling
deposits for future purchases".
Q. "Sterling deposits for future purchases"? A.
Yes, sir, and on page 171, at the very bottom, which
is headed "Notes", at the very bottom of that page
is the notation "United Baltic debit balance in
accounts payable". Then there is a question mark,
and then alongside of it "O. K."
1361

Mr. Podell: This is the item he is referring to (indicating to the jury).
Q. What was the other item on 171?
last item on this page.

A. The

Mr. Podell: Have you seen this last item?
(pointing out to the jury).

1362

Q. There is a debit balance? A. Yes, sir.
Q. In "accounts payable" a question mark? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. And then "O. K."? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Well, now, what did you make of that? A.
I referred to the ledger account in the accounts
payable ledger
Q. Pardon me, what is generally and commonly
understood by the words "debit balance"; what
does it mean? A. The debit balance generally?
Q. Yes. A. In a case of this sort, a debit balance would mean that account owes us money. A
credit balance would mean that we owe them
money.
Q. These were the work sheets of the accounts
payable? A. Yes, sir.
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Q. They were the work sheets of accounts that
Stern owed to other people? A. Apparently the
accountants question that.
Q. The accountants question the item which indicated that some one of those buyers or sellers
owed Stern money; is that it? A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Marshall: I object to "apparently
the accountants questioned that".
Mr. Podell: They did.
The Court: In accordance with their indication marked there.
Mr. Marshall: He says there is "O. K."
which shows that they investigated and satisfied it.
The Court: That is there too.
Mr. Marshall: They should not leave the
impression that they left the thing with a
question in their mind, because there is the
"O. K." following that question mark.
Mr. Podell : I want to point out that O.
K. following that. I pointed out the question mark first and then the O. K.
Mr. Marshall : It shows they questioned
it.
Mr. Podell: Not so much the question
mark.
The Court: What does the "O. K." disclose; that is what I am waiting to hear?
Mr. Podell: The O. K. undoubtedly means
that they passed the item as regular.
The Witness: I think I can answer that
from their working papers. From their
working papers it would appear that they
accepted that item as an asset, because they
transferred that account from accounts pay-
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able and included it with their trade accounts receivable and included it in their
balance sheet as an asset.
Mr. Marshall: All right.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. What did you find with respect to that?
Referring to the ledger account—

1367

1368

A.

The Court: What is wrong about that,
before you go any further?
Mr. Podell: I do not know whether we
have made it quite clear. These are the work
sheets of accounts payable, am I right?
The Court: That is right.
The Witness: Yes, sir.
Mr. Podell: In among them they found
an account receivable from somebody.
The Court: Right.
Mr. Podell: From whom they would buy
merchandise and their work sheet shows that
they questioned that item, and then O. K.'d
it; that is as far as we have gotten right now.
The Court: He has gone further than
that.
Mr. Podell: What did your Honor understand him to say after that.
The Court: I know what I have got in
my mind.
Mr. Marshall: You are putting the Court
on the witness stand.
The Court: Up to that irregularity having trouble by getting an account which
made it practically an asset, there was something wrong in addition to that.
Mr. Podell: We do not complain about
that. What we complain about just now is,
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if that item were a regular item, if the
United Baltic really owed Stern $113,000.,
that they followed the proper procedure;
that is to say, instead of having it as a Sterling Deposit, they entered it as an account
receivable due to Stern, and that is what we
complain of, and the reasons for it I was
about to tell you.
The Court: Let us have the reason.
Q. Am I right in my statement? A. I think
so.
Q. Go ahead. A. My next step was to examine
that account in the accounts payable ledger.
Q. First, is it an unusual thing to find among
the accounts payable, an advance of $113,000 which
that would seem to indicate by way of a deposit for
future purchases? A. It is an item which always
calls for explanation. Ordinarily the people we
buy merchandise from do not ordinarily owe us
money. Ordinarily the balance is the other way.
Q. Yes. Now then, go ahead and tell us what
you did. You examined the accounts of the United
Baltic? A. And I found
Mr. Marshall: Before you found it, may
I see that account.
The Witness: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: What are the items of the
United Baltic (referring to accounts with
the witness)?
The Witness: There (indicating).
Mr. Podell: I think we would all like to
be taken into this private conference.
Mr. Marshall: I am just asking him to
show me what it is. I make the same objec-
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tion, with regard to any reference to this
book, your Honor.
The Court: The same ruling.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.

1373

Q. You go on. A. These accounts with the United
Baltic Corporation show that at the end of 1923,
there was a debit balance in that account of
$113,199.60 in this account. It also shows that the
United Baltic Corporation were people from whom
Stern bought merchandise, because the credits of
this account relate to shipments of merchandise, invoice numbers and steamship references; whereas, the debits relate to letters of credit and cash
drafts and remittances, clearly indicating that they
were an account from whom we bought merchandise, and not an account to whom we sold merchandise.
Q. And do you know that it is not quite customary for people to pay in advance before merchandise is delivered, is it?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
Q. I think that is a fair question.
The Court: I will allow that.

1374

Q. Particularly when the letters of credit explain it? A. I would say it is rather unusual.
Q. You go ahead and explain it in your own
way. A. That is the condition of affairs as shown
by the ledger, and I would have investigated that
item further, particularly in view of the fact that
there were already other instances of items of purchase invoices that had been omitted. This would
suggest to me the possibility of cash having been
paid to these people for merchandise which they
had received and the invoices were omitted; that
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is, there was the failure, the omission to credit this
account with invoices; and I will say that in connection with any audit or examination of accounts,
any large debit balance in an accounts payable account especially if it results from cash payments,
would be investigated by the accountant from that
standpoint. He would want to make certain.
Q. You mean it would be the normal thing to do,
and that it should be done? A. Yes, sir, and in this
instance of course it would have to be done without
question because other instances of the omission of
purchase invoices had already been discovered as
disclosed in the working papers of Touche, Niven
& Co.
Q. Purchase invoices; by purchase invoices, the
omission of purchase invoices, you mean the omission to enter it in the book what Stern owed for
the merchandise which he had already purchased
and sold? A. Exactly, failed to credit the shipper.
Q. What would have been the most direct and
effective way of finding out whether there were
$113,000 due to the United Baltic, or whether Stern
owed the United Baltic Corporation? A. To communicate directly with the United Baltic Corporation, to tell them that the book showed they owed
this amount to Stern, and ask them to confirm it.
Q. Is there the same delicacy with communicating with a concern that you buy from as with a
similar concern to whom you sell? A. There is not,
I might say I would also have asked for a statement
from this creditor, but I doubt whether I would
have accepted that statement as final, even if it
had been submitted to me; I probably would have
insisted upon the direct communication in any case,
owing to the other circumstances and owing to the
very large amount represented here $113,000.
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Q. Now then, from these very books, have you
been able to tell after investigation, what the real
condition was as of December 31st? A. I did not
investigate that one, Mr. Podell.
Q. This investigation was made by Mr. Djorup
from these books? A. So I have been told.

1379

1380

Mr. Marshall: What investigation? I do
not get the sense of that question.
The Court: As to whether or not this was
as indicated here, a fact, whether it was a
credit or debit, whether it was really investigated by somebody.
Mr. Podell: Yes. Perhaps to save time,
we are willing to stipulate not only such
statement that Stern, or rather the United
Baltic, owed Stern $113,000 odd—not only
is that false, but that as a matter of fact,
Stern owed to the United Baltic as of December 31, $258,288.20.
Mr. Marshall: Did the books show it
when you audited it?
The Court: What is that?
Mr. Marshall: Did the books show it
when we audited it.
Mr. Limburg: Yes.
Mr. Podell: If you want me to answer
that question, I will tell you just what Mr.
Levy has just said, if you had done the
proper thing under the circumstances and
checked it up, it would undoubtedly have
shown that was the case. Let us show it the
regular way then. Let me have the invoices,
Mr. Djorup.
Mr. Marshall: I take it the witness's testimony as to Mr. Djorup's investigation is
not part of this record, you do not allow
that?
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The Court: No.
Mr. Podell: Did your Honor strike out
something?
The Court: To the effect that Mr. Djorup
has made an investigation, so he had been
told.
Q. Have you finished your statement as to the
United Baltic? A. Yes, sir.
Q. I thought you wanted to add something. Now
one more group of items— A. There was in connection with this account of the United Baltic, there
is one other observation that I made in examining
the account, and that is the balances during the
year were small in amount, and not until November of 1923 did this large debit balance appear.
That is, it developed in the accounts at the end of
the year. Prior to that time, the account was
almost in balance regularly. There was a small
balance one way or the other. I had these figures
before me.
Q. If you have the items again, will you state
them so that the jury will understand it accurately?
Mr. Marshall: Same objection and exception.
The Court: Same ruling.
A. These ledger accounts indicate that on December 31, 1922, there was a $27 debit balance.
Then $27.61 January 31st.
Q. You mean by that, that the United Baltic
owed—I would rather you put it that way—owed
Stern $27.64? A. Yes, that would mean that the
account was substantially in balance. There may
have been some little adjustment that was still
open.
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Q. And in January 1923? A. There was a credit
balance. Stern owed United Baltic $68.48. At
the end of February, Stern owed United Baltic,
$68.48. March 31, a debit balance of $397.79.
April 30, a debit balance of $67.27. May 31, a credit
balance
Q. $84.96? A. That April 30 was a debit balance.
May 31 a credit balance of $84.96. June 30th
Q. Pardon me a minute. Will you take the
months of May, June, July, September and October. Were they all balances in favor of United
Baltic, credit balances? A. Small balances in
favor.
Q. In favor of the United Baltic; that is, that
Stern owed the United Baltic $84, $1,137, $21, $10,
$276, for the month of October? A. Yes, sir, those
are round figures.
Q. Yes, I have not mentioned the pennies. But
that has been the run of that account for that
year? A. Yes, sir, but at the end of November, the
ledger account shows a debit balance of $83,017.11,
and at the end of December, as I have already
stated, a debit balance of $113,000 odd.
The Court: In favor of Stern?
The Witness: A debit balance which
would mean in favor of Stern. That is what
it indicates to me.
Mr. Marshall: The same objection as to
what it indicates to him.
The Court: I will allow it. This is expert testimony?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Witness: It indicates to me—this
debit balance was a recent thing, something
that came up right at the very end of the
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year, something new, that it was not in accordance with
The Court: The general run of business?
A. (Continuing) The general run of business,
not merely for the year, but with that concern for
the year, so of course that would be an additional
reason for inquiring into the thing.
The Court: Now, have we finished with
Baltic?
Mr. Podell: I think we are, your Honor.
I think I will have to continue with the
balance of the Baltic with the other witness.

1388

Q. Now, did you make any further check up on
these books, with regard to their condition? A.
Yes, sir, I looked into the situation with reference
to assigned accounts receivable. The balance sheet,
the certified balance sheet, indicated that there was
some $900,000 worth of assigned accounts.
Q. That is Plaintiff's Exhiibt 1? A. Yes, sir.
The Court: $900,000?
The Witness: Nine hundred thousand
and something. I have not that before me.
May I have a copy of that?
The Court: Pledged as collateral to acceptances; is that what you mean?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right.
The Witness: Included among the assets.
Q. Pardon me, before we come to that, if you do
not mind; what did you find with regard to the—
is it customary in making an audit of this character
to look into overdue accounts and so forth? A.
Yes, sir.
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Q. Did Touche-Niven in their work sheets pay
any attention to that, do you know? A. Oh, yes,
they did.
Q. And what did that show with regard to the
general condition of the business, reliability of it?
I mean, as far as these accounts that they had, accounts receivable? A. It showed a vast amount of
accounts that were past due, a large proportion. I
have the exact figures.
Q. Give us the figures. How long were they overdue? A. Various periods.
1391

1392

The Court: What do you want to say,
Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Marshall: I was going to suggest
maybe if he went to the work sheets he would
get it faster.
The Witness: I have a summary of the
work sheets. I was going to use that.
Mr. Marshall: Will you tell us which
work sheet you are referring to then, please?
The Witness: Yes, sir. I have it. Pages
59 to 64 inclusive?
Q. Just tabulate, if you please, the total amount
of accounts receivable and the total amounts that
were overdue, and from what period to what period
they were overdue? A. These working sheets of
Touche-Niven indicate that there was on December 31st, 1923 overdue accounts aggregating
$781,669.72. That of those accounts—those accounts they classified, those overdue accounts they
classified as follows: Under three months $173,558.23. Three to six months, $28,000
Q. Overdue? A. These are all overdue accounts.
Three to six months, $28,241.87.
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Q. I did not get that figure? A. $28,241.87. Six
to twelve months, $28,565.68. One year and over,
$551,303.94, making the total of $781,000 approximately—$781,700.
Q. What is the total that is overdue? A. That
is the figure I have just read, $781,669.72.
Mr. Marshall: Did I understand you to
say overdue accounts?
The Court: Yes. That is what he said,
781,000 overdue.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, if you deduct that, plus the
fictitious accounts receivable from the total accounts receivable, how much in accounts receivable
did he have that were not overdue nor fictitious?
A. He would have $391,692.50.
Q. What is the original figure that he had there?
A. What original figure?
Q. What figure did he have in this statement?
You say he had about three hundred and odd thousand? A. The balance sheet would show that,
Q. I mean the statement shows that he figured
$2,461,000? A. $2,461,000 against which they set
up a reserve of $427,000.
Q. The reserve is $427,000? A. So they showed
a net balance in the accounts of over $2,000,000.
The Court: And from that you are deducting the $781,000 and the other accounts
receivable, amounting to how much?
Mr. Podell: The admittedly fictitious accounts receivable
Mr. Marshall: What do you mean, admittedly fictitious?
Mr. Podell: I withdraw the word "admittedly". It is not quite admitted.
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The Witness: These working sheets show
that there were total accounts at that time
which they analyzed, amounting to $2,130,679.35. Now, out of that total, if I do as
you requested, if I deduct from that total the
$957,317.07
Q. Fictitious accounts? A. And the past due accounts of $781,669.72, that would leave a balance
of only $391,692.56.

1397
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Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I do
not think it is proper to make this tabulation, to deduct the overdue accounts after
deducting the reserve, the doubtful accounts.
The Witness: No. I am making my calculation on a basis of gross accounts. I am
not referring to the balance sheet. I am referring to the work sheets. There were other
adjustments.
The Court: He said he was figuring on
gross accounts.
Mr. Marshall: There was a reserve set
up in making his tabulation.
Mr. Podell: The witness is doing that
very thing.
Mr. Marshall: I did not understand he
was doing so.
Mr. Podell: That is your misunderstanding. He is just doing that very thing.
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, when you find a situation
such as you have described, fictitious accounts receivable, what would be your inference from your
experience, as to the solvency or insolvency of the
particular concern under investigation; aside from
any figures, when people omit to enter bills that
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are payable, in a number of instances? A. You
always look for a reason. You always suspect
things. You have to look for them. You have to
look further into the situation. Where there is
smoke, there is usually
Q. Would you not at least have a real suspicion
as to their solvency, as to their having any money
at all? A. Oh, certainly.
Q. Now, with that suspicion in your mind, in
the normal course of things, looking at these assigned accounts, will you please explain to the jury
what you find, and in this instance I want you to
be particularly careful, particularly careful to
point out to the jury what Touche-Niven did and
what they knew; you understand what I mean?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. At the time when you made this same examination ; and so far as you can, point it out by the
written instruments that you have, the originals?

1399

1400

The Court: They are working sheets you
are referring to?
Mr. Podell: More than that. More than
that, your Honor. I would rather have that
come from the witness, with your Honor's
permission. I do not mean to be abrupt, but
I would rather get it from the witness.
A. These working sheets, pages 61 to 64, indicate
that Touche-Niven went through the customer's
accounts and analyzed them as to due dates, and
there is also a column which is marked "assigned",
part of these work sheets; and that column totals
up $903,285.83, which appears to be, which is exactly the amount that they show in Exhibit 1, as
accounts receivable pledged as collateral to acceptances.
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Q. That is, it is included as accounts receivable
pledged as collateral, in this statement signed and
certified to by them? A. Yes, sir.
Q. $903,285? A. So evidently, in connection with
their audit, they—they, Touche-Niven, evidently
sought to verify the fact that these accounts were
assigned, and the amount of the assigned accounts.
Q. What makes you say that? A. Because they
stated in the balance sheet which they certified to
and their working sheets show—
Q. What do their working sheets show? A.
Their working sheets show the individual accounts
which were assigned, numerous items which total
the exact amount which appears in the balance
sheet.
Q. So that they were working on the assigned
accounts; there is no doubt about that? A. No
question about that, from this work sheet,
Mr. Marshall: Is there any objection to
having the jury look at these working sheets?
Mr. Podell: Certainly not.
The Court: Not at all (showing to jury).
The Witness: Now, in this column, which
is headed "assigned", is included the amount,
and alongside of it, to the right, is a number in parenthesis, the explanation

1404

Q. What page are you speaking of? A. I am referring to page 61, the first page of this detailed
schedule.
Mr. Marshall: The first broad page.
Q. What item are you speaking of? A. I am
referring to the column headed "Assigned"; it is
the last column to the right.
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Q. What appears there, do you say? A. The
amount of the account assigned, and alongside of it
to the right appears a number in parentheses.
Q. Yes. A. The meaning of that number is indicated in a little table which appears at the top of
the working sheet. Each number indicates some
bank or some creditor firm.
Q. No. 7 is the Chemical National, No. 4 is the
Huth & Company, No. 8 the Metropolitan Trust,
No. 9 Central Trust, No. 14 J. B. Moors, 16 Bank
of New York? A. Yes. That is a sort of key to
these numbers, the number indicating the assignee,
the person to whom the account was assigned. Looking through the working sheets of Touche-Niven,
I find that they wrote to various banks and wrote
to various creditors, asking them whether they held
any accounts.
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Mr. Podell: Will you produce the letters,
please?
Mr. Marshall: They are produced (handing to counsel).
Q. I hand you certain letters which are produced.
The Court: Are they in evidence?
Mr. Marshall: They are part of the working papers, I believe.
Mr. Podell: I offer them in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: They are in evidence.
Mr. Podell: Are they part of the working
papers?
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Podell: I ask for the production of
the replies to those letters.

1407

470
1408

Saul Levy—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

Mr. Marshall: Are the replies there?
The Witness: I do not think so. That is
what I was looking for.
Mr. Podell: I would like to have all the
replies, if you please.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Now, these are letters checking up from these
banks and creditors as to whether or not they are
the holders of certain assignments of accounts, is
that right? A. Yes, sir.
1409

Mr. Marshall: Let us read the letters.
They are in evidence. I think they ought to
speak for themselves.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: I will be glad to read one.
Mr. Marshall: Read one form. You do
not have to read them all.
Q. I assume this was on the letterhead of ToucheNiven, was it?

1410

Mr. Marshall: I think so.
(Letter read to jury.)
Mr. Podell: This particular one is February 15th, 1924. It is signed by ToucheNiven and then it is countersigned. Who
countersigned, do you know, Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Marshall: I do not know who countersigned it. I understand Stern did.
Mr. Podell:
Stern countersigned it.
Signed by Touche-Niven.
Now then, you have the answers received?
Mr. Marshall: They are already in evidence.
Mr. Podell: Just pass them up to Mr.
Levy, if you will, please.
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Mr. Marshall: They are scattered throughout these work sheets attached to various
schedules, so you probably have to turn to
several of them to find all the letters.
Mr. Podell: Will you be good enough to
pick out J. B. Moors' letter of December
31st?
Mr. Marshall: It is in those papers.
Mr. Podell: Will you state on the record
what answer you would like to see to those
letters?
The Witness: Well, I examined photostat copies of the replies received from Huth
& Company, and that from William Brandt's
Sons, Bingham & Company, agents.

1411
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Q. Have you got those replies? A. I think I can
locate those.
Q. You have these photostats, have you? A. Yes,
sir. Shall I use the originals or the photostats?
Q. Well, use the originals, if you have them there.
Mr. Marshall: If he could use the photostats, I could follow him.
Mr. Podell: All right. Use whichever
you prefer, whichever will help you most.
Mr. Marshall: What page are you going
to refer to?
The Witness: I have a letter; it is page
6, a letter dated January 18th, 1924.
Mr. Podell: I would like to mark that
separately in evidence.
The Witness: From Huth & Company.
Mr. Podell: May we mark that separately
in evidence, your Honor?
The Court: Yes.
The Witness: That consists of two pages.

1413

472
1414

Saul Levy—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

And another letter from Huth & Company,
dated January 31st, 1924, consisting of four
pages, marked pages 8 to 11, inclusive.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, may I read those
letters?
The Witness: And there is one more.
Mr. Podell: And that is from Huth &
Company?
The Witness: Yes.
By Mr.
1415

Podell.

Q. Do those letters of January 18th, January
31st, those letters, do they indicate the accounts
that Huth & Company claimed to have had assigned to them from Fred Stern & Company? A.
Yes, sir, they do. They give lists of those accounts.
Q. They give long lists of those accounts? A.
The accounts they claim to be assigned to them.
Q. Have you got any letters from any other people besides Huth & Company? A. I have a letter
from Bingham & Company, letter dated January
12th, 1924.
Q. Tell us what page that is? A. That is page
99 and 100.
Mr. Podell: May I have that letter please,
99 to 100 (handed).

1416
Q. And does that letter from Bingham & Company give lists of the accounts that Stern assigned
to them? A. Yes, sir, it does.
Q. And all those communications we have spoken
of purport at least to be answers to this form letter
of inquiry that I read to the jury? A. They appear
to be, yes, sir. They are all in the working sheets.
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Mr. Podell: Mark the two letters from
Huth & Company separately, please.
(Received in evidence and marked respectively Plaintiff's Exhibits 81 and 82.)
Mr. Podell: Now then, the letter from
Bingham will be marked Plaintiff's Exhibit
83.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 83.)
Q. Now, were there any other letters that you
wanted to call attention to that came in in answer
to this inquiry? A. No, sir. Those are the two
letters that I worked on.
Mr. Podell: Now, these letters, let the
record show, are in the files which have been
in the possession of Touche, Niven & Company and are produced now by them. The
originals have never been in our possession;
and addressed to Touche, Niven & Company.
Mr. Marshall: Part of our work sheets.
Mr. Podell: And embraced in part of
your work sheets, so I take it it will be conceded they were brought to the attention of
Touche, Niven & Company?
Mr. Marshall: Certainly was.
Q. Will you be good enough to tell us what you
find on a comparison of those letters from Huth
and Bingham? A. I prepared a schedule of the accounts which Huth & Company claim were assigned
to them on December 31st, and the schedule of the
accounts which Bingham claimed were assigned to
them, and then I compared those accounts with the
information contained on the work sheets of

1418
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Touche-Niven, to see what the record showed with
respect to those accounts. I also examined the customer's ledger, to see if there was any indication
there, any record there of the assignee of the account. I found such a record in each customer's
account. I have tabulated all of that information
in comparative form.
Q. Now, will you give us that tabulation, what
you found?

1421
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Mr. Marshall: I object to this again in so
far as it is based on books not identified, on
books of Stern unidentified any further than
heretofore.
The Court: You mean, on the original objection?
Mr. Marshall: On the original objection,
yes, sir.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
The Court: Not on the tabulation itself,
but on the books?
Mr. Marshall: The tabulation I am perfectly willing to take, subject to checking up.
The Court: Yes.
The Witness : I find
Q. How many accounts were there altogether,
first? A. These two letters of Huth & Company
and Bingham & Company, related in all to forty-one
invoices which either one or the other claimed had
been assigned to them.
Q. Yes. A. I compared this information, compared Huth's list with Bingham's list, compared
both lists with the information I found in the customer's ledger, and also with the information found
on Touche-Niven's working papers.
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Q. Yes. A. And that information presented
many conflicts. That is, it showed that out of the
forty-one invoices, six invoices were assigned once,
but twenty-seven invoices were assigned twice. By
that, I mean there was a record of an assignment
to two different parties in the case of twenty-seven
invoices.
Q. Of these forty-one accounts? A. Yes, sir. And
seven of them appeared to be assigned three times,
and one of them four times.
Q. When you say appeared to be assigned three
times, you mean to three different concerns, as collateral? A. Yes, sir.
Q. The same account? A. Yes, sir.
Q. No question about it being the identical account and assigned twice and three times and four
times? A. Yes, sir. I can be more specific.
Q. You must be, please. A. And indicate just
what I mean.
Q. Yes. A. There was the invoice of December
1st, customer's name was Murray Rubber Company; the amount of that invoice was——
Q. Pardon me. What date did you say? A. December 1st, 1923.
Q. To the Murray Rubber Company? A. To the
Murray Rubber Company.
Q. Does that appear on schedule 3 of your report? A. Yes, sir. It is the seventh item down.
Q. Yes. A. Murray Rubber Company, $12,821.30.
Huth & Company claimed it was assigned to them.
Bingham & Company claimed
Q. I would like you to state again, December 1st,
Murray Rubber Company, $12,821.30 is the amount
of the account due from the Murray Rubber Company, presumably, is that right? A. Yes, sir. Huth
& Company claimed it was assigned to them. Bingham & Company claimed it was assigned to them.
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Q. Now, wait a moment, Stop right there. You
say Huth & Company claimed it was assigned to
them. Did it make that claim in that very letter
that has been marked in evidence? A. Yes, sir.
That is the source of all my information.
Q. Did it make any claim in that very letter addressed to Touche-Niven that that $12,821.30 had
been assigned to them as collateral? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did Bingham & Company make the same
claim, that that same account had been assigned
to them, and did it make it in that letter addressed
to Touche-Niven? A. Yes, sir.
1427

1428

A Juror: What were the dates of these
two assignments?
Q. Give the dates of those assignments as claimed
by these people? A. I haven't the date of the assignment, I have just the information, the date of
the invoice, and the fact they claimed they were
still holding it as an assigned account on December
31, 1923.
Q. No question about that now. I would like to
explain that to the juror. The inquiry that was
sent out by Touche-Niven asked for the state of the
assigned accounts as of December 31st, did it? A.
Exactly.
Q. And the answers that came in from these people made the claim that that money shall belong to
them as an assigned account, both Huth and Bingham, made the same claim as of December 31st?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. No doubt about that? A. No, sir.
Q. And both these letters were addressed to
Touche-Niven, were they not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you go along and finish the rest of that.
A. Both Touche-Niven working papers and the
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ledger account in this instance, indicated that the
account was assigned to the Central Trust & Savings Company.
Q. In other words, Touche-Niven working papers showed an assignment to still a third party?
A. Yes, sir.
The Court: Of that December 1st account?
The Witness: Of that same December 1st
invoice.
Q. And the ledger showed an assignment to
whom? A. In this instance to the Central Trust &
Savings Company, the same as Touche-Niven.
Q. So that neither Huth & Company nor Bingham were entered in the books as assignees of that
account? A. Exactly.

1430

Mr. Marshall: I do not think he can say
that.
Q. As of December 31st anyway?
tered in the ledger.
Q. In the ledger, I mean.

A. Were en-

Mr. Marshall: May I have my same general objection and exception?
The Court: Yes.
Q. Go along and give us the other items referred
to in those letters? A. I was in the midst of my
summary, I merely gave this as a specific instance
of what I meant.
Q. I am sorry. A. So of these 41 invoices which
are covered by the letters from Huth & Company
and Bingham & Company
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Q. Pardon me. Did I understand you correctly
that besides this one of $12,821.30, there were other
accounts which Huth & Bingham both claimed belonged to them on December 31, 1923; am I right
in that? A. There was one other such account.
Q. Which other was that? A. There was a two
cents difference there in the papers, but the ledger
would indicate that it was the same account.
December 26, Hood Rubber Company, Huth &
Company claimed an account assigned to them,
$5,921.83. Bingham & Company claimed an account of the same date, from the Hood Rubber
Company, of $5,921.85.
Q. You have verified it, have you not? A. There
was only one such invoice.
Q. Of December 26th? A. Yes, sir.
Q. That was contained in both the letters, both
in Huth & Company and Bingham & Company?
A. That was contained in both the letters, yes, sir.
Q. What did the books say about that? A. The
Touche-Niven working papers showed that it was
assigned to J. B. Moors & Company.
Q. Do you happen to know where Touche-Niven
working papers got that information from, that it
had been assigned to J. B. Moors & Company? A.
I cannot say.
Q. What did the customer's ledger show it to be
assigned? A. Assigned to the Chemical National
Bank.
Q. So that altogether between the two letters,
the Touche-Niven working papers, and the customer's ledger account, the same account of $5,900,
on the same date, December 31st, appeared to belong to four different concerns as collateral? A.
Four conflicting claims, yes, sir.
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Mr. Marshall: I object to his saying four
conflicting claims. I move to strike out the
word "conflicting".
The Court: Strike it out. Answer the
question.
Q. Four different concerns, is that right? A.
There is a record of four different concerns as the
assignee of this one invoice.
The Court:

That is the answer.

Q. In coming to that conclusion, did you use one
single bit of paper more than was used or must have
been used by Touche, Niven & Company in this
audit?

1436

Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
Mr. Podell: I will withdraw it and put
it in this form.
Q. Tell us, in arriving at the assignee, according to the customer's ledger, did you look at the
customer's ledger? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you looked at that account of the Hood
Rubber Company for that date? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, there is no doubt in your mind, is there,
from the working papers that Touche, Niven & Company in making the audit, looked at and used the
customer's ledger?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling
for a conclusion.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. Do the working papers of Touche, Niven &
Co. show that they must have examined the customer's ledger?
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: I still sustain the objection.
Mr. Podell: I am going to ask your
Honor's help to frame the appropriate question.
The Court: The papers speak for themselves as a comparison. In other words, if
on the work sheets there is an indication
which shows there was an extraction taken
from the particular part of the book, of
course that has got to be shown as a fact. It
may be entirely different, another proposition.
Q. Tell me, these are the work sheets of ToucheNiven, are they not (handing to witness)? Are
those the work sheets; are they? A. I am told that
they are.
Q. Mr. Marshall admits that.
Mr. Marshall: We offered them in evidence, or somebody offered them in evidence.
The Witness: I used photostat copies.

1440

Q. At the head of that work sheet there I see key
numbers 7, 8, 9, and so forth, giving the names of
the banks? A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was the book from which that information was taken? A. I cannot say; I don't know.
Q. Now, in any event, you can tell us what books
or documents you used in order to arrive at the information you have just given us? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And those are what? A. I used the letter
from Huth, the letter from Bingham.
Q. The letter addressed to Touche, Niven & Co.,
of which you had a photostat? A. Yes, sir.
Q. The letter from Bingham & Company addressed to Touche, Niven & Co., of which you had a
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photostat? A. Yes, sir. I used these working sheets
of Touche-Niven.
Q. Of Touche, Niven & Co. and— A. And the customer's ledger.
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out that
answer, referring to books which have not
been identified.
The Court: You do not need any more
exceptions on that, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall: All right. If your Honor
says I am covered on that, I am perfectly
satisfied.
The Court: You have enough. We will
not consider it waived hereafter. To any
reference that is made to these books, you
have a clear objection and exception. I give
you a general objection and exception on
those books which the Court has thus far
permitted and as to all books which the
Court permits reference to, as to extracts
therefrom. That will cover it,
Mr. Marshall: That will save me from
doing this again.
The Court: That saves you the trouble of
making a specific objection and taking an
exception each time.
(Adjourned until Monday, April 8th,
1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.)
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